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CENTER FOR RESEARCH OF MODERN AND
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY TUZLA



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15

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PREDGOVOR

U petnaestom broju časopisa *Historijski pogledi*, objavljeni su historijski radovi, koji se bave raznovrsnim temama iz novije historije. Autori radova, su iz Bosne i Hercegovine i iz nekoliko europskih država. Ono što karakteriše ovaj broj časopisa, jesu raznovrsne i aktuelne teme, te radovi nastali na bogatoj historiografskoj osnovi, pri čemu dominiraju arhivski dokumenti, na osnovu kojih su nastali vrijedni historijski sadržaji koji se po prvi puta prezentuju naučnoj javnosti.

Člancima i prilogima petnaestog broja časopisa *Historijski pogledi*, nastoji se dati doprinos historiografiji, otvarajući prostor za naučni dijalog o složenim društvenim, političkim, kulturnim i institucionalnim procesima na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine, Balkana i šire. Navedeni broj časopisa *Historijski pogledi*, donosi devetnaest naučnih radova raspoređenih u poglavlju *Članci*, pet prikaza recentnih historiografskih publikacija, te jedan izvještaj sa naučnog skupa. Radovi u ovom broju, zasnovani na raznovrsnoj arhivskoj građi i različitim metodološkim pristupima, obuhvataju širok hronološki raspon od 16. stoljeća pa sve do savremenih političkih i društvenih kretanja na početku 21. stoljeća.

Prvi dio radova rubrike *Članci* fokusiran je na rano novovjekovlje i osmansko razdoblje, donoseći historijske sadržaje koji osvjetljavaju urbanu, vojnu, demografsku i plemensku historiju jugoistočne Evrope. Prvo poglavlje časopisa otvara rad Elme Korić i Muamera Hodžića, koji analizira osmanski model nastanka i razvoja gradskih četvrti na primjeru Kalin hadži Alijine mahale u Sarajevu tokom 16. i 17. stoljeća. Autori detaljno rekonstruišu prostorni razvoj i društvenu strukturu ove mahale, nudeći vrijedan uvid u mehanizme urbanizacije bosanskih gradova u osmanskom periodu. Na ovu analizu nadovezuje se rad turskih autora Onura Šena i Sibel Akova, koji je posvećen Matrakčići Nasuhu, svestranom geniju 16. vijeka. Autori valorizuju njegov doprinos kao vojnog polihistora, kartografa, minijaturiste i matematičara, osvjetljavajući intelektualne i tehnološke domete osmanskog društva na vrhuncu njegove moći.

Pomjerajući težište ka sjevernim i zapadnim dijelovima balkanskog prostora, Luan Tetaj u svom radu istražuje kretanja i migracije plemena Keljmendi u periodu od 1702. do 1707. godine. Ovaj rad doprinosi boljem razumijevanju unutrašnjih dinamika unutar plemenskih struktura na tromedi današnjih država Albanije, Kosova i Crne Gore, te njihovih odnosa sa centralnim osmanskim vlastima u kriznim vremenima s početka 18. vijeka. Demografskim i administrativnim aspektima osmanske uprave bavi se i Mead Osmani, koji na osnovu osmanskog popisnog deftera iz 1831. godine analizira strukturu stanovništva Nahije Masurica. Korištenjem primarnih izvora, autor donosi precizne podatke o socijalnoj i demografskoj slici ovog područja u periodu neposredno pred velike administrativne reforme u Osmanskom Carstvu.

Drugi dio obuhvata kasni osmanski period, devetnaesto stoljeće, te procese modernizacije, nacionalnih pokreta i imperijalnih utjecaja na Balkanu. Institucionalnim i pravnim okvirima bave se Muhamet Lama i Bashkim Rrahmani u radu o albanskim ejaletima Skadru i Janjini tokom 18. i 19. vijeka, analizirajući nivoe autonomije i pravne specifičnosti ovih provincija u kontekstu uspostave centralizacijske vlasti Visoke Porte nad ovim provincijama. Kulturološku i medijsku perspektivu kasnog osmanskog društva donose Elçin Gün Canik i Mehmet Yavuz Erler kroz analizu osmanskog smisla za humor u karikaturama s balkanskim motivima, pokazujući kako se kroz satiru i crtež artikulirao specifičan oblik patriotizma u osmnskom društvu tog vremena.

Uloga stranih sila u oblikovanju balkanskih prilika obrađena je u radu Bendis Kraja, u kojem se analizira austrougarski doprinos razvoju i standardizaciji albanskog jezika kroz dva ključna historijska događaja, osvjetljavajući kulturnu dimenziju habsburške politike na Balkanu. Političke i ustaničke prilike na Kosovu neposredno pred pad apsolutizma analizira Fitim Rifati u radu o pokretima u Kosovskom vilajetu prije Mladoturske revolucije, detaljno prikazujući uzroke, dinamiku i posljedice ovih nemira. Međunarodne odnose i imperijalne ambicije tokom Prvog svjetskog rata tematizira Safet Bandžović u radu o ruskim ratnim ciljevima, usmjerenim prema Istanbulu, te složenim balkanskim političkim „stranputicama“ koje su pratile ove težnje.

Prelazak u međuratni period i doba Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije donosi analize agrarnih i vjersko-obrazovnih reformi. Veli Kryeziu i Muhamet Qerimi u svom radu tematiziraju agrarne reforme i kolonizaciju Kosova u periodu od 1918. do 1924. godine, dok se Izet Šabotić fokusira na lokalni kontekst Tuzle, istražujući reformu Behram-begove medrese u periodu između 1922. i 1941. godine kroz prizmu doprinosa hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića, dugogodišnjeg direktora i muderisa ove medrese.

Ratne traume i svakodnevicu Drugog svjetskog rata istražuju Hrvoje Volner i Filip Škiljan, koji se u svom radu bave uspostavom ustaške vlasti i specifičnostima ratne svakodnevice u Brčkom od 1941. do 1945. godine. Pitanjem posljeratnih migracija i položajem manjinskih zajednica bavi se Zsolt András Udvarvölgyi, analizirajući sudbinu i integraciju bosanskih muslimana u Mađarskoj nakon 1945. godine. Hladnoratovski period i diplomatska historija zastupljeni su radom Donike Avdulli, koja na osnovu poljskih arhivskih dokumenata osvjetljava malo poznate odnose između Poljske i Albanije u periodu od 1949. do 1952. godine. Društvenom i intelektualnom historijom bavi se Bruno Šagi, koji analizira ideje o emancipaciji žena u misli istaknute hrvatske intelektualke i političarke Mare Matočec.

Treći dio radova u rubrici *Članci* fokusiran je na krizne periode s kraja 20. stoljeća, ratna dešavanja u Bosni i Hercegovini, te savremene društveno-političke procese. Selim Bezera i Fidan Haliti analiziraju demonstracije na Kosovu 1981. godine iz perspektive političkih i društvenih kretanja koja su nagovijestila duboku krizu jugoslovenskog socijalističkog poretka. Period agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i odbrambeno-oslobodilačkog rata tematizira

rad Muamera Džananovića o ratnim zločinima u Kotor-Varoši 1992. godine. Autor se fokusira na sudski utvrđene činjenice nasuprot savremenim revizionističkim narativima koji nastoje relativizirati zločine. Historiografskom dekonstrukcijom i analizom medijskog izvještavanja bave se Hikmet Karčić i Jasmin Medić, analizirajući greške i selektivnost u prikazivanju prilika u Bosni i Hercegovini tokom devedesetih godina. Posljednji rad u rubrici *Članci*, čiji su autori Mustafa Krupalija, Ibrahim Fevzi Güven i Mirsad Karić, nudi analizu politizacije i sekuritizacije vjerskog identiteta kroz prizmu nacrtu osnovnog ugovora između Islamske zajednice i države Bosne i Hercegovine.

U rubrici *Prikazi* predstavljeno je pet zanimljivih knjiga čime se čitaocima nudi uvid u najnoviju historiografsku produkciju. Edin Veladžić donosi prikaz obimnog dvotomnog djela Safeta Bandžovića o Rusiji i Istočnom pitanju. Amir Kliko prikazuje dvotomnu studiju o genocidu u Zvorniku autora Muamera Džananovića i Elvedina Mulagića, dok Muamer Džananović donosi osvrt na knjigu Enisa Omerovića o međunarodnopravnoj analizi genocida nad Bošnjacima. Nada Tomović analizira knjigu Saita Š. Šabotića o Bihoru na razmeđu vjekova, a Vjosa Jonuzi-Shala prikazuje pionirsko istraživanje Franka Dote o političkoj povijesti muške homoseksualnosti u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji.

Časopis se zaključuje izvještajem Jasmina Jajčevića o naučnom projektu i konferenciji „Historijski pogledi 2025“, održanoj u Tuzli u novembru 2025. godine u organizaciji Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla.

Petnaesti broj časopisa *Historijski pogledi*, svojim sadržajima tretira iznimno važnu i jako zanimljivu historijsku tematiku, koja nam donosi čitav spektar novih i važnih naučnih osvrta, stavova i konstatacija o bitnim događajima i procesima iz bosanskohercegovačke i prošlosti zemalja okruženja. Nadamo se da će raznovrsnost tema, naučna i metodološka utemeljenost radova i bogatstvo prezentirane arhivske građe u ovom broju ponuditi korisne putokaze za daljnja istraživanja i doprinijeti boljem razumijevanju prošlosti našeg prostora.

Posebna vrijednost radova publikovanih u časopisu *Historijski pogledi*, br. 15, sadržana je u činjenici, što značajan broj istih tretira novu historijsku tematiku, koja je u dobroj mjeri nastala na izvorima prvoga reda, koji čine bogatu historiografsku osnovu neophodnu za donošenje naučno utemeljenih stavova o bitnim historijskim pitanjima, što predstavlja izravan doprinos unapređenju historijske nauke.

Uredništvo časopisa *Historijski pogledi* izražava zahvalnost autorima na njihovim doprinosima, recenzentima na naučnom i stručnom radu i pažljivoj evaluaciji tekstova, te čitaocima koji prate i podržavaju rad *Historijskih pogleda*.

Uredništvo

FOREWORD

In the fifteenth issue of the journal *Historijski pogledi* (*Historical Views*), historical papers addressing a variety of topics from modern history have been published. The authors of the papers are from Bosnia and Herzegovina and several European countries. This issue of the journal is characterized by diverse and current topics, as well as papers built upon a rich historiographical foundation, with a predominance of archival documents, which served as the basis for valuable historical content presented to the scholarly community for the first time.

Through the articles and contributions in the fifteenth issue of the journal *Historijski pogledi*, an effort is made to contribute to historiography, opening up space for scholarly dialogue on complex social, political, cultural, and institutional processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Balkans, and beyond. This issue of *Historijski pogledi* features nineteen scholarly papers organized in the *Articles* section, five reviews of recent historiographical publications, and one report from a scholarly conference. Based on diverse archival material and various methodological approaches, the papers in this issue cover a broad chronological span, from the 16th century to contemporary political and social trends at the beginning of the 21st century.

The first segment of papers in the *Articles* section focuses on the early modern period and the Ottoman era, presenting historical content that sheds light on the urban, military, demographic, and tribal history of Southeast Europe. This section of the journal opens with a paper by Elma Korić and Muamer Hodžić, which analyzes the Ottoman model of the emergence and development of urban neighborhoods through the case study of the Kalin Hadži Alija neighborhood (*mahala*) in Sarajevo during the 16th and 17th centuries. The authors reconstruct in detail the spatial development and social structure of this neighborhood, offering valuable insight into the mechanisms of urbanization of Bosnian towns during the Ottoman period. This analysis is followed by a study by Turkish authors Onur Şen and Sibel Akova, dedicated to Matrakçı Nasuh, a versatile genius of the 16th century. The authors evaluate his contribution as a military polymath, cartographer, miniaturist, and mathematician, illuminating the intellectual and technological achievements of Ottoman society at the height of its power.

Shifting the focus toward the northern and western parts of the Balkan region, Luan Tetaj's paper investigates the movements and migrations of the Kelmendi tribe between 1702 and 1707. This study contributes to a better understanding of the internal dynamics within tribal structures at the tri-border area of present-day Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro, as well as their relations with the central Ottoman authorities during the crisis period of the early 18th century. Demographic and administrative aspects of Ottoman rule are also addressed by Mead Osmani, who analyzes the population structure of the

Masurica Nahiya based on an Ottoman census register (*defter*) from 1831. Utilizing primary sources, the author presents precise data on the social and demographic profile of this region in the period immediately preceding the major administrative reforms in the Ottoman Empire.

The second part covers the late Ottoman period, the nineteenth century, and the processes of modernization, national movements, and imperial influences in the Balkans. Institutional and legal frameworks are addressed by Muhamet Lama and Bashkim Rrahmani in their paper on the Albanian eyalets of Shkodra and Janina during the 18th and 19th centuries, analyzing the levels of autonomy and legal specificities of these provinces in the context of the establishment of the centralizing authority of the Sublime Porte over them. A cultural and media perspective of late Ottoman society is provided by Elçin Gün Canik and Mehmet Yavuz Erler through an analysis of the Ottoman sense of humor in caricatures with Balkan motifs, demonstrating how a specific form of patriotism was articulated in the Ottoman society of that time through satire and drawing.

The role of foreign powers in shaping Balkan affairs is examined in the work of Bendis Kraja, which analyzes the Austro-Hungarian contribution to the development and standardization of the Albanian language through two key historical events, shedding light on the cultural dimension of Habsburg policy in the Balkans. Political and insurgent circumstances in Kosovo immediately before the fall of absolutism are analyzed by Fitim Rifati in his paper on movements in the Kosovo Vilayet before the Young Turk Revolution, detailing the causes, dynamics, and consequences of this unrest. International relations and imperial ambitions during the First World War are the focus of Safet Bandžović's paper on Russian war aims directed toward Istanbul, as well as the complex Balkan political "byways" that accompanied these aspirations.

The transition to the interwar period and the era of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia brings analyses of agrarian and religious-educational reforms. Veli Kryeziu and Muhamet Qerimi focus on agrarian reforms and the colonization of Kosovo in the period from 1918 to 1924, while Izet Šabotić focuses on the local context of Tuzla, investigating the reform of the Behram-beg Madrasa in the period between 1922 and 1941 through the prism of the contribution of Hafiz Salih-efendi Sivčević, the long-standing director and mudarris of this madrasa.

Wartime trauma and everyday life during the Second World War are explored by Hrvoje Volner and Filip Škiljan, whose paper addresses the establishment of the Ustaše regime and the specificities of daily wartime life in Brčko from 1941 to 1945. The issue of post-war migration and the position of minority communities is addressed by Zsolt András Udvarvölgyi, who analyzes the fate and integration of Bosnian Muslims in Hungary after 1945. The Cold War period and diplomatic history are represented by the work of Donika Avdulli, who, based on Polish archival documents, sheds light on the lesser-known relations between Poland and Albania in the period from 1949 to 1952.

Social and intellectual history is addressed by Bruno Šagi, who analyzes ideas on the emancipation of women in the thought of the prominent Croatian intellectual and politician Mara Matočec.

The third part of the papers in the *Articles* section focuses on the crisis periods of the late 20th century, the wartime events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and contemporary socio-political processes. Selim Bezeraj and Fidan Haliti analyze the 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo from the perspective of political and social movements that foreshadowed the deep crisis of the Yugoslav socialist order. The period of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the defense-liberation war is addressed in the work of Muamer Džananović on war crimes in Kotor-Varoš in 1992. The author focuses on judicially established facts as opposed to contemporary revisionist narratives that seek to relativize the crimes. Historiographical deconstruction and the analysis of media reporting are addressed by Hikmet Karčić and Jasmin Medić, who analyze errors and selectivity in the portrayal of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s. The final paper in the *Articles* section, authored by Mustafa Krupalija, İbrahim Fevzi Güven, and Mirsad Karić, offers an analysis of the politicization and securitization of religious identity through the prism of the draft basic agreement between the Islamic Community and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the *Reviews* section, five interesting books are presented, offering readers insight into the latest historiographical production. Edin Veladžić provides a review of Safet Bandžović's extensive two-volume work on *Russia and the Eastern Question*. Amir Kliko reviews the two-volume study on the genocide in Zvornik by Muamer Džananović and Elvedin Mulagić, while Muamer Džananović provides an overview of Enis Omerović's book on the international legal analysis of the genocide against Bosniaks. Nada Tomović analyzes Sait Š. Šabotić's book on *Bihor at the turn of the centuries*, and Vjosa Jonuzi-Shala reviews Franko Dota's pioneering research on the political history of male homosexuality in socialist Yugoslavia.

The journal concludes with a report by Jasmin Jajčević on the scientific project and conference "Historical Views 2025", held in Tuzla in November 2025 in the organization of the Center for Research of Modern and Contemporary History Tuzla.

Through its content, the fifteenth issue of the journal *Historijski pogledi* addresses extremely important and highly engaging historical topics, bringing a broad spectrum of new and significant scientific reviews, perspectives, and conclusions regarding key events and processes in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighboring countries. We hope that the diversity of topics, the scientific and methodological rigor of the papers, and the wealth of archival material presented in this issue will provide useful guidelines for further research and contribute to a better understanding of the history of our region.

The particular value of the papers published in the journal *Historijski pogledi*, no. 15, lies in the fact that a significant number of them address new historical topics, largely based on primary sources that form a rich historiographical foundation necessary for making scientifically sound assertions on key historical issues, thereby directly contributing to the advancement of historical scholarship.

The *Editorial Board* of the journal *Historijski pogledi* expresses its gratitude to the authors for their contributions, to the reviewers for their scientific and professional work and careful evaluation of the texts, and to the readers who follow and support the work of *Historijski pogledi*.

Editorial Board

I

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OSMANSKI MODEL NASTANKA I RAZVOJA JEDNE GRADSKE ČETVRTI: KALIN HADŽI ALIJINA MAHALA U SARAJEVU (16 - 17. STOLJEĆE)

Apstrakt: Ova studija rekonstruira nastanak, prostornu evoluciju i institucionalni razvoj mahale utemeljene oko mesdžida Kalin hadži Alije u Sarajevu tokom 16. i 17. stoljeća. Oslanjajući se na širok korpus osmanskih arhivskih izvora, uključujući opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1563/65. godine, sudske protokole (sidžile) i kasnije katastarske popise, uz relevantnu savremenu literaturu, istraživanje pojašnjava genezu ove urbane mikrojedinice sistematskim ispitivanjem njene identifikacije u dokumentaciji, njene prostorne konfiguracije i promjenjivih toponimskih slojeva. Poseban fokus stavljen je na vakuf koji je utemeljio Kalin hadži Alija, administrativne i pravne mehanizme putem kojih je njegov mesdžid stekao status džamije, te na načine na koje je vakufska imovina oblikovala društveni i fizički razvoj naselja u nastajanju.

Urbani pejzaž Sarajeva bio je odlučujuće strukturiran gustom mrežom vakufskih institucija koje su osnivali pripadnici gradske elite. Putem uspostavljanja vjerskih, obrazovnih, privrednih i komunalnih objekata, ovi vakufi ne samo da su organizovali izgrađeni gradski okoliš, već su igrali i centralnu ulogu u konfigurisanju društvenih odnosa, obrazaca formiranja mahala i načina komunalne interakcije. U ovom širem okviru, vakuf Kalin hadži Alije ističe se kao reprezentativan primjer mehanizama putem kojih je jedna filantropska inicijativa mogla stvoriti trajno urbano jezgro. Smješten na desnoj obali Miljacke, mesdžid koji je utemeljio postao je žarište nove mahale, čija postepena konsolidacija odražava kako dinamiku urbanog širenja, tako i procese kojima su periferne zone inkorporirane u tkivo rano-novovjekovnog grada.

Značajan historiografski izazov dugo je predstavljala precizna identifikacija ove mahale, s obzirom na postojanje nekoliko sarajevskih mahala nazvanih po pojedincima koji su nosili ime hadži Alija. Primjenom komparativne metodologije i unakrsnim referenciranjem više grupa izvora, ova studija rješava ove nejasnoće i rekonstruira nastanak, demografski profil i prostorne granice mahale. Naselje se nalazilo na području današnjeg Narodnog pozorišta i graničilo je s mahalama Hadže Kemala, Ajaz-paše, hadži Idrisa i hadži Mahmud-balija. Arhivski dokazi iz kasnog 16. stoljeća ukazuju na to da su dijelovi ove zone još uvijek bili prekriveni šumskom vegetacijom, što pokazuje da se njena urbanizacija odvijala postepeno. Kontinuirana upotreba lokalnih toponima kao što su Pokrovnik i Čajirdžik (mala livada), uz zvanični naziv mahale, otkriva opstojnost starijih topografskih tradicija i preživljavanje kolektivnog sjećanja na predurbani pejzaž ove lokacije.

Iako originalna vakufnama nije sačuvana, drugi osmanski dokumenti omogućavaju pouzdanu rekonstrukciju vakufske imovine. To je uključivalo džamiju, mekteb, 14.000 akči u gotovini i nekoliko dućana čiji su prihodi finansirali plate vjerskog i obrazovnog osoblja. Kasnije donacije imućnih građana, uključujući žene poput Nevbihe hatun, uvećale su kapitalnu osnovu vakufa i osigurale stabilnu finansijsku podršku za obrazovanje djece.

Integracijom raspršenih arhivskih dokaza u koherentan analitički okvir, studija pokazuje da mahala Kalin hadži Alije nudi paradigmatičan primjer dinamike koja je u osnovi formiranja ranih urbanih mikrostruktura. Njen razvoj pruža vrijedan uvid u procese urbanizacije, organizacije zajednice i institucionalnog života u Sarajevu tokom 16. i 17. stoljeća.

Ključne riječi: *Urbanizacija, Sarajevo, mahala, Kalin Hadži Alija, vakuf.*

THE OTTOMAN MODEL OF THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN URBAN QUARTER: MAHALA KALIN HAJI ALI IN SARAJEVO (16TH–17TH CENTURY)

Abstract: *This study reconstructs the formation, spatial evolution, and institutional development of the quarter (mahalle) founded around the mesjid of Kalin Haji Ali in Sarajevo during the 16th and 17th centuries. Drawing on a broad corpus of Ottoman archival sources, including the Bosnian Sanjak register of 1563/65, court records (sijils), and later cadastral surveys, alongside relevant modern scholarship, the research clarifies the genesis of this urban micro-unit by systematically examining its identification in the documentation, its spatial configuration, and its shifting toponymic layers. A particular focus is placed on the waqf established by Kalin Haji Ali, the administrative and legal mechanisms through which his mesjid attained the status of a mosque, and the ways in which*

the endowment's assets shaped the social and physical development of the emerging neighbourhood.

The urban landscape of Sarajevo was decisively structured by a dense network of waqf institutions founded by members of the urban elite. Through the establishment of religious, educational, commercial, and communal facilities, these endowments not only organised the city's-built environment but also played a central role in configuring social relations, patterns of neighbourhood (mahalle) formation, and modes of communal interaction. Within this broader framework, the waqf of Kalin Haji Ali stands out as a representative example of the mechanisms through which a single philanthropic initiative could generate a lasting urban nucleus. Situated on the right bank of the Miljacka River, the mesjid he founded became the focal point of a new quarter, whose gradual consolidation reflects both the dynamics of urban expansion and the processes by which peripheral zones were incorporated into the fabric of the early modern city.

A significant historiographical challenge has long been the precise identification of this quarter, given the existence of several Sarajevo quarters named after individuals bearing the name Haji Ali. By employing a comparative methodology and cross-referencing multiple source groups, this study resolves these ambiguities and reconstructs the neighborhood's emergence, demographic profile, and spatial boundaries. The quarter was located in the area of the present-day National Theatre and bordered the quarters of Haje Kemal, Ayas Pasha, Haji Idris, and Haji Mahmud Bali. Archival evidence from the later 16th century indicates that parts of this zone were still covered in woodland vegetation, demonstrating that its urbanisation proceeded gradually. The continued use of local toponyms such as Pokrovnik and Čajirdžik (small meadow) alongside the official quarter name reveals the persistence of older topographic traditions and the survival of collective memory regarding the site's pre-urban landscape.

Although the original waqfiye has not survived, other Ottoman documents permit a reliable reconstruction of the waqf's holdings. These included a mosque, a maktab, 14,000 silver coins (akçe) in cash, and several revenue-generating shops whose income funded the salaries of religious and educational personnel. Subsequent donations by affluent townspeople, including women such as Nevbihe Hatun, augmented the endowment's capital base and ensured stable financial support for children's education.

By integrating dispersed archival evidence into a coherent analytical framework, the study demonstrates that the quarter of Kalin Haji Ali offers a paradigmatic illustration of the dynamics underpinning the formation of early urban micro-structures. Its development provides valuable insight into the processes of urbanisation, community organisation, and institutional life in Sarajevo during the 16th and 17th centuries.

Key words: *Urbanization, Sarajevo, mahalle (quarter), Kalin Haji Ali, waqf.*

Uvod

U procesu urbanog razvoja Sarajeva u osmanskome periodu presudnu ulogu imali su vakufi koje su osnivali uglednici iz osmanskog vojno-upravnog sloja, ali i pripadnici uleme, poput kadija i muftija. Kroz osnivanje vakufa kao dobrotvornih samoodrživih zaklada, izgradnjom i finansiranjem rada objekata kao što su džamije, mektebi, medrese, tekije, vodovodi, javna kupatila, česme, imareti, hanovi i mostovi, ovi različiti društveni akteri realizirali su infrastrukturne, vjerske, obrazovne i kulturne projekte od općeg značaja, čime su presudno utjecali na formiranje urbanog i društvenog ambijenta u Sarajevu. Značajan doprinos u tom smislu davali su i drugi imućniji pojedinci u gradu, prvenstveno iz redova trgovačkog i zanatskog sloja. Jedan od takvih primjera bio je sarajevski trgovac Kalin Hadži Alija koji je osnovao vakuf čiji objekti su predstavljali nukleus novog stambenog kvarta – mahale.

U historiografskim istraživanjima do sada mahala Kalin Hadži Alije nije precizno identificirana u primarnim izvorima. Jedan od razloga za to leži u činjenici da je u domaćoj historiografiji proces urbanizacije Sarajeva u osmanskome periodu najčešće promatran uopćeno. Rijetko su izdvajane pojedinačne mahale kao posebne mikrocijeline koje bi bile detaljno izučavane te se u tom smislu niko nije bavio nastankom i razvojem mahale Kalin Hadži Alije. Dodatnu otežavajuću okolnost istraživačima svakako je predstavljala činjenica da se u osmanskim dokumentima u Sarajevu u istom periodu navodi više mahala čiji je osnivači nose isto ime - Hadži Alija (npr. Nebrdilo Hadži Alija, SAGR Hadži Alija, Gazgani Hadži Alija i sl).

Kalin Hadži Alijin mesdžid, po kojem je mahala kasnije i dobila ime, izgrađen je na desnoj obali rijeke Miljacke, u neposrednoj blizini današnje zgrade Narodnog pozorišta u Sarajevu. Urbani nukleus Kalin Hadži Alijne mahale, osim mesdžida, odnosno džamije, sačinjavali u i mekteb te okolno mezarje oko kojih se nalazila stambena zona. Radi izgradnje modernih stambenih zgrada navedeni kompleks građevina je porušen 1947. godine, a mezarje zatrpalo. Nedavnim arheološkim istraživanjima otkriveni su tragovi temelja navedenih i drugih objekata kao i pojedini nišani sa mezarja. Pronađeni ostaci su konzervirani i trenutno su dio arheološkog parka Kalin Hadži Alijine džamije u Sarajevu.¹

¹ Rad je nastao kao rezultat istraživanja za potrebe realizacije projekta izrade sadržaja interpretacijske infrastrukture arheološkog parka Kalin hadži Alijine džamije u Sarajevu u okvirima djelatnosti JU Kantonalni zavod za zaštitu kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Sarajevo.

Formiranje mahale Kalin Hadži Alije i njeno identificiranje u izvornim dokumentima

U postojećoj stručnoj literaturi u kojoj se piše o Kalin Hadži Alijinom vakufu, odnosno mahali i džamiji, uglavnom se poziva na mišljenje S. Kemure da je džamija izgrađena “oko 1535. godine.”² Iako autor ne navodi izvor za svoje mišljenje, ono bi moglo biti utemeljeno i u postojećim izvorima. Naime, Kalin Hadži Alijina mahala ne spominje u osmanskome popisu Bosanskog sandžaka završenom 1530. godine, kao ni onom iz 1540. godine te se može smatrati da je tih godina mesdžid bio u izgradnji.³ Međutim, valja istaknuti da postoje i drugačija tumačenja arhivskih podataka, na temelju kojih pojedini autori smještaju nastanak mahale Kalin Hadži Alije tek u posljednja tri i pol desetljeća 16. stoljeća.⁴

Primjenom komparativne metode u analizi osmanskih izvora prikupljenih tokom ovog istraživanja, s posebnim fokusom na urbanu cjelinu koju čine mesdžid i mahala Kalin Hadži Alije, može se u najvećoj mjeri potvrditi pretpostavka da je mesdžid podignut u prvoj polovini 16. stoljeća, iako se ne može navesti tačna godina izgradnje. Nakon izgradnje mesdžida započeo je proces formiranja i prostornog širenja istoimene mahale, doprinoseći postepenom urbanom razvoju ovog dijela Sarajeva.

Izvor koji nedvosmisleno potvrđuje postojanje džamije, odnosno ruševnog mesdžida Kalin hadži Alije 1566. godine, kao i istoimene mahale koja je tada već bila formirana i solidno naseljena, ide u prilog ranijoj dataciji njihovog nastanka. Riječ je o zapisu u sudskom protokolu koji datira od 1. zilkade 973. godine (20. maj 1566), u kojem vakifov sin Husejn, u svojstvu mutevelije navedenog vakufa, podnosi zahtjev sarajevskom šerijatskom sudu za popravku oštećenog krova mesdžida. On je naveo kako je potreba za intervencijom proizašla iz nemogućnosti obavljanja zajedničkih namaza tokom kišnih dana. Izvorni sadržaj dokumenta dodatno otkriva da su se kao svjedoci ovog pravnog čina pojavili: Mehmed sin Husejnov, Sulejman sin Abdulahov, Nasuh sin Abdulahov i Ilijas sin Abdulahov, uz ostale neimenovane prisutne. Osim toga, u pratnji mutevelije Husejna na sudu tada su se nalazili i Ferhad Hodža sin Timurov, te drugi ugledni stanovnici mahale, među kojima se ističu Murad sin Husejnov, Iskender sin Husejnov, Uveys sin Ilijasov, Osman sin Alijin i Šudža sin Mustafin.⁵

² Sejfudin Kemura, Sarajevske džamije i druge javne zgrade turske dobe, *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja*, XXIII/1, Sarajevo 1911, 193-208.

³ Up. Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi, (dalje: BOA), Tapu Tahrir Defterleri (dalje: TD) 157 i BOA TD 211.

⁴ Više u: Hazim Šabanović, Teritorijalno širenje i građevni razvoj Sarajeva u XVI stoljeću, *Radovi*, XXVI/9, Naučno društvo Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo 1965, 49.

⁵ Gazi Husrev-begova biblioteka (dalje: GHB) Sarajevo, *Sidžil*, br. 2, 271. Up. S. Kemura, *Sarajevske džamije i druge javne zgrade turske dobe*, 194.

Polazeći od podataka iz navedenog dokumenta, u toku našeg istraživanja identificirane su podudarnosti s drugim službenim osmanskim dokumentima iz istog razdoblja. S obzirom na dataciju dokumenta upisanog u spomenuti sidžil 1566. godine, u procesu pokušaja precizne identifikacije mahale Kalin hadži Alije i određivanju vremena njenog nastanka, konsultirani su podaci koje nude osmanski popisi Bosanskog sandžaka iz 16. stoljeća. Kako je već napomenuto, u Opširnom popisu Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1530. i onom iz 1540. godine, navedena mahala se ne spominje što bi moglo značiti da je u navedenom periodu tek bio otpočeo proces izgradnje mesdžida odnosno vršena legalizacija vakufname. Određene informacije o ovom mesdžidu i mahali javljaju se tek u opširnom popisu Bosanskog sandžaka iz druge polovine 16. stoljeća.⁶ Navedeni defter nije datiran, ali se uglavnom smatra da je nastao u 1565. godini, odnosno u sedmoj deceniji 16. stoljeća.⁷

Na osnovu uporedne analize podataka iz navedenog popisa, kao i već spomenutih zapisa sačuvanih u sidžilu za isto razdoblje, s visokim stepenom pouzdanosti može se zaključiti da je mahala Hadži Alijina mesdžida, evidentirana u popisu pod brojem 57, istovjetna mahali Kalin Hadži Alije. Najuvjerljiviji argument za ovakvu identifikaciju jeste podudarnost imena stanovnika koji se javljaju u oba izvora. Tako se, primjerice, u popisu među žiteljima mahale Hadži Alijina mesdžida navodi imam Ferhad Hodža, sin Timurov, što se direktno može dovesti u vezu s dokumentom iz sidžila iz 1566. godine, u kojem se govori o popravci krova džamije. Pored njega, u oba izvora pojavljuju se i druga lica čija se imena podudaraju, a koja su, sudeći prema kontekstu, vjerovatno učestvovala u poslovima popravke ili su se kao stanovnici Kalin Hadži Alijine mahale pojavili kao svjedoci na sudu. Riječ je o Husejnu, sinu Alijinom – za kojeg se s velikom vjerovatnoćom može pretpostaviti da je potomak osnivača, Kalin hadži Alije, te da je u toj ulozi obavljao dužnost mutevelije vakufa; potom Osmanu, sinu Alijinom; Uvejsu, sinu Ilijasovom i Muradu, sinu Husejnovom.⁸

Lokacija i toponimija Mahale Kalin Hadži Alijinog mesdžida

Kalin Hadži Alijin mesdžid, po kojem je mahala kasnije i dobila ime, izgrađen je na desnoj obali rijeke Miljacke, u neposrednoj blizini današnje zgrade Narodnog pozorišta u Sarajevu. Tragovi nekadašnjih temelja vakufskog kompleksa, u čijem se sastavu nalazio i mezaristan, vidljivi su i danas.

⁶ BOA, TD 379.

⁷ H. Šabanović u jednom svom radu piše da je utvrdio kako je navedeni defter nastao u periodu 1560-62. godine. Up. Hazim Šabanović, *Teritorijalno širenje i građevni razvoj Sarajeva u XVI stoljeću*, Naučno društvo Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo 1965, 30.

⁸ BOA, TD 379, 79.

Mahala je imala jasno definirane granice. Na istočnoj strani graničila se s Mahalom mesdžida Hadže Kemala i Mahalom Ajas-pašine džamije. Sjeverna granica mahale bila je prema Mahali Hadži Idrisova mesdžida, čije je središte bilo smješteno na lokaciji preko puta zgrade Šipada u današnjoj Ulici Maršala Tita. Na zapadu je graničila s Mahalom mesdžida Sahtijanjdži Hadži Mahmud Balije, čije je središte bilo locirano na mjestu preko puta današnjeg sportskog centra FIS, tačnije na uglu gdje se ukrštaju Mis Irbina i Ulica Branislava Đurđeva. Na južnoj strani mahala se pružala do korita rijeke Miljacke.

Detaljniji uvid u izgled središta mahale pruža jedan hudžet nastao sredinom 16. stoljeća. U navedenom izvoru navodi se sljedeće: "U našem gradu, u Hadži Alijinoj mahali, ima jedno zemljište, koje je prazno te nije ni u čijem posjedu, koje je sitnom šumom zaraslo, a leži između dva puta i graniči s jedne strane dvorištem [Hadži Alijine]⁹ džamije, s druge rijekom Miljackom, a s treće Memi Čehajinim zemljištem, a s četvrte općim putem, te ovo zemljište po carskom zakonu prodaje sarajevski vojvoda Husejnu sinu Mehmedovu za 200 akči prenosne pristojbe te mu na to kao nadležan i tapiju izdaje."¹⁰

Ovaj izvor nije važan samo za topografsku identifikaciju, već i za razumijevanje rane faze urbanog razvoja ove gradske četvrti. Činjenica da je u samom središtu mahale, neposredno uz dvorište džamije, postojalo neizgrađeno i šumom zaraslo zemljište, upućuje na zaključak da ovaj dio grada sredinom 16. stoljeća još uvijek nije bio u potpunosti urbaniziran i integriran u gradsku jezgru. Iako je mahala već bila formirana, postojanje neiskorištenih parcela upućuje na postepeni proces urbanizacije i naseljavanja.

Što se tiče toponimije, u Opširnom popisu Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine mahala je zabilježena pod dva imena: službenim nazivom Kalin Hadži Alijina mahala, te alternativnim imenom Pokrovnik.¹¹ Ovaj drugi toponim vjerovatno predstavlja stariji, srednjovjekovni naziv za lokalitet na desnoj obali Miljacke na kojem se formirala mahala. Pored toga, u usmenoj tradiciji i svakodnevnoj upotrebi bio je rasprostranjen i naziv Čajirdžik (od tur. *çayırçık* = mala livada), što ukazuje na prirodni pejzažni karakter prostora.

Ovaj naziv nije ostao ograničen na usmenu tradiciju, nego se održao i u službenoj dokumentaciji. Tako se u jednom kupoprodajnom ugovoru iz 1704. godine, ovjerenom pred istanbulskim kadijom, spominje mlin na Miljacki lociran

⁹ U osmanskom tekstu koji navodi S. Kemura spominje se *harems Hadži Alijine džamije*, međutim u prijevodu samo stoji *dvorište džamije*. S. Kemura, *Sarajevske džamije i druge javne zgrade turske dobe*, 194-195.

¹⁰ S. Kemura, *Sarajevske džamije i druge javne zgrade turske dobe*, 194-195.

¹¹ U prevodu deftera pročitano kao Pokrovin?. Up. *Opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine*, sv. I/1, obradio Adem Handžić, Bošnjački institut Zürich, Odjel Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, Sarajevo 2000, 81.

u sarajevskoj mahali Čajirdžik. Ovaj podatak pokazuje da se i u 18. stoljeću naziv Čajirdžik koristio paralelno sa službenim imenom Kalin Hadži Alijine mahale.¹²

Osnivač vakufa Kalin Hadži Alija i njegova porodica

Kalin Hadži Alija, sarajevski uglednik i istaknuti dobrotvor, bio je imućan građanin koji je tokom svog života obavio hadž, odnosno hodočašće u Mekku. Antroponim *Kalin*, etimološkog je porijekla od osmansko-turske riječi *kalın*, što bi u prevodu na bosanski moglo značiti krupan, snažan ili debeo. Prema dostupnim historijskim izvorima, ovaj se epitet najvjerovatnije odnosio na fizičke karakteristike vakifa koji ga je nosio, hadži Alije.

Po povratku iz svete zemlje, u skladu s principima islamske tradicije, izdvojio je značajan dio svog privatnog imetka kako bi finansirao izgradnju mesdžida i mekteba. Ova dvije institucije postale su jezgro oko kojeg se već sredinom 16. stoljeća formirala nova gradska mahala. Vremenski okvir ovih događaja podudara se sa periodom intenzivne izgradnje u Sarajevu, kada su svoje zadužbine podizali i slavni Gazi Husrev-beg i brojni drugi ugledni pojedinci. Na osnovu podataka iz sudskog protokola datiranog u 1566. godinu, gdje se kao mutevelija (upravnik) hadži Alijinog vakufa spominje njegov sin Husejn, razumno je pretpostaviti da sam vakif u tom trenutku više nije bio živ. U protivnom, on bi, kao osnivač, nastavio obavljati upraviteljske dužnosti.

Porodica Kalin hadži Alije nastavila je da živi u mahali nastaloj oko njegove džamije. Pored sina Husejna, koji je evidentiran kao stanovnik te mahale i 1604. godine, izvori potvrđuju postojanje najmanje još jednog direktnog potomka, kćeri Umije, koja je umrla 1608. godine i ukopana na mezarju uz očevu džamiju.¹³ Osim toga, značajnu i dosad nepoznatu informaciju koja bi mogla biti u vezi s njegovim potomcima pronalazimo u jednom sudskom zapisu koji je nastao u aprilu 1557. godine.¹⁴ U njemu se spominje izvjesna Rukija, kćer Hadži Alije, koja se putem opunomoćenika obratila sudskim vlastima tražeći isplatu iz imovine svog supruga. Naime, njen muž je umro na putu za Mekku. Sud je tom prilikom odobrio isplatu iznosa od 5.000 akči na ime vjenčanog dara (mehr-i müeccel) koji joj je pripadao. Analizirajući visinu navedenog iznosa za mehr, kao i činjenicu da je njen suprug bio u stanju otići hadž (što je zahtijevalo značajna finansijska sredstva), možemo zaključiti da je Hadži Alijina kći Rukija

¹² *İstanbul Kadı Sicilleri 59 Rumeli Sadâreti Mahkemesi 161 Numaralı Sicil (H.1115-1116 /M. 1704)*, ed. Coşkun Yılmaz, haz. Coşkun Yılmaz - Salih Kahrman, Kültür AŞ, İstanbul 2019, 411/416.

¹³ S. Kemura, *Sarajevske džamije i druge javne zgrade turske dobe*, 303; Mehmed Mujezinović, *Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine, Knjiga I - Sarajevo*, Sarajevo - Publishing: Sarajevo 1998, 506.

¹⁴ GHB, *Sarajevski sidžil*, 88, fol. 166.

bila udata za pripadnika imućnijeg sloja sarajevskog građanstva što dodatno potvrđuje društveni status i ugled njene porodice.

O vakufu Kalin Kadži Alije

Kako nije pronađena Kalin hadži Alijina vakufnama kao zakladnica i službeni dokument kojim je legaliziran njegov vakuf i koji je sadržavao određene smjernice vezane za njegovo poslovanje, prilikom istraživanja nastojalo se doći do podataka o navedenom vakufu iz drugih izvora. Spomenuti vakuf nije naveden u postojećim spiskovima vakufskih objekata Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1540 i 1565. godine koji su do sada poznati i obrađeni u domaćoj historiografiji.¹⁵ Međutim, to je slučaj i sa nekim drugim vakufima za koje na osnovu nekih drugih pokazatelja pouzdano znamo da su postojali i funkcionisali u navedenom razdoblju tako da ta činjenica sama po sebi nije eliminatorna. O vakufskim sredstvima kao i određenim rashodima vakufa saznajemo posredno, na osnovu određenih zabilješki u defterima i nekim drugim dokumentima iz kasnijeg perioda.

U tom smislu informacije navedene u Opširnom popisu Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine su rijetke i dragocjene. Naime, nakon spiska stanovnika mahale, u spomenutom defteru navedeni su podaci o vakufu iz kojih vidimo da glavnica vakufa Kalin Hadži Alije predstavljala suma od 14.000 akči. Osim toga, saznajemo i to da je u ovom periodu vakuf sticao sredstva od iznajmljivanja dva dućana koja su na godišnjem nivou donosila prihod od 530 akči. Iz tog iznosa isplaćivana je plaća imamu u iznosu od od 3 akče dnevno, dok je mujezin primao 2 akče dnevno. S vremenom su i drugi imućniji pojedinci ostavljali novčane vakufe koji su bili namjenski osnivani kao potpora radu ovoga temeljnog vakufa. Izvjesni Hadži Ahmed namijenio je iznos od 3.000 akči kao potporu imamu navedenog mesdžida za učenje džuzi, dok je Hadži Isa namijenio 3.000 akči imamu za učenje ašereta. Osim ove dvojice imućnih muškaraca, sredstva za isti vakuf ostavile su i dvije imućne žene. Benefše Hatun je imamu spomenutog mesdžida za učenje sura namijenila 3.000 akči. Uvakufljenim iznosom od 12.000 akči, koji je namijenila imamu mesdžida za potrebe rada muallimhane, odnosno mekteba u toj mahali, posebno se izdvaja Nevbiha Hatun.¹⁶ Pružajući značajnu finansijsku podršku obrazovanju djece, ovim činom dobročinstva istovremeno je pokazala izražen osjećaj brige za djecu kao najosjetljiviju društvenu skupinu.

¹⁵ Up. Behija Zlatar, Popis vakufa u Bosni iz prve polovine XVI vijeka, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, 20-21/1970-71, Sarajevo 1974, 109-158; Hatidža Čar - Drnda, Vakufski objekti u Bosanskom sandžaku – sedma decenija 16. stoljeća, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 52-53/2002-03, Sarajevo 2004, 267-294.

¹⁶ *Opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine*, sv. I/1, obradio Adem Handžić, Bošnjački institut Zürich, Odjel Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, Sarajevo 2000, 81-82.

Iako se novčani vakufi s kapitalom od 3.000 akči u literaturi obično svrstavaju među manje fondove, posebno u poređenju s daleko većim vakufima poput Gazi Husrev-begovog (1.200.000 akči) ili vakufa Muslihudina Čekrekčije (34.000 akči), njihova se stvarna ekonomska i društvena vrijednost ne može procijeniti samo prema nominalnom iznosu.

Razumijevanje stvarne ekonomske vrijednosti ovih iznosa zahtijeva rekonstrukciju vrijednosti i kupovne moći akče u njenom historijskom kontekstu. Relevantne podatke nudi studija zasnovana na podacima iz sidžila sarajevskog kadije iz 16. stoljeća, u kojoj su utvrđene referentne vrijednosti za to vrijeme. Navedeni izvori ukazuju da se cijena kuće u Sarajevu tog doba kretala u rasponu od 1.000 do 8.000 akči, pri čemu je prosječna cijena iznosila oko 4.000 akči.¹⁷

Imajući u vidu navedene činjenice, postaje očigledno da je vakuf Kalin Hadži Alije, čiji je kapital od 14.000 akči, udružen sa drugim novčanim vakufima, predstavljao znatnu finansijsku snagu. Taj iznos, ekvivalentan vrijednosti nekoliko prosječnih nekretnina, bio je sasvim dostatan za nesmetano finansiranje ključnih aktivnosti vezanih za mesdžid (džamiju) i mekteb, uključujući njihovo održavanje, plaćanje osoblja i pokrivanje eventualnih drugih troškova. Spomenute institucije bile su samo jezgro navedenog vakufa i njihovo nesmetano i produktivno funkcionisanje davalo je zamah daljem razvoju navedene mahale.

Obrazovanje djece i gradnja mekteba

Pored džamija, među prve i najbrojnije građevine islamske arhitekture kod nas spadaju mektebi. Mektebi, kao početne škole za djecu, građeni su na inicijativu pojedinaca kao njihove zadužbine. Do sada najstariji poznati dokument o postojanju mekteba u Bosni i Hercegovini je vakufnama (zakladnica) bosanskog namjesnika Ajas-bega, pisana 1477. godine. Obično je osnivač džamije pored nje gradio i mekteb, ali su ove škole osnivali i manje imućne zanatlije, trgovci, imami i drugi pojedinci. Vakufski mektebi su bili najbrojniji. Nastali su kao zadužbine pojedinaca, koji su ostavljali sredstva za njihovo izdržavanje. Ujedno, to su bili i najbolje organizirani mektebi, jer je osnivač obezbjeđivao sredstva za platu učitelju i njegovom pomoćniku, sredstva za održavanje i popravak zgrade, a često i pomoć siromašnoj djeci u vidu odjeće i hrane. Učitelj je, po pravilu, trebalo da bude svršeni polaznik medrese, a većinom su tu dužnost obavljali imami džamija. U težnji da svaka mahala ima svoj mekteb, kao najpovoljnije mjesto za njegovo lociranje bio je prostor oko džamije, odnosno samo dvorište džamije. Pri tome, mekteb se nije uvlačio u

¹⁷ Avdo Sućeska, Vakufski krediti u Sarajevu prema podacima iz sidžila sarajevskog kadije iz godine 973, 974 i 975/1564, 65 i 66, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 44-45/1994-95, Sarajevo 1996, 99-132.

unutrašnjost dvorišta, nego se postavljao u ugao dvorišta koji se naslanjao na ulicu, kako bi imao poseban ulaz. Ovakvim lociranjem mekteba osiguravao se potreban mir džamiji, a mekteb je orijentiran na mahalalu kojoj pripada. Ukoliko se mekteb nije nalazio u samom dvorištu džamije, najčešće se nalazio u njenoj neposrednoj blizini. Time je postignut optimalan položaj i mreža mekteba u tkivu naselja, jer su džamije bile centri mahala - stambenih jedinica naselja.¹⁸

Iako, kako je već napomenuto, vakufnama nije sačuvana, kao ni drugi izvori na osnovu kojih bismo precizno znali kada su navedeni objekti vakufa nastali, pretpostavljamo da je i mekteb bio sagrađen u isto vrijeme kad i Kalin Kadži Alijin mesdžid. Na osnovu tlocrtnih ostataka pretpostavlja se da je to bio objekat manjih dimenzija, smješten uz vanjski zid kompleksa. Ranije u tekstu iznesen je podatak o vakifi Nevbihi Hatun koja je ostavila 12.000 akči za potrebe rada ovog mekteba krajem 16. stoljeća. Iz kasnijeg perioda poznato je još da je Muhamed-aga Imaretlić, nadzornik Gazi Husrev-begovog vakufa koji se na toj poziciji prvi put se susreće 1734. godine, obnovio mekteb kraj Kalin Hadži Alijine džamije.¹⁹

Preinačavanje Kalin Hadži Alijinog mesdžida u džamiju i njeno stradanje 1697. godine

Na osnovu raspoloživih izvora evidentno je kako je Kalin Hadži Alija prvobitno dao podići mesdžid, koji je tek naknadno preinačen u džamiju. U osmanskim defterima iz 16. i ranog 17. stoljeća ovaj objekat označen je kao mesdžid, što ukazuje na njegovu prvobitnu namjenu. Razlika između mesdžida i džamije bila je jasno definirana: mesdžid je predstavljao prostor u kojem se obavljalo svih pet dnevnih namaza, ali bez mogućnosti održavanja džuma-namaza i bajrama, budući da u njemu nije bio postavljen minber. Sa stanovišta osmanske upravne i vjerske prakse, procedura preinačavanja mesdžida u džamiju bila je formalizovan i administrativno reguliran proces. Cilj procedure bio je da se objektu, koji je do tada služio isključivo za svakodnevne (redovne) namaze, dodijeli puni status koji omogućava obavljanje džuma i bajram namaza. Ovi kolektivni obredi, koji su okupljali širu zajednicu vjernika, zahtijevali su prisustvo imama odnosno hatiba.

Administrativna procedura pretvaranja mesdžida u džamiju


Sam postupak je započinjao inicijativom sa lokalnog nivoa. Zajednica vjernika ili upravitelj vakufa (mutevelija) obratili bi se nadležnom kadiji. Nakon što bi kadija utvrdio da su ispunjeni svi uslovi (postojanje dovoljnog broja

¹⁸ Madžida Bećirbegović, Prosvjetni objekti islamske arhitekture u Bosni i Hercegovini, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* XX-XXI/1970-71, Sarajevo 1974, 223-364.

¹⁹ Hamdija Kreševljaković, Nazori, džabije i kjatibi, u: *Spomenica Gazi Husrev-begove četiristogodišnjice*, Sarajevo 1932, 138.

zajednice, stabilnog vakufskog prihoda za plaćanje hatiba i održavanje objekta), upućivao je službenu predstavku (arz) centralnim vlastima u Istanbul. Konačnu odluku donosila je Porta u vidu izdavanja fermana.²⁰ Ovaj ferman je služio kao temeljni pravni akt koji je potvrđivao promjenu statusa objekta. Konačni korak u proceduri bilo je sastavljanje sudske isprave sačinjene na osnovu fermana. Nakon toga je mesdžid službeno postajao džamija. Dužnost hatiba i imama u džamiji mogla je obavljati jedna osoba, dok je u većim i bogatijim vakufima bilo angažirano dvije i više osoba.

Postojanje razlike između ovih tipova objekata u slučaju Kalin Hadži Alijinog vakufa potvrđuje i podatak iz sarajevskog sidžila, gdje je u dokumentu o popravci krova prvobitno zabilježena riječ *džamija*, ali je ona naknadno precrtana i zamijenjena terminom *mesdžid*.



Prilog 1. Gazi Husrevbegova biblioteka, *Sidžil sarajevskog kadije*, br. 2, 271.

U prostorijama Kalin Hadži Alijine džamije krajem 17. stoljeća izvodila se i nastava a predavanja je držao izvjesni Tašči-zade Mehmed-efendija.²¹ On je

²⁰ Primjer procesa preinake mesdžida u džamiju zabilježen je u slučaju mesdžida Tavi Hadži Mustafe u Sarajevu, koji je sredinom 17. stoljeća dobio status džamije. Prema dokumentu iz septembra 1675. godine, stanovnici istoimene mahale, posredstvom vrhovnog bosanskog kadije, uputili su molbu Porti da se njihov mesdžid preinači u džamiju kako bi se u njemu mogli obavljati džuma i bajram-namazi. U toj molbi oni su se obavezali da će vlastitim sredstvima finansirati potrebne izmjene, što je uključivalo izgradnju minbera za održavanje hutbi i osiguravanje stalnih prihoda za angažman obrazovanog hatiba. Na osnovu službene predstave (arz) sarajevskog kadije donesen sultanski ferman da dotični mesdžid postane džamija u kome će se pored dnevnih namaza obavljati džuma i bajram namazi. Nakon toga nekadašnji mesdžid u kasnijim izvorima se spominje pod nazivom Uzun Hadži Mustafina džamija. Slična procedura provedena je i prilikom preinačavanja Sagra Hadži Alijinog mesdžida na Hridu. Više vidi: Dresden, Staats und Universitätsbibliothek, Turkish Defftern, Mscr. Dresd. Eb.387, fol. 256v. i Muamer Hodžić, Vrhovne bosanske kadije (mulle) u drugoj polovini 17. stoljeća, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, 73/2023, Orijentalni institut, Sarajevo 2024, 107.

²¹ GHB, A-3078-TO.

za tu dužnost dobijao dnevnu nadoknadu u iznosu od 10 akči koliko je primao i predavač u Hadži Osmanovoj medresi (buk'a) u Sarajevu.²² Prilikom napada Eugena Savojskog na Sarajevo 1697. godine Kalin Hadži Alijina džamija je zapaljena i oštećena. Dokument o stradanju sačinio je sudski pisar koji je bio određen da popisuje spaljene, srušene i demolirane zgrade džamija i mesdžida. Spisak je sačinjen kao službeni dokument putem šerijatskog suda, a na osnovu bujruldiye. Činjenice o razmjerama stradanja Sarajeva utvrdio mubašir (inspektor) Halil-paša, koji je iza toga 1110/1698. godine bio postavljen za namjesnika ejaleta Bosne, godine 1112/1700. U navedenom izvoru stoji da je ova džamija *prilikom nevjerničke provale izgorjela i sada je u ruševnom stanju*. Osim toga, zabilježeno je i to kako imam i mujezin primaju plaću od akara (prihoda od vakufskih nekretnina). Hatib ove džamije u to vrijeme bio je izvjesni Muhamed-efendija koji je prije paljevine Sarajeva primao plaću od 5 akči dnevno koja je isplaćivana iz sredstava vakufske gotovine. Budući da je vakuf Kalin Hadži Alije ostao bez gotovine poslana je molba u Istanbul za pomoć.²³

Ubrzo nakon ovih događaja džamija je obnovljena. U nekim dokumentima se kasnije spominje i kao džamija Kalin Hadži Alije odnosno Brza džamija (Çabucak cami).²⁴ Možda je pod ovim imenom postala poznata jer je bila veoma brzo popravljena nakon stradanja.

Službenici Kalin Hadži Alijinog vakufa

Kako bi vakuf Kalin Hadži Alije funkcionirao prema zamisli osnivača bilo je angažirano više službenika koji su se brinuli o različitim aspektima rada njegovih objekata. Budući da nije sačuvana vakufnama u kojoj se pored predmeta vakufa spominju i službenici, njihove dužnosti i novčana nadoknada za to, informacije o tome pronalazimo na različitim mjestima u drugim izvorima. Tako je već ranije spomenuto da je za upravitelja svoga vakufa Kalin Hadži Alija ostavio svoga sina Husejna. Shodno praksi prethodnika ova služba je vjerovatno ostala u rukama muških nasljednika iz iste loze. U slučaju da nije bilo muških nasljednika vakif je mogao odrediti da neko od ženskih nasljednika obnaša ovu dužnost. U slučaju da se prekine loza onda je vakif obično određivao da nadležni

²² Termin *buk'a* (u originalu: بُعْعة) ima široko i višeznačno značenje. Etimološki, riječ može označavati fizičko mjesto, turbe, zaviju ili obrazovnu ustanovu poput medrese. U kontekstu osmanske obrazovne prakse pojam *buk'a* najčešće se koristio za označavanje određene vrste medrese. Te su ustanove obično pripadale nižem rangu u hijerarhiji obrazovnih institucija, što se ogledalo i u njihovim finansijskim prilikama. Za razliku od većih i bogatijih medresa, predavači na *buk'a* medresama su obično imali dnevni prihod od 10 akči. Imenovanje nastavnika (*muderrisa*) za ovakve ustanove vršen je na prijedlog lokalnih kadija.

²³ Zejnil Fajić, Stanje sakralnih i prosvjetnih objekata u Sarajevu razorenih za vrijeme provale Eugena Savojskog, *Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke*, 7-8, Sarajevo 1982, 89-107.

²⁴ Hatice Oruç, Saraybosna Vakıfları (16. Yüzyıl Sonları - 19. Yüzyıl İlk Yarısı), u: *Balkanlarda Osmanlı Vakıfları ve Eserleri Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, İstanbul 2012, 74.

kadija angažira osobu koja je dostojna službe i koja uživa povjerenje. Dužnost prvog imama vršio je Ferhad Hodža koji je također prethodno spomenut u tekstu. On je tu dužnost obavljao sredinom 16. stoljeća. Također je poznato da je na toj dužnosti početkom 17. stoljeća bio izvjesni Ibrahim-halifa, a dužnost mujezina obavljao je njegov imenjak Ibrahim-halifa. Budući da su obojica upisana u popisni defter iz 1604. godine, znamo pouzdano da je riječ o dvije različite osobe.²⁵

Nakon što je mesdžid preinačen u džamiju prvi poznati hatib bio je izvjesni Muhamed-efendija.²⁶ Po svemu sudeći u prostorijama Kalin Hadži Alijine džamije krajem 17. stoljeća izvodila se nastava po principu tzv. buka (buk'a) medresa. Predavanja je držao izvjesni Tašči-zade Mehmed-efendija, koji je za tu dužnost dobijao dnevnu nadoknadu u iznosu od 10 akči.²⁷ Poređenja radi isto toliko je primao i predavač u Hadži Osmanovoj medresi (Tabački mesdžid). Jedini poznati muallim (učitelj) koji podučavao djecu u Kalin Hadži Alijinom mektebu bio je Zergeri Ibrahim. On je tu dužnost obavljao krajem 17. i početkom 18. stoljeća.²⁸

Stanovnici mahale od sredine 16. do početka 17. stoljeća

Poređenjem imena stanovnika mahale mesdžida hadži Alije iz popisa 1565. sa imenima stanovnika iste mahale u popisu iz 1604. godine, uočljivo je kako neki stanovnici još uvijek stanuju u navedenoj mahali. To se moglo posebno pouzdano utvrditi kod onih osoba koje imaju nešto specifičnija imena (Mensur, Hurem) u odnosu na one sa imenima koja su tada bila nešto frekventnija među muslimanima Bosanskog sandžaka (npr. Mustafa, Mehmed, Ali, Hasan, Husejn).²⁹

U popisu iz 1565. godine neki od njih se spominju kao neoženjeni stanovnici mahale, dok se u defteru nastalom nekoliko decenija kasnije navode kao oženjeni domaćini kuće, a uz njih i njihovi punoljetni sinovi. Među njima je Hurem sin Junusa koji je upisan 1565., a 1604. ubilježen u istoj mahali ali sada je tu upisan i njegov sin Hizir. Mensur sin Husejnov, Omer sin Husejnov i Osman sin Husejnov, vjerovatno braća, ubilježeni su 1565. kao neoženjeni dok se u 1604. Omer ne spominje, a uz Osmana i Mensura među stanovnicima ove mahale ubilježeni su i Mensurovi sinovi Jusuf i Ali.³⁰

²⁵ BOA TD 379, 79: *Opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine*, sv. I/1, obradio Adem Handžić, Bošnjački institut Zürich, Odjel Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, Sarajevo 2000, 81-82.

²⁶ Z. Fajić, *Stanje sakralnih i prosvjetnih objekata u Sarajevu razorenih za vrijeme provala Eugena Savojskog*, 97.

²⁷ *Isto*, 106; GHB, A-3078-TO.

²⁸ *Isto*.

²⁹ O frekvenciji muslimanskih muških imena u popisu iz 1604. godine vidi: Amina Kupusović, *Muslimanska imena u Opširnom popisu bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine*, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 40/1990, Sarajevo 1991, 267-308.

³⁰ BOA, TD 379, 79-80; *Opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine*, sv. I/1, 81-82.

U mahali Hadži Alijina mesdžida u sedmoj deceniji 16. stoljeća ubilježeno je poimenično 85 stanovnika te mahale među kojima i imam, potom 53 nosioca muslimanskog domaćinstva te 31 neoženjeni punoljetni musliman.³¹ Nekih pola stoljeća kasnije broj stanovnika mahale neznatno se povećao. U Opširnom popisu Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine ubilježeno je 91 stanovnika među kojima jedan imam, jedan mujezin, 55 nosioca muslimanskog domaćinstva te 32 neoženjena punoljetna muslimana.³²

U skladu sa osmanskim praksom popisivanja, u deftere ove vrste bilježeni su samo radno i vojno sposobni muškarci kao porezni obveznici. Malodobna djeca, žene, starci, osobe sa invaliditetom i sl. bili su oslobođeni i vojne obaveze i plaćanja poreza te stoga, osim u rijetkim slučajevima, nisu bilježeni. Zbog toga nam nije poznat ukupan broj stanovnika navedene mahale u razmatranom periodu te ovom prilikom donosimo samo one podatke koji su nam poznati i potvrđeni izvornom građom.

Zaključak

Istraživanje nastanka i razvoja Kalin Hadži Alijine mahale u Sarajevu tokom 16. i 17. stoljeća pokazalo je značaj mikrohistorijskog pristupa u razumijevanju procesa urbanizacije u osmanskome periodu. Analiza dostupnih arhivskih izvora, sudskih sidžila i popisnih deftera omogućila je preciznu identifikaciju ove mahale, njeno smještanje u urbano tkivo grada, kao i rekonstrukciju društvenih i pravno-administrativnih okolnosti njenog oblikovanja. Poseban doprinos ogleda se u potvrđivanju transformacije Kalin Hadži Alijinog mesdžida u džamiju, čime se osvjetljava šira praksa osmanske administracije i religijske politike.

Podaci o vakufu Kalin Hadži Alije ukazali su na njegovu finansijsku snagu, ali i na važnu društvenu funkciju, budući da je kroz njega osigurano održavanje vjerskog i obrazovnog života mahale. Uloga članova porodice vakifa, kao i kasnijih dobrotvora, dodatno potvrđuje kontinuitet vakufske tradicije u oblikovanju lokalne zajednice. Istovremeno, analiza toponimije i granica mahale otkriva složenu dinamiku preklapanja osmanske i ranije, srednjovjekovne, urbane geografije Sarajeva.

Rekonstrukcija života u mahali, od strukture stanovništva do uloge imama, mujezina i muallima, svjedoči o društvenoj raznolikosti i ulozi pojedinaca u očuvanju njenog identiteta. Stradanje džamije 1697. godine u pohodu Eugena Savojskog te kasnija obnova predstavljaju važan podsjetnik na otpornost sarajevske urbane zajednice i njenu sposobnost da obnavlja ključne institucije čak i u trenucima razaranja.

³¹ BOA, TD 379, 79-80.

³² *Opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine*, sv. I/1, 81-82.

Ovim radom se potvrđuje da detaljno proučavanje jedne mahale može osvijetliti šire procese urbanog razvoja Sarajeva i njegovog društveno-kulturnog identiteta. Kalin Hadži Alijina mahala, iako relativno mala u prostornom smislu, svojim nastankom, funkcijama i transformacijama predstavlja paradigmatican primjer uticaja vakufa na formiranje i trajnost urbanog tkiva Sarajeva. Time ovaj rad otvara mogućnosti za dalja istraživanja drugih mahala i vakufa, čime bi se mozaik urbane historije Sarajeva mogao dodatno upotpuniti i preciznije interpretirati.

Summary

Research into the origins and development of the Kalin Haji Ali quarter (mahalle) in Sarajevo during the 16th and 17th centuries has demonstrated the significance of a micro-historical approach in understanding the processes of urbanization during the Ottoman period. The analysis of available archival sources, court records (sijils), and census registers (defters) has enabled the precise identification of this quarter, its situation within the city's urban fabric, and a reconstruction of the social and legal-administrative circumstances of its formation. A particular contribution of this study lies in confirming the transformation of Kalin Haji Ali's mesjid into a mosque, thereby shedding light on the broader practices of Ottoman administration and religious policy.

Data regarding the waqf (endowment) of Kalin Haji Ali indicate not only its financial strength but also its vital social function, as it secured the maintenance of the religious and educational life of the quarter. The roles played by the founder's family members and later benefactors further confirm the continuity of the waqf tradition in shaping the local community. Simultaneously, the analysis of toponymy and the quarter's boundaries reveals a complex dynamic where Ottoman and earlier medieval urban geographies of Sarajevo overlap.

The reconstruction of life within the quarter—from the demographic structure to the roles of the imam, muezzin, and muallim—attests to the social diversity and the role of individuals in preserving its identity. The destruction of the mosque in 1697 during the campaign of Eugene of Savoy and its subsequent renovation serve as a poignant reminder of the resilience of Sarajevo's urban community and its capacity to restore key institutions even in times of devastation.

This work confirms that the detailed study of a single mahalle can illuminate the broader processes of Sarajevo's urban development and its socio-cultural identity. Although relatively small in spatial terms, the Kalin Haji Ali quarter, through its emergence, functions, and transformations, serves as a paradigmatic example of the influence of the waqf on the formation and permanence of Sarajevo's urban fabric. In doing so, this research opens

possibilities for further studies of other quarters and endowments, which would further complete and more precisely interpret the mosaic of Sarajevo's urban history.

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
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Prilog 2. *Popis stanovnika Mahale Hadži Alijinog mesdžida u osmanskom defteru iz druge polovine 16. stoljeća.* (Istanbul, BOA TD 379, 79-80.)

1. Ferhad sin Timura, imam
2. Bali, oslobođeni rob Karadžić
3. Memi sin Balija, neoženjen (mudžerred - dalje: m)
4. Uvejs sin Muse
5. Kurd Ali sin Uvejsa
6. Timur sin Alija
7. Muruvvet sin Timura, m
8. Korkud sin Timura, m
9. Ibrahim sin Timura, m
10. Ali sin Ahmeda
11. Mehmed sin Husejina
12. Ferhan(?) sin Mehmeda, m
13. Piri sin Mehmeda, m
14. Bajram sin Iljasa
15. Ejnehana sin Balija
16. Bajezid sin Balija, m
17. Firuz sin Ejnehbegija
18. Memi sin Firuza, m
19. Bešir sin Muruveta, m
20. Ibrahim sin Muruveta, m
21. Salih sin Pervanea
22. Mustafa sin Obrada
23. Pir Ali sin Jusufa
24. Sulejman sin Murada
25. Hasan sin Murada, m
26. Ali sin Mehmeda
27. Murad sin Alija, m
28. Ali sin Mahmuda
29. Husejn sin Alija, m
30. Uvejs sin Iljasa
31. Osman sin Uvejsov, m
32. Nasuh sin Abdulahov
33. Ali sin Nasuhov, m
34. Ibrahim sin Iljasa
35. Ahmed sin Husejina;
36. Husejn sin Timura
37. Omer sin Husejnov, m
38. Mensur sin Husejnov, m
39. Osman sin Husejnov, m
40. Redžeb sin Mustafe
41. Jusuf sin Alađoza
42. Mustafa sin Mehmeda
43. Memi sin Mustafe
44. Hurem sin Alije
45. Sulejman sin Hurema
46. Timur sin Oruča
47. Širmerd sin Iljasa
48. Ahmed sin Timura
49. Ali sin Muse
50. Omer sin Alija, m
51. Osman sin Alija, m
52. Ibrahim sin Iskendera
53. Sadik sin Alija
54. Sulejman sin Murada
55. Bešir sin Nasuha
56. Ali sin Nasuha
57. Kurd Ali sin Jahje
58. Jusuf sin Jahje, m
59. Bali sin Iljasa
60. Ibrahim sin Husejina
61. Ali sin Ibrahim, m
62. Ališah Ibrahim, m
63. Halil sin Ibrahim, m
64. Oruč sin Šir Merda
65. Veli sin Ahmeda
66. Mustafa sin Velija, m
67. Mustafa sin Ahmeda
68. Murad sin Alija
69. Sulejman sin Murada, m
70. Ali sin Oruča
71. Šaban sin Oruča, m
72. Ahmed sin Mehmeda
73. Ali sin Ferhada
74. Oruč sin Alija
75. Ali sin Oruča
76. Osman sin Alija, m
77. Husejn sin Timura
78. Hurem sin Junusa
79. Mustafa sin Husejina
80. Murad sin Husejina
81. Korkud sin Murada, m
82. Murad sin Mehmeda
83. Šahman sin Sefera, m
84. Sefer sin Timura
85. Kurd Ali sin Kasima

Prilog 3. *Imena stanovnika Kalin Hadži Alijine mahale u drugoj polovini 16. stoljeća.*
(Istanbul, BOA TD 379, 79-80.)

1. Ibrahim-halifa, imam
2. Ibrahim-halifa, muezzin
3. Hadži Ali, Muse
4. Ali, Dževlana
5. Husejn, Alije, m
6. Husejn, Balije, m
7. Hadži Gazi, Džafera
8. Bali, Džafera
9. Bali, Hasana
10. Mustafa, Ramadana
11. Ahmed, Husejina
12. Ibrahim, Hasana
13. Salih, Hasana, m
14. Halil, Ahmeda, m
15. Husejn, Ibrahim, m
16. Hurrem, Junusa
17. Hizir, Hurrema
18. Ahmed, Behrama, m
19. Omer, Alije
20. Džafer, Ferhada
21. Sulejman, Alije, m
22. Ibrahim, Džafera, m
23. Husejn, Džafera, m
24. Ali, Ferhada
25. Veli, Pir-Alije
26. Muharrem, Firuza
27. Muruvvet, Dursuna
28. Husejn, Muruvveta, m
29. Muruvvet, Timura
30. Halil, Muruvveta, m
31. Ibrahim, Muruvveta
32. Ali, Uvejsa
33. Mehmed, Alije, m
34. Šaban, Jusufa
35. Memi, Balije
36. Oruč, Kurda
37. Mustafa, Oruča
38. Gazi, Memije
39. Hadži Mustafa, Abdullaha
40. Memi, Ferhada
41. Mustafa, Ferhada
42. Salih, Memije
43. Halil, Ishaka
44. Mensur, Husejina
45. Osman, Husejina
46. Jusuf, Mensura
47. Ali, Mensura
48. Husejn, Ferhada
49. Hubijar, Alije, m
50. Hasan, Alije, m
51. Mustafa, Alije
52. Omer, Mustafe Alijina, m
53. Osman, Mustafe, m
54. Ali, Mehmeda
55. Nezir, Mehmeda
56. Mustafa, Nezira, m
57. Ali, Nezira, m
58. Abdi, Nezira, m
59. Mustafa, ambar?
60. Itmur, Behrama
61. Ali, dulger
62. Ibrahim, Abdullaha
63. Ali, Abdullaha
64. Salih, Osmama, m
65. Mustafa, Balije, m
66. Derviš, Husejina, m
67. Pervane, Abdullaha
68. Ferhad, Pervanea
69. Salih, Sudžaa
70. Osman, Sudžaa
71. Memi, Sulejmana, m
72. Veli, Balije
73. Husejn, Velije
74. Bekir, Ejnehana
75. Muharrem, Hasana
76. Mustafa, Hasana
77. Husejn, Ferhada
78. Memi, Šadije
79. Nezir, Pirije
80. Turhan, Husejina
81. Šahman, Turhana
82. Mustafa, Turhana, m
83. Gazi, Alije
84. Ibrahim, Gazije
85. Behram, Gazije
86. Abdi, Gazije
87. Ajdin, Muse
88. Hasan, Ferhada
89. Mehmed, Ejnehana
90. Abdi, Husejina, m
91. Ibrahim, Alije, m

Prilog 4. *Imena stanovnika Kalin Hadži Alijine mahale početkom 17. stoljeća.*
(Opširni popis Bosanskog sandžaka iz 1604. godine, sv. I/1, 81-82)

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A MULTIFACETED GENIUS OF THE 16TH CENTURY: AN ASSESSMENT OF MATRAKÇI NASUH AND THE MILITARY POLYMATH

Abstract: *Nasuh bin Karagöz bin Abdullah al-Bosnavî, often referred to by art historians as the „Renaissance Man” of the Ottoman Empire, stands out as one of the most distinguished polymaths of the 16th-century Ottoman State, earning his place in the golden pages of history. Renowned for his versatility, intelligence, and skills, Nasuh became a figure recognized above his contemporaries, frequently described as a genius. Despite his reticence regarding personal information in his works, it has been established through his earliest treatise in mathematics that he was of Bosnian origin; the same source also raised the possibility that Matrakçı Nasuh was a product of the devşirme (child-levy) system. Acknowledged as a polymath, Nasuh received his education at the Imperial Palace School (Enderun), subsequently serving in various capacities at the royal court. His contributions spanned the pioneering of Ottoman cartography and miniature painting, as well as the systematization of martial sports, positioning him as an emblem of the synthesis of science, art, and athleticism within the empire. In particular, the designation of 2014 by UNESCO as „The Year of Matrakçı Nasuh“ has underscored his legacy internationally and established the importance of safeguarding this cultural heritage. Nasuh’s legacy continues today through exhibitions bearing his name, ongoing academic inquiry into his works, interpretation of his artistic creations, and the recognition of sports he codified, many of which have influenced contemporary athletic*

disciplines. His unique perspective on martial arts, mathematical reasoning, and visual documentation is now the focus of both popular and scholarly efforts to promote his cultural significance globally.

The present study thus originates from the growing international need to introduce Matrakçı Nasuh's extensive heritage in both folk traditions and cultural history. Identified as a miniaturist, cartographer, historian, calligrapher, mathematician, and master swordsman, Matrakçı Nasuh belongs to the small pantheon of historical luminaries whose multidisciplinary genius continues to shed light from the past to the present. The works he left behind serve as beacons, illuminating the depths of history for subsequent generations. Nasuh, recorded as one of the most versatile and prominent intellectuals of the sixteenth-century Ottoman world, stands out primarily for the works he contributed to Ottoman visual historiography. At the same time, he holds a central position in the literature due to his production of works that reflect the scientific knowledge of his period and were designed for practical educational purposes.

*Nasuh's oeuvre not only emphasizes the importance attributed to science and art within Ottoman culture but also illustrates the holistic structure of scientific and artistic disciplines of the era. In this respect, Matrakçı Nasuh is regarded as a distinguished representative of the classical Ottoman intellectual type. His work *Beyan-ı Menazil-i Sefer-i Irak*, produced during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent through his participation in military campaigns, contains detailed city depictions documenting the geography of the Ottoman Empire and constitutes one of the most significant examples of a distinctive narrative style in Ottoman miniature art, characterized by the absence of linear perspective yet grounded in topographical accuracy. Nasuh's works are of great importance in demonstrating the intertwined nature of science, culture, history, and art in the Ottoman period. Moreover, his city depictions focusing on campaign routes occupy a distinctive and early position within Ottoman visual historiography, while also providing valuable data for military logistics and strategic planning. The primary motivation of this study is to demonstrate that Matrakçı Nasuh was not merely a historian and artist within the military culture of the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, but also a significant figure who produced works on warfare techniques and military training. Accordingly, the study aims to examine Nasuh's role within the Ottoman military system and emphasizes the necessity of evaluating the methods he developed in weapon training and physical education as integral components of disciplined military training in the Ottoman army. The *matrak* game, developed by Nasuh and bearing his name, was employed as a training method designed to enhance soldiers' reflexes, physical endurance, agility, and close-combat skills.*

Furthermore, Nasuh's treatises on weapon use and training practices highlight the importance of a disciplined and systematic military education adopted by the Ottoman army. By personally participating in campaigns and documenting conquest routes and military stations through detailed visual

representations, Nasuh made significant contributions to the understanding of the logistical structures and geographical dimensions of military operations and campaigns. Representing an approach that prioritizes practical training within Ottoman military thought, Matrakçı Nasuh is therefore considered one of the most original intellectuals of his time for his integration of the theoretical and practical dimensions of Ottoman military thinking.

Key word: *New media and communication, Matrak, Matrakçı Nasuh, Tuhfetül Guzat.*

SVESTRANI GENIJE 16. VIJEKA: VREDNOVANJE MATRAKČIJE NASUHA I VOJNOG POLIHISTORA/VOJNOG SVESTRANOG UČENJAKA

Apstrakt: *Nasuh bin Karagöz bin Abdullah al-Bosnavî, kojeg historičari umjetnosti često nazivaju „renesansnim čovjekom“ Osmanskog Carstva, ističe se kao jedan od najistaknutijih polihistora osmanske države 16. stoljeća, osiguravši sebi mjesto na zlatnim stranicama historije. Čuven po svojoj svestranosti, inteligenciji i vještinama, Nasuh je postao figura prepoznata iznad svojih savremenika, često opisivane kao genije. Uprkos njegovoj suzdržanosti u pogledu ličnih podataka u svojim djelima, kroz njegov najraniji traktat iz matematike utvrđeno je da je bio bosanskog porijekla; isti izvor navodi i mogućnost da je Matrakči Nasuh bio regrutovan putem sistema devşirme. Kao priznati polihistor, Nasuh je obrazovanje stekao u dvorskoj školi (Enderun), nakon čega je obavljao različite dužnosti na carskom dvoru. Njegov doprinos obuhvata pionirski rad u osmanskoj kartografiji i minijaturnom slikarstvu, kao i sistematizaciju borilačkih vještina, što ga postavlja kao simbol sinteze nauke, umjetnosti i atletizma unutar Carstva. Posebno je proglašenje 2014. godine „Godinom Matrakčija Nasuha“ od strane UNESCO-a naglasilo njegovu ostavštinu na međunarodnom nivou i ukazalo na važnost očuvanja ovog kulturnog naslijeđa. Nasuhova baština živi i danas kroz izložbe koje nose njegovo ime, kontinuirana akademska istraživanja njegovih djela, interpretacije njegovih umjetničkih kreacija, te kroz priznavanje sportova koje je kodifikovao, a od kojih su mnogi uticali na savremene sportske discipline. Njegova jedinstvena perspektiva na borilačke vještine, matematičko rezonovanje i vizuelnu dokumentaciju danas je u fokusu kako popularnih tako i naučnih napora da se promoviše njegov kulturni značaj na globalnom nivou.*

Ova studija, stoga, proizilazi iz rastuće međunarodne potrebe za predstavljanjem opsežnog naslijeđa Matrakčija Nasuha, kako u narodnim tradicijama tako i u kulturnoj historiji. Identifikovan kao minijaturist, kartograf, historičar, kaligraf, matematičar i majstor mačevanja, Matrakči Nasuh pripada uskom krugu historijskih velikana čiji multidisciplinarni genije nastavlja osvjetljavati put iz prošlosti u sadašnjost. Djela koja je ostavio služe kao putokazi

koji osvjetljavaju dubine historije za buduće generacije. Nasuh, zabilježen kao jedan od najsvestranijih i najistaknutijih intelektualaca osmanskog svijeta šesnaestog stoljeća, ističe se prvenstveno po djelima kojima je doprinio osmanskoj vizuelnoj historiografiji. Istovremeno, on zauzima centralno mjesto u literaturi zahvaljujući stvaranju djela koja odražavaju naučno znanje njegovog vremena, a koja su bila namijenjena praktičnim obrazovnim svrhama.

*Nasuhov opus ne samo da naglašava važnost koja se pridavala nauci i umjetnosti unutar osmanske kulture, već i ilustruje holističku strukturu naučnih i umjetničkih disciplina tog doba. U tom pogledu, Matrakçı Nasuh se smatra istaknutim predstavnikom klasičnog osmanskog tipa intelektualca. Njegovo djelo *Beyan-ı Menazil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn*, nastalo tokom vladavine sultana Sulejmana Veličanstvenog kroz Nasuhovo učešće u vojnim pohodima, sadrži detaljne prikaze gradova koji dokumentuju geografiju Osmanskog Carstva i predstavlja jedan od najznačajnijih primjera specifičnog narativnog stila u osmanskoj minijaturi, kojeg karakteriše odsustvo linearne perspektive, ali uz strogu topografsku tačnost. Nasuhova djela su od velike važnosti za demonstraciju isprepletenosti nauke, kulture, historije i umjetnosti u osmanskom periodu. Štaviše, njegovi prikazi gradova na rutama vojnih pohoda zauzimaju rano i specifično mjesto u osmanskoj vizuelnoj historiografiji, pružajući istovremeno dragocjene podatke za vojnu logistiku i strateško planiranje. Primarna motivacija ove studije je da pokaže kako Matrakçı Nasuh nije bio samo historičar i umjetnik unutar vojne kulture osmanskog 16. stoljeća, već i značajna figura koja je stvarala djela o tehnikama ratovanja i vojnoj obuci. Shodno tome, studija ima za cilj ispitati Nasuhovu ulogu unutar osmanskog vojnog sistema i naglašava potrebu za evaluacijom metoda koje je razvio u obuci oružjem i fizičkom vaspitanju kao integralnih komponenti disciplinovane vojne obuke u osmanskoj vojsci. Igra *matrak*, koju je Nasuh razvio i koja nosi njegovo ime, korištena je kao metoda obuke dizajnirana da poboljša refleksive vojnika, fizičku izdržljivost, agilnost i vještine bliske borbe.*

Nadalje, Nasuhovi traktati o upotrebi oružja i trenažnim praksama ističu važnost disciplinovanog i sistematičnog vojnog obrazovanja koje je usvojila osmanska vojska. Ličnim učešćem u pohodima i dokumentovanjem osvajačkih ruta i vojnih stanica putem detaljnih vizuelnih prikaza, Nasuh je dao značajan doprinos razumijevanju logističkih struktura i geografskih dimenzija vojnih operacija. Predstavljajući pristup koji daje prioritet praktičnoj obuci unutar osmanske vojne misli, Matrakçı Nasuh se stoga smatra jednim od najoriginalnijih intelektualaca svog vremena zbog integracije teoretskih i praktičnih dimenzija osmanskog vojnog razmišljanja.

Ključne riječi: *Novi mediji i komunikacija, Matrak, Matrakçı Nasuh, Tuhfetül Guzat.*

Introduction

From cartographic and urban depictions (cartography/topography) to miniature and illumination, calligraphy (fine writing) to mathematics, authorship and production in the fields of history and geography, as well as martial arts training and instruction, Matrakçı Nasuh is recognized for his achievements in diverse disciplines and for works entrusted to future generations, testifying to his importance as a historical figure whose skills and knowledge deserve ongoing study and scholarly inquiry. His mastery of multiple disciplines rendered Nasuh an influential figure whose contributions to various domains remain significant for contemporary advancements. This study examines Matrak Nasuh against the background of the „matrak” game—a martial and sporting discipline that constitutes a synthesis of art, sport, and military pedagogy.

Nasuh, known as Matrakçı due to his remarkable accomplishments and skills displayed in the cudgel-based sport „matrak”, has produced numerous invaluable works that merit modern examination. During military campaigns ordered by Ottoman sultans, he meticulously painted miniatures of cities and locales witnessed in person, documenting urban plans and thereby providing substantial documentary evidence concerning the political and architectural conditions of the era. Through his systematization of city plans and military campaign routes in miniature form, Nasuh significantly advanced the discipline of urban history; his works now serve as primary sources for a range of scholarly disciplines, including urban history, miniature art, architecture, cartography, and topography.

In addition to his artistic and documentary pursuits, Nasuh excelled in mathematics, history, weaponry training (Silahtar-Nasuh el-Silâhî), miniature art, competitive martial arts, swordsmanship, scholarship, philosophy, statesmanship, navigation, painting, farming, invention, calligraphy, and geography. Exceeding his contemporaries in intellectual breadth, he authored foundational mathematical treatises such as Cemâlû'l Küttâb, Kemâlû'l Hisâb, and Umdetü'l Hisâb, further establishing his reputation as a distinguished mathematician. His fame in connection with the matrak game originates from the strategic brilliance and success he demonstrated as a master swordsman; his legacy is one of multifaceted achievement, integrating the skills of a military instructor, swordsman, and athlete while elevating the matrak game as a discipline embodying both sport and the art of war.

Through his unique miniatures, Nasuh enables modern societies to envision the social and cultural contours of the sixteenth century; the matrix game itself, evocative of modern Olympic sword sports such as fencing and kendo, stands as an inspiration for subsequent martial disciplines. Matrak, an essential training method in military education and combat practice, was standardized by Nasuh and has become synonymous with his name. His strategic and original perspectives on martial drills have been decisive in gaining recognition under the epithets „silahi” (weapons master) and „silahşor”

(swordsman); in his era, Nasuh was celebrated not only for his success in combat demonstrations and competitions, but also for his leadership in military planning and preparedness.

The concept of the „silahi” (weapons master) is epitomized by Nasuh, whose martial arts and training activities were integrally linked to the development of matrak as a sport. His creative process in simulating sword and shield techniques using wooden cudgels as training implements demonstrates his ingenuity as an artist and innovator. In practice, matrak contributed to the advancement of swordsmanship among soldiers and athletes; it fostered reflex development and furthered both offensive and defensive strategic thinking, while its strict regimen ensured players maintained optimal condition and balance. In the context of close-quarters combat, the matrak game advanced war skills and enabled participants to preserve their physical and tactical readiness.

The popularization of matrak in social events and entertainment enhanced public appreciation and sympathy for the discipline. Although Nasuh refrained from providing personal biographies, it is documented that he participated in matrak demonstrations and weaponry shows during official festivities under the patronage of Ottoman sultans. Such events served both recreational and military purposes, exemplifying skill and competence. Notably, Nasuh participated in matrak competitions with Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, earning distinctions and, in 1530, being honored by the sultan with an imperial diploma for his martial prowess. His unmatched abilities in matrak are further evidenced by his literary contributions, such as *Tuhfetül Guzat*, which explores themes of warfare and strategy, as well as techniques in swordsmanship, shield, mace, cavalry, and archery.

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Nasuh's *Tuhfetül Guzat*, enriched by his personal sketches and artistic renderings, emphasizes the value of formal drill and discipline, while also showcasing his proficiency in cartography and military strategy. This treatise demonstrates that warfare consists not only of tactical operations but also requires mastery in logistics, geographic analysis, route planning, personnel deployment, and supply management. The text, therefore, remains vital for understanding Ottoman military systems and their relationship to urban

development, infrastructure, and aesthetic expression. Matrakçı Nasuh's wide-ranging legacy as an innovator, chronicler, and practitioner has bequeathed a wealth of source material to modern researchers. It stands to reason that renewed scholarly engagement, supported by academic inquiry, is essential to further illuminate the skills and talents possessed by this crucial figure in Ottoman and Turkish history.

A Study on the Life of Bosnian Scholar Matrakçı Nasuh

Nasuh bin Karagöz bin Abdullah al-Silâhî al-Matrâkî al-Visokavî al-Bosnavî (Matrakçı Nasuh Visočak), renowned for his multifaceted talents and achievements in mathematics, history, weaponry (Silahtar-Nasuh el-Silâhî), miniature art, martial sports, swordsmanship, scholarship, philosophy, statesmanship, maritime affairs, painting, agriculture, cartography, invention, calligraphy, and geography, was a prominent figure who marked the 16th century. Although his exact date of birth is not recorded, it is widely accepted that he lived between 1480 and 1564 [16 Ramadan 971 (April 28, 1564)]. A polymath who inscribed his name in the golden pages of Ottoman history, Nasuh was one of the notable personalities that the Balkan region contributed to the Ottoman Empire. Born in the town of Visoko in Bosnia, he was the grandson of Karagöz, who had entered imperial service through the Ottoman devshirme system. Nasuh served in the Janissary corps, and upon the discovery of his exceptional abilities, he became one of the instructors at the Enderun School, gaining the rare opportunity to serve the sultans of his era.

A fluent speaker of five languages, Matrakçı earned distinction through his works on history, calligraphy, painting, mathematics, and military science, establishing himself as one of the most significant intellectuals of the Ottoman 16th century. The epithet „Matrakçı” was bestowed upon him for his invention and mastery of the Matrak (Mel'abe-i Matrak), a form of mock combat or martial game. He participated in military campaigns with the sultans, illustrated the regions he traveled through, and created visual records that guided the artistic sensibilities of later generations, serving as an enduring source of inspiration. Living during the reigns of Sultan Selim I (Yavuz Sultan Selim) and Sultan Süleyman I (Kanuni Sultan Süleyman), Matrakçı Nasuh is regarded as a genius who broke new ground in the arts and documented historical details that illuminate his period.

Through his topographical painting style and his depictions of cities devoid of human figures, his works serve as visual records of the Ottoman era, portraying the social, cultural, geographical, aesthetic, architectural, and military structure of the time. With his exceptional skill, unique style, and penetrating intellect, Nasuh transcended his contemporaries. His distinct use of color and line in miniature paintings established a personal style that set him apart in Ottoman art history. Indeed, Matrakçı Nasuh is recognized as one of the most influential

painters depicting Ottoman military campaigns, with his topographical illustrations—fortresses, ports, vegetation, and cityscapes—reflecting his own observations and contributing significantly to the development of a more realistic approach in Turkish miniature art¹.

Yet it must be noted that his perception of reality diverged from that of Western painting traditions incorporating perspective and three-dimensionality. During his participation in various campaigns, he painted and took notes on the cities, ports, and fortresses he observed. Entering the Enderun School under Sultan Bayezid II, Nasuh later presented to Sultan Selim I his mathematical treatises *Cemalu'l-Küttâb ve Kemalu'l-Hisab* and *Ûdetu'l-Hisab*², works addressing the fundamental operations of arithmetic, fractions, numbers, and scales. In 1533, he expanded these studies into another major work, *Umdetu'l-Hisab*³.

Nasuh also traveled to Egypt, where he participated in competitions with the most renowned swordsmen of the time. His exceptional performances in combat games, particularly through the innovative techniques he introduced into the Matrak discipline, established him as one of the greatest duelists of the Ottoman period, earning him the epithet „Matrakçı Nasuh” and the formal title of *Silahtar* (master swordsman). His unrivaled prowess was officially confirmed by a diploma conferred by Sultan Süleyman in 1530. Upon his return from Egypt, he documented his tactical and strategic innovations in combat arts, producing a work that contributed to the literature of martial sciences.

Considering the intellectual and artistic context of his time, Nasuh's versatility, analytical insight, and keen observation distinguished him among his contemporaries, positioning him as a pioneer whose ideas and works enriched various branches of art and military science. His topographically descriptive works, serving both artistic and documentary functions, introduced fresh perspectives and methodologies into Ottoman visual culture. Highlighting his acute observational skills, Nasuh's schematic and topographic compositions, including his depictions of places he visited—roads, bridges, fortifications, vegetation, and architectural structures—brought exceptional innovation to the art of miniature painting, earning him an enduring place in the artistic heritage of the Ottoman Empire.

Matrakçı Nasuh prepared significant works on mathematics and geometry, namely *Cemâlû'l-Küttâb* and *Umdetü'l-Hisâb*, which he dedicated to Sultan Selim I (Yavuz Sultan Selim). In the extant copy preserved in Zagreb, the capital of modern-day Croatia, his name is recorded as Nasûh b. Karagöz el-

¹ Çağman, F, Tanındı, Z. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi İslam Minyatürleri, *Sanat ve Kültür Yayınları 1*, Güzel Sanatlar Matbaası A.Ş., İstanbul 1979, 53-64.

² Yurdaydın H. G., *Nasûh's Silâhî (Matrakçı), Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i Irâkeyn-i Sultân Süleymân Hân*, TTK, Ankara 2014, 2.

³ Erkan Davut, Matrakçı Nasûh'un Hayatı ve Eserleri Üzerine Notlar, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, Sayı: 37, 2011, 60.

Priştëvi⁴. Due to this identification, debates have arisen regarding his possible origin from Priştina. However, following a detailed examination of existing sources, the evidence suggests that „Matrakçı Nasuh’s grandfather was brought from Sarajevo through the devşirme system, his father’s name was Abdullah, and he himself was known as Nasuh bin Abdullah”⁵.

Although little is known about the early stages of his life, research indicates that he was born in Sarajevo. The exact date of his arrival in Istanbul remains uncertain, yet findings show that he resided in the city for many years. Living during the peak of the Ottoman Empire’s rise—an era characterized by esteem for scholarship and the arts, when eminent works flourished—Matrakçı Nasuh distinguished himself as a remarkable figure. Information concerning his family is limited. His work Süleymannâme mentions that he had a son, though nothing is known of any other children. While precise data on his final years are unavailable, it is known that his last work was completed by 1561⁶.

Seybold, referring to a Qur’anic commentary found in Breslau City Library, noted that the copyist identified himself as Hüseyin b. Nasûh el-Visokovî; based on this, he proposed that the individual might have been Matrakçı Nasuh’s son. He further asserted that Visoko is a town in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, according to this record, Nasuh may have originated from that region⁷.

The fact that Matrakçı Nasuh referred to himself using different appellations in his own works complicates efforts to trace his lineage accurately, rendering extant information ambiguous. In Cemâlî’l-Küttâb ve Kemâlî’l-Hüssâb, for example, he identified himself as Nasûh b. Abdullah on folio 1b and as Nasûh b. Karagöz el-Priştëvi on folio 2a⁸; in Umdetü’l-Hisâb⁹, he again used Nasûh b. Abdullah. In the copy of Tuhfetü’l-Guzât¹⁰ preserved in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, his name appears as Hüsrevü’s-Silahî el-müştehir bi-ser-silahşorân. Studies also confirm that he frequently referred to himself as Nasûhu’s-Silahî eş-şehir bi-Matrâkî. Kâtip Çelebi, in his Keşfu’z-Zünûn, recorded his name as Nasûh b. Karagöz b. Abdullah¹¹ and identified the

⁴ Erkan Davut, *Matrakçı Nasuh’un Süleyman-namesi (1520-1537)*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2015, 20.

⁵ Selvi Hüseyin Zahit ve Bekiroğlu Keskin, Gaye (2017), *Matrakçı Nasuh’un Galata Ve İstanbul Minyatürlerinin Harita Tekniği Açısından İncelenmesi*, *İstem*, Yıl: 15, Sayı: 29. 25-29.

⁶ Atasoy Nurhan, Silahşör, Tarihçi, Matematikçi, Nakkaş, *Hattatmatrakçı Nasuh Ve Menazilname’si: Beyan-ı Menazil-İ Sefer-İ İrakeyn-İ Sultan Süleyman Han*, 1. Cilt, Milenyum Yayıncılık, İstanbul 2015, 14-15.

⁷ Erkan D., *Matrakçı Nasuh’un Süleymân-nâmesi (1520-1537)*, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Türk Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı Yeniçağ Tarihi Bilim Dalı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul 2005, 17.

⁸ İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, TY, Nr. 2719, Vr. 1b.

⁹ Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi Kol, Nr. 3152, Vr. 1b.

¹⁰ Macar Bilimler Akademisi Kütüphanesi, Török Nr. O. 128, Vr. 2a.

¹¹ Kâtip Çelebi, *Keşfü’z-zünûn an esâmi’l-kütüb ve’l-fünûn*, İstanbul 1941, c. I, 594.

author of *Tuhfetü'l-Guzât*, attributed to Nasuh, as *Hüsrevü's-Silahî el-ma'rûf bi-reisi'l-silahşorân*¹²

Matrakçı Nasuh's Skills in the Art of Warfare

Although he is often regarded as the inventor of the matrak game, Nasuh—known by the epithet Matrakçı for his innovations in tactics and strategies within the existing game—was recognized as a polymath of his era, distinguished for his expertise in military strategy, swordsmanship, and the matrak sport. Recorded in history as a versatile, talented, and exceptionally skilled Bosnian intellectual, Nasuh was educated at the Enderun Mektebi (Palace School) during the reign of Sultan Bayezid II. There, he received training from some of the most knowledgeable and accomplished scholars and masters of the time. Among them, Sai Çelebi—one of Bayezid II's tutors—formed with him a strong bond that transcended the traditional master-apprentice relationship. In later years, Nasuh himself taught at the Enderun Mektebi, thereby transmitting his extensive knowledge and refined skills to subsequent generations.

Matrakçı Nasuh occupies a distinct place among the rare individuals who combined in one person the attributes of a scholar, artist, soldier, athlete, educator, philosopher, statesman, seafarer, farmer, and inventor. His multidimensional intellect, creative approach, and the distinctiveness of his works set him apart from his contemporaries when measured against the context and constraints of his time. For the Bosnian Matrakçı, the most significant duty was to produce enduring works worthy of being considered „history“—creations from which future generations could learn and find moral instruction¹³.

Continuously seeking self-improvement and possessing a keenly observant mind, Nasuh of Visoko mastered the ability to highlight his analytical insight. In his works, he went beyond a singular interpretive stance, integrating artistic expression to portray from his unique perspective the societal, political, cultural, geographic, and military developments of his era and region. As a witness to some of the most crucial events and transformations of his time, Matrakçı Nasuh created works that have endured as vital documentary evidence. Undoubtedly, the body of work he left to future generations serves as an invaluable resource for understanding the past in the context of contemporary societies.

In 1517, Nasuh al-Bosnawi prepared a series of works in the field of mathematics to be presented to Sultan Selim I. The sophistication and intellectual quality of these works attracted considerable attention, and through his numerous other compositions—depicting, with striking realism, various elements ranging from human settlements and vegetation cover to natural environments and

¹² Kâtip Çelebi, *Keşfü'z-zünûn an esâmi'l-küttüb ve'l-fünûn*, İstanbul, 1941, c. I, 371.

¹³ Yurdaydın H. G, *Matrakçı Nasûh*, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963, XII.

architecturally significant structures—he succeeded in drawing the appreciation and patronage of the Ottoman sultans of his time. The Bosnian calligrapher and miniature painter Nasuh, known for his mastery as both a calligrapher and an illuminator, demonstrated in his original and highly refined miniatures, which incorporate map-like visual components, as well as in the written sections accompanying these artistic depictions, that he was far more than merely an accomplished miniature artist. His manner of integrating image and text reveals that he was also a historian who sought to chronicle historical events not solely through written expression but also through carefully rendered visual documentation¹⁴

After traveling to Egypt, Nasuh al-Bosnawi participated in public demonstrations alongside eminent and renowned swordsmen. His exceptional achievements in swordsmanship and in the popular combat game matrak earned him the reputation of being the most distinguished warrior in the Ottoman domains—thereafter he became widely known as Matrakçı Nasuh. Upon his return from Egypt, he composed a treatise on the art of swordsmanship¹⁵. It is also asserted that he took part in the Iraqeyn Campaign of 1533 against the Safavid Empire, as he authored a work that includes miniatures depicting this military expedition, and certain expressions within the text strongly imply his direct participation¹⁶. Under the orders of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, Nasuh undertook the Turkish translation of the celebrated Arabic Chronicle of Islam by Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari. Furthermore, in the year 936 AH (1530 CE), he produced his distinguished work entitled Tuhfetü'l-Guzat, in which he conveyed his extensive expertise, technical skill, and accumulated strategic knowledge regarding the art and discipline of swordsmanship.

In 1529, during the grand circumcision ceremony organized in honor of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent's three sons—Şehzades Mustafa, Mehmed, and Selim—splendid festivities took place at the Atmeydanı (Hippodrome) in Sultanahmet. Among these entertainments, two mobile fortresses constructed out of paper were built, complete with cannons, battering instruments, and all the necessary materials for siege warfare. Within these model fortifications, soldiers performed a mock battle, vividly imitating scenes of real warfare¹⁷. Through these two fortress structures, Matrakçı Nasuh demonstrated not only his artistic ingenuity but also his remarkable proficiency in engineering design.

The two movable and wheeled fortresses, created as part of the performance staged for the circumcision celebrations of the Sultan's sons, stood as original works of engineering, each featuring four gates and five towers.

¹⁴ Kumcu İlal S, *Beyan-ı Menazil-i Sefer-i Irakayn-i Sultan Süleyman Han Minyatürlerinin Doğa Ve Bitki Örtüsünün İncelenmesi*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Sanat Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, Doktora Tezi, İstanbul 1995, 2.

¹⁵ Tanındı Z, *Türk Minyatür Sanatı*, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayını, İstanbul 1996, 3-62.

¹⁶ Erkan Davut, Matrakçı Nasûh'un Hayatı ve Eserleri Üzerine Notlar, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, Sayı: 37, 2011, 184.

¹⁷ Yurdaydın H. G, *Matrakçı Nasûh*, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, 28, İstanbul 2003, 144.

Moreover, the fact that the walls of these fortresses were ornamented with intricate decorations reveals the intersection of Nasuh's technical knowledge and his aesthetic sensibility. In constructing these fortresses, he also fitted them with cannons and rifles, and placed swordsmen within each stronghold. When the two fortresses were finally completed, their gates were opened, and the soldiers stationed inside emerged to engage in mock combat in the arena. Eventually, one fortress overpowered the other, marking the dramatic conclusion of the spectacle.

This impressive performance, masterminded by Nasuh, became known as the „Game of Two Castles.” The purpose of the game was to reenact the scene of a siege. Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, observing the spectacle from his throne set up in front of İbrahim Pasha Palace at the Atmeydanı, was as captivated by Nasuh's extraordinary performance as the rest of the audience. At the conclusion of the event, the Sultan issued an imperial decree appointing him as the chief master swordsman of the entire Ottoman Empire. Following this historic demonstration, Nasuh's name was forever inscribed in history as „the lion of the forest of courage—Mitrakçı Nasuh”¹⁸. The Two Castle Game of Nasuh of Visoko is also featured in his treatise Tuhfe el-Guzât.

Beyond his multifaceted talents and extraordinary abilities, when assessed within the context of the period in which he lived, it is fair to assert that Matrakçı Nasuh possessed an intellect and foresight far ahead of his contemporaries. In addition to the unique works he contributed to the scientific and artistic corpus of his era, the matrak game—through which he acquired his epithet—and his remarkable mastery in designing strategic games contributed significantly to his rapid rise to prominence. Participating in swordsmanship demonstrations organized in Egypt under the command of Hayr Bey, who had been appointed governor by Sultan Selim I, Bosnian-born Nasuh earned the deep admiration of Hayr Bey for his exceptional performance and skill in weaponry.

So impressed was Hayr Bey by Nasuh's swordsmanship that, when Nasuh prepared to return to Istanbul, Hayr Bey composed a letter to accompany him—a letter expressing his admiration and high praise for Nasuh's mastery of arms. The records further indicate that Nasuh, who surpassed his peers in the art of matrak (Celalzade, vr. 197b), was officially recognized as invincible in the field of swordsmanship through a decree (berat) issued by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the year 936 AH (1530 CE), thereby affirming his superiority¹⁹. In this imperial decree, which declared Nasuh the „chief of swordsmen,” Sultan Suleiman ordered that Nasuh, who had demonstrated exceptional excellence over all rivals in various forms of spear and weapon combat, be recognized throughout the Ottoman lands as both „Ustad” (Master) and „Reis” (Head) in these disciplines²⁰.

¹⁸ Erkan Davut, 16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarihçiliğinde Yeni Bir Soluk: Matrakçı Nasuh, *1453 İstanbul Kültür ve Sanat Dergisi*, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, Sayı: 19, 2014, 41.

¹⁹ Yurdaydın H. G, *Mitrakçı Nasûh*, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, 28, İstanbul 2003, 143.

²⁰ Yurdaydın H. G, *Mitrakçı Nasûh*, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları. 1963, XI.

In that same year, 936 AH (1530 CE)—when the circumcision festivities for Sultan Suleiman’s sons (şehzades) took place—Nasuh completed his treatise *Tuhfetü’l-Guzat*, a comprehensive work devoted to the art of warfare. In this text, Nasuh-i Silahî addressed a wide range of martial subjects, including archery, swordsmanship, shield defense, mace handling, and cavalry training, thereby solidifying his stature as both a theoretician and a practitioner in military sciences.

The Matrak Game and the Influence of the Swordsman Matrakçı Nasuh on Turkish Military Art

Although the matrak game is often attributed to Matrakçı Nasuh (Nasuh bin Karagöz al-Bosnevî) as its inventor in the 16th century, various earlier sources indicate that similar forms of the game existed prior to his time. Nonetheless, Matrakçı Nasuh is recognized as the figure who developed and systematized it, transforming it into a structured practice with educational and training objectives. Beyond being a type of game, when evaluated within the conditions of its time, matrak came to be regarded as a form of sport. Furthermore, in the modern era—considered the contemporary continuation of Turkish traditional practices—it has been revived and included within the scope of traditional sports disciplines.

From an etymological perspective, the term matrak derives from the Arabic root *tark*, which was adopted into Turkish with the meanings of „stick” or „club.” Accordingly, it is reasonable to claim that the stick or club used in the game not only served as its main instrument but also lent its name to the sport itself. During the Ottoman Empire, matrak was practiced particularly during festivals and celebrations, as well as within the imperial court and the Janissary corps, where it functioned as a form of competition. While it may be described variously as a race, a sport, a game, or a training exercise, matrak was both an entertainment activity with social dimensions and a form of military drill aimed at enhancing combat readiness.

As a martial society, the Ottomans valued close-combat skills, and the matrak sport was therefore played primarily in open fields and public squares as a means of developing such techniques. During the later Ottoman periods, this vigorous sport was practiced by strong players known as *matrakçıs*, and the contests—called *matrak bazlık*—involved combat using matrak clubs, which were short, soft-tipped batons. Similar to other traditional athletic events such as *cirit* (equestrian javelin-throwing) or wrestling, the game was accompanied by the beat of drums and the shrill sound of the *zurna* (a reed instrument).²¹

²¹ Matrak Oyunu, *Türk Halk Oyunları Kataloğu T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı*, e-kitap, <https://ekitap.ktb.gov.tr/TR-79507/matrak-oyunu>.

However, unlike certain folk games such as *sinsin*, *matrak* contained virtually no element of dance or rhythmic movement.

Matrakçı Nasuh, the individual credited with institutionalizing and formalizing the rules of the *matrak* game, also excelled as a swordsman and promoted it as a defensive sport that fostered both physical and mental development within the military context of the time. The game required two essential pieces of equipment: the *matrak* stick—a polished club made from boxwood with a soft protective cover at the end—and a soft cushion or shield held in the left hand, serving as protective gear. Players, known as *matrakçis*, also wore helmets or padded headgear to protect against blows.

The primary objective of the *matrak* match was to strike the opponent's head or guarded area using controlled, touch-like movements. Scoring was based on the precision of each strike: a hit to the head earned 3 points, the torso 2 points, and contact with the arms or legs 1 point. Matches were supervised by a referee who enforced established rules regarding duration, equipment specifications, and scoring. Within this regulated framework, *matrak* functioned as more than a mere entertainment game—it cultivated balance, speed, technical control, and discipline, qualifying it as a unique hybrid between sport and military exercise in the Ottoman martial tradition.

The *matrak* sport, in which harsh strikes and injury-intended actions were subject to penalties, embodied an ethos grounded in fairness, self-defense, tactical awareness, and respect for the opponent. Beyond these moral imperatives, it also cultivated proficiency in close-combat techniques, tactical innovation, improved speed, precision, and decisive offensive ability in the martial arts context. As a form of military exercise, the *matrak* war game was designed not to inflict fatal or violent blows but rather to train participants to anticipate their opponent's movements, develop rapid reflexes, increase agility, and maintain balanced control between attack and defense.

Focusing on agility, coordination, defense, and offensive skills, *matrak* functioned as a defensive sport aimed at enhancing combat and survival capabilities. Over time, this training-oriented practice evolved into a structured game format, gaining popularity across all layers of Ottoman society and becoming an enduring social and martial tradition. It is therefore appropriate to note that *matrak* possessed ritual, social, and ethical dimensions that emphasized courtesy, discipline, and sportsmanship. As a form of close-combat exercise deeply rooted in Turkish culture and Ottoman military tradition, *matrak* served both as a training tool for soldiers and as a recreational activity that strengthened communal bonds.

Throughout Ottoman history, particularly within the *sipahi* cavalry and the Janissary corps, *matrak* was widely employed as an instructional method to enhance martial aptitude. During the sixteenth century, this sport was used to refine the fighting styles, techniques, and tactical competence of the Janissaries

and to improve their swordsmanship²². The noted Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi provides further evidence of the game's prominence, recording in his *Seyahatname* that there were ten workshops in Istanbul dedicated to matrak players (matrakçısı), employing around thirty craftsmen responsible for producing game equipment and weapons²³. The existence of these specialized workshops, as documented by Evliya Çelebi, clearly demonstrates that the matrak game had already achieved a high level of organization and refinement centuries before the emergence of modern Olympic fencing and other sword-based sports, functioning as a formalized martial training practice within the Ottoman Empire.

Considering the historical record of traditional Turkish sports—which included wrestling, swordplay, archery, horsemanship, polo (çöğen), cirit (mounted javelin throwing), spear-fighting, gökbörü (a game resembling polo with a goat carcass), stick-fighting (cop), tepük (a precursor of football), running (seyirtmek), hunting, skiing, boxing, bayonet fighting, swimming, matrak, club combat (tomak), stone throwing, tuluk (a competitive bag game), weightlifting, and pole climbing—it becomes evident that matrak predates many of the sports regarded as modern today, including fencing and kendo. In light of its tactical, strategic, and rule-based system, matrak may thus be characterized not only as a martial art but also as a form of simulated combat—one that integrates discipline, intellect, and controlled technique into the practice of warfare.

The matrak game, characterized by its emphasis on courtesy and sportsmanship, represents a distinctly Turkish martial sport that was embraced by the public as early as the 1500s. It was a regulated discipline with established rules, clearly defined principles, and protective equipment that ensured safety during play. Over time, its dynamic movements and codified structure served as a source of inspiration for the evolution of other athletic practices. According to the travel accounts of Evliya Çelebi, the art of matrakbazlık—the performance of matrak maneuvers—comprised more than 160 distinct forms of movement. It is further recorded that Sultan Murad IV himself was proficient in nearly seventy of these forms, highlighting both the sport's complexity and its cultural integration within Ottoman society²⁴.

Indeed, matrak occupies a significant place within the Turkish tradition of sport, combining martial training with elements of recreation, thereby transforming warfare techniques into a structured and socially valued game. It stands as a discipline designed to promote both the technical and physical development of its players. Today, matrak is officially represented within the Turkish Federation of Traditional Sports Branches, continuing to transmit principles of respect toward one's opponent, acknowledgment of personal

²² Yıldız Doğan, *Türk Spor Tarihi*, Ser Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1979, 11-12.

²³ https://ectal.meb.k12.tr/icerikler/geleneksel-turk-sporlari-matrak_11652373.

²⁴ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi Cilt 1*. (R. Dankoff ve S. A. Kahraman, Çev.). Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul 2006.

mistakes, and cultivation of ethical awareness—values that collectively form the moral foundation of sporting culture.

Through the organization of tournaments and demonstrations by various clubs and federations, matrak continues to survive as a living tradition that embodies both the preservation of cultural heritage and the promotion of national identity. As Evliya Çelebi records, the sport included diverse varieties such as fenn-i kesme, bağla, tanı, haddâd, bağal, muhalif, sürme ve gazel, kulak, serre, zîr ve heva, bağla top, rehâ top, fîdye, cângûş, top kafâ, and hevâkes, each emphasizing distinct technical motions and tactical patterns²⁵. These movements contributed to players' development of coordination, defensive skills, physical strength, agility, and quick responsiveness—all of which were integral to martial readiness.

Evliya Çelebi also recounts that Sultan Murad IV was an accomplished matrak player who could anticipate an opponent's technique, identify every vulnerability, and strike skillfully upon the head in a manner that produced the characteristic „matrak-trak” sound—a vivid expression of both control and artistry. His *Seyahatname* thus offers invaluable ethnographic insights into the cultural context, material conditions, and performative aspects surrounding matrak during the Ottoman period. Furthermore, Çelebi noted that the matrak club, shaped similarly to a mace (lobut), was relatively heavy, requiring practitioners to possess strong arm muscles—demonstrating that the game simultaneously stimulated mental focus and physical strength.

While preserving its traditional values, the development of matrak in accordance with modern sporting standards would allow it to attract the interest of younger generations. As a cultural and historical legacy central to the Turkish martial tradition, matrak embodies the imperative of safeguarding historical heritage while nurturing national memory—ensuring the transmission of historical consciousness to future generations as a vital cultural and ethical responsibility.

Summary

The preservation of cultural heritage and the transmission of values acquired throughout history to future generations within the framework of historical consciousness bear great significance for humanity. Communities composed of individuals who lack historical understanding and cultural awareness are inevitably bound to experience identity loss and increased susceptibility to external influence. Societies continually regulated by external actors eventually adopt lifestyles defined by standards and expectations not of their own making.

²⁵ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi Cilt 1*. (R. Dankoff ve S. A. Kahraman, Çev). Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul 2006.

Within the panorama of Turkish history and cultural heritage, the sport of matrak occupies a remarkable position and contributes to the broader development of world sports history (Nasuh, 1530). Although the precise inception or invention date remains unrecorded, matrak is estimated to have originated in the early 1500s or the 16th century. Scholarly consensus acknowledges that Matrakçı Nasuh systematized the sport and popularized it for the advancement of military training (Nasuh, 1530; Seyahatname). Specifically, during the 16th century, Nasuh formalized the rules and standards of matrak. The sport, while played alongside other disciplines within the Ottoman Empire, became more prominent due to its military character and persists today.

Matrak's emphasis on physical abilities—such as technical control, speed, and balance—alongside cognitive skills like tactical reasoning and strategic thinking, as well as ethical values including respect for opponents and sportsmanship, establishes it as a key element of the Turkish intangible cultural heritage necessitating continued preservation (Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatname). Its documentation in written works, ranging from Evliya Çelebi's travelogue to subsequent folklore studies, has cemented matrak's classification among traditional sports undergirding modern athletic traditions.

Given its historical depth, distinctive aspects, and multidimensional benefits, matrak justifiably deserves increased scholarly attention and visibility. Matrakçı Nasuh provided detailed exposition of the sport in his treatise *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* (The Gift to the Warriors), published in 1530, encompassing subjects such as archery, swordsmanship, the use of shields and maces, horsemanship, and weapon proficiency (Nasuh, 1530). Evaluated within its historical context, *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* stands as the first and sole source addressing this topic until its publication year.

The treatise, produced in the same year as the circumcision ceremonies of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent's sons, carries importance for its technical and martial terminology and its visual depictions—illustrated through maps and miniatures that attest to Nasuh's artistic expertise. Enhanced by a meticulously structured layout complemented by miniatures, the work distinguishes itself by integrating military history and art. By encompassing both tactical instruction and celebratory performance, *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* is widely regarded as a primary source for understanding the institutionalized tradition of swordsmanship and the prominence of martial training in Ottoman society.

Significantly, the manuscript brings together the extraordinary skills and accomplishments of Nasuh bin Karagöz bin Abdullah al-Silâhî al-Matrâkî al-Visokavî al-Bosnavî (Matrakçı Nasuh Visočak), a pivotal figure of the 16th century who excelled in mathematics, history, weaponry, miniature art, martial sports, swordsmanship, scholarship, philosophy, statesmanship, seamanship, painting, agriculture, cartography, invention, calligraphy, and geography (Nasuh, 1530). Thus, *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* serves as an enduring testament to his intellectual legacy.

Presently, three extant copies of *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* are preserved in notable archives: Süleymaniye Manuscript Library (*Esad Efendi Collection*, No. 2206), Millet Manuscript Library (*Ali Emiri Collection*, *Askeriyye* No. 219), and the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (*Török Collection*, No. O.128). Its detailed miniature representations of fortresses, military structures, and city walls underscore the significance of urban planning in the Ottoman context, rendering the work an essential reference for studies in architectural and urban history. The meticulous portrayal of city fortifications with distinctive color schemes, observed from multiple angles yet with limited use of perspective, embodies artistic conventions of the era.

Beyond its artistic merit, *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* is a crucial documentation of Ottoman military strategies, ideologies, and methodologies. Moreover, it is valuable in demonstrating that *matrak*, as compared to contemporary sports such as fencing and kendo, possesses a much older and more rooted history (Nasuh, 1530). Consequently, the reintroduction and revitalization of *matrak* among traditional sports are highlighted as central outcomes of this study.

Both in scholarly discourse and practice, *matrak* commands a distinguished place in Turkish sports history as an integral aspect of cultural heritage. Promoting *matrak* to younger generations is essential for fostering historical consciousness. Since its formal recognition in the global sports literature in 2010 as a Turkish sport, *matrak* has been supported by various federations and associations through training programs and international events. The renewed scholarly and cultural interest in Matrakçı Nasuh and *matrak* itself, and the reinforcement of their historical significance within Turkish cultural identity, constitute further notable conclusions of this research.

Zaključak

Očuvanje kulturne baštine i prenošenje vrijednosti stečenih kroz historiju na buduće generacije, u okviru historijske svijesti, od velikog je značaja za čovječanstvo. Zajednice sačinjene od pojedinaca kojima nedostaje historijsko razumijevanje i kulturna svijest neizbježno su osuđene na gubitak identiteta i povećanu podložnost vanjskim uticajima. Društva kojima stalno upravljaju vanjski akteri na kraju usvajaju stilove života definisane standardima i očekivanjima koja nisu njihova vlastita.

U panorami turske historije i kulturne baštine, sport *matrak* zauzima istaknuto mjesto i doprinosi širem razvoju svjetske sportske historije (Nasuh, 1530). Iako tačan datum nastanka ili izuma nije zabilježen, procjenjuje se da je *matrak* nastao početkom 1500-ih ili u 16. stoljeću. Naučni konsenzus priznaje da je Matrakçı Nasuh sistematizovao ovaj sport i popularizovao ga radi unapređenja vojne obuke (Nasuh, 1530; Seyahatname). Konkretno, tokom 16. stoljeća, Nasuh je formalizovao pravila i standarde *matraka*. Ovaj sport, iako se upražnjavao uz

druge discipline unutar Osmanskog Carstva, postao je istaknutiji zbog svog vojnog karaktera i opstao je do danas.

Naglasak matraka na fizičkim sposobnostima – kao što su tehnička kontrola, brzina i ravnoteža – uz kognitivne vještine poput taktičkog rezonovanja i strateškog razmišljanja, kao i etičke vrijednosti uključujući poštovanje protivnika i sportski duh, pozicionira ga kao ključni element turske nematerijalne kulturne baštine koji zahtijeva trajno očuvanje (Evlija Čelebi, *Seyahatname*). Njegovo dokumentovanje u pisanim djelima, u rasponu od putopisa Evlije Čelebija do kasnijih folklornih studija, učvrstilo je klasifikaciju matraka među tradicionalne sportove koji čine osnovu modernih atletskih tradicija.

S obzirom na njegovu historijsku dubinu, specifične aspekte i višedimenzionalne koristi, matrak opravdano zaslužuje veću naučnu pažnju i vidljivost. Matrakçi Nasuh je detaljno izložio ovaj sport u svom traktatu *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* (Poklon ratnicima), objavljenom 1530. godine, koji obuhvata teme kao što su streličarstvo, mačevanje, upotreba štitova i buzdovana, konjaništvo i vještina rukovanja oružjem (Nasuh, 1530). Ocjenjujući ga u historijskom kontekstu, *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* predstavlja prvi i jedini izvor koji se bavi ovom temom do godine svog objavljivanja.

Traktat, nastao iste godine kada su održane ceremonije sunečenja (obrezivanja) sinova sultana Sulejmana Veličanstvenog, nosi veliku važnost zbog svoje tehničke i borilačke terminologije te vizuelnih prikaza – ilustrovanih mapama i minijaturama koje svjedoče o Nasuhovoj umjetničkoj stručnosti. Obogaćen pedantno strukturiranim rasporedom upotpunjenim minijaturama, rad se izdvaja integracijom vojne historije i umjetnosti. Obuhvatajući i taktičku poduku i svečanu izvedbu, *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* se široko smatra primarnim izvorom za razumijevanje institucionalizovane tradicije mačevanja i značaja borilačke obuke u osmanskome društvu.

Značajno je da ovaj rukopis objedinjuje izvanredne vještine i dostignuća Nasuha bin Karagöza bin Abdullaha al-Silâhîja al-Matrâkîja al-Visokavîja al-Bosnavîja (Matrakçija Nasuh Visočak), ključne figure 16. stoljeća koja se istakla u matematici, historiji, oružju, minijaturnoj umjetnosti, borilačkim sportovima, mačevanju, nauci, filozofiji, državništvu, pomorstvu, slikarstvu, poljoprivredi, kartografiji, inovacijama, kaligrafiji i geografiji (Nasuh, 1530). Tako *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* služi kao trajno svjedočanstvo njegove intelektualne ostavštine.

Danas su tri sačuvana primjerka *Tuhfetü'l Guzât* pohranjena u značajnim arhivima: Biblioteci rukopisa Süleymaniye (*zbirka Esad Efendi, br. 2206*), Biblioteci rukopisa Millet (*zbirka Ali Emîrî, Askeriyye br. 219*) i Biblioteci Mađarske akademije nauka (*Török zbirka, br. O.128*). Njegovi detaljni minijaturni prikazi tvrđava, vojnih objekata i gradskih zidina naglašavaju važnost urbanističkog planiranja u osmanskome kontekstu, čineći ovo djelo nezaobilaznom referencom za studije arhitektonske i urbane historije. Pedantno prikazivanje gradskih utvrda sa specifičnim bojama, posmatrano iz više uglova,

ali uz ograničenu upotrebu perspektive, utjelovljuje umjetničke konvencije tog doba.

Osim umjetničke vrijednosti, Tuhfetü'l Guzât je ključna dokumentacija osmanskih vojnih strategija, ideologija i metodologija. Štaviše, dragocjen je u dokazivanju da matrak, u poređenju sa savremenim sportovima kao što su mačevanje i kendo, posjeduje mnogo stariju i ukorijenjeniju historiju (Nasuh, 1530). Shodno tome, ponovno uvođenje i revitalizacija matraka među tradicionalne sportove istaknuti su kao centralni ishodi ove studije.

Kako u naučnom diskursu, tako i u praksi, matrak zauzima istaknuto mjesto u turskoj sportskoj historiji kao integralni aspekt kulturne baštine. Promovisanje matraka mlađim generacijama od suštinskog je značaja za podsticanje historijske svijesti. Od svog formalnog priznanja u svjetskoj sportskoj literaturi 2010. godine kao turskog sporta, matrak podržavaju različite federacije i udruženja kroz programe obuke i međunarodne događaje. Obnovljeni naučni i kulturni interes za Matrakčija Nasuha i sam matrak, kao i jačanje njihovog historijskog značaja unutar turskog kulturnog identiteta, predstavljaju daljnje značajne zaključke ovog istraživanja.

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THE KELMENDI TRIBE AND MOVEMENTS OVER THE YEARS (1702-1707)

Abstract: *The Kelmend tribe is one of the most prominent and powerful tribes of Malësi, playing a significant role in the history of the liberation wars against the Ottoman conquerors. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the people of Kelmend rose in open revolt against the Ottoman army, which sought to subdue the mountainous regions of Albania. Due to its extraordinary natural features, Kelmend remained a formidable natural fortress, making it difficult for the Ottoman armies to carry out large-scale and successful operations in the region. The Kelmend tribe bordered the regions of Plavë, Gucia, Pult, Kuç, Gruda, Hoti, and Kastrati. This meant strong protection for this region, which also had an excellent position for it. Throughout the Ottoman period, the mountain tribes, including Kelmend, fought tirelessly for their freedom. Despite numerous Ottoman attempts to subdue the region over the centuries, they were never fully successful due to the harsh terrain and the resilience of the people. A significant moment in Kelmend's history occurred in the early 18th century when Hodo Verdi Pasha, a prominent figure in the Ottoman administration, led a military expedition against the Kelmend tribe.*

The Pasha sought to strengthen Ottoman authority in this well-organized and independent region while subduing Kelmend, which had remained untouched until that point. The Pasha's expedition, which began in the winter, lasted two years and proved to be extremely difficult for the Kelmend people. Despite being hungry and unable to resupply their ammunition, they resisted with great determination. The battles were intense, resulting in the deaths of several Kelmend leaders, including Voivoda. In an unprecedented act, the heads of the slain leaders were sent to the Sublime Porte as proof of the victory, showcasing Ottoman power. In 1702, after enduring food shortages and an epidemic that caused significant damage to both livestock and people, the Kelmend tribe, facing an extremely difficult situation, was forced to enter negotiations with Hodo Verdi Pasha. After extended discussions, an agreement was reached that

required the Kelmend people to move from their ancestral lands to a remote area, Peshter, near Novi Pazar in Serbia. During their years of exile in Peshter, the Kelmend tribe considered themselves displaced and under constant pressure to convert to Islam. They fought with all their strength to regain their lost freedom and return to their homes in Malësi. Their relocation was driven by harsh economic conditions and the oppression of the Ottoman army.

After several years, once they had stabilized their economic situation, the Kelmend people began planning their return to their homeland. The excellent organization and support of 400 armed men enabled the journey of 1,362 individuals toward Malësi. Despite the Ottoman army's efforts to stop them, fierce battles led to a victory for the Kelmend on July 17, 1707, when the Ottoman forces were forced to retreat after a heavy clash, losing around 300 troops. This battle became a symbol of the resistance and loyalty of the Kelmend to their homeland. It was a sacred act of perseverance and bravery by the people of Kelmendi, who, despite their losses, managed to preserve their identity and continue their lives under new conditions. After their relocation from Peshter, the Kelmendi tribe settled in their ancestral lands in Malësi, where life was marked by the restoration of traditional structures and efforts to rebuild their existence according to the ancient customs and culture of the tribe. Despite the challenging conditions they faced, the Kelmendi focused on developing agriculture and livestock farming, both essential for their survival. They also took active steps to protect their territories from external threats, including the continuous pressure from the Ottoman Empire and other dangers posed by neighboring regions.

Their efforts to maintain a stable life and safeguard their cultural identity were crucial. The connections among tribe members were strong, built on solidarity and mutual cooperation. They had a well-organized social structure based on helping one another, ensuring their survival and the preservation of their traditions. Despite economic and social difficulties, the Kelmendi managed to establish a sustainable life, rich in a strong and unique identity, while preserving their ancient customs and culture.

Key words: Kelmendi Tribe, Malësi, Ottoman Empire, Hodo Verdi Pasha, Peshter.

PLEME KELJMENDI I KRETANJA TOKOM GODINA (1702-1707)

Apstrakt: *Pleme Keljmendi jedno je od najistaknutijih i najmoćnijih plemena Malisije (Malësi), koje je odigralo značajnu ulogu u historiji oslobodilačkih ratova protiv osmanskih osvajača. Tokom 16. i 17. vijeka, narod Keljmendija podigao je otvoreni ustanak protiv osmanske vojske koja je nastojala pokoriti planinske regije Albanije. Zahvaljujući izvanrednim prirodnim karakteristikama, Kelmendi je ostao neosvojiva prirodna tvrđava, što je*

osmanskoj vojsci otežavalo izvođenje opsežnih i uspješnih operacija u toj regiji. Pleme Kelmendi graničilo je s regijama Plav, Gusinje, Pult, Kuči, Gruda, Hoti i Kastrati. To je značilo snažnu zaštitu za ovu regiju, koja je imala i odličan strateški položaj. Tokom cijelog osmanskog perioda, planinska plemena, uključujući Kelmendi, neumorno su se borila za svoju slobodu. Uprkos brojnim osmanskim pokušajima da tokom vijekova pokore ovu regiju, nikada nisu bili u potpunosti uspješni zbog surovog terena i otpornosti naroda. Značajan trenutak u historiji Kelmendija dogodio se početkom 18. vijeka kada je Hodo Verdi-paša, istaknuta ličnost u osmanskoj administraciji, predvodio vojnu ekspediciju protiv plemena Kelmendi.

Paša je nastojao ojačati osmansku vlast u ovoj dobro organizovanoj i nezavisnoj regiji, uz istovremeno pokoravanje Kelmendija koji je do tada ostao netaknut. Pašina ekspedicija, koja je započela zimi, trajala je dvije godine i pokazala se izuzetno teškom za narod Kelmendija. Iako izgladnjeli i bez mogućnosti da dopune zalihe municije, pružali su otpor s velikom odlučnošću. Borbe su bile intenzivne, što je rezultiralo smrću nekoliko vođa Kelmendija, uključujući i vojvodu. U do tada nezapamćenom činu, glave ubijenih vođa poslale su Visokoj porti kao dokaz pobjede i pokazatelj osmanske moći. Godine 1702, nakon što je pretrpjelo nestašicu hrane i epidemiju koja je nanijela značajnu štetu i stoci i ljudima, pleme Kelmendi je, suočeno s izuzetno teškom situacijom, bilo prisiljeno stupiti u pregovore s Hodo Verdi-pašom. Nakon dugotrajnih rasprava, postignut je dogovor koji je zahtijevao da se narod Kelmendija preseli sa svojih pradjedovskih ognjišta u udaljeno područje Peštera, blizu Novog Pazara u današnjoj Srbiji. Tokom godina izgnanstva na Pešteru, pleme Kelmendi se smatralo raseljenim i bilo je pod stalnim pritiskom da pređe na islam. Borili su se svom snagom da povrate izgubljenu slobodu i vrte se svojim kućama u Malisiju. Njihovo preseljenje bilo je uzrokovano teškim ekonomskim uslovima i ugnjetavanjem od strane osmanske vojske.

Nakon nekoliko godina, čim su stabilizovali svoju ekonomsku situaciju, Kelmendiji su počeli planirati povratak u domovinu. Odlična organizacija i podrška 400 naoružanih ljudi omogućili su putovanje 1.362 pojedinca prema Malisiji. Uprkos naporima osmanske vojske da ih zaustavi, žestoke borbe dovele su do pobjede Kelmendija 17. jula 1707. godine, kada su osmanske snage bile prisiljene na povlačenje nakon teškog sukoba, izgubivši oko 300 vojnika. Ova bitka postala je simbol otpora i lojalnosti Kelmendija svojoj domovini. Bio je to sveti čin istrajnosti i hrabrosti naroda Kelmendija, koji je, uprkos gubicima, uspio očuvati svoj identitet i nastaviti život u novim uslovima. Nakon povratka s Peštera, pleme Kelmendi se naselilo na svoju djedovinu u Malisiji, gdje je život bio obilježen obnovom tradicionalnih struktura i naporima da se ponovo izgradi egzistencija prema drevnim običajima i kulturi plemena. Uprkos izazovnim uslovima s kojima su se suočavali, Kelmendiji su se fokusirali na razvoj poljoprivrede i stočarstva, koji su bili ključni za njihov opstanak. Također su poduzeli aktivne korake kako bi zaštitili svoje teritorije od vanjskih prijetnji,

uključujući kontinuirani pritisak Osmanskog carstva i druge opasnosti iz susjednih regija.

Njihovi napori da održe stabilan život i zaštite svoj kulturni identitet bili su od presudne važnosti. Veze među članovima plemena bile su jake, izgrađene na solidarnosti i uzajamnoj saradnji. Imali su dobro organizovanu društvenu strukturu zasnovanu na međusobnom pomaganju, što im je osiguralo opstanak i očuvanje tradicije. Uprkos ekonomskim i društvenim poteškoćama, Keljmendiji su uspjeli uspostaviti održiv život, bogat snažnim i jedinstvenim identitetom, čuvajući svoje drevne običaje i kulturu.

Ključne riječi: *Pleme Keljmendi, Malisija, Osmansko carstvo, Hodo Verdi-paša, Pešter.*

Introduction

The Kelmend Tribe was located in a strategic region of Malësi (the Highlands), in the northern part of Albania and the southern part of Montenegro, within a mountainous area characterized by very high mountains and deep valleys. This difficult terrain made the region hard to access for foreign invading forces, such as the Ottoman army. The Kelmend Tribe, one of the most powerful tribes in Malësi, had a long-standing tradition and significant experience in the struggle for liberation against the Ottoman invaders. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Kelmend people, united with other mountain tribes, waged open war against the Ottoman army, strongly resisting military expeditions that repeatedly attempted to bring the Kelmend region under their control. The tribe's geographical position played an important role in these wars, as it helped defend the territory from Ottoman invasion.

The French scholar Charles du Fresne, Sieur Du Cange, in his work „Historia Byzantina“, provides important information about the history of the Kelmend tribe, highlighting its influence and role during the Byzantine period. The Kelmend tribe extended from Naronë, located in the Neretva River valley in present-day Croatia. The counts of the Kelmend tribe held influence and estates in the Popovo region of Bosnia and along the coastline, playing a significant role in the political and social developments of the area during the medieval period. In 1241, the Ban of Bosnia, Stefan, conquered the County of Kelmend and brought most of the region's castles under his control, leaving the four brothers of Kelmend—Count Pjetër, the son of Count Ndreu, Pjetër's son Nikolla, and Tolleno—with nothing. As a result, the entire Kelmend region came under the occupation of the Ban of Bosnia. The Kelmend tribe also had its own coat of arms, an important symbol that reflects the tribe's distinct identity. This coat of arms represented not only the authority and strength of its leadership but also the

established order and traditions of the tribe.¹ After the conquest of the Kelmend tribe, and in an effort to preserve their identity from assimilation, the tribe migrated toward Montenegro and Northern Albania. These migrations were forced as a means of escaping assimilation and safeguarding the tribe's identity and continuity.

The Kelmend Tribe had inhabited and operated in their lands long before the Battle of Kosovo (1389). Prior to the battle, Sultan Murat attempted to negotiate with the tribe. During this period, the Kelmend tribe grew stronger and expanded steadily. The tribe had suffered greatly from wars and had decided to remain neutral. Facing an unfavorable position, the Sultan sought allies and made contact with the Kelmend to determine which side they would support. The Kelmend responded that they would side with whoever asked for their help. The Sultan seized the opportunity and, by reaching out to the leaders, tried to win them over to his side with promises. According to this account, the Kelmend tribe played a significant role during the Battle of Kosovo. After the armistice,² the Sultan granted them the promised privileges, which included the right to collect tribute in Malësi and most of Kosovo. They also made several marches to the city of Peja to loot.³ Information about the participation of the Kelmend tribe in the Battle of Kosovo is also provided in the book *Letters and Reports from Franciscan Missionaries Among Albanians*. The Kelmend tribe is well-known and proud of their past military actions. *The last of these actions was the bloody Battle of Kosovo, where, as envoys of Sultan Murad, they sided with him, securing a victory for the Turks and delivering a decisive defeat to the Slavs, who had been victorious until that point. Thus, they were very proud of this.*⁴ During the period of the Battle of Kosovo, the political and military situation in the Balkans, especially in Malësi e Madhe, was highly complex. Alliances and agreements between various parties frequently shifted as they sought to protect their local interests and territories. These alliances were often formed to secure their positions, as it was easier to reach an agreement with a rising superpower like the Ottoman Empire. The Kelmend tribe may have participated in the Battle of Kosovo through a favorable arrangement with the Ottomans, aiming to preserve their autonomy and avoid potential threats from other rivals.

¹ Charles du Fresne Du Cange, *Historia Byzantina, Duplici Mommentario Illustrata*: Prior familias ac Stemmata Imperatorum, Constantinopolitanorum, cum eorundem Augustorum Nomifmatibus, aliquot Iconibus, Venetiis, Ex Typographia Bartholomei Javarina, MDCCXXIX, 266; The Counts of Kelmendi, literary magazine „Leka”, no. II, Shkodër 1930, 9-10.

² Hyacinthe Hecquard, *Histoire et Description de la Haute Albanie ou Guégarie*, Consul de France à Scutari, Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur, etc, Paris Chez Arthus Bertrand, Libraire de la Société de Géographie 23, Rue Hautefeuille, 1858, 183-184; Noel Malcolm, *Kosova një histori e shkurtër*, Koha dhe Shtëpia e Librit Prishtinë-Tiranë 2011, 65.

³ Peter Bartl, Injac Zamputi, Vincenzo Zmajevich, *Relacion i gjendjes se Shqipërisë e Serbisë, Relazione dello stato d'Albania e Serbia*, Faik Konica-Albanjshches Institut, Prishtinë-St. Gallen 2022, 51; H. Hecquard, *Histoire et Description de la Haute Albanie ou Guégarie*, 65.

⁴ *Letra dhe relacione nga misionarët françeskan ndër shqiptarë*, përgjegjës për botime françeskane At Vitor Demaj, OFM, At Mirash Marinaj, OFM, Franciscan Order Shkodër 2019, 78-79.

The Kelmend people derived their name from the leader of their land. According to legend, the first leader of the Kelmend tribe had seven sons, each of whom became the leader of a new tribe. These tribes included: Selcë, Nikaj, Vuklaj, Martinaj, Utaj, Ukaj in Dukagjin, and Labët in Kosovo. The first son of Kelmend was Kola, the head of Selca.⁵ After coming from Kuçi, he settled nearby and established his headquarters in the highest mountain peaks of Albania, two days' journey from the city of Shkodra. To the east, it borders Plavë, Gucë, and Pult; to the west, Kuçi and Gruda; to the south, Hoti and Kastrati; and to the north, Kolashin. All of these natural borders provided strong defenses for the settlement. The Kelmend region was fortified by narrow roads, dominated by rugged mountains with frightening views and steep cliffs that seemed as though they would swallow a traveler. These roads are divided into two main routes, going in opposite directions—one from Shkodra to the west and the other from Gucia to the east—each following the banks of the Cem River, with a distance of less than a day's journey. In the middle of the roads, the slope of the mountains eases and becomes more suitable for possible habitation.⁶ Due to its strategic position and natural advantages, the population of Kelmend remained untouched by the Ottoman invaders for centuries. They preserved their freedom through a system of popular governance, continually fighting to defend their independence against the Ottomans.

In the 1485 Registration Book of the Sanjak of Shkodra, an Ottoman tax register, the Ottoman administration recorded and collected taxes in the „Nahija Kelmenta“ the Kelmend district, which was an Ottoman administrative division consisting of five villages. The „Kelmend Nahija“ included five villages with a total of 152 houses. The Christian inhabitants of these villages were required by the Ottoman authorities to pay the Sanjakkbey 1,000 akçe (an Ottoman silver coin used as currency) in tribute (jizya—a tax imposed on non-Muslims) as a tax payment, as well as an additional 1,000 akçe in the form of another tax.⁷ According to this register, both the name and the Nahija of Kelmend were well-known, reflecting the integration of the Kelmend people into the Ottoman system.

Referring to the 1,684 records, the Kelmend tribe existed long before 1480, as it mentions the ancestors of Vuk Doda with the following names: Kelmendi – Lesh Kelmendi – Mash Leshi – Vul Mashi – Vruja Vuli – Zam Vruja – Dud Zami – Vuk Doda. Logically, this lineage can be traced back to 1405. According to the scholar Franz Nopcza, a very interesting coincidence arises here, as a Kelmendi is mentioned—the son of a certain Gjini (Dzhini), who in

⁵ Dr. Jur. Johan Georg von Hahn, *Studime Shqiptare* 10, Institute of Dialogue and Communication, Tiranë 2007, 251; Јован Радонић, Римска Курија Јужнословенске земље од XVI до XIX Века, Српска Академија Наука, Посејна издања књига CLC, Сдењњ Друштвених Наука нова серија књига 3, Београд 1950, 514.

⁶ *Central State Archive*, Fund 846, file 21.

⁷ Selami Pulaha, *The Register of the Sanjak of Shkodër for the year 1485*, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History, Tiranë 1974, 431.

1330 served as a notary in Shkodra. In the popular tradition of the Kelmend tribe, this geological list is considered very reliable. As mentioned by Windishi, the first of the Kelmends was called Clement, a contemporary of Skanderbeg, who organized the men of the Kelmend tribe in 1465 to fight against the Ottomans.⁸ In the high mountains of Albania and Kosovo, the Kelmend tribe established a free zone and built their defensive homes on all sides. There, they also chose the first leader of the Kelmend tribe, a courageous man. From him, the name „Kelmendi“ originated, and it was adopted by his fellow tribesmen who remained at home and continue to carry it to this day.⁹ In their tradition, for the Kelmendis it was customary not to marry outside their ethnicity, and similarly, women were not allowed to marry outsiders. As a result of these traditions, the Kelmend tribe has remained unique and unmixed to this day.



The Coat of Arms of the Kelmendi tribe „Comitvm Chelmensivm“.¹⁰

The 1638 report by Frang Bardhi provides reliable information that the Kelmendi people, of Albanian ethnicity, spoke both Albanian and Dalmatian and practiced the Roman Catholic belief. At that time, there were approximately 250 households and 2,900 individuals, known for their fierce nature, great courage, military expertise, good looks, and strong physiques.¹¹ While, the report of the Venetian writer Mariano Bolica in 1614 provides information that Kelmendi had

⁸ Karl Gottlieb von Windisch: „Von den Klementinern in Syrmien“ In, *Ungrisches Magazin oder Beyträge zu ungrischen Geschichte, Geographie, Naturwissenschaft und der dahin einschlagenden Litteratur*, Pressburg Bratislava 1782, 77-78; Franc Nopça, Fiset e Malësisë së Shqipërisë Veriore dhe e drejta zakonore e tyre, The Center for Albanian Studies, Institute of History, Tiranë 2013, 184-185.

⁹ Robert Elsie, Texts and Documents of Albanian History, 1782 Karl Gottlieb von Windisch: On the Kelmendi in Syrmia, http://www.albanianhistory.net/1782_Windisch/index.html. Seen on the date August 28, 2024; Karl Gottlieb von Windisch: Von den Klementinern in Syrmien, f. 78.

¹⁰ Charles du Fresne Du Cange, *Historia Byzantina, Duplici Mommentario Illustrata*: Prior familias ac Stemmata Imperatorum, Constantinopolitanorum, 215.

¹¹ *Relacione mbi gjendjen e Shqipërisë Veriore dhe të Mesme në shekullin XVII*, Volume II (1634-1650), University of Tirana, Institute of History and Linguistics, prepared by Injaz Zamputi, Tiranë 1965, 161; *Archive of the Institute of History Tranë, fund: A-III-222*, Dokumente mbi Kosovën nga relatorë të huaj (shek. XV-XVIII), 8.

188 households and around 650 fighters.¹² The 1634 report by Bishop Gjergj Bardhi, following his visit to the mountains of Dukagjin, Pult, and Kelmendi, provides information that the Kelmendi tribe had around 300 households and 3,200 Christian inhabitants. These figures are very close to one another, and importantly, they are quite realistic.¹³

Ottoman military expeditions against Malësia e Madhe, and especially the Kelmendi tribe, began in the 16th century and continued until the 19th century. In 1565, the Kelmendi tribe, along with other Albanian tribes such as the Kuçi and Piperi, rebelled against the Ottoman army. In 1597, the Kelmendi people, in cooperation with other Albanian tribes, rose again in rebellion under the leadership of their voivode (local ruler) Nikshiç Gërdani, to liberate their land from Ottoman control in Malësia.¹⁴

The Kelmendi tribe fought relentlessly for centuries against the Ottoman invaders. In 1613, the Ottoman Empire sent Asllan Pasha to confront the Kelmendi rebels, supported by seven sanjak-beys (a provincial governors) from Prizren, Peja, Dukagjin, Kaçanik, Elbasan, Zadrime, and Shkodra. In 1638, Vuço Pasha, in cooperation with the Beylerbey (a high-ranking Ottoman official) of Bosnia, mobilized an army from his pashalik (an administrative region governed by a Pasha), which included Hercegovina, Albania, and Serbia, to decisively suppress the uprisings of the Kelmendi tribe. During the wars in Kosovo (1689-1690) and the subsequent actions until 1699, the Kelmendi tribe played a central role as a key player, emerging victorious each time.

The Kelmendi tribe, protected and favored by natural conditions, remained largely untouched by the Ottoman invasion for many centuries. The mountainous terrain made it difficult for Ottoman armies to carry out large and successful operations in the region. The Kelmendi tribe exploited this terrain to organize defense and halt the advance of foreign forces. They built fortifications and established strategic positions in their mountains to protect their territories and hinder the Ottoman army's progress. These fortifications were crucial for maintaining control over key areas and safeguarding the local population. In the heart of the empire, the tribe preserved its freedom and democratic governance, which contrasted sharply with the terror and destruction that the Ottoman Empire brought to most of the Albanian territories under its control.

After a series of consecutive defeats inflicted on the Ottoman army by the Kelmendi tribe, the Ottomans made a firm decision to end the tribe's resistance once and for all. Hodo Verdi Pasha Mahmutbegolli was appointed to lead this highly challenging military expedition. The long-standing conflict between the Kelmendi tribe and his house provided further motivation for the campaign.

¹² Injac Zamputi, *Bashkimi i maleve shqiptare në fillim të shekullit të XVII*, Bulletin of the University of Tirana, Seria shkencat shoqërore 1, Tiranë 1957, 77; *Relacione mbi gjendjen e Shqipërisë Veriore dhe të Mesme në shekullin XVII*, 277.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Robert Elsie, *Fiset Shqiptare, historia, shoqëria dhe kultura*, Botime Artini, Prishtinë 2017, 57.

Hodo Verdi Pasha is known for his military activities in the region of Malësia e Madhe, including clashes with the Kelmendi tribe. During this period, various Albanian tribes frequently clashed with the Ottoman authorities due to their resistance against Ottoman control and policies.

As an important pasha in the Ottoman administration, Hodo Verdi Pasha played a significant role in managing the Albanian territories, particularly Malësia e Madhe. Controlling this region was difficult due to the presence of many independent tribes, such as the Kelmendi. As a pasha, Hodo Verdi Pasha sought to strengthen Ottoman authority in these areas and address the issues stemming from rebellions and local conflicts.

Hodo Verdi Pasha Mahmutbegolli's appointment to lead this difficult campaign was driven, in part, by the open wounds of his homeland and his house in Peja, which had suffered from the wars with the Kelmendi tribe. This personal motivation for revenge led to his success in 1700, when he emerged victorious over the three cities—Shkodër, Ulqin, and Tivar—that had risen in rebellion. The Ottoman army, under the leadership of Hodo Verdi Pasha, launched a powerful campaign that significantly weakened the Kelmendi army, killing the most important leaders of the rebels. He considered the war with the Kelmendi Highlanders to be the most important victory of his military career. Aware of the threat posed by the Kelmendi rebels, the Pasha implemented repressive measures, conquering all the mountain paths and sealing off the exits from the mountains. Trapped on three sides within their borders, the Kelmendi Highlanders were further confined on the fourth side, which led to Gucia, by the army of Hodo Verdi Pasha, who had personally gone there to be closer to the unfolding events. Within a few days, he established a large garrison in the area.¹⁵ The military expedition against the Kelmendi tribe lasted about two years and was carried out according to the plans devised by the Pasha. The siege of the Kelmendi tribe was conducted meticulously, with the goal of finally subduing a tribe that had never been conquered before, and capturing all of them alive to relocate them from their lands. This is confirmed by a letter from Hodo Verdi Pasha, dated August 14, 1702, addressed to the Venetian provost (administrator, from it.- provveditore) in Kotor, Cavalier Giovanni Bolica.¹⁶

The Pasha's expedition against the Kelmendi tribe began in the middle of winter. Despite suffering from hunger and a lack of ammunition, the brave Highlanders fought back fiercely, defending themselves with desperation. During the military battles against the Ottoman army, Vojvoda and several prominent leaders of the Kelmendi tribe were killed. Their deaths inevitably weakened the tribe. By the Pasha's order, the leaders of the Kelmendi tribe had their heads severed. At the time, the Kelmendi people were known for braiding

¹⁵ *Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSH), Republic of Albania*, fund. 846, file. 21.

¹⁶ *Il Montenegro de Relazioni dei Provveditori Veneti (1687-1735)*, Roma M.DCCC.XCVI, 117; Kristo Frashëri „Kryengritjet e kelmendasve kundër turqve dhe feudalëve Begollas“, Mësuesi, The Organ of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the People's Republic of Albania, Viti III-no. 6 (76), February 8 1963.

their hair into four braids, tied with silver ribbons around their ears and necks—a symbol derived from the four peaks of their mountain. The Pasha sent the severed heads to the Sublime Porte as proof of his victories, showcasing his triumph over the Kelmendi tribe. Upon seeing the display of the victims' heads, Sultan Murat, addressing the courtiers—among them Albanians who served the Sultan—made a remark that reflected his cruelty: „Look how beautifully the Pasha has decorated the heads of my subjects in Albania“.¹⁷

The Turkish-origin historian Naima provides details and describes the Kelmendi tribe during the Ottoman army's campaign: *They are fierce, disorganized, and aimless. Armed with spears and bows from all directions, their legs are wrapped in crampons, and the blades of their knives gleam on their belts. Accustomed to scaling steep rocks and fearlessly descending into the depths of ravines—where others would surely perish—they are as swift as wild goats. They live in caves, the entrances of which are guarded by armed sentinels carrying rifles.*¹⁸

After enduring many hardships in battles with the Ottoman army, the situation of the Kelmendi people worsened significantly in 1702 due to a severe food shortage.¹⁹ Their condition worsened further when an epidemic broke out, severely affecting both livestock and people, as it was highly contagious. Confronted with this dire situation, the Kelmendi tribe was forced to enter negotiations with Hodo Verdi Pasha regarding the terms of their surrender. During the talks, Hodo Verdi Pasha demanded that they be relocated as far as possible from their lands, to the Pillaja of Peshter, near Novi Pazar in Serbia.²⁰ A smaller number of them was forced to move not only to the Peshter Plain but also to other areas, including Rugova, Peja, the mountains of Llap, Gjiilan, the mountains of Gollak, and others.²¹ The Pasha's actions were also well-received by the Ottoman Empire, as he finally broke the century-long resistance of the Kelmendi tribe, placing them under Ottoman rule for the first time. The situation for the Kelmendi people was extremely dire, as they no longer had the strength to continue resisting. On the other hand, they were scattered and divided like never before in the face of the enemy. Under these circumstances, the Kelmendi tribe could not withstand the heavy pressure from the Ottoman army and ultimately accepted their relocation from their ancestral lands. About 274 households, totaling around 2,000 people, along with their valuable possessions, were relocated to Peshter, near the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Similarly, part of the Kelmendi tribe was sent by the Pasha to the city of Peja, where they were held

¹⁷ Feansoa Lenorman, *Turcs et Monténégrins*, Paris Librairie Académique, Didier & C, Libraires-Éditeurs 34, Ouai des Augustins, 35, 1866, 131.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 144.

¹⁹ R. Elsie, *Fiset shqiptare, historia, shoqëria dhe kultura*, 63.

²⁰ Kristo Frashëri „Kryengritjet e kelmendasve kundër turqve dhe feudalëve Begollas“, Mësuesi.

²¹ Franc Nopça, *Fiset e Malësisë Shqipërisë Veriore dhe e drejta zakonore e tyre*, The Center of Albanian Studies, Institute of History, Tiranë 2013, 187; R. Elsie, *Fiset shqiptare, historia, shoqëria dhe kultura*, 55.

as war prisoners.²² The wars and clashes with the Ottoman authorities, along with other external factors, likely created immense pressure and insecurity for the Kelmendi tribe, forcing them to seek safer territories. Migration often served as a way to escape hardships and preserve their identity and culture.

Although the pastures of Peshter were fertile, they became an internment camp for the Kelmendi tribe. Upon settling there, the tribe suffered under the supervision and control of the Mahmutbegolli family. The pressure from this family was intense, as the Pasha initiated a process of Islamizing the Kelmendi people, aiming to sever their ties once and for all with their fellow Christians from Malësi e Madhe. Despite the passing of years and continued hardships, the Kelmendi remained resolute. Even under constant Ottoman pressure, they did not yield, for their belief remained clear: one day, they would return to their lands.²³ The military strength of the Kelmendi tribe weakened significantly after a portion of them migrated to Peshter. This loss of strength made them more vulnerable to the intense pressure from the Ottoman authorities. However, the Kelmendi people of Selca, who had remained in their homes, felt regret for the divisions that had occurred. Concerned about their situation, they began inviting their brothers in Peshter to return to their homes in Malesi.

During their years of migration to Peshter, the Kelmendi tribe felt interned and constantly pressured to convert to Islam. Despite the hardships, they worked tirelessly to return to their homeland in Malësi, for the freedom they had lost was more precious to them than the life they were living in Peshter. They never accepted their life there, viewing it as a momentary time until the right moment came to return to their homeland, no matter the consequences they might face. One of the main reasons for the migration of the Kelmendi tribe was the worsening economic conditions, which became increasingly difficult to endure. The Ottoman army had left them without any means of sustenance, prompting them to strike an agreement with the Pasha and move towards Peshter. After a few years, once the Kelmendi tribe had regained some strength, they began to plan concrete actions to leave Peshter and return to their homeland. As their economic situation improved in Peshter, they started taking steps toward their goal. This desire was further fueled by psychological factors, particularly the growing nostalgia for their homeland, which increasingly consumed their thoughts. Their deep connection to their land made the desire to return even stronger. They could no longer find peace and began to view their stay in Peshter as an undesirable and hopeless situation.

The Kelmendi tribe was exceptionally well-organized for this endeavor. About 1,362 men, women, and children were preparing to leave Peshter, under the protection of 400 armed Kelmendi men who secured the caravans and confronted the Ottoman army, which attempted to avert their march and force them back to their previous location. As soon as their journey began, around

²² K. Frashëri „Kryengritjet e kelmendasve kundër turqve dhe feudalëve Begollas“, Mësuesi.

²³ *Ibidem*.

1,000 Ottoman soldiers attempted to obstruct their march from the very first day. The Ottoman commanders, with all their forces, attempted to persuade the Kelmendi to turn back and halt their journey, but the Kelmendi rejected these demands. As a result, the fighting became inevitable. The Kelmendi tribe was determined to fight and clear the way at any cost, ultimately defeating the Ottoman army. During their march, on July 17, 1707, the Kelmendi caravan was caught in a location between Rozhajë and Plavë, near the mountains. After a day of intense fighting, the clash between the Kelmendi and the Ottoman army was fierce and uneven.²⁴ The men of Kelmendi, with the support of their women—about 300 armed women—fought together with more determination than ever.²⁵ The Ottoman army, significantly larger in number with around 6,000 troops, engaged in the battle to stop the march of the Kelmendi tribe. After several days of attempts to reach an agreement, it was the Ottoman army that launched a fierce attack on the Kelmendi. However, after a fierce battle, the Ottoman army was forced to retreat with heavy losses and return to its trenches. During the fighting, both sides suffered casualties and injuries. According to some sources, the Ottoman army incurred around 300 casualties, while the Kelmendi lost 21 lives, along with 65 soldiers of the Pasha.²⁶

On September 16, 1707, a letter from the Venetian proveditor reported that the Kelmendi tribe, which had been relocated to Peshter, had gathered to fight for their homeland after being forced by Hodë Verdi Pasha to leave their homes. The Kelmendi tribe had lived in Peshter for many years, enduring great anxiety during this time. The pressure to convert to Islam had become more intense than under previous rule. Spiritually broken and restricted in their movements, they struggled to preserve their identity and uphold their traditional customs. While marching to leave Peshter and return to their homeland in Malësi, the Kelmendi faced fierce battles against Ottoman forces. During these clashes, the Ottoman army suffered significant losses, with around 65 Ottoman soldiers killed and many others injured. However, there were also losses and many injuries among the Kelmendi tribe. Despite this, they fought fiercely and managed to free the hostages held by the Ottoman army in Peja. Upon returning to their homeland, they gathered and, with great love and loyalty, swore an oath with the other members of the tribe to fight for and care for one another whenever necessary.²⁷ With every attack by the Ottoman army, the Kelmendi tribe was forced to respond with military actions to protect their families and sacred land. The tribe's leaders and people were deeply angered by the Ottoman rulers and

²⁴ *Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSH), Republic of Albania*, fund, 846, file, 21 Docs. on the facts and circumstances that led to the migration of the Kelmend people to Peshter in 1970 and their return to their homeland in 1707.

²⁵ *History Institute Archives (AIH), Republic of Albania*, fondi, p. 46, dok. Materials for the history of Upper Albania, presented by Jovan Tomić.

²⁶ *Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSH), Republic of Albania*, fund, 846, file, 21.

²⁷ *Il Montenegro de Relazioni dei Proveditori Veneti (1687-1735)*, Roma M.DCCC.XCVI, doc. „1707, Settembre 16, Castelnovo-Il Proveditore Straordinario al Senato“, 124.

were determined never to surrender, vowing to defend their land no matter the consequences. The organized departure of the Kelmendi tribe from Peshter, through battles with the Ottoman army, resonated profoundly in the public awareness of the time. It was seen as an event that, until then, had seemed impossible to achieve.

This moment, however, became a heroic and extraordinary act. The news of the Kelmendi tribe's migration from Peshter spread quickly, described not only as a historical legend but also as a legendary tale, filled with vivid imagery and intense emotions. The migration of the Kelmendi from Peshter to their ancient homelands occurred in July 1707. The details of this migration are captured in a letter dated August 31st, sent to Rome by Vincent Zmajeviqi, who provides full information about the event.²⁸ Still fresh in the collective memory, this event spread rapidly and resonated within Albanian and Balkan circles, becoming one of the most significant and discussed events of the time.

The return of the Kelmendi people to their homelands in Malësi in 1707 marks an important chapter in the history of the tribe. It is closely tied to the period of instability and tensions in the Balkans during the 18th century. Many members of the tribe were forced to leave Peshter due to immense pressure from the Ottoman authorities, which included high taxes, demands for military service, political constraints, changes in living conditions, and difficult economic circumstances. These pressures ultimately led the Kelmendi to return to their homeland and restart their traditional way of life in Malësi.

After their migration from Peshter, life for the Kelmendi tribe in their homesteads in Malësi was centered on the restoration of traditional structures and efforts to rebuild their lives according to ancient customs and culture. They focused on developing agriculture, livestock farming, and protecting their territories. Despite the challenging economic circumstances, the tribe organized itself to defend against external threats, including Ottoman pressures and other risks from neighboring regions. The bonds among tribe members were strong, maintaining an organized social structure based on cooperation and mutual support. Furthermore, they preserved their culture and traditions, creating a sustainable life deeply rooted in their unique identity.

Summary

The Ottoman military expeditions against Malësi e Madhe (Greater Malësia), and especially the Kelmendi tribe, began in the 16th century and continued into the 19th century. In 1613, the Ottoman Empire sent a large military expedition to suppress the Kelmendi uprisings, led by Asllan Pasha, who

²⁸ *Central State Archives (AQSH)*, fund, 846, file, 21, Document on the facts and circumstances that caused the relocation of the Kelmend people to Peshter in 1970 and their return to their homeland in 1707.

commanded a significant army composed of regional sanjak beys from areas such as Prizren, Peja, Dukagjin, and others. Again, in 1638, Vuço Pasha, with the help of the beys from Bosnia, formed a powerful army to defeat the Kelmendi. During the period of wars in Kosovo (1689-1690), the Kelmendi tribe played a crucial role and continued to be one of the main factors preventing the Ottoman army from advancing in this region. The Kelmendis achieved great victories against the invaders during this period, becoming a symbol of national resistance and independence. The Kelmendi tribe built and maintained strong fortifications that helped them defend against occupying forces, providing effective protection for the local population. During this long period of resistance, the Kelmendi tribe preserved its freedom and a democratic form of governance, which gave strength and cohesion to the population in the face of the Ottoman Empire. However, in 1700, the Ottoman Empire appointed Hodo Verdi Pasha to lead a new expedition against the Kelmendis, following the previous defeats that the Ottoman army had suffered from this tribe. Hodo Verdi Pasha, known for his military activities, was determined to carry out the task of subduing the Kelmendis once and for all. The Pasha launched a powerful expedition and managed to suppress the Kelmendi resistance, defeating several of the tribe's most prominent leaders, as well as employing repressive measures to halt any form of rebellion.

He regarded this war as one of the most important victories of his military career, completely destroying a significant portion of the Kelmendi forces. Hodo Verdi Pasha initiated a brutal campaign, surrounding the Kelmendi territories and engaging in combat with the mountain people under harsh conditions, including shortages of food and ammunition. The battles ended with the deaths of many Kelmendi leaders, while those who survived were displaced to other regions, such as the Pllaja of Peshter, near Novi Pazar in Serbia. For many Kelmendis, this displacement became an internment camp, where they were subjected to pressure to convert to Islam and lost their traditional identity. Despite these difficult conditions, the Kelmendis kept hope alive that one day they would return to their homeland. After years of suffering, the Kelmendi tribe resolved to take action and return home. They organized themselves and set out on a journey back to Malësi, fighting through a route filled with intense battles against the Ottoman forces. The fighting was fierce, but the Kelmendis, with the help of their women, fought bravely and resolutely to reclaim their lands. After a decisive clash, the Ottoman army was forced to retreat with heavy losses.

Zaključak

Osmanske vojne ekspedicije protiv Velike Malisije (Malësi e Madhe), a posebno protiv plemena Keljmendi, počele su u 16. vijeku i nastavile su se do 19. vijeka. Godine 1613, Osmansko carstvo poslalo je veliku vojnu ekspediciju da uguši ustanke Keljmendija, pod vodstvom Asllan-paše, koji je komandovao značajnom vojskom sastavljenom od regionalnih sandžak-begova iz područja

kao što su Prizren, Peć (Peja), Dukadın i drugi. Ponovo, 1638. godine, Vučo-paša je, uz pomoć begova iz Bosne, formirao moćnu vojsku kako bi porazio Keljmendije. Tokom perioda ratova na Kosovu (1689–1690), pleme Kelmendi igralo je ključnu ulogu i nastavilo biti jedan od glavnih faktora koji su sprečavali osmansku vojsku da napreduje u ovoj regiji. Keljmendiji su u ovom periodu ostvarili velike pobjede protiv osvajača, postajući simbol nacionalnog otpora i nezavisnosti. Pleme Keljmendi gradilo je i održavalo snažna utvrđenja koja su im pomogla u odbrani od okupacionih snaga, pružajući efikasnu zaštitu lokalnom stanovništvu.

Tokom ovog dugog perioda otpora, pleme Keljmendi je očuvalo svoju slobodu i demokratski oblik upravljanja, što je stanovništvu dalo snagu i koheziju u suočavanju s Osmanskim carstvom. Međutim, 1700. godine, Osmansko carstvo imenovalo je Hodo Verdi-pašu da predvodi novu ekspediciju protiv Keljmendija, nakon prethodnih poraza koje je osmanska vojska pretrpjela od ovog plemena. Hodo Verdi-paša, poznat po svojim vojnim aktivnostima, bio je odlučan da izvrši zadatak pokoravanja Keljmendija jednom zauvijek. Paša je pokrenuo moćnu ekspediciju i uspio ugušiti otpor Keljmendija, porazivši nekoliko najistaknutijih vođa plemena, te primjenjujući represivne mjere kako bi zaustavio bilo koji oblik pobune.

Smatrao je ovaj rat jednom od najvažnijih pobjeda u svojoj vojnoj karijeri, potpuno uništivši značajan dio snaga Keljmendija. Hodo Verdi-paša je pokrenuo brutalnu kampanju, opkolivši teritorije Keljmendija i upuštajući se u borbu s gorštacima pod surovim uslovima, uključujući nestašicu hrane i municije. Borbe su završile smrću mnogih vođa Kelmendija, dok su oni koji su preživjeli bili raseljeni u druge regije, poput Pešterske visoravni, blizu Novog Pazara u Srbiji. Za mnoge Keljmendije ovo raseljavanje postalo je poput boravka u internacijskom kampu, gdje su bili izloženi pritisku da pređu na islam i gdje su gubili svoj tradicionalni identitet. Uprkos ovim teškim uslovima, Keljmendiji su održavali nadu da će se jednog dana vratiti u svoju domovinu. Nakon godina patnje, pleme Keljmendi odlučilo je poduzeti korake i vratiti se kući. Organizovali su se i krenuli na put povratka u Malisiju, boreći se duž rute ispunjene intenzivnim bitkama protiv osmanskih snaga. Borbe su bile žestoke, ali su se Keljmendiji, uz pomoć svojih žena, borili hrabro i odlučno da povrate svoju zemlju. Nakon odlučujućeg sukoba, osmanska vojska bila je prisiljena na povlačenje uz teške gubitke.

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THE NAHIYAH OF MASURICA ACCORDING TO THE 1831 OTTOMAN POPULATION REGISTER

Abstract: *Masurica represents a settlement with ancient historical roots, as evidenced by archaeological findings discovered in its surrounding area, which indicate a continuity of habitation since early period times. These findings place Masurica among the locations of particular historical significance in the southern Balkans. During the Ottoman period, Masurica was first mentioned as a village, while by the course of the 19th century it had attained the administrative status of a nahiyah, becoming a constituent unit of the kaza of Vranje. This administrative status reflected its importance not only from a demographic perspective but also in economic and strategic terms within the framework of the local Ottoman administration. Until the events of 1877–1878, the nahiyah of Masurica was predominantly inhabited by Muslim Albanians, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. Ottoman population registers attest to the extensive spread of settlements and the presence of a stable social organization. However, during the Russo-Ottoman wars and with the territorial expansion of the Serbian state, the Albanian population of this area faced systematic violence, which led to the forced displacement of the local inhabitants from their centuries-old lands. This violent process brought about profound changes in the ethnic and demographic structure of Masurica, leaving deep social, cultural, and economic consequences that persisted in the following decades. The geographic position of the Masurica nahiyah was particularly favorable for the development of economic life. Situated in a contact zone between the Vardenik mountain slopes and the surrounding lowlands, Masurica enjoyed suitable conditions for agriculture, livestock breeding, and the rational exploitation of forest resources. These natural resources formed the main basis of the local economy and ensured the population's livelihood, making the nahiyah relatively economically stable. The proximity to the well-known Roman military road Via Militaris, specifically its middle branch, was also of particular importance for*

the economic and strategic development of this nahiyah. This road constituted a major communication artery connecting the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, with the Balkan provinces and retained its significance during the Ottoman period. Along this route, which passed through the territory of Masurica, a considerable number of inns and rest stations had been established, so much so that it was difficult to find a two-hour segment of road without an inn, indicating the intensity of commercial, administrative, and military movement. Another important economic feature was the presence of iron mines in Upper Masurica, which were used to supply six furnaces for iron smelting in the surrounding area. This activity gave the Masurica nahiyah a special role in the regional economy and in the Ottoman artisanal production network. This study aims to analyze in detail the demographic structure of the Masurica nahiyah and the process of its population's displacement, relying primarily on the 1831 Ottoman population register, as well as other relevant historical sources, with the goal of shedding light on the historical developments of this area.

Key words: Masurica, 19th century, Ottoman period, demography, Albanians, migration.

NAHIJA MASURICA PREMA OSMANSKOM POPISNOM DEFTERU STANOVNIŠTVA IZ 1831. GODINE

Apstrakt: Masurica predstavlja naselje sa drevnim historijskim korijenima, što potvrđuju arheološka otkrića u njenoj okolini, koja ukazuju na kontinuitet naseljenosti još od ranih perioda. Ova otkrića svrstavaju Masuricu među prostore od posebnog historijskog značaja na jugu Balkana. Tokom osmanskog perioda, Masurica se prvi put spominje kao selo, dok je tokom 19. stoljeća stekla administrativni status nahije, postajući sastavni dio kaze Vranje. Ovaj administrativni status odražavao je njen značaj ne samo sa demografskog aspekta, već i sa ekonomskog i strateškog u okviru lokalne osmanske administracije. Do događaja iz 1877–1878. godine, nahija Masurica je bila pretežno naseljena muslimanskim Albancima, koji su činili ogromnu većinu stanovništva. Osmanski popisni registri svjedoče o širokoj rasprostranjenosti naselja i prisutnosti stabilne društvene organizacije. Međutim, tokom rusko-osmanskih ratova i sa teritorijalnim širenjem srpske države, albansko stanovništvo ovog područja suočilo se sa sistematskim nasiljem, što je dovelo do prisilnog iseljavanja lokalnih stanovnika sa njihovih stoljetnih ognjišta. Ovaj nasilni proces prouzrokovao je duboke promjene u etničkoj i demografskoj strukturi Masurice, ostavljajući duboke društvene, kulturne i ekonomske posljedice koje su se reflektovale i u narednim decenijama. Geografski položaj nahije Masurica bio je posebno povoljan za razvoj ekonomske djelatnosti. Smještena u zoni kontakta između planinskih padina Vardenika i okolnih nizina, Masurica je imala pogodne uslove za razvoj

poljoprivrede, stočarstva i racionalno korištenje šumskih resursa. Ovi prirodni resursi predstavljali su glavnu osnovu lokalne ekonomije i osiguravali egzistenciju stanovništva, čineći nahiju relativno ekonomično stabilnom. Poseban značaj za ekonomski i strateški razvoj ove nahije imala je i blizina poznatog rimskog vojnog puta Via Militaris, tačnije njen srednji tok. Ovaj put predstavljao je glavnu komunikacijsku arteriju koja je povezivala osmansku prijestolnicu Istanbul sa balkanskim provincijama i zadržao je značaj i tokom osmanskog perioda. Duž ovog puta, koji je prolazio kroz teritoriju Masurice, izgrađen je značajan broj hanova i stanica za odmor, toliko da je bilo teško pronaći dvosatni segment puta bez hana, što pokazuje intenzitet trgovačkog, administrativnog i vojnog kretanja. Još jedna važna ekonomska karakteristika bila je prisutnost rudnika željeza u Gornjoj Masurici, koji su opskrbljivali šest peći za topljenje željeza u okolini. Ova djelatnost davala je nahiji Masurica poseban značaj u regionalnoj ekonomiji i osmanskoj mreži zanatske proizvodnje. Ova studija ima za cilj detaljno analizirati demografsku strukturu nahije Masurica i proces iseljavanja njenog stanovništva, oslanjajući se prvenstveno na osmanski popis stanovništva iz 1831. godine, kao i na druge relevantne istorijske izvore, s ciljem osvjetljavanja istorijskog razvoja ovog prostora.

Ključne riječi: *Masurica, 19. stoljeće, osmanski period, demografija, Albanci, migracije.*

Population Registration in the Ottoman Empire

Although the Ottoman Empire had compiled cadastral registers as early as the fifteenth century, the practice of modern population enumeration began only in 1828–1829 in parts of Anatolia and the Balkans. This census, however, was left incomplete due to the Russo-Ottoman War.¹ In 1830, following the end of the war, a special council was established and a decision was made to conduct a census that would encompass the empire's population in its entirety. The council was tasked with determining where the enumeration would begin, who would carry it out, in what form it would be conducted, and with preparing the necessary regulations.² Preparations were completed in June 1830, and the census was implemented during the second half of that year and the first half of 1831. Thus, the census covered Anatolia and the Balkans, while other regions remained outside its scope.³ The Ottoman census focused exclusively on the male population, with the aim of identifying religious affiliation, approximate

¹ Kemal H. Karpat, *Popullsia Osmane 1830-1914*, Alsar, Tiranë 2017, 19.

² Musa Çadırcı, 1830 Genel Sayımına Göre Ankara Şehir Merkezi Nüfusu Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları I*, İstanbul 1980, 110.

³ Raif Kaplanoğlu, *1830-1843 Yılları Nüfus Defterlerine Göre Bursa'nın Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yapısı*, Nilüfer Belediyesi, Bursa 2013, 14.

ethnic characteristics, and occupational or social status.⁴ The principal objective was not to establish the total population count, but rather to determine taxable groups and to identify individuals eligible for conscription into the newly founded military division Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye, which replaced the abolished Janissary corps.⁵ Another purpose was to register those liable for the jizya tax, as well as the bedel-i askeriye a payment imposed on non-Muslims as compensation for exemption from military service primarily affecting the reaya (tax-paying subjects). Officials summoned to the capital for this task were first gathered in a designated place, assigned duties, and then dispatched to census districts. To ensure public trust and security, members of the local elite—such as imams, teachers, and mudarris were recruited to oversee the process.⁶ During 1830–1831, as census officials began submitting results to the Sublime Porte, a special commission was established in the capital to safeguard and process the registers. Based on the data, taxes were calculated and demographic changes identified. For this purpose, in 1831 the Statistical Agency (Ceride Nezareti) was founded.⁷ After the registers were collected, they were compiled and the results recorded in a special ledger.⁸ It is noteworthy that significant variations in methods and classifications were observed across different territories. The empire lacked sufficient teams to register and classify all males. In most areas, Muslim males were recorded in two categories: those fit for military service and those unfit. In some regions, the latter were further subdivided into elderly, children, disabled persons, and those incapable of work. Elsewhere, males were classified by age groups 1 to 16, 16 to 40, and over 40 or by physical features such as beard or mustache.⁹

Building upon the 1831 census and other historical sources, the demographic structure of the nahiyah of Masurica is analyzed through its constituent settlements, including villages, population numbers, anthroponyms, and professions. The census data are compared with additional historical materials, with the aim of providing an objective overview of Masurica's demography during this period, as well as of migration processes.

⁴ Yunus Koç, Nüfus, *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi* (mê tej: *D.İ.A.*), C. XXXIII, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (mê tej: T.D.V.), İstanbul 2007, 297.

⁵ Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, 1830 Nüfus Sayımına Göre Menteşe Sancağında Hane Nüfusu, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları XXIII*, İstanbul 2003, 75–76.

⁶ Cem Behar, Osmanlı Nüfus İstatistikleri ve 1831 sonrası Modernleşme, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilgi ve İstatistik*, ed. Halil İnalçık, Şevket Pamuk, T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Ankara 2000, 68.

⁷ Mehmet Güneş, Osmanlı Dönemi Nüfus Sayımları ve bu Sayımları İçeren Kayıtların Tahlili, *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, C. 8, S. 15, 2014, 227; In 1831, in the Ottoman state, the institution for finance, census, and statistics, known as Ceride Nezareti, was established, Cevdet Küçük, *Ceride Nezareti, D.İ.A.*, C. VII, T.D.V., İstanbul 1993, 409.

⁸ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İlk Nüfus Sayımı 1831*, T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, Ankara 1995, 12.

⁹ C. Behar, *Osmanlı Nüfus İstatistikleri ve 1831 sonrası Modernleşme*, 68–69.

General Characteristics of the Register

The defter under examination is preserved in the Directorate of State Archives under the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, within the Ottoman Archives Department, catalogued as NFS.d, serial number 6829.¹⁰ It comprises a total of 15 pages, with the final page (no. 15) left blank. The register itself contains no original pagination; numbering was added later using modern numerals. Written in the rika script, the defter is well preserved and generally easy to read. On its first page, the following information is provided: “The nahiyah of Masurica, part of the kaza of Vranje. This is the register of the enumeration of the Muslim population of the aforementioned nahiyah, compiled between February/March 1831 and May 1832 (from the beginning of Ramadan 1831 to the end of Dhul-Hijjah 1832)”.¹¹ From page 2 onward, the register begins with the village of Surdulica, recording households and individuals sequentially from no. 1. At the end of each village entry, the total number of households and Muslim males is noted. The defter covers 11 villages: Surdulica, Alakinca, Zhitörögja, Old Masurica, Lloginca, Prekodolci, Binovca, Kukavica, Lepenica, Jellashnica, and Verbova. The final page (no. 14) concludes with the statement: “This register was compiled according to sharia law and in conformity with the fatwa issued by Sejid Hafiz Ali, appointed by the central authority (caliphate) in the kaza of Vranje. This register was prepared in accordance with sharia law, and I, the humble servant, Sulejmani, census registrar of the aforementioned kaza, hereby attest as supervisor”.¹²

Population registers were typically compiled at intervals of 6 to 12 months, and the register under review belongs to this type. They encompassed the entire population, arranged hierarchically from the largest administrative unit to the smallest: vilayet, sanjak, kaza, nahiyah, and villages. In this case, the focus is on the nahiyah as an administrative unit composed of several villages. The census served as a population database, while subsequent changes births, deaths, migrations were annotated directly on the individual’s entry, usually in red ink. For instance, a red line was drawn across a name to indicate death; in cases of relocation, the date and new place were recorded. Newborns were not assigned numbers but were added next to the parent’s entry, in red ink and a distinct style. At the end of each neighborhood or village, newcomers (if any) were listed without numbers. The register concluded with the authorized registrar’s signature and official seal.¹³


¹⁰ T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), NFS.d. 6829/1-15.

¹¹ BOA, NFS.d. 6829/2.

¹² BOA, NFS.d. 6829/14.

¹³ Muzafer Bislimi, Adnan Sherif, İrfete İbraimi, *Dokumente osmane për historinë e Maqedonisë: regjistrime të shekullit XIX : sanxhaku i shkupit, kaza tetovë 1832/33*. V. 1, li. 1, Shkup 2020, 7-10; Sadik Mehmeti-Hatixhe Ahmed, *Popullsia e kazasë së Prizrenit sipas defterëve të vitit 1833 (Prizreni, Suhareka, Rahoveci, Malisheva, Drenasi)*, Instituti Albanologjik, Prishtinë 2024, 17-42.

Enumeration began with the head of household, followed by his descendants, thereby enabling calculation of the number of households and inhabitants in the villages of the Masurica nahiyah. Nineteenth-century Ottoman population registers are invaluable sources for genealogical research, as they provide detailed information on family composition, intergenerational relations, and social structure of the period. Through these registers, populations displaced from the Masurica nahiyah after 1878 can trace their ancestors and reconstruct or supplement their family genealogies. In addition to data on births and deaths recorded with the individual's name, father's name, age, and the terms *fevt* (deceased) or *tevellüd* (born) the registers also contain titles such as imam, mullah, hajji, sipahi (cavalry soldier), as well as two cases of fugitives (*firar*). The inclusion of titles such as imam clearly indicates the existence of mosques in these villages, where they served. In the register under review, imams are mentioned in the villages of Old Masurica, Surdulica,¹⁴ Prekodolci, and Jellashnica. From these data, corroborated by other sources, it is evident that mosques existed in these villages, staffed by the respective clerics.¹⁵



Prilog 1. The first page of the Population Register of the Masurica Nahiyah.¹⁶

¹⁴ The mosque of Surdulica was called the mosque of Sulejman Pasha; Osmani, *Sanxhaku i Nishit gjaṭē periudhës osmane*, 163; "In Surdulica there was a large mosque, which was later converted into a school, as well as the finest houses, which after the emigration were sold at symbolic prices."; Felix Kanitz, *Das Königreich Serbien und das Serbenvoli: von der Römerzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, V. II, Velag von Bernhar Meyer, Leipzig 1909, 264-165.

¹⁵ BOA, *NFS.d.* 6829.

¹⁶ BOA, *NFS.d.* 6829/1.

A Brief Historical-Geographical Overview of Masurica

Masurica lies 3 km south of Surdulica and occupies a highly favorable geographical position: situated along the Masurica River, precisely at the boundary between the eastern mountain slope and the western valley plain. Two ancient settlements exist in Masurica, where remnants of former walls are still visible.¹⁷ One is located in the mountains, to the right of the river (approximately 2 km away), where stones from old house walls and aged fruit trees (plum, cherry) remain. The other site is near Masurica, at the lower part of the settlement. Additionally, two places known as Crkvište (“church site”) are found in Masurica: one near the village itself, and the other in Vardenik. At the first site, the walls of a shrine and stone steps are visible; the church was oriented east–west.¹⁸

The kaza of Vranje, which included the village of Masurica, was definitively incorporated into Ottoman rule in 1455. This region lay at the crossroads of economically and strategically important routes connecting Istanbul with Belgrade and beyond. As such, both before and during Ottoman rule, it exerted a notable influence on the development of Vranje and its surroundings, including Masurica.¹⁹

Masurica referred to in Ottoman documents as Masuriça, Masurica, or مصوريجه first appears in the cadastral register (tapu tahrir) of the early sixteenth century. In this register, it is listed as a village within the nahiyah of Inegoshta²⁰, part of the kaza of Vranje and administratively belonging to the liva of Kyustendil.²¹ Within the nahiyah of Masurica there existed a Samokov, a specialized site for iron ore processing. Similar workshops were located in Romanovc, Topli Dol, and Zaguzhan.²² The German diplomat Johann Georg von Hahn²³, during his journey from Belgrade to Thessaloniki, also mentioned the mines of Masurica, noting: “The wealth of iron ore in Upper Masurica is so great that it supplies six iron-smelting furnaces in the surrounding area. All the iron produced is processed immediately on site, less into horseshoes and other items, but primarily into horseshoe nails. This industry is run by the Roma, who

¹⁷ J. Trifunovski, O ranijim šiptarskim naseljima u Masuričkoj kotlinici, *Hrvatski geografski glasnik* 19, br. 1. (1957), 176; Jusuf Osmani, *Pronat e muhaxhirëve në Sanxhakun e Nishit*, V. II, Prishtinë 2025, 319-320.

¹⁸ Jovan F. Trifunoski, *Vranjska Kotlina: antropogeografska ispitivanja; kniga druga*, posebni deo, Skopje 1963, 220-223.

¹⁹ Machiel Kiel, İvranye, *D.İ.A.*, C. EK-1, T.D.V. Yayınları, İstanbul 2016, 682.

²⁰ Inegoşt in Turkish and Inogoşt in Serbian mean the region around Surdulica. *Aysun Acar Durkan, 1572 Tarihli Köstendil İcmal Defterinin Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi*, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Erzurum Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Erzurum 2021, 221-223.

²¹ Ahmet Özkılınç vd. haz, *Rumeli Eyaleti (1514-1550)*, T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 2013, 563.

²² J. F. Trifunovski, *Vranjska Kotlina*, 220-223.

²³ Johann Georg von Hahn (1811–1869) was a German diplomat and scholar, widely regarded as the father of Albanological studies. 21/01/2026.

https://www.biographien.ac.at/oebl/oebl_H/Hahn_Johann-Georg_1811_1869.xml.

are numerous in this region; it is estimated that there are at least 300 families, 100 of whom live in the neighboring village of Jellashnica.²⁴ According to Trifunovski, Masurica during the Ottoman period was also known as “a small Istanbul.” At the center of the village stood a mosque, along with two Muslim cemeteries, the remains of which were visible until a few decades ago. In 1877–1878, the majority of the indigenous Albanian Muslim population of the Masurica nahiyah was forcibly displaced, while the small number who remained were compelled to leave in subsequent years. Today, Masurica is inhabited primarily by a Serbian population, with a few Muslim Roma families also present. Most of the current inhabitants are relatively recent arrivals.²⁵



Prilog 2. A 1530 map of the liva of Kyustendil, with the kaza of Vranje and the villages of Masurica, Surdulica, Alakinca, etc.²⁶

²⁴ Johann Georg von Hahn, *Reise von Belgrad nach Salonik*, Kaiserlich- königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, Wien 1861, 40-43.

²⁵ J. Trifunovski, O ranijim šiptarskim naseljima u Masuričkoj kotlinici, 174-177.

²⁶ A. Özkılınç, *Rumeli Eyaleti (1514-1550)*, 981.

Comparative Analysis of the Population of the Masurica Nahiyah According to the Ottoman Register of 1831 and Johann Georg von Hahn in 1861

Based on the Ottoman population register of 1831, Masurica was a nahiyah composed of several villages, administratively linked to the kaza of Vranje. Vranje itself belonged to the sanjak of Kyustendil, which was an administrative unit of the vilayet of Skopje. According to the 1831 Ottoman register of the Muslim population, the nahiyah of Masurica comprised 11 villages:

No.	Villages ²⁷	Households	Muslim Males
1.	Surdulica (Surduliça)	13	47
2.	Alakinca (Alakinça)	13	37
3.	Zhitoragja (Jitoraca)	15	29
4.	Masurica e vjetër (Eski Masuriça)	31	78
5.	Lloginca (Loginça)	10	43
6.	Prekodolci (Prekodolça)	13	44
7.	Binovca (Binofça)	9	24
8.	Kukavica (Kukaviça)	5	11
9.	Lepenica (Lepenica)	5	17
10.	Jellashnica (Jelaşniça)	32	109
11.	Vërbova (Virbova)	22	56
TOTAL		168	495

Table 1. Muslim population in the nahiyah of Masurica in 1831.²⁸

As shown in the table, the nahiyah of Masurica in 1831 had 11 villages with a Muslim population, totaling 168 households and 495 males. If the female population approximately equal in number to the males is added, the nahiyah of Masurica in 1831 would have had around 1,000 inhabitants.

Masurica and its surroundings are also mentioned in Hahn's travel account *From Belgrade to Thessaloniki* (1861), which provides important demographic details. Hahn recorded the following data for the Albanian villages of Masurica:

1. *Prekodolci (Brekodoltza)* – 20 households, located at the entrance of the western gorge.
2. *Zhitoragja (Schitoradscha)* – 25 households, one hour upstream along the river.
3. *Alakinca (Lakinza)* – 20 households, one hour upstream along the brook, at the confluence with Surdulica.

²⁷ For more on these eleven villages, see: Osmani, *Pronat e muhaxhirëve në Sanxhakun e Nishit*, V. II, 284, 289, 304, 312, 316, 318, 319, 333, 346, 361, 382.

²⁸ BOA, *NFS.d.* 6829/2-15.

4. *Old Masurica (Stara Masuritza)* – 60 households, situated on both sides of the brook, where it emerges from the western gorge. From here to its source in the uninhabited Vlasina mountains, the Masurica flows for about five hours through uninhabited gorges. Other sources, however, note Bulgarian villages on the surrounding ridges.
5. *Surdulica (Surdulitza)* – 40 households, located where the stream of the same name (also called Suropica) emerges from the southwestern gorge, with settlement on both sides.
6. *Binovca (Winofcza)* – 25 households, one hour northwest of Masurica, in the plain.
7. *Dllugojnica (Dlugonitza)*²⁹ – 30 households, a mountain village southeast of Prekodolci.

In addition to these, Hahn noted that Jellashnica (Jeleschnitza), Lepenica (Lepenitza), and Verbova (Wrbova) the latter located one hour from the inn on the road to Vranje, with 20 households were also inhabited by Albanians.³⁰ The total number of households recorded separately for these seven villages was 210, which Hahn estimated to correspond to approximately 1,000 Albanian inhabitants in this easternmost region.³¹

No.	Villages	Households	Total Population
1.	Prekodolci (Prekodolça)	20	1.000
2.	Zhitoraxha (Jitoraca)	25	
3.	Alakinca (Alakinça)	20	
4.	Masurica e Vjetër (Eski Masuriça)	60	
5.	Surdulica (Surduliça)	40	
6.	Binovca (Binofça)	25	
7.	Dllugojnica	30	
TOTAL		220 ³²	

Table 2. *The Albanian population of the Masurica Nahiyah in 1861 according to Hahn.*³³

From Hahn's data, it is evident that the nahiyah of Masurica, composed of seven villages in 1861, had approximately 1,000 inhabitants. Compared with

²⁹ Dllugojnica of Masurica is the village of Hasan Masurica's father. Hasan Masurica's father was Hoxha Islam Bajrami, who was displaced from the village of Dllugojnica in the Masurica Nahiyah during the years 1877–1878, Kadrush Sylejmani, Hasan Masurica hoxhë e Inovatorë, Prishtinë 1993, 13-15; J. Osmani, *Pronat e muhaxhirëve në Sanxhakun e Nishit*, 300-301.

³⁰ J. Georg von Hahn, *Reise von Belgrad nach Salonik*, 149.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 41-42.

³² Note: Hahn made an error of ten households during the enumeration. Instead of recording 220, he wrote 210.

³³ J. Georg von Hahn, *Reise von Belgrad nach Salonik*, 149.

the Ottoman register of 1831, a population increase is observed: in that year, the nahiyah contained eleven villages with about 1,000 inhabitants, while three decades later, with only seven villages, the population remained around 1,000. If we focus on the villages appearing in both the 1831 Ottoman register and Hahn's 1861 account, a clear increase in the number of households and consequently in population is visible.

Villages	Households (1831)	Households (1861)	Increase
Prekodolci (Prekodolça)	13	20	+7
Zhitoraxha (Jitoraca)	15	25	+10
Alakinca (Alakinça)	13	20	+7
Masurica e Vjetër (Eski Masuriça)	31	60	+29
Surdulica (Surduliça)	13	40	+27
Binovca (Binofça)	9	25	+16

Table 3. *Comparative Data on the Number of Households in Masurica Villages (1831–1861).*

The comparative analysis of the Ottoman data from 1831 and Hahn's account from 1861 demonstrates that the nahiyah of Masurica experienced continuous population growth, despite the reduction in the number of villages from eleven to seven. The increase in households in the seven villages recorded in both sources is a direct indicator of demographic expansion and the consolidation of several key settlements. The Ottoman data, based on religious affiliation, compared with Hahn's data, which emphasize ethnic identity (in this case Albanian), reveal that during the period 1831–1861 the seven villages of Masurica underwent demographic growth and consolidation. This process reflects the internal demographic and economic dynamics of the region, as well as the influence of Ottoman administration on its socio-economic organization.

*Patronymy, Natality, and Mortality in the Masurica Nahiyah
According to the Ottoman Population Register of 1831*

No.	Villages	Births	Deaths	Age Range	Most Frequent Patronyms
1.	Surdulica (Surduliça)	1	2	4-71	Husein, Sulejman, Mustafë
2.	Alakinca (Alakinça)	1	1	3-76	Osman, Sulejman, Mustafë
3.	Zhitoragja (Jitoraca)	-	-	3-71	Tahir, Husein, Hasan, Osman, Ali
4.	Masurica e vjetër (Eski	-	4	2-86	Mustafë, Sulejman, Ali, Husein, Jahja

	Masuriça)				
5.	Lloginca (Loginça)	2	6	2-71	Salih, Mustafë, Tahir, Husein, Bajram, Arslan
6.	Prekodolci (Prekodolça)	3	2	3-81	Salih, Mustafë, Husein, Talib, Ahmed, Jahja
7.	Binovca (Binofça)	-	1	3-86	Osman, Selim, Jahja, Sulejman, Davud
8.	Kukavica (Kukaviça)	-	2 people wanted	2-51	Salih, Ali, Islam, Sulejman, Tahir
9.	Lepenica (Lepeniça)	2	2	4-56	Malik, Selim, Abas
10.	Jellashnica (Jelaşniça)	2	2	2-86	Sulejman, Jahja, Et'hem, Muhtar, Halil, Ahmed, Ibrahim, Hasan, Mehmed
11.	Vërbova (Virbova)	1	4	1-81	Sulejman, Kurta, Halil, Demir, Ali, Bekash
TOTAL		12	24	1-86	Sulejman, Mustafë, Jahja dhe Halil

Table 4. *Patronymy, natality, and mortality in Masurica, 1831.*

Based on the Ottoman population register of 1831, the eleven villages of the Masurica nahiyah reveal a clear structure of paternal lineage, with households often encompassing multiple generations under one roof. Village sizes varied considerably, from small settlements such as Kukavica with only 5 households and 11 males, to larger ones like Jellashnica with 32 households and 109 males, reflecting diverse economic and social conditions. The most common patronyms—Sulejman, Mustafa, Yahya, and Halil indicate the dominance of certain family lines and their intergenerational continuity. The population consisted of a mix of children, adults, and elderly individuals, with a notable number of early-recorded births and deaths, pointing to high mortality rates at younger ages. At the same time, longevity exceeding 80 years was observed in five villages, suggesting relatively favorable economic and living conditions. On average, each household contained 2–4 males, and the distribution of population across households reflects strong social organization and the prevalence of extended families as a form of economic security and social stability.

Some Professions in the Masurica Nahiyah According to the Ottoman Population Register of 1831

Professions in Masurica Nahiyah	Imam	Mullah	Hajji	Spahi	Fugitives
Masurica e Vjetër (Eski Masuriça)	1	-	-	-	-
Surdulica (Surduliça)	1	2	1	-	-
Prekodollca (Prekodolça)	1	-	-	1	-
Jellashnica (Jelaşniça)	1	-	-	1	-
Kukavica (Kukaviça)	-	-	-		2
TOTAL	4	2	1	2	2

Table 5. *Selected professions in the Masurica nahiyah, 1831.*

The data from the Ottoman Population Register (1831) reveal that the professional structure of the Masurica nahiyah was limited and primarily tied to religious and administrative functions, reflecting the peripheral character of the region. Imams represented the most widespread category, with four cases recorded in Old Masurica, Surdulica, Prekodolci, and Jellashnica. This highlights the central role of religious institutions in the social and administrative organization of the nahiyah. Mullahs (two cases) and one hajji were registered only in Surdulica, a settlement with a more consolidated religious and educational profile. The hajji title indicated religious prestige and economic stability. Sipahis (two cases) were found only in Prekodolci and Jellashnica, suggesting limited feudal-military influence in the area. An interesting element is the registration of two fugitives in Kukavica, reflecting the fiscal and disciplinary function of the Ottoman register and the mechanisms of surveillance in peripheral regions prior to the Tanzimat reforms.

The Displacement and Resettlement of the Albanian Population from the Masurica Nahiyah

In the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, population movements were primarily aimed at increasing the Muslim population from Anatolia toward the Balkans. However, in the eighteenth century, following the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman Empire began to lose territories under its administration. Consequently, both the direction and mechanisms of settlement and displacement changed. To protect the Muslim population living in the Balkans, a large wave of migration from the Balkans to Anatolia began.³⁴ This

³⁴ Mead Osmani, *Sanxhaku i Nishit gjatë periudhës osmane (Shek. XIX)*, Instituti i Historisë “Ali Hadri” – Prishtinë 2022, 213.

situation intensified alongside the efforts of the Christian world to expel the Ottoman population from Europe and the Balkans and relocate it to Anatolia.³⁵ After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1853–1856, known as the Crimean War, approximately two million Muslims were displaced between 1856 and 1865, forced to leave their homelands and resettle in Rumelia and Anatolia.³⁶ Following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, Russia and the Balkan states, driven by expansionist Pan-Slavist policies, compelled large numbers of Muslims to migrate toward Rumelia and Istanbul due to insecurity and constant threats to life.³⁷

The uprisings in the Serbian Principality in the early nineteenth century, the privileges later granted to the Serbian population, and the final withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the region in 1878 left the Sanjak of Niš under Serbian administration. As a result, the Muslim population of this area, which had previously constituted a significant portion of its inhabitants, was severely affected and within a short period became a minority.³⁸ One of the areas impacted by these displacements was the nahiyah of Masurica, administratively part of the kaza of Vranje. According to Serbian sources, Albanians from 14 villages in the Vranje district, including Masurica, allegedly assisted the Serbian army. For this reason, the Serbian authorities did not expel them in 1877–1878. However, within three years (1879–1881), attacks against Albanians in the Vranje district began, with some being killed to force their displacement and seize their lands. One documented case is that of Jusuf H. Rexhepi from Surdulica, who repeatedly appealed to Serbian authorities for protection but was ultimately murdered on March 25, 1881. His brother, Mulla Selimi, sought justice but without success.³⁹ The violence against Albanians in the 14 villages intensified further. Testimonies reveal that Serbian villagers openly plundered livestock and belongings, and even committed killings. Reports describe corpses piled together “as if they were animals,” and people “cut into pieces.” These accounts illustrate the extreme suffering endured by Albanians in the Vranje district. Many displaced families fled overnight, taking only part of their possessions, crossing the Ottoman-Serbian border with their animals, and resettling in Presheva, Kumanovo, and other areas.⁴⁰ This reflected the Serbian policy of permanently cleansing these fertile lands of their remaining Albanian inhabitants.

³⁵ Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, T.T.K. Yayınları, Ankara 1999, 1.

³⁶ H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanların Makûs Talihi: Göç*, Kum Saati Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, 33.

³⁷ N. İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 10; H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e*, 61.

³⁸ J. Osmani, *Sanxhaku i Nishit gjatë periudhës osmane*, 171–202.

³⁹ Sabit Uka, *Jeta dhe veprimtaria e shqiptarëve të sanxhakut të Nishit deri më 1912*, V. 4, Prishtinë 1995, 41–42.

⁴⁰ S. Uka, *Jeta dhe veprimtaria e shqiptarëve të sanxhakut të Nishit*, 42–43.

There is, however, a discrepancy between Serbian sources and those of Kanitz.⁴¹ According to Kanitz, the Albanian Muslim population concentrated along the right bank of the Morava River in eleven villages resisted the Serbian army under General Beli-Marković during the January 1878 military operations. After being forced into submission near Vranje, this population chose mass migration toward Albanian-inhabited Ottoman territories rather than remaining under permanent Serbian administration. The abandoned settlements were repopulated by Orthodox Slavs from the mountainous regions of “Old Serbia,” long interested in the fertile lands of the Morava plain.⁴²

The displaced Albanian Muslim population from Masurica settled primarily in Albanian-inhabited areas of Bujanoc and Presheva, facilitated by territorial proximity and ethnic similarity. According to scholar Sabit Uka, five families from Masurica resettled in Bujanoc: two in Tërnoc, two in Nasalce, and one in Bilaç. In Presheva, families settled in Bushtran, Rahovica, Lower Shoshaja (Shoshaja e Poshtme)⁴³, and ten families in the town of Presheva. Other villages of the Masurica nahiyah Surdulica, Dllugojnica, Alakinca, Verbova, Jellashnica, and Prekodollci also experienced displacement, with their inhabitants resettling mainly in Bujanoc and Presheva. Some families later migrated further, to Karaçeva, Dobërçan, Gjilan, and others to Kumanovo and Skopje, with part continuing toward deeper Ottoman territories, including present-day Turkey. As was common, displaced families often adopted the name of their place of origin as a surname. One notable example is Hoxha Hasan Masurica, a prominent figure among Albanians and beyond.⁴⁴

The displacement of the Albanian Muslim population from Masurica during and after 1877–1878 demonstrates a continuous process of migration, initially directed toward Bujanoc and Presheva and later extending to more distant regions. This process also reflects an organized resettlement pattern, where ethnic and geographical factors played a decisive role in determining new destinations.

⁴¹ Felix Philipp Kanitz (1829–1904), Hungarian archaeologist and ethnographer, was born in Budapest on August 2, 1829, and passed away in Vienna on January 8, 1904; consulted at 15:20 on February 6, 2026. <https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/9190-kanitz-felix-philipp>.

⁴² F. Kanitz, *Das Königreich Serbien und das Serbenvoli: von der Römerzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, 263–264.

⁴³ For further information on those displaced from Masurica to Lower Shoshaja, refer to: Nexhat Agushi, *Shoshaja (Monografi)*, Pika 5A, Gjilan 2024.

⁴⁴ K. Sylejmani, *Hasan Masurica hoxhë e Inovatorë*, 13–17; S. Uka, *Jeta dhe veprimtaria e shqiptarëve të sanxhakut të Nishit*, 261.

Summary

Masurica is a settlement that preserves traces of early habitation, as evidenced by the remains of houses and ancient cultural monuments found in the village and its surroundings. These traces indicate that the area has been continuously inhabited and has played a significant role in the lives of the local population. In 1455, Masurica was fully incorporated under Ottoman rule, becoming an administrative part of the kaza of Vranje. This marked the beginning of a long period under Ottoman administration, which influenced the organization of daily life, social structure, and the economic development of the area. During the Ottoman period, up to the early 19th century, Masurica did not hold a particularly prominent administrative role. However, its location near the main Istanbul–Niš–Belgrade route ensured its continued significance as a communication hub. This road axis was a major artery connecting the Ottoman capital with the northern Balkans and further to Central Europe. Therefore, even though Masurica was not an administrative center, it held particular value as a transit and communication point. This demonstrates that small settlements often have greater importance than may appear at first glance, as they become part of broader networks of human and commercial movement. By the early 19th century, specifically in 1831, Masurica is recorded as a nahiyah comprising eleven villages. This represented significant development compared to the 16th century, when Masurica was only a small village. Comparing Ottoman data from 1831 with Hahn's 1861 records indicates a steady population increase in the Masurica nahiyah. The growth in the number of houses in the seven main villages and the consolidation of certain central settlements reflect economic development, social stability, and the effects of Ottoman administration on local community organization. The analysis of family structures, the distribution of main patronymics, and occupational profiles show a strong social organization, with religious institutions playing a central role in maintaining local stability. Additionally, a combination of favorable economic conditions and high mortality rates at a young age reflects the complex demographic dynamics of the period. The period 1831–1861 marks the consolidation and development of the Masurica nahiyah, making it a case study of how social, economic, and administrative factors influenced the evolution of rural communities in the Ottoman context. This expansion was closely linked to economic factors, particularly the exploitation of arable land and iron deposits. Fertile land and natural resources created favorable living conditions, promoting population growth and strengthening social structures.

Data from 1861 confirm population growth in the villages of the nahiyah, showing that Masurica had become a dynamic area. However, the period following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 brought radical changes. After the war, the Masurica nahiyah experienced a major demographic transformation. The Muslim Albanian population was forcibly expelled from its settlements, suffering significant human and material losses. This violent

process marked a dramatic turning point in Masurica's history. From a predominantly Muslim Albanian area, it was transformed within a short period into a space inhabited mostly by Serbian Orthodox settlers from various regions. This shift was not merely a population displacement but a profound social and cultural transformation that left an indelible mark on the identity of the Masurica nahiyah. Most of the expelled population relocated near the new Serbian-Ottoman border, mainly to Albanian-majority settlements in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo, as well as the surrounding areas of Gjilan, Kumanovo, Skopje, and further within Ottoman territories. Even those residents who remained until 1881 were eventually forced to leave due to ongoing violence and pressure. This process of expulsion and migration highlights the intensity of these changes and the impossibility of maintaining a stable coexistence under the new political conditions. The history of Masurica is thus a painful story of displacement and loss of identity. Although many years have passed since these events, traces of the former Muslim Albanian presence continue to be identified through the ruins of cultural monuments and settlement structures. These material evidences are important reminders that history cannot be completely erased; it remains present in stones, ruins, and the collective memory of people. Today, Masurica appears as a predominantly Serbian settlement, with a few remaining Muslim Roma families.

Zaključak

Masurica je naselje koje čuva tragove ranog naseljavanja, što potvrđuju ostaci kuća i drevnih kulturnih spomenika pronađenih u selu i okolini. Ovi tragovi ukazuju da je područje bilo kontinuirano naseljeno i da je imalo značajnu ulogu u životu lokalnog stanovništva. Godine 1455. Masurica je u potpunosti uključena pod Osmansko vlasništvo, postajući administrativni dio kaze Vranje. Ovaj trenutak označava početak dugog perioda pod osmanskom administracijom, koja je utjecala na organizaciju svakodnevnog života, društvenu strukturu i ekonomski razvoj ovog područja. Tokom osmanskog perioda, do početka 19. stoljeća, Masurica nije imala naročito značajnu administrativnu ulogu. Međutim, njen položaj u blizini glavne ceste Istanbul–Niš–Beograd osiguravao je njen stalni značaj kao komunikacijskog čvorišta. Ova prometna osovina bila je glavna arterija koja je povezivala osmansku prijestolnicu sa sjevernim Balkanom i dalje prema Srednjoj Europi. Stoga, iako Masurica nije bila administrativno središte, imala je poseban značaj kao tranzitna i komunikacijska tačka. Ovaj podatak pokazuje da mala naselja često imaju veću važnost nego što se na prvi pogled čini, jer postaju dio šire mreže kretanja ljudi i robe. Početkom 19. stoljeća, tačnije 1831. godine, Masurica se bilježi kao nahija koja se sastoji od jedanaest sela. Ovo je predstavljalo značajan razvoj u odnosu na 16. stoljeće, kada je Masurica bila samo malo selo. Poređenjem osmanskih podataka iz 1831. sa Hahnovim podacima iz 1861.

godine, primjećuje se stabilan porast stanovništva u nahiji Masurica. Povećanje broja kuća u sedam glavnih sela i konsolidacija određenih središnjih naselja odražava ekonomski razvoj, društvenu stabilnost i utjecaj osmanske administracije na organizaciju lokalnih zajednica. Analiza strukture porodica, raspodjele glavnih patronimika i profesija pokazuje snažnu društvenu organizaciju, u kojoj su vjerske institucije igrale centralnu ulogu u održavanju stabilnosti oblasti. Također, uočava se kombinacija povoljnih ekonomskih uvjeta i visoke smrtnosti u ranoj dobi, što odražava složenu demografsku dinamiku tog perioda. Period 1831–1861. obilježava konsolidaciju i razvoj nahije Masurica, čineći je primjerom za proučavanje utjecaja društvenih, ekonomskih i administrativnih faktora na evoluciju ruralnih zajednica u osmanskome kontekstu. Ovo širenje bilo je usko povezano s ekonomskim faktorima, posebno iskorištavanjem obradivog zemljišta i rudnika željeza. Plodno zemljište i prirodni resursi stvarali su povoljne uvjete za život, podstičući rast stanovništva i jačanje društvenih struktura.

Podaci iz 1861. godine potvrđuju rast stanovništva sela u nahiji, pokazujući da se Masurica pretvorila u dinamično područje. Međutim, period nakon rusko-osmanskog rata 1877–1878. donio je radikalne promjene. Nakon rata, nahija Masurica doživjela je veliku demografsku transformaciju. Muslimansko albansko stanovništvo nasilno je protjerano iz svojih naselja, doživjevši velike ljudske i materijalne gubitke. Ovaj nasilni proces označio je dramatičnu prekretnicu u historiji Masurice. Iz područja pretežno naseljenog muslimanskim Albancima, u kratkom periodu postalo je naseljeno uglavnom srpskim pravoslavnim stanovništvom iz različitih krajeva. Ova promjena nije bila samo preseljenje stanovništva, već duboka društvena i kulturna transformacija koja je ostavila neizbrisiv trag u identitetu nahije Masurica. Većina protjeranog stanovništva preselila se blizu nove srpsko-osmanske granice, uglavnom u albansko većinskim naseljima općina Bujanovac i Preševo, kao i u okolinu Gnjilana, Kumanova, Skoplja i šire u osmanskim teritorijama. Čak i oni stanovnici koji su ostali do 1881. godine, zbog nasilja i stalnog pritiska, na kraju su bili prisiljeni na preseljenje. Ovaj proces protjerivanja i migracije pokazuje intenzitet tih promjena i nemogućnost održavanja stabilnog suživota pod novim političkim okolnostima. Historija Masurice je, dakle, bolna priča o preseljenju i gubitku identiteta. Iako je prošlo mnogo godina od tih događaja, tragovi bivšeg muslimansko-albanskog prisustva i dalje se prepoznaju kroz ruševine kulturnih spomenika i stambenih struktura. Ovi materijalni dokazi važni su podsjetnici da se historija ne može potpuno izbrisati; ona ostaje prisutna u kamenju, ruševinama i kolektivnom sjećanju ljudi. Danas se Masurica predstavlja kao naselje sa većinskim srpskim stanovništvom, dok su prisutne i neke muslimanske romske porodice.

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1.02 Review scientific article/Pregledni naučni rad

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2026.9.15.96>*Received/Primljeno: 18. 12. 2025.**Accepted/Prihvaćeno: 12. 04. 2026.***INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW IN ALBANIAN EYALET
IN THE XVIII-XIX CENTURY: SHKODAR AND JANINA**

Abstract: *This paper examines the institutional structures and legal practices of the Albanian Eyalets of Shkodra and Janina. In addition, the paper analyzes the main sources of law and the relationship between Sharia and Albanian customary law, with a focus on fundamental legal institutions. Ideas for separation from the Ottoman Empire to create an Albanian state began to take shape during the existence of the two Albanian Eyalets. Key figures such as Kara Mahmud Pasha and Ali Pasha governed their respective Eyalets within the Ottoman Empire, adapting them to the Empire's formal structures and administrative divisions while pursuing their own interests. This paper aims to describe and explain how these Eyalets were established, and to examine their central institutions, administrative divisions, legal system, and the resources of law in the Eyalets of Shkodra and Janina.*

The Eyalet of Shkodra was a semi-autonomous and, at times, de facto entity within the Ottoman Empire, created by Albanian leaders in northern Ottoman Albania, encompassing today's Northern Albania, a large part of Montenegro, Southern Serbia, most of Kosovo, and Northern and Western Macedonia. The weakening of central Ottoman authority and the timar system brought anarchy to the Albanian-populated lands. By the end of the 18th century, two Albanian centers of power had emerged: Shkodra, under the Bushati family; and Janina, under Ali Pasha of Tepelena.

The Eyalet of Janina was a de facto independent entity created by Ali Pasha, an Albanian leader in southern Albania, that encompassed much of

continental Greece, southern and central Albania, and southwestern Macedonia. In 1787, Ali Pasha was awarded the Eyalet of Trikala as a reward for his support for the sultan's war against Austria. But this was not enough to satisfy his ambitions. Shortly afterwards, he took control of Ioannina, which remained his power base for the next 33 years. Like other regional leaders who emerged at the time, such as Osman Pazvantoğlu, he exploited a weak Ottoman government to expand his territory further until he gained de facto control of most of Albania, western Greece, and the Peloponnese, either directly or through his sons. In both Eyalets, the Sublime Porte delegated power. As such, authority remained within a form of autonomous governance, which ultimately failed to transform into an independent state.

In Shkodra Eyalet, Mehmet Pasha Bushatli failed to establish a fully structured system of central and regional administrative organs, nor to create a new legal order. In the Eyalet of Shkodra, legal norms similar to those of the broader Ottoman Empire were applied. In the Eyalet of Janina, legally the power of Ali Pasha was - and remained - a delegated authority granted by the Sublime Porte. The General Assembly is an organ that could be considered virtually non-existent,

The Divan was an auxiliary organ of Ali Pasha, to which he had delegated executive functions. Members of the divan were called secretaries (γραμματικός). In the Shkodra Eyalet, Mahmud Pasha appointed and dismissed various clerks and bylykbashas without permission of the Sublime Porte. He collected taxes that were used to maintain the Eyalet's state apparatus without any accountability to Istanbul.

According to sources, two parallel legal systems coexisted in the Ottoman Empire: Sharia (theocratic) law and secular (laic) law. Bujurides as the source of law – despite certain limitations in the field of legislation, the Albanian pashas of these two major Eyalets - Bushatli in Shkodra and Ali Pasha in Ioannina - exercised their right to issue legislative acts through so-called bujurdiies.

The authors employ a combined methodology, incorporating legal and historical analyses, to construct a detailed account of the principal developments in these two significant Eyalets that contributed to the weakening of the Ottoman Empire (often referred to as „the sick man of Europe”).

Key words: Ottoman Empire, Shkodra, Janina, Pasha, Eyalet, law, Albania.

INSTITUCIJE I PRAVO U ALBANSKIM EJALETIMA U XVIII I XIX VIJEKU: SKADAR I JANJINA

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad istražuje institucionalne strukture i pravne prakse albanskih ejaleta, Skadarskog i Janjinskog. Pored toga, rad analizira glavne izvore prava i odnos između šerijatskog i albanskog običajnog prava, s posebnim naglaskom na temeljne pravne institucije. Ideje o odvajanju od Osmanskog Carstva radi stvaranja albanske države počele su se oblikovati za vrijeme postojanja dva albanska ejaleta. Ključne ličnosti, poput Kara Mahmud-paše i Ali-paše, upravljale su svojim ejaletima unutar Osmanskog Carstva, prilagođavajući ih formalnim strukturama i administrativnim podjelama Carstva, dok su istovremeno slijedili vlastite interese. Cilj ovog rada je opisati i objasniti kako su ovi ejaleti uspostavljeni, te istražiti njihove centralne institucije, administrativne podjele, pravni sistem i izvore prava u Skadarskom i Janjinskom ejaletu.

Skadarski ejalet bio je poluautonomni, a povremeno i *de facto* nezavisni entitet unutar Osmanskog Carstva, koji su stvorile albanske vođe na sjeveru osmanske Albanije, a obuhvatao je današnju sjevernu Albaniju, veliki dio Crne Gore, južnu Srbiju, veći dio Kosova te sjevernu i zapadnu Makedoniju. Slabljenje centralne osmanske vlasti i timarskog sistema dovelo je do anarhije na područjima naseljenim Albancima. Krajem XVIII vijeka pojavila su se dva albanska centra moći: Skadar, pod vlašću porodice Bušatlija, i Janjina, pod vlašću Ali-paše Tepelenskog.

Janjinski ejalet bio je *de facto* nezavisni entitet koji je stvorio Ali-paša, albanski vođa na jugu Albanije, a obuhvatao je veći dio kontinentalne Grčke, južnu i centralnu Albaniju te jugozapadnu Makedoniju. Godine 1787. Ali-paši je dodijeljen ejalet Trikala kao nagrada za podršku sultanovom ratu protiv Austrije, ali to nije bilo dovoljno da zadovolji njegove ambicije. Ubrzo nakon toga, preuzeo je kontrolu nad Janjinom, koja je ostala njegova baza moći naredne 33 godine. Poput drugih regionalnih vođa koji su se pojavili u to vrijeme, kao što je Osman Pazvantoğlu, iskoristio je slabu osmansku vlast kako bi dodatno proširio svoju teritoriju, sve dok nije stekao *de facto* kontrolu nad većim dijelom Albanije, zapadne Grčke i Peloponeza, bilo direktno, bilo preko svojih sinova. U oba ejaleta, Visoka Porta je delegirala vlast. Stoga je autoritet ostao u obliku autonomne uprave, koja se na kraju nije uspjela transformisati u nezavisnu državu.

U Skadarskom ejaletu, Mehmed-paša Bušatlija nije uspio uspostaviti potpuno strukturiran sistem centralnih i regionalnih administrativnih organa, niti stvoriti novi pravni poredak. U Skadarskom ejaletu primjenjivale su se pravne norme slične onima u širem Osmanskom Carstvu. U Janjinskom ejaletu, pravno gledano, moć Ali-paše bila je – i ostala – delegirana vlast koju mu je dodijelila Visoka Porta. Opća skupština je organ koji se može smatrati praktično nepostojećim. Divan je bio pomoćni organ Ali-paše, kojem je delegirao izvršne funkcije. Članovi Divana nazivali su se sekretarima (γραμματικός). U

Skadarskom ejaletu, Mahmud-paša je imenovao i smjenjivao razne činovnike i buljukbaše bez dozvole Visoke Porte. Prikupljao je poreze koji su se koristili za održavanje državnog aparata ejaleta, bez ikakve odgovornosti prema Istanbulu.

Prema izvorima, u Osmanskom Carstvu su koegzistirala dva paralelna pravna sistema: šerijatsko (teokratsko) pravo i sekularno (laičko) pravo. Bujurdije kao izvor prava – uprkos određenim ograničenjima na polju zakonodavstva, albanske paše ova dva velika ejaleta, Bušatlije u Skadru i Ali-paša u Janjini, koristili su svoje pravo da izdaju zakonodavne akte putem takozvanih bujurdija.

Autori koriste kombinovanu metodologiju, koja uključuje pravnu i historijsku analizu, kako bi konstruisali detaljan prikaz glavnih dešavanja u ova dva značajna ejaleta koja su doprinijela slabljenju Osmanskog Carstva (često nazivanog „bolesnikom Evrope”).

Ključne riječi: *Osmansko Carstvo, Skadar, Janjina, paša, ejalet, zakon Albanija.*

Introduction

Albania and territories inhabited by Albanians were under Ottoman rule for approximately 470 years. Resistance to the Ottoman occupation of these territories varied in intensity and effectiveness, sometimes more aggressive and effective, at other times weaker and less impactful. Key examples of this resistance include Skanderbeg and the Eyalets of Shkodra and Ioannina, which also represented significant efforts to break away from Ottoman control. The Albanian Eyalets of the 18th and 19th centuries marked the first step in the country's political unification, a status that had last been achieved (to some extent) in the 14th century.¹

In the second half of the 18th century, Albanian feudalists established two major Eyalets: the Eyalet of Shkodra and the Eyalet of Ioannina. The Ottoman Empire had taken the plunge, and under these circumstances, there were two prominent cases in which pashas nominated by the sultan sought to separate from the Turkish government and establish autonomous Eyalets.²

During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire faced a multifaceted crisis stemming from internal economic and political struggles and external pressures. A key factor was the collapse of the Timar system, which could no longer meet the Empire's needs. The Timari Army, outdated in the face of modern warfare and firearms, became ineffective, leading to the system's

¹ Skënder Anamali, Kasem Biçoku, Ferit Duka, Selim Islami, Muzafer Korkuti, Stavri Naçi, Frano Prendi, Selami Pulaha, Pëllumb Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Instituti i Historisë, Tirana 2002, 61.

² Kosta Çekrezi, *Shqipëria e shkuara dhe e tashmja*, Tirana 2012, 68.

eventual dissolution.³ The Eyalets of Janina and Shkodra marked a significant turning point in the Albanian territories' movement towards separation from the Ottoman Empire. These autonomous entities emerged within the framework of the Empire's *elayetes* (provinces) but gradually severed *de facto* ties with central authority.⁴ These state formations, built and led by Albanians, although integral to the Ottoman Empire, gradually gained a degree of autonomy, as clearly reflected in both their internal organization and their foreign relations with the major powers of the time. After centuries of occupation, the Eyalets began to express aspirations for independence, much like other Balkan nations, many of which gained independence earlier than the Albanians for various reasons.⁵ These two Eyalets were located in regions that served as crucial interprovincial trade centers, populated predominantly by Albanians, and were governed by an Albanian ruling class.

During the 18th century, it was the Albanian feudal lords who established the feudal aristocracy. They were divided into factions, among which armed conflicts erupted in the mid-18th century. This phenomenon was particularly evident in Shkodra, where leading families fought to establish their dominance in this part of the Ottoman Empire. The prominent rival families were the Bushatli and the Çausholli.⁶

The Ottoman Turks divided the Albanian-inhabited territories into several districts, or *vilayets*. In the late eighteenth century, two major Albanian centers of power emerged: Shkodër, under the Bushati family, and Janina, under Ali Pasha of Tepelenë. Depending on their interests, both centers at times cooperated with the Sublime Porte, and at other times acted independently of the central Ottoman authority.⁷ The *Eyalets* were autonomous territories ruled by influential local leaders. These were established on the initiative of the rulers themselves, often without the approval of the Ottoman central government.⁸

The Eyalet of Shkodra had a longer existence compared to that of Janina. It was established earlier and lasted longer. The Shkodra Eyalet was led by members of the powerful Bushatli family and spanned the period from 1757 to 1831. In contrast, the Eyalet of Janina, under Ali Pasha, existed from 1787 to 1822. At its peak in 1812, it controlled the entire region of Toskëria. Both Eyalets were granted delegated authority from the Sultan, and their power was exercised in his name. As such, they remained autonomous possessions within the Ottoman Empire, without evolving into independent Albanian states. However, from an

³ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e Shtetit dhe e së Drejtës në Shqipëri*, Tirana 2018, 236.

⁴ Nuray Bozborra, *Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar në Perandorinë Osmane*, Tirana 2002, 97-98.

⁵ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e Shtetit dhe e së Drejtës në Shqipëri*, Tirana 2018, 237.

⁶ Grup autorësh (Group of authors), *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*, Tirana 2007, 215-220.

⁷ Raymond Zickel, Walter. R. Iwaskiw, *Albania a country of study*. Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1992, Second Edition, First Printing, 1994, Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data.

⁸ A. Luarasi, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*, 246.

organizational standpoint and in terms of how power was exercised, they displayed features characteristic of autonomous state-like entities.⁹

According to the researcher Egro, both the Bushatlis and Ali Pashë Tepelena took the first steps toward separation from the Sultan's authority and the Ottoman Empire. Each pasha—one in the north and the other in the south of Albania—issued their currency, an act that provoked the Sultan's anger and fury. Neither ruler was particularly fanatical about religion: Catholicism thrived under the Bushatlis, while Ali Pasha of Janina placed great trust in his Orthodox Christian subjects.¹⁰

Ali Pashë Tepelena governed the Eyalet in southern Albania. At the same time, the one in the north, centered in Shkodër, was ruled by the feudal Bushatli family, who maintained near-independence for almost three-quarters of a century (1757–1831). From the early days of Ottoman rule, the empire attempted to manage the region by aligning the interests of local elites with those of the state, incorporating many into the ruling *askeri* class.¹¹ Mahmud Pasha of Shkodra envisioned himself as a new Skanderbeg. However, Western historiography has shown relatively little interest in him compared to his southern counterpart, Ali Pasha of Janina—often referred to as the „Lion of Janina.“¹² As Ottoman power declined, some genuine feudal principalities emerged, forming what were known as the large *Eyalets*. The Ottoman government placed *sipahis* in each district—cavalry soldiers who were expected to respond to the Sultan's call to arms, appearing on horseback and accompanied by infantry. To cover their expenses, the *sipahis* were granted *timars*—plots of land taken from public holdings.¹³ Although the Pashas of Shkodra and Janina governed their territories within the framework of the Ottoman imperial system, they did not act to sustain the empire. Instead, they pursued ambitions that leaned toward the creation of an Albanian state. As Misha Glenny notes, despite being an Ottoman official, Ali Pasha reportedly spoke no more than a dozen words of Turkish.¹⁴ The independent and decentralizing policies pursued by the Bushatli family in the north and Ali Pasha Tepelena in the south were early expressions of a broader movement that would eventually culminate in the Albanian National Renaissance.¹⁵

⁹ S. Anamali, K. Biçoku, F. Duka, S. Islami, M. Korkuti, S. Naçi, F. Prendi, S. Pulaha, P. Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, 671.

¹⁰ Dritan Egro, *Bushatllinjë dhe Ali Pasha thyen ligjet e Portës së Lartë*, In: Inforpress Albania, Tirana 2018.

¹¹ Rederick F. Anscombe, Albanians and “mountain bandits, in: Anscombe, Frederick F, (ed), *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830*, Princeton, NJ, 2006, 87-113.

¹² Noel Malcolm, *Kosova një histori e shkurtër*. Tirana 2001, 182.

¹³ Sokol Pacukaj, The Independence of Albania, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, E-ISSN 2039-2117, Vol. 4, Nr. 11, 2013.

¹⁴ Misha Glenny, *Historia e Ballkanit 1804-1999, Nacionalizmi, Luftërat dhe Fuqitë e Mëdha*. Tirana 2007, 27.

¹⁵ Zamir Tafilica, Ermal Hysen Baze, Ols Lafa, in book: *Archaeological Investigations in a Northern Albanian Province*: Chapter 4. Results of the Projekti Arkeologjik i Shkodres (PASH),

It is essential to recall that the Ottoman Empire was one of the most significant political powers in Southeastern Europe for an extended period. From the XIV to the beginning of the XX century, it was the largest and most influential political entity in the region.

Eyalet of Shkodra

From the middle of the XVIII century, in the village of Bushat near Shkodra, lived an influential Albanian nobleman named Mehmed. Through his growing power and abilities, he succeeded in obtaining the title of Pasha and became the heir to the Eyalet of Shkodra.

The Eyalet of Scutari, Iskodra, or Shkodra (1757–1831), was an autonomous and de facto independent Eyalet established by the Albanian Bushati family out of the former Sanjak of Scutari. It was centered around the city of Shkodër in present-day Albania and included much of what is now Montenegro. At its height, under the rule of Kara Mahmud Bushati, the Eyalet encompassed large parts of Albania, most of Kosovo, western Macedonia, southeastern Serbia, and a significant portion of Montenegro. Until 1830, the Eyalet of Shkodra maintained control over much of these territories, including Southern Montenegro.¹⁶

Until 1830, the Eyalet of Shkodra controlled most of these territories, including southern Montenegro.¹⁷ However, the Eyalet of Shkodra was officially dissolved at the end of 1829.¹⁸

According to contemporary foreign evidence, Kara Mahmud „kept the country independent up to a level that it appeared he aimed to become an absolute ruler”, or that „his talent, his bravery, his wealth and the loyalty of the people he governed consistently demonstrated his real independence”. These accounts highlight the respect and significance attributed to the Albanian vizier, mainly due to his political actions, particularly his pursuit of independent governance in the Eyalet of Shkodra.¹⁹

The political activities of Kara Mahmud reflected the basic aspirations of the Albanian population to live independently from the rule of Istanbul. The resistance of the inhabitants of the Eyalet of Shkodra under Kara Mahmud's

Chapter 4, Historical background. In: *Volume One: Survey and Excavation Results*. Ann Arbor, Michigan 2023.

¹⁶ Kosta Çekrezi, *Shqipëria e shkuara dhe e tashmja*, Tirana 2012, 68. See also: Pashalik of Scutari, DBEDIA.

¹⁷ Hilmi Ismaili, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e Shtetit dhe e së drejtës I, Pjesa e përgjithshme*. 2002; Skënder Anamali, Kasem Biçoku, Ferit Duka, Selim Islami, Muzafer Korkuti, Stavri Naçi, Frano Prendi, Selami Pulaha, Pëllumb Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, Tirana, 2002. See also: Pashalik of Scutari DBEDIA.

¹⁸ Kosta Çekrezi, *Shqipëria e shkuara dhe e tashmja*, Tirana 2023, 68-70.

¹⁹ S. Anamali, K. Biçoku, F. Duka, S. Islami, M. Korkuti, S. Naçi, F. Prendi, S. Pulaha, P. Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, 630.

leadership continued the efforts of the Albanian population against foreign (Ottoman) domination. In other words, the ultimate goal was the creation of an independent Albanian feudal state, possibly even as a vassal to one of the European Great Powers, as evident from the project agreements with Russian and Austrian representatives. However, the Sublime Porte was entirely unwilling to recognize or support such a possibility. In response, the Ottoman central authority intensified its efforts to suppress Kara Mahmud and the Eyalet of Shkodra. As a result, the Sublime Porte then condemned Kara Mahmud to death and, in 1793, launched an expedition against him. Once again, Kara Mahmud defeated the Ottomans, after which he added the provinces of Prizren and Dibra to his Eyalet. In 1796, however, the rebel pasha was killed during a campaign in Montenegro. He had ruled for 21 years and is remembered as the most prominent, energetic, and determined Albanian leader in the period preceding the national independence movement.²⁰

Eyalet of Janina (*Ioannina*)

The name of the Pacha is Ali, and he is regarded as a man of exceptional ability. He governed all of Albania (the ancient Illyricum), Epirus, and part of Macedonia.²¹ In theory, Albania was ruled by the Sultan; in practice, much of it was controlled by a fierce and capable brigand leader who would later be remembered in history as Ali Pasha (1740-1822). The Sultan was compelled to acknowledge Ali's diplomatic and administrative skills, as well as his military prowess. He persuaded Ali to abandon his life as a brigand and instead serve the Ottoman Empire. Ali did so to significant effect and was rewarded in 1787 by the title of Pasha. In theory, he was under the Sultan. Still, in practice, he expanded his Albanian territory considerably to include much of northern Greece and ruled it, more or less, as an independent territory.²²

Under Ali Pasha's rule, the Eyalet of Janina was furnished with administrative, judicial, and military institutions modeled after the Ottoman system. However, it differed in one key respect: each *myteselim* (provincial official) was assisted by a local council. These councils included representatives

²⁰ Zamir Tafilica, Ermal Hysen Baze, Ols Lafe, In book: *Archaeological Investigations in a Northern Albanian Province*: Chapter 4, Results of the Projekti Arkeologjik i Shkodres (PASH), Chapter 4, Historical background. In: *Volume One: Survey and Excavation Results*. Ann Arbor, Michigan 2023.

²¹ Robert Elsie, Bayron letter to his mother. 1809-1810. In: *Texts and Documents of Albanian History, Lord Byron: Letters on Albania*. From: Lord Byron, *Selected letters and journals in one volume*, from the unexpurgated twelve volume edition. Edited by Leslie A. Marchand, London, John Murray 1982, 29-34, 41-42.

²² Elizabeth Bailey, Lyne Connolly, Nicola Cornick, Amanda Grange, Baron in Albania, In: *Historical and Regency Romance, UK*, 2015.

of the Muslim elite, prayers in Muslim-majority provinces, and kocabasha, who represented the Catholic-majority areas, representing the Catholic population.²³

In the Janina Eyalet, the divan, or High Council, acted as a collegial body with advisory functions. The divan was composed of some of the most educated individuals in the Eyalet who held 'ministerial' positions or secretarial positions for various administrative affairs. It also included Ali Pasha's most trusted people.²⁴ Ali Pasha of Ioannina demonstrated a notable ability to unite people of different religious backgrounds. He permitted the free operation of religious institutions of various faiths, and he encouraged both religious and secular education. As a new ruler, Ali Pasha successfully united the clergy, particularly the Orthodox. On the other hand, Ali Pasha was distinguished by his hypocrisy, lack of scruples, cruelty, and unprincipled and unlimited ambitions.²⁵ On the other hand, with his politics (Mahmud Pasha Bushati) and his justice courts, he gained the support not only from the people of his provinces but also from neighboring provinces. Many people have asked him to send his officers so they can defend them from unjust courts, from robberies made by qadis, and from those who collect taxes. On numerous occasions, Mahmud Pasha expelled qadis and tax officials (who collected taxes) who abused their positions.²⁶

Since the military was the central pillar of his rule, Ali Pasha devoted particular attention to it. The core of his army consisted of salaried soldiers, primarily recruited from the impoverished highlands of southern Albania. Through the income they received, these poor soldiers were able to provide for their families, which in turn created strong personal loyalty to the pasha they served.²⁷

Over ten years in power, Ali Pasha effectively made himself de facto independent from the Sublime Porte. Despite ongoing threats from Istanbul, he sent his representatives to the European powers with messages and specific instructions. He proposed projects, negotiated, and maintained regular correspondence with European monarchs, including Napoleon Bonaparte, the King of England, the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, and the Tsar of Russia. In doing so, he presented himself as a fully independent political actor on the international stage.²⁸ Under Ali Pasha's rule, Janina became one of the largest centers in the Balkans. The Eyalet was home to approximately 1.500.000 inhabitants. At the same time, Janina flourished with businesses that had around

²³ S. Anamali, K. Biçoku, F. Duka, S. Islami, M. Korkuti, S. Naçi, F. Prendi, S. Pulaha, P. Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, 630.

²⁴ Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës, Disertacion*, Universiteti i Tiranës. Tirana 2017, 27.

²⁵ Kosta Çekrezi, *Shqipëria e shkuara dhe e tashmja*. Tirana 2023, 71.

²⁶ Ferdhon Meksi, Bushatlinjtë e Shkodrës. *Kreu i dytë. Mahmud Pashë Bushati (1749-1796)*. In: *Alb Spirit*, 2020.

²⁷ S. Anamali, K. Biçoku, F. Duka, S. Islami, M. Korkuti, S. Naçi, F. Prendi, S. Pulaha, P. Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, 639.

²⁸ Kosta Çekrezi, *Shqipëria e shkuara dhe e tashmja*. Tirana 2023, 72-73; Iliriana Nano, *Sistemi i drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës, Disertacion*, Universiteti i Tiranës. Tirana 2027.

2,000 economic units, which had trade connections with many European capitals. Ali Pasha built roads and other public works, including bridges, dams, water supply systems, castles, and inns for travelers and merchants. He built and restored forty churches and monasteries for Christians, without mentioning mosques and Bektashi tombs.²⁹ Ali Pasha welcomed and highly valued foreigners who came to work and live in the Eyalet. Doctors, military officers, carpenters, and other skilled professionals were well received. He often encouraged them to remain by arranging marriages and granting them citizenship rights. However, once they were settled in the Eyalet, they couldn't leave the Eyalet. E. Jacques provides numerous examples of the fate of these foreigners.³⁰

A well-known researcher, Georges Castellan, when discussing the Balkan Eyalets, „whose fame went beyond the borders of the Empire” (referring primarily to the Albanian Eyalets of Shkodra and Janina, as well as those of Pasvan Oglu and Vidin), asserts that ”these large Eyalets emerged in Balkan regions where the authority of the Sultan was only theoretical.”³¹

Institutions and Administrative Division

The Ottoman Empire was an absolute monarchy for most of its history. In terms of governance, it functioned as a theocratic, absolutist, and hereditary monarchy, with the sultan as its head. The Sultan was formally regarded as the chief enforcer and defender of God's justice on earth.³² The monarch of the Ottoman Empire held the title of sultan and also bore the title of caliph, signifying his role as Padishah, or the successor of the Prophet. In the personality of the Padishah, both secular and religious authority were united.³³

The Sultan was the supreme authority in the state and was regarded not only as the highest organ of power but also the oldest institution of governance. This absolutist power was secured mainly through the army, which was used for invasions and also as a means of governance.³⁴ The Sultan was expected to uphold the sacred laws of Islam, whose primary source was the Qur'an. These laws also drew on the sayings and decisions of the Prophet Muhammad, known as sunnahs, as well as the interpretations and rulings of the first caliphs. Over time, sultans also issued their laws, known as kanun. Notably, sultans such as

²⁹ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*. Tirana 2018, 245.

³⁰ Edwin Jacques, *Shqiptarët, Historia e popullit shqiptar nga lashtësia deri në ditët e sotme*. Kartë e Pendë, Fondacioni Abraham Linkoln, 281.

³¹ Georges Castellan, *Histori e Ballkanit*. Tirana 1996, 225.

³² Miodrag Simović, Milena Simović, Marina Simović, Pravo i pravosuđe u Osmanskom Carstvu sa posebnim osvrtom na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke*, Vol. 2, No. 1. (2020), 38-53.

³³ Hilmi Ismaili, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës I*, Universiteti i Prishtinës, Prishtina 2002, 205.

³⁴ Ferdinand Schevill, *Ballkani historia dhe qytetërimi*, (*History of Balkan Peninsula*), Tirana 2002, 188.

Mehmed II and Suleiman were highly active in this regard, promulgating a series of kanunes that clarified legal ambiguities for judges (qadis) and administrators. Although *kanuns* were considered secondary to Sharia (Islamic law), they played an essential supplementary role in the Ottoman legal system.³⁵

In his inner circle, the Sultan was always surrounded by advisers and high-ranking state officials who formed the Sultan's *divan* (council). According to *the Kannunname of El-Fatih (Mehmed II)*, the highest state officials were grouped into four offices: viziers, *kadiaskers* (chief military judges), *defterdars*, and *nishandjis*. The term *kanun* can also be understood in a broader, more traditional sense: it was used to address legal areas not covered by *shari'a*, such as criminal law and land law.³⁶

Initially, there was only one vizier; however, under the *kannune* of El-Fatih, the number was fixed at seven. Among them, one held the position of Grand Vizier (Sadr-I Azam), the highest-ranking official after the Sultan. All viziers formed the Divan of Grans Vizier, which later came to be known as the Sublime Porte. Holders of high religious offices - such as the *Seyhulislam*, the *kadiaskers* (chief judges) of Rumelia and Anatolia, and the chief provincial qadis - were, in theory, equal in rank to the corresponding members of sultanic bureaucracy, including the Grand Vizier and provincial governors. These religious leaders exercised significant autonomy within the Ottoman system.³⁷

The Ottoman State was divided into three central geographical regions: Anatolia, Rumelia, and Arabia. The primary administrative unit in these zones was the province, known as an *elayet*. These were further subdivided into *sanjaks* (districts or sub-provinces), each governed by a *sanjak-bey*. The sanjak where the Beylerbey (provincial governor) resided was known as the Pasha sanjak (Pashasanjak).³⁸

One *elayet* typically comprised around eight *sanjaks*. The *Sanjak-bey*, as the military authority for the province, was also responsible for overseeing economic activities and administering urban cities. He served as the military commander of the *timar* and *zeamet* cavalry units within the *sanjak*, while also acting as the head of civil administration. The *sanjak* was further subdivided into *kaza* (districts), *nahiye* (sub-districts), and villages.

As Hatice Oruc notes, the primary duties of the *sanjak* were to maintain public order in the region and to ensure a lawful relationship between the *sipahis* and the *reaya*. In addition, *sandjak* beys participated in military campaigns

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ Dorothy Greene, Shari'a and Kanun: A Study of the Ottoman Empire's Legal System, In: *Kleio Historical Journal*. 2023. See also: Hilmi Ismaili, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës I, Pjesa e përgjithshme*, Universiteti i Prishtinës, Prishtina 2002, 206-207.

³⁷ Yavuz M. Hakan, Turkey: Islam without Shari'a. In *Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World*. edited by Robert W. Hefner, 146-178. Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 2011. See also: Ismaili Himi, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e institucioneve shtetërore dhe juridike*. Prishtina 2017, 209.

³⁸ *Historia e shtetit, shoqërisë dhe qytetërimit Osman*, Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, Vol. 1, Tirana 2009, 231.

alongside the *timâriots* of their *sanjak*, under the command of the *beglerbegi* to whom they were subordinate.³⁹

According to Dr Ishani Choudhury, „the largest entity was the province-*vilayet* or *beylerbeylik* - which was divided into sub-provinces or districts called *sanjaks*. *Sanjaks* were composed of even smaller units called *nahiyes*. Ottoman district governors were called *sancakbeyi*. The first *sancakbeyi* was perhaps appointed during the reign of Orhan or Murad I. The post of *Beylerbeyi* was created to supervise the duties of *Sancakbeyi*. The *Beylerbeyi* ruled over the large province of *Vilayet*. In the 1520s, there were 6-8 *vilayets* and approximately 90 *sanjaks*. By around 1570, the number increased to 24 *vilayets* and more than 250 *sanjaks*. The provincial ruling class in the Ottoman Empire was identified as *Umra* and included both *beylerbeyis* and *sanjakkbeyis*. In addition to these provincial posts, another critical figure in Ottoman provincial administration was the *Qadi* (or *kadi*), who was typically educated in a religious school and served at different levels depending on their income.⁴⁰

The Eyalet of Shkodra, throughout all phases of its existence, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in its relations with the Sublime Porte, but it never achieved complete separation. The power exercised by Mehmed Pasha Bushatli was not entirely sovereign. He did not succeed in establishing a fully structured system of central and regional administrative organs, nor in creating a new legal order.⁴¹ In the Eyalet of Shkodra, legal norms similar to those of the broader Ottoman Empire were applied. However, the authority exercised by the pasha included several functions typically associated with statehood, such as tax and customs collection, organization and command of military forces, and management of foreign relations. Nonetheless, these powers were indicative of a process of state formation rather than a fully functional and independent state.⁴²

Legally, the power of Ali Pasha was - and remained - a delegated authority granted by the Sublime Porte. The Imperial decree of 1788, which recognized his rule over Janina, and the subsequent decree of 1820, which declared him „*fermanli*”, contain the temporal borders, both of which defined the temporal limits within which he exercised the authority granted and recognized by the Sublime Porte.⁴³

³⁹ Hatice Oruç, *Administrative Division of the Bosnian Sandjak in the 16th Century*, 2009.

⁴⁰ Hilmi Ismaili, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e institucioneve shtetërore dhe juridike*. Prishtina 2017, 207-209. See also: Ishani Chodhuri, *Administration of the Ottoman Empire*. In: Bethune College.

⁴¹ Aleks Luarai, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*, Tirana 2018, 243.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 243.

⁴³ Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës, Disertacion, Universiteti i Tiranës*, Tirana 2017, 34.

Other State Organs

The General Assembly is an organ that could be considered virtually non-existent, as there is insufficient evidence regarding its convening. The researcher Ilo Mitkë Qafëzezi, in his work „Historia e Ali Pashës,” mentions an Assembly meeting held in May 1820.⁴⁴ The reasons for considering the Assembly a non-functional or marginal organ may lie in the existence of another institution, modeled after the Ottoman system, which held significant authority just below that of the pasha. This alternative organ appears to have overshadowed the Assembly's power.

The Divan was an auxiliary organ of Ali Pasha, to which he had delegated executive functions. Members of the divan were called secretaries (*γραμματικος*). Precise information about the number of secretaries in Ali Pasha's Divan does not exist, and available accounts are often contradictory. Nevertheless, some individuals are mentioned in contemporary sources. For instance, the chairman of the divan, who assumed leadership in Ali Pasha's absence, was Mehmet Efendi. He is considered one of the most important figures of the Eyalet, tasked with leading negotiations with Russian military officials from the early days of Ali Pasha's rule. Later, he also undertook diplomatic missions to Bonaparte as Ali Pasha's representative. Other secretaries mentioned in the literature include Mantho Ikonomi (Secretary of Justice), Spiros Kolovos, and Aleks Nuço, among others. According to *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar*, the Eyalet was equipped with an administrative and judicial apparatus based on the Ottoman model, with a significant modification: each *myteselim*, or provincial official, was accompanied by a council composed of members of the Muslim and Catholic elites, or *kocobashas*, who represented Catholic provinces. Furthermore, judicial decisions were appealed in Janina rather than Istanbul. In forming this apparatus, Ali Pasha appointed not only experienced Muslims but also several Catholic advisers and secretaries. At the head of the Eyalet stood Ali Pasha himself as the absolute ruler. He was supported by a high council or divan composed of his sons and his most trusted associates, such as Thanas Vaja, Jusuf Arapi, Tahir Abazi, Meço Bono, Veli Gega, Hysen Poda, Dalip Përmeti, Dervish Hasani, Ago Vasjari, and Mehmed Myhyrdari, among others. In addition to holding executive power, Ali Pasha treated the treasury as his personal property, maintaining strict oversight and ensuring it consistently covered all necessary expenses.⁴⁵

In the Shkodra Eyalet, Mahmud Pasha appointed and dismissed various clerks and *bylykbashas* without permission of the Sublime Porte. He collected

⁴⁴ Ilo Mitkë Qafëzezi, In: Ilirjana Nao, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës, Disertacion*. Tirana 2017.

⁴⁵ S. Anamali, K. Biçoku, F. Duka, S. Islami, M. Korkuti, S. Naçi, F. Prendi, S. Pulaha, P. Xhufi, *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar I*, 639.

taxes that were used to maintain the state apparatus of the Eyalet without any accountability to Istanbul.⁴⁶

Organization of military forces

The core of their strategic and military concept was the creation of a well-prepared and sizable army. The Eyalet armies consisted of land and naval forces. In both Eyalets, the land forces – comprising infantry, cavalry, and artillery – played the primary role, while the maritime component was more developed in the Janina Eyalet. In peacetime, the number of troops in each Eyalet did not exceed 20.000. However, during wartime mobilization, this number increased significantly, reaching up to 40.000 soldiers in Janina Eyalet and up to 60.000 soldiers in the Shkodra Eyalet. Both Ali Pashë Tepelena (Janina) and Kara Mahmud Pashë Bushati (Shkodra) made considerable efforts to supply their armies with weapons, equipment, and other technical resources.

Large quantities of rifles, revolvers, cannons, and ample ammunition were purchased from Europe. Both Eyalets developed local industries, including the production of gunpowder and firearms.

The efforts of the Eyalet leaders to secede from the Ottoman Empire failed because, although the main element was Albanian, they never considered creating an independent Albania. The concept of the nation-state did not yet exist; Albanian political thought was in its formative stages; and the army was based on the principles of mercenary service rather than on national sentiment or pride.⁴⁷

Police and Espionage Organs

After establishing the Ministry of Interior, Ali Pasha appointed a former gangster named Thanas Vaja as its head, tasking him with organizing the internal police structures. Among their responsibilities was the gathering of information from individuals entering or leaving the Eyalet. Historical sources frequently note Ali Pasha's remarkable ability to acquire intelligence about decisions made in Istanbul. Ali Pasha established a strong network of informants, recruiting among them a significant number of women and prostitutes who were assigned specific missions. This efficiency is illustrated by the observation of an English military officer, who said: „I am convinced, and this is confirmed as an uncontested truth, that no important event-even if it occurred in the innermost

⁴⁶ Ferdhon Meksi, *Bushatlinjtë e Shkodrës. Kreu i dytë*. Mahmud Pashë Bushati (1749-1796), In: *Alb-spirit*. 2020.

⁴⁷ Muzeu i Forcave të Armatosura, In: *Koleksione Historike*. ND.

chambers of the Divan in Istanbul—remained unknown in the mansions of Janina for more than eight days”.⁴⁸

Organs for diplomacy

The Organs of diplomacy and foreign affairs were organized by those nominated and appointed by the pasha. These were trusted figures - high-ranking officials of the administration, advisors, and other reliable individuals. During Ali Pasha's rule, the Sublime Porte did not yet have a formal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Janina hosted several foreign consuls, and activities related to international cooperation intensified significantly. As a result, Ali Pasha appointed trustworthy and professional individuals to handle international affairs. These individuals served either as senior members of the administration.⁴⁹ Holders of high religious offices, such as the Seyhulislam, the Qadiaskars of Rumelia and Anatolia, and the chief provincial qadis, were, in theory, equal in rank to their counterparts in the sultan's bureaucracy, including the Grand Vizier and provincial governors, and were able to exercise considerable autonomy.⁵⁰ To cover the expenses for administration, military forces, construction, and maintenance of palaces and villas, as well as to ensure reserves of treasury for difficult times, Ali Pasha and his sons relied primarily on two resources: revenue from private properties and income from state-sanctioned monopolies.⁵¹

The law and resources of law

According to sources, two parallel legal systems coexisted in the Ottoman Empire: Sharia law (theocratic law) and secular (laic) law. Together, these systems formed a unified legal framework commonly referred to as Ottoman law. Sharia law is known in Arabic as *fiqh*. The term sharia derives from an Arabic word meaning „the right path”, „right direction,” or path to salvation.” Under *Sharia*, every Muslim was obliged to obey God, the Prophet, and lawful authority, and to be prepared to defend the faith, even with their life and property. The legal system aimed to keep order, prevent discord among Muslims, and ensure that justice, humanity, and mutual respect formed the foundation of social life. Killing another Muslim was strictly forbidden, as were all forms of harm,

⁴⁸ Shpendi Topollaj, *Rreth librit, "Policia sekrete e Ali Pashës"* të autorit Irakli Koçollari. In: Fjala. 2023.

⁴⁹ A. Luarasi, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës*, 249. See also: Iliriana Nano, *Sistemi i drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës. Universiteti i Tiranës*. Tirana 2017, 25.

⁵⁰ Yavuz M. Hakan "Turkey: Islam without Shari'a." In: *Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World*, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 146 178, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011.

⁵¹ Pashallëqet e Mëdha Shqiptare (1771-1831), Kreu IV, In: *Zagracani worldpress*. ND.

theft, and violations of property. Alcoholism, gambling, and adultery were also banned. Believers were expected to fulfill their contractual obligations conscientiously.⁵²

Thus, the discipline concerned with Sharia is called *fiqh*; more precisely, Islamic jurists who interpret Sharia are known as *mujtahids*. The primary sources of Sharia law are the Qur'an, Hadith (*sunnah*), *ijma* (consensus), and *qiyas* (analogy). The Qur'an is the holy book of Islam and serves as the primary source of Sharia law, functioning in many ways like a constitution. The hadith or *sunnah* refers to the collected sayings, actions, and tacit approvals of Prophet Muhammad. These are categorized based on their authenticity into *two classifications: sahil (completely reliable) and less reliable. Kiyas of analogy is the fourth resource of law, which Islamic lawyers use when dealing with issues not regulated by the Qur'an*. In addition to the basic resources, there are additional legal resources: *Er-rei* and *urf-adet*. *Er-rei* is used in a specific case that could not be solved based on basic resources, and in this case, the solution is based on a ratio according to justice or the judge's conscience. *Urf-adet* or *el-urf* is the customary law of any social community.

In addition to the theocratic law, secular state law also existed in the Ottoman Empire. This law primarily consisted of the Sultan's legal acts and *Urf-adet* (customary law). It is essential to note that in Albanian-populated territories, customary law was of significant importance and widely practiced. As Syrja Pupovci pointed out in the introduction to the 1972 reprint of the Kanun, „The preservation of customary law was one of the most important elements in helping the Albanian people to maintain their individuality under Ottoman domination”.⁵³

It is known that the Sultan was the sole legislator; however, he was still limited by Sharia law and the *fetva* of the *Sheikh-ul-islam*. As Caliph and head of a theocratic state, the Sultan could not promulgate laws that were against the principles of Islam. The Ottoman Sultan and his bureaucracy, serving as the central executive, regularly issued a series of statutory laws known as *kanun*, *'urfi*, or sultanic laws.⁵⁴ These kanuns were issued to regulate specific fields, while a *kanunname* (a collection of statutes) covered broader areas. Until the 19th century, the Sultan issued kanuns as *fermans*; thereafter, they were issued as *hatt-i sherifs*.⁵⁵

⁵² Небојша С. Шулетић, *Сремски санџак у XVI веку, докторска дисертација*, Универзитет у Београду Филозофски факултет, Београд 2013.

⁵³ Arben Cara, Mimoza Margjeka, Kanun of Leke Dukagjini, Customary Law of Northern Albania, In: *European Scientific Journal*. 2015, edition vol. 11, No. 28 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431.

⁵⁴ John Bugnacki, The Garden of Forking Paths: Islamic Legal Transformations in the Ottoman Empire During the Nineteenth Century, In: *History & Classics Undergraduate Theses*, 2014, 18.

⁵⁵ Hilmi Ismaili, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës I, Pjesa e përgjithshme*, Prishtina 2002, 212-217.

The legal system of Janina Eyalet remained a part of and a reflection of the Ottoman system of justice. In the field of law, Ali Pasha neither overthrew nor abolished the legal regime in force, which had been implemented for the majority of the Muslim population. Nor did he violate the legal privileges of Catholics who were a considerable portion of the Eyalet. On the contrary, as his actions demonstrate, Ali Pasha showed an extraordinary interest in combating and limiting corruption among Ottoman judges.⁵⁶ In Shkodra Eyalet, three systems of legal norms were applied: Ottoman law (Sharia), Church law (for Catholics), and Albanian customary law.⁵⁷

In the fields of administrative and financial law, the fiscal system, taxation, customs, and related areas, legal norms that have been largely uniform (with minor variations) throughout the Ottoman Empire were applied. In the Janina Eyalet, all matters related to immovable properties – such as property transactions, rental agreements, and ownership were governed by legal formulations of Ottoman law.⁵⁸ Major disputes involving significant or financial interests were adjudicated by judges, whose decisions were then verified (ratified) by domestic institutions of authority. These decisions were based on the written legal formulations of trade law and customary practices, similar to those in other parts of the Empire, before the codification of a unified Ottoman commercial law.⁵⁹ In addition to Ottoman law, other legal systems were also in effect within the Eyalet, including elements inherited from Byzantine law, which had remained influential in the Balkans for centuries.

Christian Law or Church Law

This system of norms, institutions, and procedures extended its authority over the Christian population within Ali Pasha's state, functioning in much the same way as it did in bishoprics and archbishoprics beyond his domain. This legal system was applied through its ecclesiastical courts. It can be viewed as both a spiritual and legal continuation of Byzantine tradition. In Albania, during the Ottoman conquest, the canonical principles of Heksabiblos, as applied by Harmenopulos, were followed by the Orthodox.⁶⁰ In this context, it is worth

⁵⁶ Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës*. Fakulteti i Drejtësië, Universiteti i Tiranës, Tirana 2017, 43.

⁵⁷ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e shteti dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*. Tirana 2018, 243.

⁵⁸ Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës*, Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Drejtësisë. Tirana 2017, 43.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ According to Ilirjana Nano, Konstantin Harmenopoulos (or Armenopoulos) is a Greek lawyer during the late Byzantine period of time. During 1344-1345 he wrote "Procheiros Nomos" or as it is known Hexabiblos. In fact, his work is not clearly a creative work. But anyway, he has summarized and systemized in a thematic way legal corpus found by him, in order to serve judges. His admirable work served populations of Byzantine Empire even after it failed as a result of Ottoman conquer, and it even served until Greek Civil Code was adopted by modern Greek state,

noting the role of Ecclesiastical law. As in earlier historical periods, both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches exercised judicial authority in addition to their religious functions. In the field of criminal law, the Church was responsible for judging clergy for crimes they committed, as well as the laity for offenses related to sacred rites, such as blasphemy, heresy, or violations of marriage and family laws. Canon (or Roman) law recognized certain offenses against the authority of the papacy. Those subject to this crime were members of the Catholic rite who committed acts against the Christian faith.⁶¹

Customary law was widely implemented. In the Eyalet of Shkodra, to gain the trust of the Catholic population, Mahmud Pasha presented himself as respectful toward Christians. As a result, the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini was elevated to the status of law for all. Observing this development, Austrian Emperor Josef II foresaw the possibility of Mahmud's conversion to Catholicism and the subsequent expansion of Austrian influence in the region. On this basis, he proposed to Mahmud that, should he accept Catholicism, Austria would recognize him as the sole sovereign of all Albania.⁶²

System of legal norms created by Pasha – positive law

Within the borders of major Albanian Eyalets, this law was represented by *bujurdies*, which were expressions of the pasha's authority in promulgating normative acts. *Bujurdies were the primary means by which the legislative function of the Eyalet was exercised.* They took the form of decisions or orders issued by the pasha. In addition to *bujurdies*, agreements were a distinctive feature of the Eyalet of Janina and are considered one of the primary sources of written law.⁶³ Research in the archives reveals a large number of such agreements, shedding light on various aspects of social life and illustrating how legal relations between parties were regulated.

Another system of law, Latin (Roman) law, derived from city statutes and reflected the Roman legal heritage. This system extended its jurisdiction only to those parts of the Eyalet that had formerly been under Venetian control. These included certain coastal cities and provincial territories along the Ionian and

in 1946. Hexabiblos is a summary of legal norms which regulated life of Christian Orthodox, in similar was as it is done by Sharia for Muslim population and the canonic law for catholic population. In: Ilirjana Nano: Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës, *Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Drejtësisë*. Tirana 2017.

⁶¹ Bashkim Rrahmani, Majlinda Belegu, *The State of Scanderbeg. Institutions and the Applied Law*. In: Adjuris Academic Publisher, ISBN 978-606-94978-4-5 (E-Book), Bucharest 2020.

⁶² Edwin Jacques, Historia e popullit shqiptar nga lashtësia deri në ditët e sotme. In: *Kartë e Pendë*. Fondacioni Abraham Linkoln, Grafischena, Fasano, ND, 282.

⁶³ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*. Tirana 2018, 250. See also: Iliriana Nano, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës*, Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Drejtësisë, Tirana 2017, 188.

Aegean Seas. In administering and regulating political, economic, and legal affairs in these possessions, the norms of Venetian Statutes were applied.

Bujurdies - Documents taken from the secretary of Vizier Ali Pasha (a few examples)

These documents are part of the collection of documents of the State Central Archive, within the fund titled „Janina Eyalet” (no. 4), under the name „Ali Pashë Tepelena”, dossier 7, pages 8, 9. The documents themselves do not contain any information about their history in the sense of who possessed them previously (apart from the persons mentioned in the papers) and how they came to be in the Central Archives. Text is written in a letter with black color. The written language is Greek, but it imitates the formulation of Ottoman documents. The vocabulary and syntax do not conform to the rules of written Greek of the time, a feature common to the documents of the period. The writing materials (paper and color) and the method of creating documents indicate that we are dealing with authentic documents of the time, issued by Ali Pasha. I, Ali Pasha, give these items to Bujurdie Miksi Aleksiu, my servant, and I have appointed him as a fiancé to the daughter of Duka Nika from Karjan. And I give from the çiftlik a house that I have built together with a garden behind and in front of the house, and he and his sons, after my death, will not be bothered by my sons or my grandchildren, because I have given this myself as mylk and as the property until the end of this world. I made this decision based on my desire, and at the same time, I ensured it was tax-free, including the curve and the guest house. If bothered by my sons or my grandchildren after my death, may he be damned by the Prophet and by me. Therefore, I gave this bujurdi to Miksi as attestation. Decided [signature] May 17, 1818. Janina. Fund: Pashallëku i Janinës (Ali Pashë Tepelena, 4), dossier 7, Pg. 8. The vizier Ali Pasha gave bujurdi Hajdhos, the daughter of Duka Nika from Karjani, since she served in my harem, whom I now took out [from harem] and put into marriage. Here I am giving half of the field of Nisi Papa Kosta from Karjani, half of which is sixteen hectares, and a vineyard of her father, Duke, which is located at the end of the village, consisting of a hectare and a half, altogether 17,5 hectares, which I gave as mylk to her sons even after my death. None of my sons or grandchildren will ask for any rights to these 17.5 hectares, but [hadho] she will have this milk as her property until the end of time, since I gave it according to my will. Any of my sons or grandchildren who bother them about this after my death may be damned by the Prophet and by me. Therefore, I submitted the aforementioned document as a bujurdi for attestation and decided [signature], July 02. 1818. Janina. Fond: Pashalliku i Janinës (Ali Pashë Tepelena, 4), dossier 7, Pg. 9r.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ani Jaupaj, Si i mbyti Ali Pasha 17 vajza për faj të prostitutes Frozinë. Transliterated from Greek and translated by Sokol Çunga. In: *Gazeta Panorama*. 2016.

Basic sources of the positive law

Bujurides as the resource of law – despite certain limitations in the field of legislation, the Albanian pashas of these two major Eyalets - Bushatli in Shkodra and Ali Pasha in Ioannina - exercised their right to issue legislative acts through so-called *bujurdies*. A *bujurdi* can be considered a normative act in the form of an order or decision, which, depending on the addressee, could have a general character when directed to the entire population of the Eyalet, or an individual character when addressed to a specific person or a small group.⁶⁵ These acts established legal norms applicable to the general population or issued binding instructions to administrative organs, which were obligated to act on them. *Bujurides* could also contain specific orders directed to a community or to key persons, requiring them either to perform or refrain from a particular duty, such as enforcing compulsory sales, delivering property, returning property to a *vakuf*, confirming an engagement, or appointing a person to a specific post. Ali Pasha's decisions and orders were typically brief, final, and unmistakably imperative. They allowed no discussion or appeal. As a rule, they included stern warnings of serious consequences for those who failed to comply.⁶⁶

Agreements were also a source of law in the Eyalets. These agreements can be categorized as follows: agreements between the Eyalet and other Eyalets, agreements between the pasha and various provinces within the Eyalet, agreements among the villages or provinces within the Eyalet, and international agreements. Among these, international agreements were particularly significant in both Eyalets. Both Eyalets established diplomatic relations with major powers to get support. They maintained and developed international relations with Russia, Austria, France, and others. In this context, one notable example of international diplomacy from the Shkodra Eyalet was its relationship with Russia, which was then at war with the Ottoman Empire. Negotiations were conducted at Rozafa Castle, culminating in an agreement that was to be approved by Katarina II of Russia.⁶⁷

Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure

Ali Pasha embraced and effectively implemented the Islamic legal system (Sharia) and enforced the severe sanctions prescribed by it. By analyzing the Islamic (sharia) law as applied in the Ottoman Empire, it becomes clear which acts were considered criminal offenses. Among these, the following offences were present and prosecuted within the Eyalets:

⁶⁵ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e shteti dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*. Tirana 2018, 250. See also: Mandro, B, A, In: Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës, Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Drejtësisë*. Tirana 2017, 188.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷ Aleks Luarasi, *Historia e shtetit dhe e së drejtës në Shqipëri*, Tirana 2018, 242.

Criminal Offenses against family and morality. This category includes offenses such as a wife's infidelity, extramarital sexual relations, extramarital pregnancy, relations between a Muslim woman and a Catholic man, and prostitution. These were considered serious crimes under Sharia law, as well as under customary law and church law, since all three systems of law sought to protect personal and family honor.⁶⁸ The case of Frosina⁶⁹ serves as a clear example, highlighting the problematic position of women, who were often viewed more as instruments for labor and childbirth, as well as objects to satisfy male desire.

In cases of rebellion by population from various provinces against the Sublime Porte or the authority of Ali Pasha, it was not uncommon for harsh sanctions to be imposed after the uprising was suppressed. These included the destruction of their residences. This tradition and practice, dating back to the Roman Empire, was later adopted by the Byzantines, and ultimately by the Ottoman Empire. A clear example is the Rebellion of Kardhiq, where, following its suppression, a large number of houses and properties were destroyed.

Acts of espionage and conspiracy with foreigners

Espionage was punishable by death. In other words, the death penalty was imposed for politically motivated acts such as „cooperating in a conspiracy with foreign powers to overthrow the Pasha” – as seen in the case of the Kardhiq conflict. The Kardhiq case⁷⁰ is described in various ways in the literature. Severe

⁶⁸ Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës*, Universiteti i Tiranës. Fakulteti i Drejtësisë, Tirana 2017, 66.

⁶⁹ Mukhtar, Ali Pasha's son, was a big, voluptuous. One of his paramours was a beautiful woman, the wife of a Greek merchant. Since he loved her so much, she knew she could gain everything from him. Blinded by passions, he didn't refuse to give her a valuable ring, which she did not take as a symbol of love but as a means to be sold. The ring was sold, whereas Mykhtar's wife, from the jeweler to whom the ring was sold, found out who sold it. Ali Pasha was informed about this and undertook some investigation, finding all women his son was flirting. Thus 17 girls and women. These women and girls were executed being handcuffed and thrown in the Janina lake, because of the prostitution they were exercising. Prostitution according to Ali Pasha and according to positive laws of that time was a big crime. For this case, there is a lot written and most of writings neglect that these women were doing prostitution. These beautiful girls and women were forced to obey sexual hunger of Mykhtar (and his father indeed). However, they were executed whereas sayings say that their roar of their scream was heard during the very long time by the ears of island.

⁷⁰ Kardhiq is a place where Ali Pasha's mother was raped and attacks against Kardhiq may be considered as the acts of revenge of Pasha." Hanko, this provocative woman, autarkic and insatiable, set up heavy taxes. Apart of this, assisted by her brave men, abducted a village which did not belong to her. But this was not forgiven by them. They one night entered into Karjan, robbed Hanko, Shanishaha and little boy Ali and send them to Kardhiq. And there, before the eyes of future tyrant, as a revenge they broke out into a collective orgy in the bodies of her mother and her sister. In his primitive, wild and proud soul, he seeded hate against people in one side and, he became thirsty of being powerful in order to punish and to rinse this insult." This description made by Spiro Mela offers to the readers ate the introduction of the book "The Lion of Epirus – Ali Pasha and

punishments were applied explicitly to crimes of espionage and double-dealing. Spies from the enemy side were punished with mutilation (such as the cutting of hands) or execution.⁷¹ The crime of betrayal, as a criminal act that directly harmed the interests of the liberation war, was punished with either the death penalty or life imprisonment.⁷²

Criminal offenses against life and health

In this category, murder was the primary criminal offense. During this period, it is evident that the number of murders was high, and the motives behind them varied, ranging from revenge to robbery, both of which were especially frequent in the Albanian and Greek provinces. To deter such crimes, in an era when human life was often valued at no more than two pennies and criminals showed little regard for law or morality, Ali Pasha ordered shocking and barbaric executions. These executions served as a powerful deterrent, instilling fear in many potential offenders. According to historical literature and based on court rulings that imposed the death penalty, Professor Nano summarized the following: the Beys of Kardhiq, such as Dosti and Koka, were executed for conspiring with France against the interests of the state. Methods of execution included breaking limbs, exposing the condemned in front of lions, hanging, and drowning in deep waters. Across nearly all regions of the Ottoman Empire, murder was punishable by death. Executions were required to be carried out in the presence of high-ranking authorities and one of the victim's heirs. Any execution carried out without the presence of these individuals was subject to disciplinary action.⁷³

Suli", published by Toena in 2013. This history is one of the most painful events of Ali Pasha family, since his mother and his sister were ill-treated and raped by Kardhiq people. Situation became much complicated when in a barbarous way and under a lustful brutality, two women were turned into subjects of massive sexual exploitation. Hanko and Shanica were exposed unlimitedly to a nightmare made by men of that place. Mother and sister of Ali were kept as hostage over 40 days, being transferred from a hand to the other in order to fill up everyone's pleasures. Dorian Koçi, *Pse e rrënoi Ali Pashë Tepelena, Hormovën?* In: *Gazeta Tema*. 2018.

⁷¹ According to M. Barletit, Skenderbeu says in a speech: *but if this should be called more than a crime rather than a necessary protection ... your yourselves judge, etc. It should be believed that this speech is a creation of the author, but however it shows that in Albania of XV, the notion of crime and the necessary were known*, cited by Luarasi, A, *op. cit.*, 1977, 214.

⁷² Bashkim Rrahmani, Majlinda Belegu, Majlinda, *The State of Scanderbeg. Institutions and the Applied Law*. In: *Adjuris*. ISBN 978-606-94978-4-5 (E-Book), Bucharest 2020.

⁷³ Hilmi Isajli, Fatmir Sejdiu, *Historia e institucioneve shtetërore dhe juridike. Universiteti i Prishtinës*. Prishtina 2018. See also: Ilirjana Nano, *Sistemi i Drejtësisë në Pashallëkun e Janinës*, Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Drejtësisë. Tirana 2017.

Family Law

Engagement was arranged between the bride and bridegroom, always through the mediation of a matchmaker (*shkuesi-shkues*). Marriage followed only after the engagement was concluded. According to Sharia law, the institution of marriage varied depending on the Islamic schools of thought. In the context of the Islamic traditions followed in the Western Balkans, marriage could be classified into three types: regular marriage, marriage with an enslaved person, and a third form known as temporary marriage. Polygamy was permitted under Sharia law, but only for men. A Muslim man had the right to marry up to four women, a practice allowed among the Muslim population and also acknowledged in the Kanun of Skanderbeg. However, the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini did not allow polygamy, as the Catholic Church influenced it. According to Islamic principles, a husband was obliged to provide materially for all his wives, not just one. If he was unable to have a free wife, he could instead marry an enslaved person, which was recognized as a form of marriage with an enslaved person.⁷⁴

Marriage was regarded as a mutual support system between husband and wife, as well as a framework for raising children. To legally conclude a marriage, a minimum age was required, though this age differed between boys and girls. A boy had to be at least 16 years old, while a girl could marry at 14 or 15. Within families, there was often a traditional order of precedence for marriage, determining who should marry first. According to Catholic canon law, marriage was strictly monogamous. In contrast, Muslim men were to marry more than one woman; a Muslim man could enter into a new marriage even while still married to another wife.⁷⁵ It is also important to note that the Pasha could order engagements through an official decree (*bujurdi*).

Summary

The formation of these two Eyalets marked the beginning of the process toward the creation of the Albanian state. Although the Eyalets of Shkodra and Janina were eventually dismantled by force by the Sublime Porte, the idea and the goal were extinguished. These Eyalets were established and organized within territories conquered by the Ottoman Empire, and, for the most part, their administration and legal systems functioned according to Ottoman rules and instructions. Even the pashas themselves were appointed and officially recognized by the Sultan. However, both the Pasha of Shkodra and the Pasha of Janina were aware of the Ottoman Empire's eventual decline, and they actively

⁷⁴ Belegu Majlinda, Bashkim Rrahmani, Marital and Inheritance Law from the Middle Ages to the Positive Law. From Scanderbeg Canon to Positive Law. In: *Journal on European History of Law*. Vol. 14, No. 1, 2023, 197.

⁷⁵ Bashkim Rrahmani, Majlinda Belegu, The State of Scanderbeg. Institutions and the Applied Law. In: *Adjuris*. ISBN 978-606-94978-4-5 (E-Book), Bucharest 2020.

participated in its fragmentation. In doing so, they sought alliances with major European powers, including the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. Despite these efforts, such cooperation did not result in concrete support for the creation of an Albanian state. There was hope that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would provide an opportunity for statehood, which is why these relationships with the Great Powers were maintained. However, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 decided to preserve the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Eyalet of Janina found itself without international backing—a critical development that enabled the Sublime Porte to move decisively against Ali Pasha.

The reasons for the Eyalets' failure were both external and internal. Externally, as previously mentioned, the foreign powers changed their positions and withdrew support. Internally, the broader population was not strongly inspired by the idea of a promised constitutional state, so the pasha's power and support against Istanbul were limited. Many of the pasha's collaborators, including members of his own family, abandoned him. The local feudal class was not fully committed to the long-term goals of national development; instead, they focused on short-term, personal interests. This proved to be a significant mistake, which became evident immediately after the pasha's death.

It is clear that in both Eyalets, the Sublime Porte delegated power. As such, authority remained within a form of autonomous governance, which ultimately failed to transform into an independent state. Nevertheless, although these Eyalets did not succeed in establishing an independent Albanian state, the ideas of Albanian statehood persisted and continued to evolve in the subsequent phases of regional development.

Zaključak

Formiranje ova dva ejaleta označilo je početak procesa stvaranja albanske države. Iako je Visoka porta na kraju silom ukinula Skadarski i Janjinski ejalet, ideja i cilj nisu ugašeni. Ovi ejaleti su uspostavljeni i organizovani unutar teritorija koje je osvojilo Osmansko Carstvo, i većim dijelom su njihova administracija i pravni sistemi funkcionisali prema osmanskim pravilima i uputstvima. Čak su i sami paše bili imenovani i zvanično priznati od strane sultana. Međutim, i skadarski i janjinski paša bili su svjesni neminovnog propadanja Osmanskog Carstva i aktivno su učestvovali u njegovoj fragmentaciji. Čineći to, tražili su saveze sa velikim evropskim silama, uključujući Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, Francusku i Rusiju. Uprkos ovim naporima, takva saradnja nije rezultirala konkretnom podrškom stvaranju albanske države. Postojala je nada da će raspad Osmanskog Carstva pružiti priliku za državnost, zbog čega su se ovi odnosi sa velikim silama i održavali. Međutim, Bečki kongres 1815. godine odlučio je da očuva Osmansko Carstvo. Kao rezultat toga, Janjinski ejalet se našao bez međunarodne podrške – što je bio ključni razvoj događaja koji je omogućio Visokoj porti da odlučno krene protiv Ali-paše.

Razlozi za neuspjeh ejaleta bili su i vanjski i unutrašnji. Vanjski faktor je, kao što je već spomenuto, bio taj što su strane sile promijenile svoje stavove i povukle podršku. Iznutra, šire stanovništvo nije bilo snažno nadahnuto idejom o obećanoj ustavnoj državi, pa su pašina moć i podrška protiv Istanbula bili ograničeni. Mnogi pašini saradnici, uključujući i članove njegove porodice, su ga napustili. Lokalna feudalna klasa nije bila u potpunosti posvećena dugoročnim ciljevima nacionalnog razvoja; umjesto toga, fokusirali su se na kratkoročne, lične interese. To se pokazalo kao značajna greška, koja je postala očigledna odmah nakon pašine smrti.

Jasno je da je u oba ejaleta Visoka porta delegirala vlast. Kao takva, vlast je ostala unutar oblika autonomne uprave, koja se na kraju nije uspjela transformisati u nezavisnu državu. Ipak, iako ovi ejaleti nisu uspjeli uspostaviti nezavisnu albansku državu, ideje o albanskoj državnosti su opstale i nastavile se razvijati u narednim fazama regionalnog razvoja.

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A PATRIOTISM, CREATED WITH THE BALKAN DRAWING, BEING DEPICTED THE OTTOMAN SENSE OF HUMOUR IN THE CARTOONS

Abstract: *The aim of this study is to identify the descriptions of the Balkan states in the Ottoman satirical newspaper Cadalog. From a philological perspective, the metaphorical words used for the Balkan nations also provide insight into the political processes between the Ottoman and Balkan countries. Every literate Ottoman citizen who read a satirical newspaper in the Ottoman Empire was considered knowledgeable about the metaphors used in these newspapers to describe the Balkan nations. Otherwise, when presenting a cartoon or humorous piece about Montenegro, using the term "Potato Kingdom" instead of "Montenegro" would be a meaningless joke. By 1911, the Ottoman people had retained in their general cultural repertoire the fact that the Potato Kingdom depicted in the cartoon or anecdote was related to the Kingdom of Montenegro. More examples on this topic are included in our study. The humor newspaper Cadalog, which published in opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress regime that exiled Abdulhamid II in the Ottoman Empire, also offers a strikingly humorous take on the ruling powers' perception of the Balkans. The satirical newspaper, which published a pro-sultanate stance, was financed by Bedrifelek Hanım, wife of Abdülhamid II. It is possible to attribute the cartoons in the newspaper to Ottoman elites educated in France. It is particularly plausible that Prince Ahmet Nuri, son of Abdülhamid II, was the author of the cartoons about his father and signed them to the newspaper with the pseudonym "Dj Noury". It's worth noting that*

Cadaloz, whose words and metaphors defined the Balkans were examined, was censored by pro-government supporters and, as a result, continued publication under the name Afacan approximately one year after its launch. Despite this name change after a few issues, the newspaper was censored again. Following the Balkan Wars in 1912, Abdülhamid II's exile in Thessaloniki ended, and he was permitted to return to Istanbul. Thus, the humor newspaper's critical approach to the pro-sultanate government was eliminated, eliminating the need to maintain its publishing and oppositional stance. The newspaper content we examined employed all the techniques known for humor in 1911. This helps us understand the rich diversity of Ottoman society in terms of humor. Western-style cartoons often portray Ottoman figures in black and white pencil. It's clear that techniques found in Ottoman literature, such as epics, anecdotes, jokes, lectures, prose, humorous exchanges, and humorous poems, were masterfully employed throughout the over one hundred issues we examined. The metaphors that define the Balkan nations that we obtained in our study were also criticized in the content of our study for the negative and positive effects of the fragile international relations between the Ottoman-Balkan nations on the Ottoman public opinion.

Key words: *Balkan Nations, Humor, Ottoman Public, Ottoman Press, Cartoon.*

PATRIOTIZAM STVOREN BALKANSKIM CRTEŽOM: PRIKAZ OSMANSKOG SMISLA ZA HUMOR U KARIKATURAMA

Apstrakt: Cilj ove studije je identifikovati opise balkanskih država u osmanskom satiričnom listu Cadaloz. Iz filološke perspektive, metaforički izrazi korišteni za balkanske narode također pružaju uvid u političke procese između Osmanskog carstva i balkanskih zemalja. Smatralo se da je svaki pismeni osmanski građanin koji je čitao satirične novine u Osmanskom carstvu bio upoznat s metaforama koje su se u tim novinama koristile za opisivanje balkanskih naroda. U suprotnom, prilikom prikazivanja karikature ili humorističnog priloga o Crnoj Gori, upotreba izraza „Kraljevina krompira” umjesto „Crna Gora” bila bi besmislena šala. Do 1911. godine, osmanski narod je u svom općem kulturnom repertoaru zadržao činjenicu da se „Kraljevina krompira” prikazana u karikaturi ili anegdoti odnosi na Kraljevinu Crnu Goru. Više primjera o ovoj temi uključeno je u našu studiju. Humoristički list Cadaloz, koji je izlazio u opoziciji režimu Komiteta jedinstva i napretka koji je prognao Abdülhamida II iz Osmanskog carstva, također nudi upečatljiv humoristički osvrt na to kako su vladajuće strukture doživljavale Balkan. Ovaj satirični list, koji je zastupao prosultanatski stav, finansirala je Bedrifelek Hanım, supruga Abdülhamida II. Karikature u novinama moguće je pripisati osmanskoj eliti obrazovanoj u Francuskoj. Posebno je vjerovatno da

je princ Ahmet Nuri, sin Abdülhamida II, bio autor karikatura o svom ocu, koje je u novinama potpisivao pseudonimom „Dj Noury”. Vrijedi napomenuti da je list Cadaloz, čiji su izrazi i metafore koje definišu Balkan ovdje istraženi, bio cenzurisan od strane vladinih pristalica, te je zbog toga, otprilike godinu dana nakon pokretanja, nastavio izlaziti pod nazivom Afacan. Uprkos ovoj promjeni naziva, nakon nekoliko brojeva list je ponovo cenzurisan. Nakon Balkanskih ratova 1912. godine, progonstvo Abdülhamida II u Solunu je završeno te mu je dozvoljen povratak u Istanbul. Tako je eliminisan kritički pristup ovog humorističkog lista prema prosultanatskoj vlasti, čime je nestala potreba za održavanjem njegovog izdavanja i opozicionog stava. Sadržaj novina koji smo istražili koristio je sve tehnike humora poznate 1911. godine. To nam pomaže da shvatimo bogatu raznolikost osmanskog društva u pogledu humora. Karikature u zapadnjačkom stilu često prikazuju osmanske ličnosti crno-bijelom olovkom. Jasno je da su tehnike prisutne u osmanskoj književnosti, poput epova, anegdota, šala, predavanja, proze, šaljivih dijaloga i humorističkih pjesama, majstorski primjenjivane u više od stotinu brojeva koje smo analizirali. Metafore koje definišu balkanske narode, do kojih smo došli u našem istraživanju, u okviru ove studije analizirane su i kroz kritiku negativnih i pozitivnih utjecaja krhkih međunarodnih odnosa između Osmanskog carstva i balkanskih nacija na osmansko javno mnijenje.

Ključne riječi: Balkanski narodi, humor, osmanska javnost, osmanska štampa, karikatura.

Introduction

The *Cadaloz* newspaper began its publication life at the apartment number 35 on Ebusuud Street in Istanbul between April 4, 1911 and September 9, 1911 and was managed from this address. The newspaper copies were printed at the *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* printing house. A copy of the *Cadaloz* newspaper could be purchased for 10 cents, or it was possible to access the newspaper by paying an annual subscription fee of 30 cents. The annual subscription fee of the newspaper abroad was 12 francs. This annual subscription fee of abroad costumers can be interpreted as the *Cadaloz* newspaper being read by Ottoman citizens abroad. It is stated that the *Cadaloz* newspaper was published only on Tuesdays and Saturdays. It was determined that the newspaper consisted of four pages and that there was a cartoon on the first and last pages. The other pages contained satirical poems, articles, jokes, song lyrics and narratives. As in other publications of the period, the newspaper traditionally stated the Hijri and Rumi dates, but it was also determined that the Gregorian date was included.¹

¹ *Cadaloz Gazetesi*, 4 April 1911, 4.

It is explored that the *Cadaloz* newspaper was published in the *Seda-yi Millet* printing house for a while and then withdrew from publication shortly thereafter. In its last issues, it was introduced that the responsible manager was Hüseyin Nazmi. In particular, in its last issue, it is stated that the *Cadaloz*, which called on its subscribers to pay their debts before closing, went on holiday due to the Aid al Mubarak. In a sense, this warning elevates the issue of payment problems to the first place among the reasons for the closure of the humor newspaper, which can be assumed as the main reason for its ending. Especially towards the last issues, the name of the editor-in-chief is only stated as *Cadaloz*.² The *Cadaloz* newspaper was published in the traditional humorous newspaper style during the Second Constitutional Era by Nurettin Rüştü and Haydar Rüştü (March 22, 1327) and August 27, 1327, with 45 issues. The newspaper, which has an important place in Turkish cartoons and humor, introduces itself as a “humorous newspaper published on Tuesdays and Saturdays.” This phrase about the newspaper is located in the upper middle of the first page of the newspaper.

The first issue of *Cadaloz* was published on March 22, 1327, and the forty-fifth issue was published on August 27, 1327. The newspaper was published under the title *Afacan* between the thirty-fourth and forty-first issues, and the first, second and third issues of *Afacan* were included in this range. In the 34th issue published under the name *Afacan*, it is stated on page 2 with the title “*Kıram*” why it was published as *Afacan*. It states that; “Until *Cadaloz* comes into being, the little squires of the *Cadaloz* will kiss your hands to represent him. I hope that it is accepted.” The *Cadaloz* newspaper continued its uninterrupted publication life and was a newspaper that continued for six months. When it is considered that some magazines and newspapers during the Second Constitutional Era could only publish a single issue, the success of *Cadaloz*, which published forty-five issues, can be better understood.

It is understood that the important political events of 1911, when the *Cadaloz* newspaper was published, were reflected in the cartoons in the newspaper. In order to grasp the expressions contained in the cartoons, it is useful to examine the main events that affected the Ottoman Empire in 1910-1911. First of all, it should be known that the Union and Progress administration, which would leave its mark on the last period of the Ottoman Empire, came to power in 1908 with a military coup (March 31 incident). This administration, which aimed to develop serious relations with the Prussian State, began by completing the Berlin - Medina railway, which the Germans had long dreamed of and undertook to engineer, in 1909. This rapprochement between the Ottomans, Austria and Prussia created discontent in France, England and Russia. These states, which reduced the Ottoman State a little more at every opportunity, were not very tolerant of new partners in this field. In particular, the railway extending from Berlin-Vienna and Ottoman-Istanbul

² *Cadaloz Gazetesi*, 9 September 1911, 4.

to Hejaz mobilized military shipments in Ottoman lands and also gave the Prussian armies the right to move into Ottoman lands using the same line. Russia, aware of this danger, was ready to abandon all of its gains in the Ottoman Balkans, except for the independence of Montenegro and Serbia, to Austria, and was also in favor of recognizing Austrian sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Austria, on the other hand, planned to save its reputation with new gains in the Ottoman Balkans in order to compensate for its losses in Prussian and Italian lands, but the attitude of its ally Prussia, which had been evident since the Münchengrad Treaty, prevented it from embarking on a reckless adventure. Nevertheless, in the Albanian rebellions that broke out in 1910, while it adopted a more Ottoman-like attitude in the Montenegro incidents, it did not refrain from providing shelter for the rebels in some cases. It is understood that the Trieste port belonging to Austria in particular was transformed into one of the most important bases for arms smugglers. However, the main support element in the Albanian rebellion was the Italian state. Italy, which definitely had a certain dominance over the Catholic Albanians, also supported the nationalist movement and rebellions that spread among the Muslim Albanians due to the wrong administration of the Ottoman state in every way. While the military measures taken to suppress the Albanian incidents made the situation even more insoluble, this time the claims of the Bulgarian and Greek kingdoms over Macedonia caused new conflicts to intensify in the region. On the one hand, the border violations of Montenegro and Serbia, which were principalities subject to the Ottoman Empire, the Albanian rebels who took refuge and were protected in Montenegro's territory and the Macedonian problem created tension points that affected the security at a high level in the Balkan lands that remained in Ottoman hands.

It is understood that the national and international events that took place in 1911 were caricatured in the *Cadaloz* newspaper for the benefit of the Ottoman public. In order to understand and make sense of the caricatures in the humor newspaper hereby represented as *Cadaloz*, the events that took place in 1911 and were included in the magazine will be examined and introduced with the help of existing archive documents and bibliography. For Albania, the Ottomans, the year 1911 was full of unrest caused by the rebels in southern Albania. The resisters, who were supported politically and militarily by Catholic countries, especially Italy, seriously damaged the Ottoman social structure. The writer and responsible manager of the *Tomor* newspaper, Ilbasanlı Lefnos, who was sentenced to life exile on the grounds that he made provocative publications in southern Albania, was pardoned by the decision dated April 25, 1911.³ However, this show of good will by the state did not help and the conflicts continued with all their violence. The “malistors” who rebelled in Albania crossed into Montenegro territory and continued their actions from there. In order to prevent the rebels from taking refuge in

³ BOA, (State Ottoman Archive), *İ.MMS*,137/1329, Ramazan 1329(H).

Montenegro, the Ottomans intensified their measures on the Montenegrin border. The Ottomans, who took Albania's Adriatic coast under protection with warships on 30 April 1911 to protect it from arms smugglers, were not sufficient to stop the arms shipments because they could not control the land borders.⁴

While the Ottoman state was dealing with the rebellions of Catholic Albanians in southern Albania, the international commission in Crete rejected the judges that the Ottoman state would send to the island. However, the Ottoman government was authorized by international agreements for the practices of Cretan Muslims. The approach of this international commission that was contrary to the agreements was protested in İzmir's Hürriyet (Freedoom) Square, where 50,000 people gathered, on May 20, 1911. A protest was held in Damascus on May 22 for the rights of Arabs who settled in Crete during Ottoman rule.⁵ The cartoon in the *Cadaloz* newspaper that we examined, symbolizing the fez worn by the judges, must have been written in order to satirize these developments. Positive news about Albania began to come for the Ottoman state in July 1911. The telegram stating that the Albanians in Shkodra and Thessaloniki had nothing to do with the rebellions and that the rebels were Italian volunteers and Montenegrin soldiers reached Istanbul on July 18, 1911.⁶ The Ottoman state presented these telegrams to the European states that were preparing to intervene under the pretext of protecting the Albanians on July 19, 1911.⁷ The people of Prizren also joined the Albanians who supported the Ottoman state. The Albanians living in Prizren in Kosovo reiterated in letters they sent to the government on July 20, 1911 that they would remain loyal to the Ottomans. However, the 1911 rebellions were an important testing ground in the Albanian independence process and tested the Ottoman influence in the region.⁸

It is understood that the issues such as the Balkans, Albania and Montenegro were mainly discussed in the content of the *Cadaloz* newspaper, both in prose and cartoon style. Again, it is possible to access some cartoons about Crete, Cyprus and Tripoli, as well as scathing prose articles in the newspaper content. It is estimated that the newspaper, which was published in 1911, brought to its agenda national and international issues that deeply affected the Ottoman Empire during this year. It is understood from the signatures on the cartoons that the cartoons in the *Cadaloz* newspaper were drawn by cartoonists Cevat Nuri and Dr Mazlum. In some cartoons, there is another signature in French Latin letters, "dj noury", under Cevat Nuri's Ottoman signature. It is thought that this signature belongs to Ahmet Nuri Bey,

⁴ BOA, *A.MKT.MHM*, 735/39, 1 Cemaziyülahır 1329(H).

⁵ BOA, *BEO*, No. 3907/292956, 21.C.1329."İzmirde protesto".

⁶ BOA, *BEO*, No. 3917/292971, 23 Cemaziyülevvel 1329.(H).

⁷ BOA, *BEO*, No. 3917/293729, 22 Recep 1329(H).

⁸ Fahri Maden, Arnavutluk'un bağımsızlık süreci (1877-1913), *Avrasya Etütleri Dergisi*, 38/2011, 166-67.

the son of Abdulhamid II. This signature written in Latin alphabet on the newspaper cartoons also shows us that Ottoman cartoonists were not content with just Ottoman signatures, but also needed a second signature in French letters. However, we should not ignore the possibility that the signature “Dj Noury” is Prince Ahmet Nuri, the son of the exiled Sultan Abdulhamid II. Indeed, some data we have determined on the subject brings this possibility to the forefront. Because Ahmet Nuri was in Paris at these dates and was mostly busy with art.⁹

The reason for this is that the cartoonist resorted to such a method in order to express his knowledge of a foreign language and that it was used as a kind of image among the intellectuals of the period. It is understood that Dr. Mazlum did not resort to an Ottoman signature, signing only in the French alphabet. This situation indicates the existence of a foreign cartoonist in the *Cadaloz* newspaper. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the possibility that Dr. Mazlum was a Muslim or an Arab Christian.

The Ottoman State is known as the only region with free nations and lands that is trying to survive with its own resources in the technical and scientifically supported absolute global domination area of Western imperialism and that has not yet come under the control of the shackles of Western origin of slavery. America, Africa, Australia and parts of Asia were turned into colonial lands controlled by western states with technical superiority. Some European states, especially those that had access to high technology and science, led the list in this colonial race and took control of the more backward and primitive world. For the Westerners, the rise in science that began with the fall of Andalusia and the admiration for science paved the way for the establishment of a powerful technology, and with this superior technology, nations that did not have it were enslaved. Nations that were inadequate in terms of science were accepted as animals that could not turn their intellectual abilities into products, and in the 1700s, they became the center of political and administrative tendencies in the eyes of European states in this direction. Just as an ox can be trained and plowed, people who did not use their intellectual abilities were enslaved by the Westerners by being considered in the category of those in need of education and guidance, and were redesigned in a way that would supposedly contribute to the development of Western civilization. The ancient pharaohs of the modern ages, in their pyramids which they accepted as a civilization, gained an irreparable superiority with the carbon technique and stronger iron steel and ammunition such as locomotives, steamboats, guns, cannons, bullets, etc. In the 1900s, Japan in the Far East and the Ottoman Empire in the Near East, as the last free bastions of humanity outside the West, made efforts to eliminate this gap by reconstruction. It can be stated that both states foresaw the unstoppable rise of the West centered on science as early as the 1800s and followed closely in

⁹ Elçin Gün Canik, *Cadaloz Mizah Gazetesi*, *Near East Historical Review*, 2024, 129.

order not to open up too much in this technological race. Japan's Meiji Restoration and the Ottoman's Tanzimat Edict can be considered figures outside the European camp that aimed to achieve a Western-style modernization and technological development within a more humane framework. Although the Ottoman Empire, located in the Near East, has been made a target for Western global imperialist states as a suitable colonial area, it has been predicted that this ancient state's deep-rooted political experience and warlike character will not be an easy target and will cause a very costly struggle for the West. This is why, instead of directly confronting the Ottomans, the Western states aimed to disintegrate the Ottoman lands and society, which had become a kind of national society, through discord, trickery and intrigue in order to weaken them. Within the Ottoman nations, they became rivals in betraying the motherland in the face of Western propaganda due to the scientific and technological advances of the West. Especially the Christian and Jewish nations within the Ottoman nations did not see any harm in offering themselves to states such as England, France, Russia, Prussia, etc. in order to reap the fruits of the colonial success in the West. The political structures of Italy and Prussia, which were established more nation-centered in Europe, which prevented them from having an imperialist appetite on the Ottoman nations, must have strengthened the Ottoman Empire's hand at least on this front. However, the Ottoman Empire had a multi-national structure and experienced England, France and Russia could not remain indifferent to the green light signal coming from the nations in the Ottoman League of Nations without wasting any time. It can be argued that while the Orthodox Balkan states mainly created the excuse to intervene under the protection of Russia, the Catholic Balkans made efforts to be on the side of France and in some cases England. In short, it is incomprehensible that some parasites who cannot use their minds and cannot glorify the state they are in would cooperate with stronger hyenas in order to share a rent that emerged like a culture.

The Ottoman side, on the other hand, approached the incident with a more modest approach, with the *mise en scene* of the first yellow ox to leave the herd. Although he warned and inculcated the nations he ruled that if they cooperated with the Western imperialist powers, they would not only end up like the yellow ox that strays from the herd, but would also cause the disaster of the entire herd, the ox would continue to be an ox. Those who took refuge behind Christianity and declared the Ottomans as enemies were turned into pawns, one by one, away from their national identity and identity under the domination of their new masters. The careful fattening of every ox that left the Ottoman Empire led to the formation of new fan bases, and the great national community in this geography that was established over the centuries was divided into small pieces. These formations, which were too weak to resist the Western imperialist powers on their own, were made to work for the interests of others in this geography, like slaves groaning under the whip in the pyramids, under the domination of the imperialist states with all their resources. While the

new Greek master English, who left the Ottoman Empire, worked to grow more lemons and olives, the Christian Maronite was concerned with how to present the best orange. Among Muslims, swearing at the Ottomans must have become a priority, and Arab nationalism has been brought to the brink of a visible social differentiation and ethnic separation. While the big and fat, dim-witted parts were primarily torn off, the more intelligent or secondary and smaller parts were left for centuries.

The Ottoman state entered 1911 under such a negative grip. It would be useful to examine the social content of some cartoons in the content of the *Cadalo* newspaper in the Ottoman press, which aimed to prevent the disintegration in the Ottoman Balkans, within a historical context. The Ottoman public opinion was warned through the cartoons that not falling into the trap of the Western imperialist states would cause many painful losses for the entire country and geography. As a member of the community of nations in this geography established by the Ottomans, they listened to these warnings with sincerity and support.

However, some naive people who thought that their Christian identity would be a kind of business card were condemned to take their place in history as yellow oxen by surrendering both their own lands and their neighbors to hyenas. It should not be forgotten that especially the Albanians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, who abandoned Christianity and Judaism and were honored with the honor of Islam in the face of Ottoman justice and the greatness of Islam, were on the alert against the possibility of the Western imperialist structure asking for an account of their conversion and fought wholeheartedly in the Ottoman ranks. Nevertheless, this power and wealth that we have from different nations that have become Turkified and Islamized throughout the historical process will be squandered in vain because of the lunatics who cut off the branch they were sitting on by following the suggestions of the Western cunning ones for these helpless people who remained in this limbo.

The *Cadalo* newspaper, cartoons drawn by Cevat Nuri and Dr. Mazlum, attract attention as pictures where western drawing technique is applied. The fact that Cevat Nuri, one of the cartoonists, signed in French as well as Ottoman Turkish confirms that he had a good western education. It is understood that Ottoman humor had a line of "dark humor" beyond the well-known humorous humor during a crisis period of the state. In this context, cartoons about the Balkan geography, which is considered a problematic geography and has gained intensity from separatist activities, are dense in the humor newspaper called *Cadalo* that we examined. In these cartoons, the struggle of our security forces against separatist elements is mainly symbolized. The relevant cartoons and the socio-cultural symbols they contain will be defined in order in the determined subject classifications.



Figure 1. *Cadalog*, No. 22, 19 Cemaziyülahır 1329, s. 1.

Figure 1 symbolizing the capital of Ottoman as İstanbul. It is thought that the patriotic love in the Ottoman Balkans was intended to be reinforced through the Ottoman capital, or sultanate. It is worth noting that the Ottoman Sultan V. Mehmet Reşat was a frequently used figure for this purpose. It has been determined that the sultans who worked and sacrificed their lives in the conquest of the Balkan lands from among the members of the Ottoman dynasty also contributed to Ottoman romanticism, or nationalism, within the scope of historical nostalgia. A cartoon featuring Ottoman sultans who were both contemporary to the newspaper's publication process and within the scope of historical romanticism draws attention. This cartoon, published in the *Cadalog* humor newspaper, attempts to establish Ottoman historical romanticism through the Ottoman dynasty within the concept of patriotism and the idea and philosophy that a monarchic structure like England would contribute to ensuring national unity are highlighted. In the cartoon dated June 17, 1911, there is a conversation anecdote in which the Ottoman Sultan, figured in the upper right corner, addresses the Ottoman soldiers, Albanian militia and the Ottoman Sultan of the period, Mehmet V, with a sublime tone, saying, "There is nothing that would make my soul happier than to see all my Ottoman sons, all alone in these plains that I sacrificed my life for, wishing happiness to the homeland".¹⁰ It is understood that he is addressing with his words. In these

¹⁰ *Cadalog Mizah Gazetesi*, No. 22, 19 Cemaziyülahır 1329, 1.

words, there are clues as to which sultan the Ottoman sultan who addresses the Ottomans among the clouds in the sky is depicted as. The phrase “I took it by sacrificing my life” brings with it a description of Sultan Murad Khan Hudavendigâr, the only Ottoman sultan who was martyred on the battlefield during the conquest of the Balkan lands. The depiction of Sultan Murad Khan in the sky must have been drawn with a sublime mystical interpretation, imagining that he was in heaven. Probably the belief in the old Kök Tengri (Blue Iron Dome) belief that good spirits were in the sky must have carried pagan influences into the content of the Ottoman cartoon. From an Islamic perspective, since Sultan Murad Khan's martyrdom on the battlefield in pursuit of a holy cause indicates a sublime position, namely martyrdom, it must have helped to process a subliminal motif in the form of him calling out from the clouds, namely from heaven. The existence of neighboring states that directly supported the separatist terrorist movements that emerged in the Ottoman Empire must have been exposed to the Ottoman public opinion through the cartoon. It can be understood that the attacks of armed militia gangs, especially in the geography of Macedonia and Albania, against the Ottoman people and state were supported by neighboring states that had a hostile attitude. Of course, it is obvious that these kingdoms, which were limited in size and scope and could not be held against a powerful state like the Ottoman Empire, were acting under the command of powerful imperialist states in the background. States such as Prussia, Austria, France, England and Russia, which were global powers of the period, did not hesitate to maintain political relations at a high level and ensure their commercial, political and military interests instead of directly displaying a hostile attitude towards the Ottoman Empire in order to benefit from the vast hinterland of the Ottoman Empire. It is understood that these states also continued their separatist and destructive activities through puppet and front states such as Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria in order to leave the Ottoman Empire weak and helpless and in need of their own weapons and political support.

Today, similarly, it has become known to the Turkish public that the global powers that protect their political, military and economic interests with the Republic of Turkey are plotting a Bermuda Triangle game against Turkey through Greece, Armenia and Israel. It is possible to witness the use of Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia in the Ottoman Bermuda Triangle against our sovereignty in the Macedonia and Albanian areas. A cartoon we obtained from one of the issues of the *Cadalog* newspaper on the subject contains quite meaningful symbols and motifs.



Figure 2. *Cadaloz, No. 2, 9 Rebiyülahir 1329, s. 1.*

In the *Figure 2*, a black mountain with the word Montenegro written on it is symbolized. At the foot of the mountain, there is a hag chasing a flock of geese. It is known that Montenegro, or the kingdom of Montenegro, which gained its independence following the Berlin Congress in the Ottoman Empire, had the support of the Russian Tsardom, Austria and Italy. It is understood that these three colonial states, which were in competition for a share or area of influence over the Ottoman Balkans, tried to provoke or terrorize the Ottoman Albanians in Montenegro to separate this geography from the Ottomans. In addition to this knowledge of the Ottoman people, this cartoon both reinforces the morale of Albanian separatists and terrorists by depicting them as geese and interprets the separatists as “goose-headed fools” and carries an artistic content. The words “Gang, let them be overthrown all winter long. You fed on that Montenegro all winter and raped our fields, haha!” are written under the cartoon. The text provides historical data confirming that terrorists operating in Albania and Macedonia sheltered in Mount Cetina in Montenegro during the winter and obtained their logistic supplies from this region. Today, the same plot, by creating a similar Mount Kandil, occupies the agenda, and also brings with it some tragic approaches such as a nation that cannot learn from history falling into the same mistakes again. It is obvious that the political formations that were separated from the Ottoman mainland by force of war in the Ottoman Balkans and turned into satellite puppet kingdoms under the protection of Western states hurt the Ottoman patriots. Another cartoon we obtained in the

content of the *Cadalo* humor newspaper is a drawing depicting the Black Sea militia forces struggling for the safety of the homeland in the Balkans.



Figure 3. *Cadalo*, No. 11, 10 Cemaziyülevvel 1329, s. 1.

Figure 3, The fact that the soldiers, who are caricatured in Black Sea local costumes, wear crossed cartridge belts like militia forces and are all depicted armed with swords can be interpreted as the Ottoman army evaluating a military force consisting of local forces in order to maintain public order. These forces, which are based on volunteering, include not only local militias from the Balkans but also volunteers from other regions, but the depiction of the Black Sea volunteer militia forces, who are waiting ready with their swords drawn in the presence of the Ottoman Chief of General Staff Mahmut Şevket Pasha, in a position with the discipline of a regular army, confirms that they went through a military training process.

In today's Turkey, it can be thought that an educated patriotic class formed from Black Sea volunteers in the struggle against local guards in the east will contribute to the defense of the country today, as it did in the Ottoman Empire. The presentation of Mahmut Şevket Pasha as a "teacher" in the cartoon and his words to the Black Sea volunteer professional militia unit waiting in front of him as "Your skill in using the sword is already a must..." should be examined carefully. The presentation of the Ottoman chief of general staff as a teacher proves that he trained the Black Sea volunteer militia in the cartoon within the general staff himself.

It also confirms that this unit received additional training in swordsmanship. The words of *Cadalo*, “Excuse me, I interrupted you with honey, officer son, well... can’t you cut them all off with one blow?” are a reflection of the public anger felt towards the states that provoked the Balkans and separated from the Ottomans. On the watermelons presented on the ground as training for swords, there are Ottoman writings on them, primarily describing Montenegro, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. This situation must have occurred according to the degree of support given by these countries to the terrorist incidents in the Ottoman, Macedonian and Albanian lands, respectively. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the most problematic neighboring state that caused the separatist security incidents in the Balkans is Montenegro.



Figure 4. *Cadalo*, No. 27, 7 Recep 1911, s. 1.

Another *Figure 4* derived from Ottoman humor directly symbolizes the parties that stirred up the Balkan issue and gathers them in one frame.¹¹ Cartoon 4, On the globe shaped rock symbolizing the world, there is written “draft Balkan politics”. This situation figures that the western states divided the Balkans within the scope of a program with a consensus among themselves regarding the Balkans. As in other cartoons, in this drawing, Mahmut Şevket Pasha, an Ottoman sergeant, is depicted with his sword removed from its scabbard. This situation means that the Ottoman army is on alert. The highest authority representing the Ottoman army is depicted by cartoonists as Mahmut

¹¹ *Cadalo*z Gazetesi, 4 Temmuz 1911, 1.

Şevket Pasha. It is estimated that Mahmut Şevket Pasha, who was also the Minister of Defense in the Ottoman cabinet, was known by the Ottoman society as a figure appreciated for his patriotism. He must have gained the appreciation of the society as a commander who suppressed the uprisings that increased in Albania, especially in 1909 and later. The identity of the individuals in military uniform who chiseled the stone with the draft Balkan politics written on it into small pieces remains unclear for now, as we do not have sufficient visual data. Nevertheless, it is possible to guess from their attire that they were the highest ranking military officials in their countries, based on their country and Mahmut Şevket Pasha. If we are right in this claim, there will probably be a match between the images of the Russian, Austrian and French defense ministers or chiefs of general staff in 1911 and the caricatures in the drawing.



Figure 5. *Cadalog*, No. 7, 26 Rebiyülahir 1329, s. 1.

Another *Figure 5* with Balkan content includes a drawing of a group of people depicted as swineherds, an Albanian volunteer and the one he blocked.¹² Of course, the hag was included in the drawing in order to be able to say a few words on behalf of the Ottoman society against this scene. The Albanian militia is defined as the “hero Albanian” in the cartoon based on the description in the anecdote. The words addressed to the “hero Albanian” who acted as a supporter of the state, especially in ensuring public order in the Ottoman Balkan lands and fighting against separatist uprisings, once again reveal the social importance of patriotism and merit. In the cartoon, the hero Albanian scolds a

¹² *Cadalog Gazetesi*, No.7, 26 Rebiyülahir 1329/25 Nisan 1911, 1.

squad of swineherds depicted as representing European politicians with the words “There are no bloodless people among the Ottomans who would set an enemy foot on the lands kneaded with the blessed blood of his ancestors, destroy!!!”. The words of the witch, the main character of our humor newspaper that we are examining, are in the nature of a historical situation determination. The witch, who is old in the cartoon but drawn in a European style dress; “Did you get your share? You want to snatch my cone in the middle of a sibling fight, Nah you”, with her words, actually establishes the truth of a sibling fight between the Ottoman and Albanian natives. As in the slogans of today, Turks and Kurds are brothers, those who separate them are treacherous, there is no smoke without fire. It can be claimed that the Westerners deepen the issue by stirring up problems that occur within the country for various reasons and gain imperial interests. In that case, instead of solely blaming external forces in the emergence of the events, making an effort to drain the swamp that has formed within the country must be the most rational solution in combating the problem. Otherwise, it is possible that a tragic similarity to the losses of the Ottomans will be valid for the Republic of Türkiye.




Figure 6. *Cadalog*, No. 16, 28 Cemaziyülevvel 1329, s. 4.

Another important event that occupied the Ottoman Empire in its last days was the taking of Crete from us by international interventions. Although the Ottoman Empire, as a guarantor state, had the responsibility of protecting and representing the social and cultural rights of the Muslim people in Crete, the Western states found even these humanitarian reasons inappropriate for the

Muslim elements.¹³ It is understood that a cartoon in the humor newspaper *Cadaloz* depicted a crowd of Westerners on the island of Crete.¹⁴ On the other hand, *Cadaloz* made satirical remarks by showing the mufti's turban in his hand to the Western powers on the island of Crete from a flying cube. The administration of Crete was occupied by international powers for some reasons such as human rights violations and was given an independent status quo under the control of an international commission and commissioner. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, could not resist this occupation due to its inadequate navy and military deficiencies and submitted to this fait accompli on condition that the rights of the Cretan Muslims were protected. However, the fact that the presence of the mufti to be appointed to the island by the Ottomans disturbed the Westerners and that they tried to create obstacles for the Ottoman state in this regard found a satirical response in Ottoman black humor.

In cartoon 6, the words of the Witch on a flying cube, "Oh, you little palikaryalar, you are so afraid of him, what if he comes?!" remind us of the Cretan mufti who will be appointed by the Ottomans to represent the Muslim people of Crete. In the relevant cartoon, the presentation of the turban by the Witch, representing the mufti who will be responsible for the administration of the Muslim people of Crete, is depicted. This situation must have aimed to provide courage and optimism to the Ottoman citizens who were in a moral depression in the face of the loss of Crete through satire.



Figure 7. *Cadaloz*, No. 29, 14 Recep 1329, s. 1.

¹³ Melek Öksüz, Girit Meselesinin Belirsizlik Yılları 1908-1913, *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, Sayı 25, Bahar 2010, 107-108.

¹⁴ *Cadaloz Gazetesi*, 27 Mayıs 1911, 4.

The cartoon on the Balkan theme in the *Cadaloz* humor newspaper is about the Averof armored warship purchased by Greece for 1,000,000 pounds in Figure 7.¹⁵ It is noteworthy that a Greek businessman and an Egyptian Orthodox, Georgios Averof, contributed to the purchase of the armored ship with a significant amount and that its name was defined with the name of this important donor.¹⁶ The benefactors who will probably collect resources under the naval aid and transfer resources to the fund to be created for the modernization of the Ottoman navy encourage the participants through “Averof” and even provoke the competition with a humorous invitation. The fact that the Averof armored ship was in danger of sinking during a drill also brought the Ottoman satire masters into action and this historical incompetence was caricatured as a mockery of Ottoman humor and society.

It is highly probable that the person on the Averof battleship in the cartoon is the Greek naval commander and Prime Minister Venizelos. It is also interesting that the hag is circling over the ship with a flying cube. The Ottoman balloon factory, probably established in Tekirdağ, must have started to manufacture suitable vehicles for air attacks. These first products of Ottoman aviation, represented by the flying cube, were processed with the “flying cube” motif in order to create anxiety in the enemy and to instill morale in the Ottoman society and to increase patriotic feelings in a sense. The witch's exclamation from the sky, “Kiryä Kapudan! Didn't I tell you that a cheese ship cannot be sailed with words and that you cannot race with a single oar?” probably contains a humiliation and publicly declares that the Ottoman sovereignty is ready to launch an attack on Greek territory at any time.

The fragmentation of Ottoman lands by global powers and their abandonment to nation-states of Christian origin created a kind of traumatic effect on Ottoman society. The rapid rise of the nation-states that separated from the Ottoman Empire with the support of Western states in technology, politics and economy and their prosperous standard of living set an example for other nations that planned to separate from the Ottoman Empire. The aim of this situation and conditions being provided by the western states must have been to damage the unity of the Ottoman Empire and accelerate the disintegration of the nations.

Indeed, the Western collaborator masters of these nation-states, which gained their independence one after another and soon became able to challenge the Ottoman Empire, waited for the Ottoman Empire to lose strength with each element it lost and planned to wipe it off the face of the earth completely if a suitable opportunity arose. Finally, World War I witnessed that the elements that meticulously continued the struggle to wear down the Ottoman Empire for many years destroyed this ancient society and state. Although the modern

¹⁵ *Cadaloz Gazetesi*, 11 Temmuz 1911, 1.

¹⁶ Dimitris Michalopoulos, The 1922 Samsun Bombardment, *Studies of the Ottoman Domain*, C5, S9, Agustos 2015, 12.

Republic of Turkey, founded on the Ottoman mainland, served itself as the heir of a legacy at certain periods, there was no longer any empire or sultanate. The British, French and Russian trio did their job meticulously and destroyed the ancient heir of this Eastern novel.

The authority that re-established Pax Romana in the eastern lands and preserved this peace for 600 years by paying a great price was destroyed and by completely eliminating any possible peace and tranquility in this geography, the colonial states created a new area of exploitation. When the Ottomans were spoiled and rewarded during the process of elimination, the small nation states that were created in the Ottoman geography were no longer needed, and their masters, the colonial states, left these small states in misery in a short time. After the so-called independence they gained after the struggle they carried out under the pretext of the Ottomans' intervention in their own culture, geography and beliefs, they were subjected to the assimilation of the tyrants they brought and invited from thousands of miles away, and they became different, impoverished and came under the yoke of colonial capitalist or socialist authorities. Although these small Balkan nation states probably realized the pain of losing the yellow ox when it was their turn, it was now time for the dawn both for this geography and for the nations living in these lands.

Summary

In conclusion, it should be noted that the cartoons in Ottoman humorous newspapers were not made solely for entertainment purposes, but also served the purpose of criticizing some of the political, social and economic realities of the period. It is worth noting that the historical developments brought about by 1911 also left deep traces on Ottoman humor. The Ottoman-Italian war and the occupied Ottoman lands in North Africa paved the way for the formation of a violent protest in Ottoman society against the imperial policies of the Western powers. The cholera epidemic that broke out in Istanbul in 1911 also proves that the Ottoman society did not go through an easy period.

In the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire faced intense pressure from nation-states. Greece, backed by Britain, France, and Russia, irked Ottoman public opinion as an unwelcome neighbor seeking to incite the Greek Orthodox community within Ottoman territory and exploit its own territory. Orthodox Greeks, who constituted a significant portion of Ottoman society, attributed immense significance to this small kingdom established by their compatriots, daring to rebel against Ottoman state authority at every opportunity. The Greek Kingdom, which protested the Ottoman state's security measures against these rebellions to Western powers as an example of despotism, successfully served as a source of pain in the neck for the Ottoman state. It can be argued that the Greek Kingdom, particularly by exploiting the demographic structure of the Aegean islands, restricted the Ottoman Empire's maneuverability in the Aegean

Sea. The tensions over Crete, which peaked in 1911 and the autonomous status quo granted to the island under the guarantee of Western powers, provoked anger within the Ottoman Muslim community. However, Ottoman Christians perceived this development as strengthening their own existence and welcomed it. The Greek Kingdom's hosting of Christian bands engaged in banditry on its territories in the Ottoman Balkans also escalated tensions between the public opinions of both bordering countries. Ottoman Orthodox Greeks, on the other hand, were subjected to a process that was met with even greater anxiety by Ottoman Muslims. Orthodox Christian holidays became challenges to Ottoman state authority, and Ottoman society took this challenge upon itself on behalf of the state, and some interventions against Greeks who were disruptive during Easter holidays left security forces helpless in their efforts to resolve the issue.

The Greek Kingdom wasn't the only problematic neighbor in the Ottoman Balkans. Montenegro, which perpetrated terrorist attacks on civilians and military units in Ottoman territory, was also depicted in Ottoman cartoons as a country viewed with suspicion and concern by Ottoman society. Mount Cetina in Montenegro appears in many cartoons as a gathering and hiding base for terrorists. While Montenegrin terrorists were depicted as geese in Ottoman cartoons, it is possible to note that Ottoman soldiers and commanders were also presented as goose shepherds who, in a sense, herded the geese. The description of Montenegro as the Potato Kingdom in Ottoman satirical newspapers was also a sarcastic social assessment of the state's poverty. In Ottoman society, potatoes were generally considered a food for poor families who could not afford to cook meat at home.

Cartoons about the Greek Kingdom's development of its navy attracted attention in the Ottoman satirical press. These cartoons depicted Greek warship admirals as fishing boat captains, alluding to their inexperience, and mockingly insulted them. Ottoman warship captains are identified with the world-famous Barbarossa Hayrettin Pasha, who is a greatest admiral of Ottoman history.

Furthermore, the Ottoman sultans are described in the Ottoman satirical press as the true protectors of the Balkans and the only dynasty that managed to unite the Balkan nations under one flag. Ottoman satirical newspapers praised the Albanian and Bosnian nations in the Balkans for their loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty. They emphasized that these two nations represented unity and solidarity in the Balkans, while Montenegrins, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks were described as separatists and collaborating with imperialists.

The words used to describe international politics and the Balkan nations in Ottoman satirical newspapers, and the values they carry, connect their origins to history. This demonstrates that Ottoman society was well-equipped to navigate the historical wars, agreements, and alliances with the Balkan nations. By 1911, a significant portion of Ottoman literate citizens remembered the Kosovo War in the Balkans. Ottoman society was also aware of the Greeks' talent in fishing. These people, who likely contributed to Ottoman society through fishing in Ottoman coastal cities, earned a well-deserved affection and

a place in Ottoman hearts. However, their attacks on their Ottoman neighbors with warships were satirized in satirical newspapers, and they were invited to return to fishing to reclaim their place in Ottoman society's hearts.

Zaključak

Zaključno, treba napomenuti da karikature u osmanskim humorističnim novinama nisu bile pravljene isključivo u zabavne svrhe, već su služile i za kritiku nekih političkih, društvenih i ekonomskih realnosti tog perioda. Vrijedi napomenuti da su historijski događaji doneseni 1911. godine također ostavili duboke tragove na osmanskome humoru. Osmansko-talijanski rat i okupirane osmanske zemlje u sjevernoj Africi utrli su put formiranju nasilnog protesta u osmanskome društvu protiv imperijalne politike zapadnih sila. Epidemija kolere koja je izbila u Istanbulu 1911. godine također dokazuje da osmansko društvo nije prošlo kroz lak period.

Na Balkanu se Osmansko carstvo suočilo s intenzivnim pritiskom nacionalnih država. Grčka, podržana od strane Britanije, Francuske i Rusije, iritirala je osmansko javno mnjenje kao nepoželjan susjed koji je nastojao uvrijediti grčku pravoslavnu zajednicu unutar osmanske teritorije i iskoristiti vlastitu teritoriju. Pravoslavni Grci, koji su činili značajan dio osmanskog društva, pridavali su ogroman značaj ovom malom kraljevstvu koje su osnovali njihovi sunarodnici, usuđujući se da se pobune protiv osmanske državne vlasti u svakoj prilici. Grčko kraljevstvo, koje je protestovalo zapadnim silama protiv sigurnosnih mjera Osmanske države protiv ovih pobuna kao primjer despotizma, uspješno je poslužilo kao izvor muke za Osmansku državu. Može se tvrditi da je Grčko kraljevstvo, posebno iskorištavanjem demografske strukture Egejskih ostrva, ograničilo manevarske sposobnosti Osmanskog carstva u Egejskom moru. Tenzije oko Krita, koje su kulminirale 1911. godine, i autonomni status quo dodijeljen ostrvu pod garancijom zapadnih sila izazvali su bijes unutar osmanske muslimanske zajednice. Međutim, osmanski kršćani su ovaj razvoj događaja shvatili kao jačanje vlastitog postojanja i pozdravili su ga. Ugošćavanje kršćanskih bandi koje su se bavile razbojništvom na svojim teritorijama na osmanskome Balkanu od strane Grčkog kraljevstva također je eskaliralo tenzije između javnog mnjenja obje susjedne zemlje. S druge strane, osmanski pravoslavni Grci bili su podvrgnuti procesu koji su osmanski muslimani dočekali sa još većom anksioznošću. Pravoslavni kršćanski praznici postali su izazovi osmanskoj državnoj vlasti, a osmansko društvo je preuzelo ovaj izazov na sebe u ime države, a neke intervencije protiv Grka koji su bili remetilački tokom uskršnjih praznika ostavile su sigurnosne snage bespomoćnim u njihovim naporima da riješe problem.

Grčko kraljevstvo nije bilo jedini problematični susjed na osmanskome Balkanu. Crna Gora, koja je vršila terorističke napade na civile i vojne jedinice na osmanskoj teritoriji, također je u osmanskim karikaturama prikazana kao

zemlja na koju osmansko društvo gleda sa sumnjom i zabrinutošću. Planina Cetina u Crnoj Gori pojavljuje se u mnogim karikaturama kao baza za okupljanje i skrivanje terorista. Dok su crnogorski teroristi u osmanskim karikaturama prikazani kao guske, moguće je primijetiti da su osmanski vojnici i komandanti također predstavljeni kao pastiri gusaka koji su, u određenom smislu, čuvali guske. Opis Crne Gore kao Kraljevstva krompira u osmanskim satiričnim novinama bio je i sarkastična društvena procjena siromaštva države. U osmanskom društvu, krompir se uglavnom smatrao hranom za siromašne porodice koje nisu mogle priuštiti kuhanje mesa kod kuće.

Karikature o razvoju mornarice Grčkog kraljevstva privukle su pažnju u osmanskoj satiričnoj štampi. Ove karikature prikazivale su grčke admirale ratnih brodova kao kapetane ribarskih brodova, aludirajući na njihovo neiskustvo i podrugljivo ih vrijeđajući. Kapetani osmanskih ratnih brodova poistovjećuju se sa svjetski poznatim Barbarosom Hajretinom Pašom, koji je najveći admiral osmanske historije.

Nadalje, osmanski sultani su u osmanskoj satiričnoj štampi opisani kao pravi zaštitnici Balkana i jedina dinastija koja je uspjela ujediniti balkanske narode pod jednom zastavom. Osmanske satirične novine hvalile su albanski i bosanski narod na Balkanu zbog njihove odanosti osmanskoj dinastiji. Naglašavali su da ova dva naroda predstavljaju jedinstvo i solidarnost na Balkanu, dok su Crnogorci, Srbi, Bugari i Grci opisani kao separatisti i saradnici s imperijalistima.

Riječi koje se koriste za opisivanje međunarodne politike i balkanskih naroda u osmanskim satiričnim novinama, kao i vrijednosti koje nose, povezuju njihovo porijeklo s historijom. To pokazuje da je osmansko društvo bilo dobro opremljeno za snalaženje u historijskim ratovima, sporazumima i savezima s balkanskim narodima. Do 1911. godine, značajan dio pismenih osmanskih građana sjećao se Kosovskog rata na Balkanu. Osmansko društvo je također bilo svjesno grčkog talenta za ribolov. Ovi ljudi, koji su vjerovatno doprinijeli osmanskom društvu kroz ribolov u osmanskim obalnim gradovima, stekli su zasluženu naklonost i mjesto u osmanskim srcima. Međutim, njihovi napadi na osmanske susjede ratnim brodovima satirizirani su u satiričnim novinama, te su pozvani da se vrate ribolovu kako bi povratili svoje mjesto u srcima osmanskog društva.

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AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN CONTRIBUTION TO TWO IMPORTANT EVENTS FOR ALBANIAN LANGUAGE

Abstract: *The Austro-Hungarian contribution to the development of the Albanian language represents one of the most significant examples of cultural and scholarly foreign involvement in the formation and affirmation of Albanian as a national language. This paper examines the decisive role played by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in two key events: first, its support for the opening of Albanian-language schools using the Latin alphabet in northern Albania and its involvement in the solution of the alphabet question during the Congress of Manastir in 1908; and second, the foundation and promotion of the „Literary Commission,” which played an essential role in the publication of linguistic and literary works in Albanian.*

During a period marked by the Albanian national awakening and the struggle to build a cultural and political identity, Austro-Hungary acted as a strategic supporter of the Albanian cause, especially in matters of language and education. This study focuses on initiatives undertaken by Austro-Hungarian diplomats and albanologists, particularly August Kral, who recognized that linguistic unity was a necessary precondition for national cohesion. The Congress of Manastir became a turning point in Albanian cultural history, not only for the standardization of the alphabet but also for promoting a collective identity through language. The Austro-Hungarian role in the congress was both ideological and logistical, offering guidance, scholarly expertise, and subtle diplomatic support to ensure a practical and widely acceptable solution—the adoption of a Latin-based alphabet that symbolized both modernity and neutrality among religious and regional factions.

The Empire’s contribution extended far beyond symbolic encouragement. It included the financing of Albanian publications, training of teachers, and the establishment of schools where Albanian could be taught,

particularly in Catholic regions of the north. These actions were driven not only by cultural interest but also by geopolitical strategy. Austro-Hungary aimed to counteract the growing influence of the Ottoman Empire, Greece, and Slavic states in the region, while fostering a pro-Austrian Albanian elite that would serve its broader political interests in the Balkans.

Moreover, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, combined with the influence of the Catholic Church, played a crucial role in defending the right of Albanians to be educated in their native language under the Ottoman framework. This cultural policy laid the groundwork for a national consciousness rooted in a shared linguistic heritage and reinforced Albanian claims to linguistic and cultural autonomy.

In conclusion, Austro-Hungarian involvement in the development of the Albanian language was instrumental to the emergence of a modern national identity. Its efforts transcended traditional imperial politics and functioned as a powerful form of cultural diplomacy. Without such support, the standardization of the Albanian language and the broader cultural unification process would likely have been delayed or even undermined. By analyzing archival documents, diplomatic reports, and contemporary publications, this study highlights how Austro-Hungarian cultural policy aligned with Albanian national aspirations in the crucial domains of education and linguistic development, leaving a lasting impact on the cultural and intellectual foundation of the Albanian nation.

Key words: Contribution of August Kral, Latin alphabet, Literary commission, language standardization, Congress of Manastir.

ULOGA AUSTRO-UGARSKE U DVA VAŽNA DOGAĐAJA ZA ALBANSKI JEZIK

Apstrakt: Austrougarski doprinos razvoju albanskog jezika predstavlja jedan od najznačajnijih primjera kulturnog i naučnog stranog angažmana u formiranju i afirmaciji albanskog kao nacionalnog jezika. Ovaj rad istražuje odlučujuću ulogu koju je Austro-Ugarska monarhija imala u dva ključna događaja: prvo, njenu podršku otvaranju škola na albanskom jeziku uz korištenje latiničnog pisma u sjevernoj Albaniji i njeno učešće u rješavanju pitanja alfabeta tokom Kongresa u Manastiru 1908. godine; i drugo, osnivanje i promociju „Književne komisije“, koja je odigrala suštinsku ulogu u objavljivanju lingvističkih i književnih djela na albanskom jeziku.

Tokom perioda obilježenog albanskim nacionalnim preporodom i borbom za izgradnju kulturnog i političkog identiteta, Austro-Ugarska je djelovala kao strateški pobornik albanskog pitanja, posebno u oblastima jezika i obrazovanja. Ova studija se fokusira na inicijative koje su poduzeli austrougarski diplomati i albanolozi, naročito August Kral, koji je prepoznao

da je jezičko jedinstvo neophodan preduslov za nacionalnu koheziju. Kongres u Manastiru postao je prekretnica u albanskoj kulturnoj historiji, ne samo zbog standardizacije alfabeta, već i zbog promicanja kolektivnog identiteta putem jezika. Uloga Austro-Ugarske na kongresu bila je i ideološka i logistička, nudeći smjernice, naučnu ekspertizu i suptilnu diplomatsku podršku kako bi se osiguralo praktično i široko prihvatljivo rješenje – usvajanje alfabeta zasnovanog na latinici, koji je simbolizirao i modernost i neutralnost među vjerskim i regionalnim frakcijama.

Doprinos Monarhije sezao je daleko izvan simboličkog ohrabrenja. On je uključivao finansiranje albanskih publikacija, obuku nastavnika i osnivanje škola u kojima se albanski jezik mogao predavati, posebno u katoličkim regijama na sjeveru. Ove akcije nisu bile vođene samo kulturnim interesom, već i geopolitičkom strategijom. Austro-Ugarska je nastojala neutralisati rastući uticaj Osmanskog Carstva, Grčke i slavenskih država u regionu, istovremeno njegujući proaustrijsku albansku elitu koja bi služila njenim širim političkim interesima na Balkanu.

Štaviše, austrougarska diplomatija, u kombinaciji sa uticajem Katoličke crkve, odigrala je ključnu ulogu u odbrani prava Albanaca na obrazovanje na maternjem jeziku unutar osmanskog okvira. Ova kulturna politika postavila je temelje za nacionalnu svijest ukorijenjenu u zajedničkom jezičkom naslijeđu i ojačala albanske zahtjeve za jezičkom i kulturnom autonomijom.

Zaključno, austrougarsko učešće u razvoju albanskog jezika bilo je od presudnog značaja za pojavu modernog nacionalnog identiteta. Njeni naponi su prevazišli tradicionalnu imperijalnu politiku i funkcionisali kao snažan oblik kulturne diplomatije. Bez takve podrške, standardizacija albanskog jezika i širi proces kulturnog ujedinjenja vjerovatno bi bili odloženi ili čak podriveni. Analizirajući arhivsku građu, diplomatske izvještaje i savremene publikacije, ova studija osvjetljava kako se austrougarska kulturna politika uskladila s albanskim nacionalnim težnjama u ključnim domenima obrazovanja i jezičkog razvoja, ostavljajući trajan uticaj na kulturne i intelektualne temelje albanske nacije.

Ključne riječi: *Doprinos Augusta Krala, latinični alfabet, Književna komisija, standardizacija jezika, Kongres u Manastiru.*

Introduction

Throughout the history of each nation, certain events, due to their significance and prominence, serve as foundational elements in the development of national identity and culture. The evolution of the Albanian language has experienced several pivotal moments, notably the Congress of Manastir, which standardised the Albanian alphabet, and the Literary Commission, which facilitated the standardisation and unification of the written language. The journey towards national linguistic unification has been protracted and arduous, yet simultaneously illuminating and commendable.

The extensive journey of the „train of the Albanian language” culminated at two significant historical milestones. The first was the Congress of Manastir, occurring just before the Declaration of Independence and the establishment of the Albanian state. The second was the Literary Commission, representing national endeavours and foreign academic influence, such as Lambert, which contributed to the advancement of the official language, publications, and the Albanian educational system. This institution commenced its operations in September 1916, four years subsequent to Albania's declaration of independence.

During both of these critical phases, a significant international factor was present and impactful: Austria-Hungary offered significant assistance through its esteemed representative, diplomat and consul August Ritter von Kral, whose legacy is intricately associated with the endeavours for the unification of the Albanian language.

Early 20th-century attempts to preserve the Albanian language and Theodor Anton Ippen's contribution

The rivalry and competition for Albania and the Adriatic region between Austria-Hungary and Italy began to intensify during the time of Otto von Bismarck and the Italian prime minister of Arbëresh origin, Francesco Crispi. Since 1699, Austria had established a Kultusprotectorat over Albania, through which the Albanians were recognized the right to freely practice their religion, to build and repair places of worship. Through the support of Rome, the financing of the Catholic clergy, the press and religious publications in the Albanian language was ensured, playing an important role in preserving the religious and cultural identity of the Albanians.¹

As Italy unified and strengthened, Austria's prolonged investment in the Albanian Catholic clergy became detrimental, as a faction of this clergy—previously subsidised by Austria—began to endorse Italian politics and

¹ Eqerem Zenelaj, *Kongresi i Manastirit, Kongresi i ABC-së, sipas dokumenteve arkivore të Austro-Hungarisë*, Epoka e Re, (visited 30 June 2025) <https://www.epokaere.com/kongresi-i-manastirit-kongresi-i-abc-se-sipas-dokumente-ve-arkivore-te-austro-hungaris/>.

interests. Prominent clergy members who gravitated towards Italy included Monsignor Prenkë Doçi, while Prenkë Bib Doda, the leader of Mirdita, emerged from the northern Albanian elite.

Beginning in the late 19th century and particularly throughout the initial decade of the 20th century, Austria-Hungary orientated its policy towards Albania to cultivate the favour of the Albanian populace, leveraging the influence of the Catholic clergy. The objective was to establish the requisite conditions for the future self-governance of the nation by safeguarding the interests of Catholics. In this context, Austria's religious protectorate over Catholic institutions evolved into a tool with a significant political function.²

During this period, the Albanian language remained absent from the curricula of seminaries and secular schools. Seminarians, anticipated to deliver sermons in Albanian, lacked the opportunity to practise their native tongue. Similarly, secular students were also educated without any direct association with Albanian. The Austrian consul in Shkodra, Theodor Ippen, explicitly condemned the Jesuits' methodology, asserting that neither the seminaries nor the high schools were cultivating genuine Albanians, despite the presence of numerous Albanian priests eager to assist in this endeavour. T. Ippen persistently advocated for the establishment of a chair of the Albanian language in Vienna and consistently highlighted the absence of Albanian in the Shkodra educational system.³ He perceived these deficiencies as a direct catalyst for the apathy exhibited by Albanian youth towards the Jesuit mission and, subsequently, towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that funded these institutions. Ippen deemed it imperative for the Austrian government to reevaluate its strategy and guarantee the incorporation of the Albanian language into the curricula of seminaries and secondary schools, employing contemporary techniques through oral and written exercises centred on subjects related to the history and geography of Albania.⁴

On January 2, 1901, Theodor Ippen proclaimed the initiation of an Albanian language course by the Austrian government at the Teacher Training Institute in Borgo Erizzo, near Zara in Dalmatia, under the direction of the Franciscan priest Father Pashko Bardhi. In 1903, a significant advancement occurred with the establishment of a course at the Oriental Institute of Languages in Vienna, overseen by Dr. Gjergj Pekmez, a philology graduate from the University of Vienna.⁵

² Annelise Wernicke, *Theodor Ippen dhe Shqipëria në fokusin e Perandorisë Austro-Hungareze*, (trans. E. Imami), Plejad, Tiranë 2012, 50.

³ Hasan Bello, *Shqipëria Kisha Katolike dhe Vatikani (nga fundi i shekullit XIX-1939)*, ASA, Tiranë 2019, 38-39.

⁴ Annelise Wernicke, *Theodor Ippen dhe Shqipëria në fokusin e Perandorisë Austro-Hungareze*, 59.

⁵ Stavro Skëndi, *Zgjidhje kombëtar shqiptar*, Phoenix&Shtëpia e Librit dhe Komunikimit, Tiranë 2000, 241.

Austria-Hungary, in pursuit of its long-term geopolitical aims, consistently endorsed the Albanian national awakening for several decades, employing education and culture as instruments to equip Albanians for autonomy and subsequently, national independence.⁶ The Monarchy believed that the future independent Albania would serve as a loyal political ally, functioning as a defensive barrier against Pan-Slavism and Italian ambitions.⁷

In the early 20th century, Vienna determined that the Italian language would be supplanted by Albanian as the medium of instruction in certain Austrian Catholic schools in Northern Albania; in other instances, German was also employed, while in specific regions of Kosovo, instruction persisted in the Slavic language.⁸

These actions sought to diminish Italian influence and enhance the Austro-Hungarian cultural and political presence in Albania. A primary objective of the Albanian National Movement was the creation of national schools that utilised the Albanian language, prompting Vienna to view these initiatives, including the publication of Albanian literature, as instrumental in the dissemination and preservation of Albanian national identity.⁹

Archival documents indicate the proactive involvement of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the unification of the Albanian language and the establishment of a standardised alphabet. Diplomats Theodor Ippen and August Ritter von Kral, proficient in the Albanian language and culture, were instrumental in alleviating tensions and steering discussions towards mutually agreeable solutions.

By 1902, Ippen had been actively striving to incorporate Albanian into the curricula of institutions funded by Austria-Hungary. This initiative gained renewed momentum with the appointment of August Kral as the head of the consulate in Shkodra in 1905.

Kral, a seasoned diplomat in the Balkans, had formerly held positions in Manastir and Salonika, and in 1914, he served as a member of the International Control Commission. As an adept connoisseur of the Albanian language and its context, he was assigned the crucial responsibility of definitively addressing the alphabet issue in a manner that would appease all

⁶ Marenglen Verli, *Austro-Hungaria dhe Lëvizja Kombëtare Shqiptare 1912*, në „*Shqipëri-Austri, reflektim historiografik*”, Aktet e konferencës Shkencore, Shkodër Maj 2012, Tiranë, tetor 2012, Botimet Albanologjike Tiranë 2013, 58.

⁷ Kurt Gostentëtschnigg, August Ritter Von Kral, aktori kryesor i Asutro-Hungarisë në trojet shqiptare, *Studime Historike*, nr. 3-4, 2016, 49.

⁸ Shaban Demiraj, Kristaq Prifti, *Kongresi I Manastirit*, Akademia e Shkencave, Institutit i Historisë, Tiranë 2008, 39.

⁹ *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar*, Vëll. II, Akademia e Shkencave, Institutit i Historisë, Tiranë 2002, 301.

stakeholders and circumvent impediments to Austro-Hungarian policy in Albania.¹⁰

In this context, Vienna closely monitored the Albanian alphabet issue, aiming to select a practical and acceptable alphabet for all Albanians to facilitate the publication of school textbooks. Alfred Rappaport, the Vice-Consul of Prizren, presents a comprehensive analysis of the alphabetic circumstances in Albania.¹¹

During that period, the utilisation of various alphabets posed economic and political challenges: the Istanbul alphabet incurred substantial expenses due to its unique characters; the Arbëresh alphabet served as a vehicle for Italian propaganda, while other alphabets lacked broad acceptance.

Ippen anticipated that the discord among the alphabets would endure for several years and create divisions even within the Catholic Albanian community; however, he did not regard this as an insurmountable barrier; rather, he viewed it as the sole means to attain enduring unification. At that time, the Albanians were categorised into three factions: one faction that advocated for the traditional alphabet, another that adhered to the principles of Dom Preng Doçi, and the third that endorsed the alphabet proposed by Ndre Mjeda.

Ippen, attentively monitoring their dialogues and competition, anticipated that subsequent to the confrontations, all factions would discern the most appropriate alphabet and that the Catholic Albanians would acquiesce to the alphabet employed by the Tosks. Nonetheless, this anticipation was erroneous, as the competition among the Albanian Associations escalated. Both parties endeavoured to obtain the backing of bishops and other ecclesiastical institutions to alter the alphabet utilised in educational institutions.

August Kral's involvement in the alphabet issue and the preparations for the Congress of Manastir

In 1905, August Kral was designated consul in Shkodra, tasked with definitively resolving the alphabet issue in a manner satisfactory to all factions. Consul Kral posited that the disparity between the alphabets employed in Albania was a principal factor contributing to discord among Albanians.¹² He

¹⁰ Anila Omari, *Çështjet e gjuhës së përbashkët shqipe dhe ndikimi i diplomacisë Austro-Hungareze*, në „*Shqipëri-Austri, reflektim historiografik*”, Aktet e konferencës Shkencore, Shkodër Maj 2012, Tiranë, tetor 2012, Botimet Albanologjike Tiranë 2013, 165.

¹¹ Teodora Toleva, *Der einfluss Osterreich-Ungarus auf die Bildung der Albanischen (1896-1908)*, (*Ndikimi i Austro-Hungarisë në formimin e kombit shqiptar 1896-1908*), Dudaj, Tiranë 2018, 287-292.

¹² *Haus und Hof Staats, Wien Politisches Archi, Albanien* (hereinafter- *HHStA, Ar*), year 108 in: (Arkiven e Institutit të Historisë- hereinafter *AIH*), AR, F 27, K 35, *Raport nr. 122 i konsullit Kral dërguar nga Shkodra për ministrin e Jashtëm, Aehrenthal*, Shkodër, 09.11.1908.

asserts that disputes regarding the alphabet were primarily accountable for the sluggish advancement of the Albanian language and literature. The principle of neutrality and non-interference in Albanian matters by monarchy representatives must be upheld. August von Kral endeavoured to persuade Ndre Mjeda, leader of the literary Association „Agimi,” and Preng Doçi, leader of the literary Association „Bashkimi,” of the imperative for a compromise with the Tosks to establish a universally acceptable alphabet for all Albanians, given their inability to directly comprehend one another.¹³ Kral posits that the representatives of the Sami alphabet could more effectively avert chaos concerning the alphabet issue than the two literary Associations in Shkodra, „Bashkimi” and „Agimi”.

By his recommendation, Vienna wielded equivalent influence over all newspapers published by the principal expatriate associations in Sofia, Bucharest, Brussels, and other locations. Numerous distinguished Albanian intellectuals of that era, including Shahin Kolonja, Sotir Peci, Kristo Luarasi, and Dervish Hima, believed that *among all foreign assistance, that from Austria was the most advantageous for Albania*.¹⁴

The Association *Bashkimi* (Union) holds a robust position, as its president, Monsignor Jak Serreqi, has been appointed bishop of Sapa. From this moment forward, Mjeda's supporters expressed apprehensions whenever a vacant episcopal position arose, as it was understood that one of the factions would claim it, specifically the one with the most qualified candidate. In 1905, the abbot aimed to deliver a significant setback to the new representative in Shkodër, Kral, while inflicting considerable harm on Austrian interests, by formalising an agreement with the Italian consul general. Under this agreement, the consul would consent to utilise Albanian textbooks printed in Italy featuring the *Bashkimi* (Union) alphabet in Italian schools in Albania, thereby competing with those endorsed and published in Vienna. Henceforth, the distinction between the two systems in Shkodër will be referred to as the Italian writing system and the Austro-Hungarian writing system. Furthermore, among the two aforementioned groups, the representatives of the Association „Bashkimi” were able to implement activities due to their superior financial resources compared to the Association „Agimi”, which relied solely on its own efforts and produced textbooks only at the behest of Vienna. In the complex web of misunderstandings and compromises that hindered the Austro-Hungarian educational policy in Albania, the expansion of its influence was achieved solely through an accord among competing factions in the city of Shkodra.

In 1905, Vienna designated August von Kral to facilitate negotiations and achieve consensus among the various Albanian factions utilising distinct

¹³ *HHStA, AR*, F 27, K 35, Raport nr. 122 i konsullit Kral dërguar nga Shkodra për ministrin e Jashtëm, Aehrenthal, Shkodër, 09.11.1908.

¹⁴ Stavro Skëndi, *Zgjidhje kombëtar shqiptar*, Phoenix&Shtëpia e Librit dhe Komunikimit, Tiranë 2000, 246.

alphabets, with the objective of establishing a unified alphabet for the Albanian language. Kral, a seasoned Austrian diplomat, had held the position of consul in Shkodra and possessed extensive knowledge of the Albanian context. He was instrumental in consolidating the various factions and steering the discussions towards a conciliatory resolution. Consequently, August Kral, upon assuming office as a career diplomat, undertook the challenging objective of reconciling the three principal factions of Shkodra, namely „Bashkim,” „Agim,” and the Jesuits, with the Tosk party. *If the solution to the alphabet problem had seemed urgently necessary to me for the reasons mentioned at the beginning, which were primarily political in nature, I realised after a brief stay in Shkodra that it seemed absolutely necessary even for considerations that were of vital interest to our protectorate of the Catholic cult.*¹⁵

Upon assessing the situation, he initiated an intense effort to reach out to the key figures of the factions contending over the alphabet matter in Shkodra, including „Agimi,” „Bashkimi,” and the Jesuits. He articulates: *It became evident that the primary source of the challenges we faced in the political and religious domains, the schism among the clergy, the frailty of the Catholic party, the intrusive Italian influence in Catholic matters, and the stagnation of our national educational initiatives, stemmed from the disputes regarding the alphabet, which had a profoundly detrimental impact within Catholic circles. The dispute regarding the alphabet was intertwined with various matters, influencing, albeit paradoxically, the replacement of Italian congregations with Austrian ones, the subsidisation of the clergy, the Catholic musical chapel, the election of the Catholic municipal commission, the appointment of educators, and more. In summary, in all matters of interest, both locally and for us.*¹⁶

For Albanian patriots, the absence of a unified alphabet for writing Albanian represented a significant impediment, not only linguistically but particularly in the political realm of national unification. Recognising the significance of addressing the single alphabet issue, they persisted in their endeavours throughout the final two decades of the 19th century. The situation in Shkodra seemed precarious, with the chasm between the two Shkodra factions, the Association „Bashkimi” under Preng Doçi and the Association „Agimi” led by Ndre Mjeda, widening. The principal figures and their adherents were entrenched in two opposing camps, which they defended with fervour. Similar to Mjeda, who embodied the Association Agimi’s framework, Abbot Doçi, as the leader of the Association Bashkimi, vigorously advocated for the endorsement of their system. While Ndre Mjeda rigorously defended his alphabet, Preng Doçi largely relegated the matter to the prestige and authority of the party he represented.

¹⁵ HHStA, Minoritenplatz 1 A-1010, AIH, nr. 122, fk.3-33, Relacion konfidencial i Karlit për Baronin Erental, Shkodër, 9 nëntor 1908.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

August Kral observes: *...it was not unexpected, albeit ultimately inaccurately, that one was regarded as the Italian alphabet and the other as the Austro-Hungarian one. He concludes: From this maze of misconceptions that hindered our efforts, only a constructive resolution, reconciling all parties, to the alphabet issue could guide us.* Having comprehended the solution's essence, August Kral concentrated his efforts on facilitating an agreement among the three factions of Shkodra and the Tosks, *aiming to establish a definitive alphabet for all of Albania to eradicate local hostilities.*¹⁷

Kral employed diverse forms and methods in the mission he established for himself. Initially, he capitalised on the challenging circumstances in the city and province of Shkodra following the 1905 earthquake by orchestrating various humanitarian aid initiatives that benefitted the affected individuals without regard for religious affiliations. Simultaneously, he laboured diligently to foster solidarity and enhance comprehension of the interests of the three religious faiths, advocating for the necessity of unity. His engagement in Shkodra afforded him the opportunity to familiarise himself with the province, the Albanian populace, the circumstances of both Catholic and Muslim Albanians in the north, and their interactions with members of other tribes.

He functioned as a shrewd diplomat, formulating his country's policy while initiating actions *in a wholly confidential manner and nearly unnoticed by outsiders.* He adeptly leveraged his connections and influence among various figures within both the Frashërlijve party and those in Shkodra, executing the role of mediator with remarkable finesse. He asserts, *I had connections in Manastir with representatives of Albanian propaganda and journalism, relationships that I diligently nurtured even from Shkodra.*¹⁸ He also functioned as a visionary and significant benefactor for the Albanians by striving to resolve the alphabet issue definitively and collaboratively, *ensuring that no animosity remained among individuals. There should be neither victors nor vanquished; I advocated for the adoption of a compromise alphabet derived from the three predominant existing systems.*¹⁹

The Austrian consul opted to engage with the most prominent and esteemed individuals. We reference the prominent Tosk author Shahin Bey Kolonja²⁰ who *through the newspaper Drita and the publishing house in Sofia, wielded significant influence over public opinion among Albanian patriots.*²¹ He established connections and exerted influence with the leaders of the

¹⁷ Mentor Quku, *Mjeda 3 (1899-1912), Lbri i parë, Alfabeti (1899-1912).* ILAR, Tiranë 2007, 420-421.

¹⁸ HHStA (Haus Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Minoritenplatz 1 A-1010 wien), AIH, nr.122, fk.3-33, rel. konfidencial i Karlit për Baronin Erental, Shkodër, 9 nëntor 1908.

¹⁹ *Ibidem.*

²⁰ HHStA, *Arkivi i Institutit të Gjuhësisë e Letërsisë*, Tiranë, fil.I/1, K. 70,(1908/06-05), nr.inv.894, d.D-27, v.1908, C, letra e Shahin Kolonjës drejtuar konsullit Kral, Sofie,10 mars 1906.

²¹ HHStA (Haus Hof-und Staats Archiv, Minoritenplatz 1 A-1010 Wien), AIH, nr.122, fk.3-33, rel. konfidencial i Karlit për Baronin Erental, Shkodër, 9 nëntor 1908.

Albanian community in Romania, with the Albanians in Egypt via Foqion Turtulli, and with prominent circles in the vilayet of Manastir. He maintained ongoing associations with Gjergj Qiriaz, Anastas Sinon, Fehmi Bey Zavalani, and Selman Blloshmi. It required sustained, multifaceted efforts over several years to persuade the *zealous adherents of the Frashërjot alphabet* that he was *an anachronism and could not be accepted under any circumstances by other factions*. Kral reports to Foreign Minister Ehrental: *The initial years appeared nearly insurmountable... The leadership, amidst ongoing debates about the significant damages resulting from the attack, initially influenced their thoughts and subsequently facilitated discussions, as I motivated them through personal meetings.*²²

Another strong weapon of the Royal Consul was the use of this issue to his advantage through the influence of the Albanian press. He solicited Vienna for the endorsement of Albanian newspapers amenable to adopting a compromise alphabet, aiming to establish a foundation for a robust exchange of perspectives with Dervish Hima, editor of the newspaper *Albania* in Brussels, Nikollë Ivanaj, editor of *Shpnesa e Shqypnies* in Ragusa (Trieste), and Sotir Pecin, proprietor of *Kombit* in Boston. He exploited his personal connections with Faik Konica, despite his apprehension regarding Konica's *less accommodating disposition*.²³

Kral collaborated concurrently with both factions, endeavouring to persuade the Tosks to adopt the Latin script while simultaneously urging the two communities of Shkodra to recognise the imperative of compromise and concessions regarding the Frashërlinje alphabet. This was particularly accomplished through significant efforts with the leaders and members of the *Bashkimi* (Union) and *Agimi* (Dawn). *It required immense effort to inform the founders of the alphabets in Shkodra that neither of their alphabets had any prospects of success and that representatives from other parties also needed to express their significant opinions.* The Consul in Vienna reports that his endeavours encountered not only objective challenges but also scepticism and misinterpretations.²⁴ During his time with Mjeda, he quickly discovered the language of tolerance and understanding;²⁵ however, Abbot Doçi remained entirely unteachable for over a year and a half, compelling Consul Kral to adopt a unique strategy of complete isolation regarding his perspective, as even most members of *Bashkimi* (Union) reverted to the notion of compromise.²⁶ In this

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Mentor Quku, *Mjeda 3 (1899-1912), Lbri i parë, Alfabeti (1899-1912)*. ILAR, Tiranë 2007, 422.

²⁴ *HHStA* (Haus Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Minoritenplatz 1 A-1010 Wien), AIH, nr.122, fk.3-33, Relacion konfidencial i A. Kralit për Baronin Erental, Shkodër, 9 nëntor 1908.

²⁵ *HHStA, AIGJLT*, Fil.I/1, K.70 (1908/06-05), nr.inv.894, d.D-27, V.1908, C, Relacion i Kralit për Golluhovskin, Shkodër, 23 mars 1906. ...*mua më kushtoi mund për t'i qetësuar shpirtrat e ndezura dhe për të bindur partinë e Mjedës mbi qëllimet e drejta të Ministries së Jashtme...*

²⁶ On March 8, 1908, Gjergj Fishta writes to Father Pal Doda: „I fought Mr. Abat (Doçi) for three days prior to the date of your letter to baptise the Association you desired, but in the presence of

endeavour, Vienna cautioned Kral to exercise prudence in his demeanour towards the Abbot, stating that *...it would be perilous for the influential cleric in that nation to be incited to become an overt adversary. It is advisable for our interests to uphold a wholly objective position in the future, as we have thus far.*²⁷

A. Kral's explicit strategy for reconciling the discrepancies between the parties, grounded in the belief that dialogue was essential, that sustainable outcomes required tolerance and compromise, and that this approach was vital for ensuring the longevity of the alphabet, yielded positive results. Moreover, it established a methodology for addressing significant issues when the parties have conflicting views, yet the overarching objective transcends these divergences. This will be the methodology subsequently employed by the Literary Commission. He states: *...The sown seed was maturing, shaped by the media and the discourse of my acquaintances, public sentiment in Albania began to be swayed by a formidable movement advocating for the resolution of the alphabet issue...*²⁸ In 1907, prior to the Congress of Manastir, the factions in Shkodra indicated the potential for unifying their systems and a propensity for compromise. However, A. Kral maintained his vision of a comprehensive agreement among all parties—Tosk and Gheg, Muslim and Christian—that would be meticulously prepared, *'subsequently ratified by a delegate assembly, and proclaimed as a national and independent initiative'*. Establishing cohesion among the three disputing factions benefitted Austro-Hungarian politics, while simultaneously aligning fortuitously with the urgent aspirations of the Albanian National Movement, just prior to the Declaration of Independence. The envisioned Albanian state could not be realised without a unified alphabet. The Congress of Manastir, also referred to as the Alphabet Congress, convened from November 14 to November 22, 1908, in the city of Manastir. The primary objective of this congress was to reach a definitive resolution regarding the alphabet issue, which is also regarded as the overarching validation of the Declaration of Independence. Kral states: *...I am attributing significant importance to this unification endeavour, regarding it as one of the most crucial, if not the most challenging, responsibilities of this general consulate.*²⁹

The Proclamation of the Constitution of Hurriet in July 1908 exerted a beneficial influence. The valiant Albanian patriots capitalised on the advantageous circumstances that ostensibly offered legal assurances for

Mjeda, Serreqi, and others, it was impossible to persuade him. Consequently, there is a risk that the offspring may be born with rickets. Not even England accords as much significance to the Indians as the Abat bestows upon Bashkimi (Union) for this endeavour. As far as the Union is concerned, it has become utterly incomprehensible. *At Gjergj Fishta*, Tiranë, 1943, f.81-82.

²⁷ *HHSStA, AIGJLT*, Fil.1/1. K. (1908-06-05), d.27, v.1908, C, nr.inv.894, Urdhër i Vjenës dhënë Kralit, 31 korrik 1905.

²⁸ *HHSStA* (Haus Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Minoritenplatz 1 A-1010 Eien), AIH, Tiranë, nr.122, fk.3-33, Relacion konfidencial i Kralit për Baronin Erental, Shkodër, 9 nëntor 1908.

²⁹ *HHSStA, AIGJLT*, Fil.1/1, K.70 (1908/06-05), nr.inv.894, d.D-27, V.1908, C, Relacion i Kralit për Golluhovskin, Shkodër, 23 mars 1906.

political liberty and equal rights for subjugated populations.³⁰ As a result of these endeavours, the „train of the Albanian language” reached Manastir in November 1908. Gjergj Fishta, the central figure of that era's endeavours, representative of the Association Bashkimi at Congress, and chairman of the alphabet drafting commission, states: *When it became imperative to resolve the alphabet issue definitively... no one attended to this objective as diligently as the ministers of the Vienna Minister in Albania, thus enabling us to possess our own alphabet for the Albanian language, for which we owe particular gratitude to the indefatigable efforts of Z.A. Kral.*³¹ Consequently, the initial significant objective of written Albanian was achieved: the selection and development of a unified alphabet. The subsequent significant task will be the national codification of standard Albanian, enabling the Albanian language to be recognised as the language of a nation-state.³²

Initiatives for a standardised Albanian language during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Albania from 1915 to 1918

The advancement of the Albanian language was abruptly halted by the onset of World War I (1914-1918), during which Albania was invaded by the armies of two rival factions. In January 1916, the Austro-Hungarian army invaded Albania to pursue the Serbian-Montenegrin forces. In contrast to the Montenegrin invaders, the Austro-Hungarians entered Shkodra with a significant „advantage”, attributable to Austria's substantial role at the Conference of Ambassadors in London (1912-1913) as the principal architect of the Albanian state's establishment and the protector of Shkodra, alongside considerable investments under the *Cultural Protectorate*, where Shkodra served as a pivotal focal point. The contemporary press referred to it as *friend-enemy*, while years later, Luigj Gurakuqi characterised the military occupation by Austria-Hungary as *the occupation of a friendly power*.³³ Under such advantageous conditions,³⁴ it succeeded in establishing control over two-thirds

³⁰ Bendis Kraja, *Reflektimi i Kongresit të Manastirit në Shtypin e Kohës*, Buletini Shkencor, Seria e Shkencave shoqërore, Universiteti i Shkodrës „Luigj Gurakuqi”, Viti XXXIX, nr. 59, Shkodër 2009, 307.

³¹ Atë Gjergj Fishta, Tiranë, 1943, 81.

³² Xhevat Lloshi, *Një dijetar slloven dhe Komisia letrare e Shkodrës*, Gazeta „Dita,” 01 shtator 2016, 18-19.

³³ Vehbi Hoti, *Luigj Gurakuqi për shkollën shqipe dhe arsimin kombëtar*, Camaj-Pipa, Shkodër 2002, 190-191.

³⁴ The entreaty directed at Albanians by notable political leaders, including Luigj Gurakuqi, Aqif Pashë Elbasani, Prengë Bib Doda, Hasan Prishtina, and Fejzi Alizotimetj, significantly influenced public sentiment, urging them to embrace the Austro-Hungarians as „Guardians and liberators,” as they had „consistently safeguarded the existence and sacred rights of our nationality”, cited by; *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar III*, Botim i Akademisë së Shkencave dhe Institutit Historik, Toena, Tiranë 2007, 84.

of the country within three months. The support provided for education, culture, the instruction of the Albanian language, academic studies at their universities, and assistance in publishing at Jesuit and Franciscan Catholic institutions established a significant legacy in the bilateral relations between the two nations. During this occupation, these initial connections were accompanied by a more liberal policy implemented in the city of Shkodra, in contrast to other regions of the country. The legacy and characteristics of Austro-Hungarian policy, despite the significant challenges posed by this occupation, fostered an environment that positively influenced the continuity of cultural and educational advancements. Given that Austria-Hungary had contributed to this degree while Albania was subjected to other invaders and frequently had to engage diplomatically rather than overtly and from a distance; what is the situation now that two-thirds of Albania is under its control?

The situation exhibited distinct characteristics. In alignment with its strategic objectives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna formulated a plan of measures concerning Albania, which aimed to: secure military operations; safeguard the political and economic interests of the Monarchy; eradicate any adversarial influence; protect the lives and property of citizens; promote the cultural and economic advancement of the nation and its populace; and cultivate the populace for future self-governance and national awareness. Three directorates were established for the execution of this plan: finance, justice, and education. The occupied territory was partitioned into six districts, each overseen by a military commander. The Command of the 19th Army Corps, led by General Ignac Trollman, wielded all civil and military authority. Consequently, an entirely military regime was instituted. Throughout the two years of occupation, a discord emerged between the military faction, whose severe measures undeniably fostered a strained atmosphere, disillusioning the aspirations and initial fervour of the local populace, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ballplatz), which sought to preserve the capital painstakingly amassed over years of labour and conflict. Kral, serving as a civil commissioner and representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, observed that the military command's trajectory jeopardised the Empire's longstanding efforts, deeming this course *unsatisfactory and unpromising for engaging the Albanians*.³⁵ This situation elicited apprehension in the Austrian capital, particularly as the centre exhibited confusion and indecision regarding Albania's political future. Both parties lodged complaints with the centre, presenting conflicting arguments against one another.³⁶ The records of the Austro-Hungarian consulate confirm daily reports from Shkodra.³⁷ A report from the A-H Foreign Ministry in

³⁵ Arkivi i Muzeut Historik të Shkodrës (hereinafter –AMHSH), Fondi: *Pushtimi Austro-Hungarez 1916-1918*, 168-169.

³⁶ AMHSH, Fondi: *Pushtimi Austro-Hungarez 1916-1918*, Vj.26.12.1204; nr.32.120, f.143-160, secret, *Inkonvenienca në Shqipëri*, Gjeneral-kolonel Konrad, 169-170.

³⁷ AMHSH, Fondi: *Pushtimi austro-Hungarez 1916-1918*, Vj.26.12.1204; nr.32.120, f.143-160, secret, *Inkonvenienca në Shqipëri*, Gjeneral-kolonel Konrad, 169-170.

August 1916 indicated that *the possibility of the Albanians opposing us, should circumstances favour them, to the advantage of our adversaries must also be considered*.³⁸ August Kral is a personal Austrian name that has positively influenced the advancement of the Albanian issue, particularly in the realms of education and culture. He played a pivotal role during these years, particularly in the establishment of the administration and in the educational and cultural advancements he initiated, supported, and negotiated with Albanian patriots amid the Ottoman occupation of Albania. Sejfi Vllamasi states: *The renowned August Kral, Albanian philosopher...*³⁹

Kral oversaw civil issues including cults, Sharia law, education, civil service, and banking. He assiduously contributed to the structuring of the Albanian educational system and the formation of the Albanian administration. He had faith in the capabilities of Albanian figures to cultivate and oversee education and *frequently allowed himself a free rein*.⁴⁰ The political position of a-h regarding the Albanian language significantly influenced the establishment of a local administration based on that language. Regardless of whether the post-war Albanian state was autonomous or independent, the primary objective for that state was the resolution of the standard language issue, even amidst the conditions of the world war. In these circumstances, the aspirations and determination of patriots such as Gurakuqi, Fishta, and Mjeda Pekmezi were optimally aligned with the preceding policies of the era to advance the development of Albania, characterised by its renowned liberal policies towards the diverse populations in the region, alongside the contemporary political interests, the necessity for administrative establishment, the imperative for an educational system, and the continuation of the trajectory initiated years prior, which persisted until the unification of the alphabet. The initial demand was the *unification of spoken and written language as a foundation for the nation, educational institutions, administrative offices, and as a literary medium*.⁴¹ The Literary Commission was assembled for this purpose.

The commencement of its activity was contingent upon the approval of the Austro-Hungarian military command in Shkodra. In his initiative, researcher Robert Elsie highlights the contributions of the Austrian consul in Shkodra, noting: *In 1916, alongside Luigj Gurakuqi, Ndre Mjeda, and Mati Logoreci, Fishta was instrumental in the Albanian Literary Commission, formed by the Austro-Hungarians at the behest of Consul General August Ritter von Kral, to address the official spelling issue and promote the publication of educational materials in the Albanian language*. Pal Duka-Gjini (Daniel

³⁸ *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar III*, Botim i Akademisë së Shkencave dhe Institutit Historik, Tirane 2007, 86.

³⁹ Sejfi Vllamasi, *Ballafaqime Politike në Shqipëri (1897-1942)*, Marin Barleti, Tirane 1995, 26.

⁴⁰ Vehbi Hoti, *Luigj Gurakuqi për shkollën shqipe dhe arsimin kombëtar*, Camaj-Pipa, Shkodër 2002, 194.

⁴¹ *Parathënia e fjalorit shqip-gjermanisht*, përgatitur nga Anton Paluca e Karl Gurakuqi, Salzburg, 1947, përkthyer nga Gjergj Zef Kola, Revista Phoenix 1998, 3-5.

Gjeçaj) discusses this occurrence: *Austria's commitment to the preservation of the Albanian language has motivated the nation's veterans to engage in increasingly significant efforts in this regard. This assistance motivated Luigi Gurakuqi to found the Literary Commission, under the auspices of the military authorities...*⁴² In 1962, Eqerem Çabej noted that *during the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian authorities initiated the establishment of a „Literary Commission“ in Shkodra, comprising both Austrian and Albanian linguists.*⁴³

Karl Gurakuqi, a contemporary and associate of the Commission, states in his memoirs that *the foundational basis of the modern official Albanian language was established by Austro-Hungarian officials following the occupation of Albania during the First World War (1914-1918). A significant contribution to this historical event is attributed to Albania's ally, Mr. August Kral, who served as the Civil Commissioner of the nation, stationed in Shkodra at that time.*⁴⁴ The military command of the A-H sanctioned one of its headquarters as the location for the Commission to commence its operations. The Command was the one that, through the letter dated September 1, 1916, sanctioned the provisional statute of the State High Command,⁴⁵ appointed the chairman Gjergj Pekmezi,⁴⁶ designated acting commissioners such as Ndre Mjeda and Ndue Paluca, and selected the secretary of the Commission.⁴⁷ The Command meticulously monitored the Commission's activities and provided support by enlisting language specialists like Lamberc and Nahtigal, while also issuing unequivocal and authoritative directives. The State High Command aimed, from political, administrative, and practical perspectives, to establish a language and script expeditiously. Consequently, when Pekmezi proposed the utilisation of two dialects, Gjergj Fishta articulated his apprehension that: *maintaining two dialects post-chairman contradicts the intentions of the Corps Command and the obligations imposed by the statute...* All actions undertaken by the State High Command were executed in

⁴² Pal Duka-gjini, pseudonimi i Daniel Gjeçaj, *Gjergj Fishta jeta dhe vepra*, Botimet Provinca franceskane, Shkoder 1992, 100.

⁴³ Eqerem Çabej, *Maximilian Lambertz*, Nëntori, nr. 9, Tirane 1962, 176.

⁴⁴ *Parathenia e fjalorit shqip-gjermanisht*, përgatitur nga Anton Paluca e Karl Gurakuqi, Salzburg 1947, perkthyer nga Gjergj Zef Kola, Phoenix 1998.

⁴⁵ The initial point states: In accordance with the directives of the High Command in Albania, an Albanian literary commission is being formed in Shkodra cited by, Tomorr Osmani, *Komisia Letrare shqipe në Shkodër* në „*Shqipëri-Austri, reflektim historiografik*“, Aktet e konferencës Shkencore, Shkodër Maj 2012, Tiranë, tetor 2012, Botimet Albanologjike Tiranë 2013, 203

⁴⁶ Kral subsequently notified Vienna in his correspondence regarding the discrepancies between Pekmez and the members of the Commission's presidency. He requested the Ministry to terminate his appointment as chairman. Pjetër Logoreci, *Dosja Pekmezi në Vjenë, Përplasjet me Gurakuqin, Konicen dhe kryekonsullin Kral, Rilindasi supplement i Shqiptarja*, 8 korrik, 2012. https://www.shkoder.net/images/pdf/3_rilindasi_8_korrik_pekmezi.pdf. (visited. 30 June 2025).

⁴⁷ The Secretary of the Commission shall invariably be one of the secretaries of the Directorate of Education, as the Commission will consistently maintain a connection with the Directorate of Education". The Commission sustained formal relations with the Military High Command via L. Gurakuqi.

conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian military command. No definitive action appears to have been executed without the consent of the Austrian command. The Commission formulated rules that were submitted for approval to the Military Command, which possessed the authority to grant them official status for use *without any irregularities, in all acts, in the responsibility and in the execution of these in orders, in publications, etc.*⁴⁸

Consequently, Austria-Hungary not only encouraged, supported, and assisted, but also provided the impetus for execution through prompt and resolute directives to the Commission's decisions, ensuring they were not merely theoretical. It provided support to the newspaper *Posta e Shqipënis*, the library, specialists, the publication of the Commission's organ printed in Vienna, field expeditions, offices, and meal payments. It utilised a comprehensive array of resources to support the Commission's efforts.

Among the numerous political, historical, socio-cultural, and educational factors that shaped the establishment, organisation, and advancement of the Congress of Manastir and the State High Command in Shkodra, two principal components and protagonists are Austria-Hungary and Albanian intellectuals. Attributing them to the Austrians does not diminish the contributions of the Albanian patriots in any way. Their commitment and shared aspirations facilitated the success and durability of their decisions.

Summary

The endeavour to standardise the Albanian alphabet in the early 20th century signifies a pivotal moment in the development of Albanian national identity. August Ritter von Kral, the consul general of Austria-Hungary in Shkodër, served as a pivotal mediator, negotiator, and advocate for compromise among Albanian literary and political factions.

Kral's diverse actions—including diplomatic interventions, influence over the Albanian press, unification of representatives from all Albanian regions, and engagement with religious and educational institutions—facilitated the political and cultural environment necessary for the Congress of Manastir in 1908. The congress, which culminated in the adoption of a unified Latin-based

⁴⁸ In the letter dated February 24, 1917, no. 128/1, the Military Command informed the Commission that „the orthographic rules for the written Albanian language, established by the Literary Commission and communicated on the 31st of Kalendar 1917, were approved.“ The Military Command declared that „effective immediately, the writing style established by these regulations shall be officially recognised and must be adhered to without exception in all actions, responses, and implementations of orders, as well as in publications, etc“. *Lajmet e Komissisë Letrare në Shkodër*, 1918, nr. 1. *idem* Tomor Osmani, *Komisia Letrare shqipe në Shkodër* në „*Shqipëri-Austri, reflektim historiografik*“, Aktet e konferencës Shkencore, Shkodër Maj 2012, Tiranë, tetor 2012, Botimet Albanologjike Tiranë 2013, 253.

Albanian alphabet, is regarded as a significant milestone in the pursuit of linguistic cohesion and Albanian statehood.

Austria-Hungary's involvement in this process encompassed political, cultural, educational, and strategic dimensions. The policy endorsed the Latin alphabet as a component of a larger initiative to facilitate Albanian autonomy, ultimately leading to the Declaration of Independence on November 28, 1912.

Thus, August Kral's endeavours constituted not merely a transient diplomatic initiative, but a sustained investment in the cultivation of Albanian national identity via language. He recognised early that any state-building initiative required a shared linguistic and alphabetic foundation; thus, his efforts exemplify a model of cultural diplomacy grounded in dialogue, respect for local identity, and a forward-looking vision.

His endeavours preceded a methodology subsequently adopted by the Literary Commission of 1916 to standardise written Albanian. The Congress of Manastir and the efforts of August Kral serve as incontrovertible evidence of language's pivotal role in fostering national unity and Albanian national consciousness in the early 20th century.

Zaključak

Nastojanje da se standardizuje albanski alfabet početkom 20. vijeka označava ključni trenutak u razvoju albanskog nacionalnog identiteta. August Ritter von Kral, generalni konzul Austro-Ugarske u Skadru, služio je kao ključni posrednik, pregovarač i zagovornik kompromisa među albanskim književnim i političkim frakcijama.

Kralove raznolike akcije — uključujući diplomatske intervencije, uticaj na albansku štampu, ujedinjenje predstavnika iz svih albanskih regija, te saradnju sa vjerskim i obrazovnim institucijama — omogućile su političko i kulturno okruženje neophodno za Kongres u Manastiru 1908. godine. Kongres, koji je kulminirao usvajanjem jedinstvenog albanskog alfabeta zasnovanog na latinici, smatra se značajnom prekretnicom u težnji ka jezičkoj koheziji i albanskoj državnosti.

Uključenost Austro-Ugarske u ovaj proces obuhvatala je političke, kulturne, obrazovne i strateške dimenzije. Ta politika je podržala latinični alfabet kao dio šire inicijative za olakšavanje albanske autonomije, što je na kraju dovelo do Deklaracije o nezavisnosti 28. novembra 1912. godine.

Stoga, nastojanja Augusta Krala nisu predstavljala tek prolaznu diplomatsku inicijativu, već kontinuirano ulaganje u njegovanje albanskog nacionalnog identiteta putem jezika. On je rano prepoznao da svaka inicijativa za izgradnju države zahtijeva zajednički jezički i alfabetni temelj; stoga, njegovi naponi služe kao model kulturne diplomatije zasnovane na dijalogu, poštovanju lokalnog identiteta i viziji usmjerenoj ka budućnosti.

Njegova nastojanja prethodila su metodologiji koju je kasnije usvojila Književna komisija iz 1916. godine za standardizaciju pisanog albanskog jezika. Kongres u Manastiru i naponi Augusta Krala služe kao neoboriv dokaz ključne uloge jezika u podsticanju nacionalnog jedinstva i albanske nacionalne svijesti početkom 20. vijeka.

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THE POLITICAL AND UPRISING MOVEMENT IN KOSOVO VILAYET BEFORE THE YOUNG TURKS REVOLUTION: CAUSES, DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES

Abstract: *The political and insurgent movement in the Kosovo Vilayet during the years 1904-1907 constitutes a fundamental component for the study of the political, social, economic, cultural and national developments of the Albanians within the framework of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century. This period was characterized by an intensification of interventions by the international factor, particularly the European Great Powers, which, through diplomatic and political pressure exerted on the Sublime Porte, sought to implement administrative and institutional reforms in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Kosovo Vilayet, together with the Vilayets of Manastir and Salonica, emerged as an area of particular strategic and political importance due to its complex ethnic, national and religious composition. The reform projects promoted by the Great Powers, which essentially aimed at the creation of an autonomous or semi-autonomous political entity with a predominantly Christian population, were perceived by the Albanian population of the Kosovo Vilayet as a direct threat to territorial integrity and national interests. Consequently, these initiatives generated a climate of profound discontent, initially expressed through local resistance and uprisings of a social and economic character, led by local leaders. Over time, these movements acquired a more organized structure and a more clearly articulated political orientation, gradually transforming into formations with a pronounced national character and demands that went beyond partial administrative reforms. An important role was also represented by the intellectual elite within the framework of the Albanian National Renaissance, which operated within the European territories of the Ottoman Empire, in Constantinople, and in Albanian communities in exile, such as those in Romania,*

Bulgaria and other countries. With its support, was also achieved the formation of the Monastir Committee „Për lirinë e Shqipërisë” („For the Freedom of Albania”) and the „Besa” Society in Prizren. Local leaders who were part of the Albanian National Movement, such as Sulejman Agha Batusha, Hasan Hysen Budakova, Ramadan Zaskoku, Isa Boletini and several others, were aware of the risks posed by the territorial and administrative changes that were being planned in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The uprisings they led, initially motivated by economic and social reasons, served merely as a pretext to convey messages to the Sublime Porte and the Great Powers that Albanians would oppose projects that endangered their political and national future. The Ottoman government, in order to immediately suppress the centres of Albanian uprisings that were erupting in various areas of the Kosovo Vilayet, responded by activating its governor in Skopje, as well as through armed forces commanded by Şemsi Pasha. This study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the structural and circumstantial causes that led to the outbreak and development of the political and insurgent movement in the Kosovo Vilayet during the years 1904-1907, as well as to examine the internal dynamics and the influence of external factors in this process. Drawing on unpublished and published archival sources, as well as relevant Albanian and broader historiographical literature, the study seeks to assess the short-term and long-term outcomes and consequences of this movement in the process of shaping Albanian political and national consciousness on the eve of major political transformations within the Ottoman Empire.

Key words: Movement, Kosovo Vilayet, political, uprising, reforms, Albanians.

POLITIČKI I USTANIČKI POKRET U KOSOVSKOM VILAJETU PRIJE MLADOTURSKE REVOLUCIJE: UZROCI, DINAMIKA I POSljedICE

Apstrakt: *Politički i ustanički pokret u Kosovskom vilajetu u periodu 1904–1907. godine predstavlja jednu od ključnih pojava za razumijevanje političkih, društveno-ekonomskih, kulturnih i nacionalnih procesa albanskog stanovništva u okviru Osmanskog carstva početkom XX stoljeća. Ovaj period obilježen je intenziviranjem djelovanja međunarodnog faktora, posebno evropskih Velikih sila, koje su putem diplomatskih i političkih mehanizama vršile pritisak na Visoku portu s ciljem provođenja administrativnih i institucionalnih reformi u evropskim provincijama Osmanskog carstva. U tom kontekstu, Kosovska vilajet, zajedno s Manastirskim i Solunskim vilajetom, profilirao se kao prostor od izuzetnog geopolitičkog i strateškog značaja, prije svega zbog svoje složene etničke, konfesionalne i nacionalne strukture. Reformski projekti koje su inicirale Velike sile, a koji su u suštini bili usmjereni ka uspostavljanju*

autonomne ili poluautonomne administrativno-političke jedinice s većinskim kršćanskim stanovništvom, u percepciji albanskog stanovništva Kosovskog vilajeta predstavljali su direktnu prijetnju teritorijalnom integritetu i kolektivnim nacionalnim interesima. Kao posljedica navedenog, ove inicijative proizvele su stanje izraženog političkog i društvenog nezadovoljstva, koje se u početnoj fazi manifestiralo kroz lokalne oblike otpora i oružane pobune pretežno socijalno-ekonomskog karaktera, predvođene lokalnim prvacima (notabilima). Tokom vremena, navedeni pokreti su poprimali viši stepen organizacije, uz jasniju političku artikulaciju ciljeva, transformirajući se u pokrete s naglašenim nacionalno-političkim obilježjima i zahtjevima koji su prevazilazili okvire parcijalnih administrativnih reformi. Posebno značajnu ulogu u ovom procesu imala je albanska intelektualna elita u okviru Albanskog nacionalnog preporoda (Rilindja Kombëtare), koja je djelovala kako unutar evropskih teritorija Osmanskog carstva i u Carigradu, tako i u okviru albanskih emigrantskih i dijasporских zajednica u Rumuniji, Bugarskoj i drugim državama. Uz njenu idejnu i organizacionu podršku došlo je do formiranja Manastirskog komiteta „Për lirinë e Shqipërisë“ (Za slobodu Albanije), kao i društva „Besa“ u Prizrenu, što predstavlja važan segment institucionalizacije albanskog nacionalnog pokreta. Istovremeno, lokalni politički i vojni lideri Albanskog nacionalnog pokreta, među kojima se izdvajaju Sulejman-aga Batusha, Hasan Hysen Budakova, Ramadan Zaskoku, Isa Boletini, kao i drugi istaknuti akteri, bili su svjesni dugoročnih implikacija planiranih teritorijalno-administrativnih prestrukturiranja u evropskim provincijama Osmanskog carstva. Oružani ustanci koje su predvodili, iako u početnoj fazi motivirani prvenstveno ekonomskim i socijalnim faktorima, funkcionirali su kao sredstvo političke komunikacije i pritiska prema Visokoj porti i evropskim Velikim silama, s ciljem artikulacije albanskog protivljenja projektima koji su ugrožavali njihovu političku subjektivnost i nacionalni opstanak. U nastojanju da brzo i efikasno neutralizira žarišta albanskih ustanaka koja su izbijala u različitim dijelovima Kosovskog vilajeta, osmanska centralna vlast reagirala je angažiranjem valije u Skoplju, kao i primjenom vojnih represivnih mjera putem regularnih oružanih snaga pod komandom Šemsi-paše. Cilj ove studije jeste da ponudi sveobuhvatnu historiografsku analizu strukturnih i kontekstualnih uzroka koji su doveli do izbijanja i razvoja političkog i ustaničkog pokreta u Kosovskom vilajetu u periodu 1904–1907. godine, te da ispita unutrašnje dinamike pokreta, kao i utjecaj međunarodnih i regionalnih faktora na njegovu evoluciju. Na temelju analize neobjavljenih i objavljenih arhivskih izvora, kao i relevantne albanske, regionalne i međunarodne historiografske literature, rad nastoji evaluirati kratkoročne i dugoročne posljedice ovog pokreta u procesu formiranja albanske političke svijesti i nacionalne ideologije uoči ključnih političkih transformacija unutar Osmanskog carstva.

Ključne riječi: *Pokret, Kosovski vilajet, politički, ustanak, reforma, Albanci.*

Introduction

The assassination of the Russian consul in Mitrovica (spring 1903¹), the Mürzsteg Reforms (October 1903) and the opposition to their implementation, the threat of the re-partition of Albanian-inhabited territories, demands for the withdrawal of the Ottoman army from the Kosovo Vilayet, the release of political prisoners, and the rejection of an Albanian autonomy within the Ottoman Empire² etc., were among the principal factors that drove the Albanians to revolt. Although the uprising did not encompass all Albanian-inhabited regions and lacked a single centralized leadership, it was nevertheless characterized by common objectives and a distinctly national character.

Uprising activities during 1904

On 8 February 1904, in Constantinople, De Giorgis, the commander of the gendarmerie appointed within the framework of the implementation of the Mürzsteg Reforms, convened a meeting with his associates to discuss the territorial division of reform zones. According to the plan of the International Military Commission, six reform zones were established in the Vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica, each placed under the supervisory authority of one of the Great Powers. Consequently, areas predominantly inhabited by Albanians and Slavs were excluded from the reform process.³ Such a plan was perceived by the Albanians as a serious threat, as it directly endangered the territorial integrity of their ethnic lands and raised the prospect of their partition or incorporation into another political or state formation. For this reason, the Albanian National Movement reacted immediately, expressing its discontent through the organization of armed uprisings.

Consequently, under pressure from the Great Powers, the Ottoman administration proceeded with the implementation of the reforms. In this context, following an organized assembly in Gjakova, an armed uprising broke out against the reforms, accompanied by the blockade of the Gjakova-Peja road. Among the Albanians of the Sanjak of Peja, who persistently agitated against the reforms, Sulejman Agha Batusha emerged as a prominent figure. The Ottoman government adopted immediate measures to suppress the Albanian uprising in

¹ Jusuf Osmani, *Mitrovica dhe diplomacia ruso-serbe (Sipas burimeve arkivore)*, Prishtinë 2009, 92-102.

² *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar II*, Tiranë 2002, 313; Павле Орловић, *Стара Србија и Арбанаси*, Београд 1904, 1-9; Shukri Rahimi, *Çështja shqiptare gjatë viteve 1903-1904, Gjurmime albanologjike*, seria e shkencave historike, nr. III-1973, Prishtinë 1975, 56.

³ Emin Pllana, *Kosova dhe reformat në Turqi (1839-1912)*, Prishtinë 1978, 192-193.

the Kosovo Vilayet.⁴ These measures included the disarmament of the Albanian population, enforced conscription, the regular collection of approximately twelve different taxes and levies - including newly introduced ones such as the livestock tax and the income tax - and the internment of local leaders, as exemplified by the cases of Zenel Bey, Ruzhdi Agha and the Mufti of Peja. However, the Albanians did not recognize the authority of the Ottoman administration and instead obeyed exclusively the commands of their own leaders. As a result, the maintenance of public order and security failed to reach the levels desired by the state authorities.⁵ The Ottoman response consisted of military operations supported by artillery, commanded by Şemsi Pasha, who engaged in armed combat with the Albanian insurgents at the Ura e Shenjtë (Sacred Bridge), near Gjakova. Dozens of battalions were deployed and artillery was employed by the Ottoman army to break the encirclement at Çabrat, near Gjakova, an operation in which the Governor (vali) of Kosovo, Shakir Pasha, was also directly involved. This armed confrontation resulted in casualties and wounded on both sides, among the latter being Şemsi Pasha himself. Consequently, the Ottoman forces suffered a defeat and telegraphic communication along the Peja-Gjakova-Prizren line was severed.⁶ Following the clashes in Gjakova, another battle took place in Skivjan, near Gjakova, where the Albanian insurgent forces reached approximately 2,000 fighters under the leadership of Sulejman Agha Batusha. In addition, fierce fighting occurred in Baballoq, near Deçan, where the number of insurgents rose to around 3,000 men. Despite reinforcements and attempts to negotiate an agreement with the leaders of the uprising, the Ottoman army was unable to break the Albanian resistance.⁷

Meanwhile, armed movements opposing the newly imposed taxes also emerged in the Sanjak of Prizren. The collection of revenues through the *vergi*,

⁴ *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Affaires de Macédoine 1903-1905*, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1905, 59-60, Le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères à l'Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, à Constantinople. Sublimé-Porte, le 20 janvier 1904.

⁵ *Haus und Hof Staats Archiv, Wien, Politisches Archiv, Albanien* (hereinafter: *HHSt.A.P.A.*), in *Politik und Gesellschaft im Vilayet Kosovo und im serbisch beherrschten Kosovo 1870-1914* (hereinafter: *PGVK*), Berichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Konsuln aus dem zentralen Balkan, Band 3, Oliver Jens Schmitt und Eva Anne Frantz (Hg) unter Mitarbeit von Sven Mörsdorf, Wien 2020, 228-230, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizren, Karl Halla, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Goluchowski, Prizren, 8 February 1904; Shukri Rahimi, *Kombinimet politike rreth Kosovës gjatë viteve 1902-1908 dhe qëndrimi i shqiptarëve, Kosova*, nr.3, Prishtinë 1974, 142; Bujar Dugolli, *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-serbe (1878-1912)*, Prishtinë 2011, 260.

⁶ *Документи о спољној политички Краљевине Србије 1903-1914*, Књига I, Свеска 1 (29. мај/11. јун 1903 - 14/27. фебруар 1904), Ириредно Андрија Раденић, Српска Академија и Уметности - Одељење Историјских Наука, Београд 1991, 950-958, Report of the Serbian Consul General in Skopje, Mihailo Ristić, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, Nikola Pašić, Skopje, 2/15 February 1904; Jusuf Bajraktari, *Gjakova me rrethinë (1878-1912)*, Prishtinë 1998, 203-204.

⁷ *HHSt.A.P.A.* in *PGVK*, 231-233, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizren, Karl Halla, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Goluchowski, Prizren, 14 February 1904.

taxes on livestock (cattle, sheep, etc), poll taxes and levies imposed on each household proved unbearable and further deepened the population's economic hardship. The Albanian resistance was led by Ramadan Zaskoku, who, among other plans, intended to descend with his forces from Luma toward Prizren, an initiative that was thwarted and contained by the Ottoman authorities. In the Sanjak of Prizren, insurgent activities did not subside; instead, they continued in June 1904 in Budakova under the leadership of Hasan Hysen Budakova, who was distinguished for his role in organizing Albanian armed groups.⁸ The Albanian uprising against tax payments also spread to Plav and Gusinje, where government officials dispatched from Peja to collect taxes were expelled by the local Albanian population.⁹

The abandonment by the Reform Commission of the idea of establishing an Albanian sanjak within the Kosovo Vilayet - on the grounds that such a measure would have entailed negative consequences for the interests of Russia and Serbia - had significant repercussions.¹⁰ Consequently, in February 1904, the International Military Commission, taking into account both the armed resistance of the Albanians and the aspirations of interested European powers to intervene in Albanian-inhabited territories, decided to suspend the implementation of the gendarmerie reforms in the Vilayets of Shkodra and Janina, as well as in the western regions of the Kosovo Vilayet and the Vilayet of Monastir, where Albanians constituted the majority of the population. These areas included the Sanjaks of Prizren, Peja and Dibra, among others. Furthermore, the reorganization of the gendarmerie envisaged by the Mürzsteg Agreement was not extended to the *kazas* of Pljevlja and Sjenica within the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.¹¹ Notably, this suspension of the reform process did not apply to the Sanjaks of Pristina and Skopje, despite the fact that Albanians also constituted a majority of the population in these administrative units.

Meanwhile, in addition to opposing the payment of taxes, Albanians in Novi Pazar, Mitrovica, Vushtrria, Pristina and Gjilan engaged in clandestine contacts and meetings aimed at organizing resistance to the implementation of

⁸ Marjan Prenkaj, *Prizreni dhe rrethina në shekullin XIX dhe në fillim të shekullit XX*, Prishtinë 1998, 295-296.

⁹ *Haus und Hof Staats Archiv, Wien, Politisches Archiv, Albanien* (hereinafter: *HHSt.A.P.A.*), in *Arkivi i Institutit të Historisë në Tiranë* (hereinafter: *AIHT*), Vj.13-5-518, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 10 April 1904.

¹⁰ *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar II*, 314.

¹¹ *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Affaires de Macédoine 1903-1905*, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1905, 75-76, Note submitted to the Sublime Porte by the Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary and Russia in Constantinople, Pera, 16/29 February 1904; Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, terza serie: 1896-1907, volume III (3 novembre 1903 – 28 marzo 1905), Roma: Istituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, MMVII (2007), 129, Report of the Italian ambassador in Constantinople, Obizzo Malaspina di Carbonara, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rome, Tommaso Tittoni, Pera, 11 February 1904; Noel Malcolm, *Kosova - një histori e shkurtër*, Prishtinë 2011, 307.

the reforms. Of particular concern to the Albanian population was the reform of the gendarmerie sector, as it was directly linked to their disarmament.¹²

The Albanian insurgent movement did not subside during the summer months of 1904; on the contrary, it expanded across Peja, Gjakova, Prizren, Luma, Drenica, Pristina, Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Novi Pazar, Sjenica and other regions. The *mutasarrıfs* and *kaymakams* found it increasingly difficult to act independently in order to impose effective administrative authority. As the situation deteriorated considerably - particularly in Prizren and Peja - the Ottoman military authorities deployed several battalions in an attempt to restore control; nevertheless, this proved unfeasible without the direct intervention of the provincial governor (*vali*), Shakir Pasha. The principal demands of the Albanians included the repatriation of internees, the release of political prisoners, the removal of foreign generals and police officers from the Kosovo Vilayet, the abolition of newly imposed taxes and the autonomy of Albania. Shakir Pasha was compelled, alongside the use of force, to concede to several of the demands put forward by the thousands of Albanian insurgents, particularly those concerning disarmament and the release of political prisoners who enjoyed broad public support. However, the process of disarmament proved impossible to implement, as the situation remained beyond effective administrative control. Following his visits to Peja and Prizren, Shakir Pasha ultimately authorized only the release of hundreds of political prisoners who had opposed the reforms, suspended several taxes, and concluded agreements with Albanian leaders, who undertook to *exercise their influence in maintaining peace and security* within the Kosovo Vilayet. Judicial, gendarmerie and police reforms were not annulled.¹³ In this context, the Albanian National Movement emerged as a decisive factor in the political developments of the Kosovo Vilayet, shaping internal political dynamics and compelling the Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states to take it into account within the framework of their respective interests in Albanian-inhabited territories.

In this context, the Albanian uprisings that took place in the Kosovo Vilayet between February and September 1904, although neither coherently coordinated nor directed by a single leadership centre, nonetheless conveyed to both the international community and the Ottoman Empire the depth of Albanian concern and anger regarding the reforms and the newly imposed taxes. Beyond the articulation of socio-economic demands, these uprisings increasingly

¹² HHS.A.P.A.A. in *AIHT*, Vj.13-5-518, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 10 April 1904.

¹³ HHS.A.P.A.A. in *PGVK*, 293-299, Reports of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 30 August and 20 September 1904; *Mendimi politik e shoqëror i Rilindjes Kombëtare Shqiptare (Përmbledhje artikujsh nga shtypi)*, Vëllimi I 1879-1908, mbledhur dhe përgatitur për shtyp nga Zihni Haskaj, Tiranë: Universiteti i Tiranës, Instituti i Historisë dhe i Gjuhësisë, 1971, 129; Nuray Bozborra, *Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar në Perandorinë Osmane*, Tiranë 2002, 226; Fahredin Shabani, *Mendimi politik në Rilindjen Kombëtare Shqiptare*, Prishtinë 2011, 286.

assumed the form of political movements with a pronounced national character, openly expressing aspirations for the self-government of Albanian-inhabited territories and their unification into a single territorial and administrative entity within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴

In October 1904, King Peter I Karađorđević of Serbia travelled to Sofia to meet with Prince Ferdinand I of Bulgaria. During their discussions, the Bulgarian prince declared that the Vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica should be granted autonomous status under the designation „Macedonia.” This proposal, however, was unacceptable to the Kingdom of Serbia, which suspected Bulgarian ambitions to subsequently annex these territories. The Serbian side did not conceal its own expansionist aspirations toward Albanian-inhabited regions, including Kosovo.¹⁵ The reaction of Albanian National Renaissance intellectuals living and operating abroad was immediate. In a memorandum addressed to Sultan Abdülhamid II, Ibrahim Temo wrote, among other points, that *the Bulgarian project for the formation of a separate Macedonian province, which would include the Albanian territories of the Vilayets of Monastir and Kosovo, must not be accepted*. Opposing any format or reform project that threatened to re-partition Albanian ethnic territories within the framework of Balkan states or the interests of any of the Great Powers - particularly Russia - Ibrahim Temo reaffirmed the objectives of the Albanian National Renaissance, emphasizing that *we Albanians will organize an independent administration*.¹⁶

The intensification of uprisings in 1905

The insurgent movement in the Kosovo Vilayet remained active throughout 1905, growing stronger and consolidating its political profile. During this year as well, the principal factors that compelled the Albanians to organize armed uprisings were largely the same as those of previous years. Consequently, in February 1905, large numbers of Albanians gathered in Drenica to express their dissatisfaction with the newly introduced fiscal system. They submitted a petition to Sultan Abdülhamid II demanding the annulment of the numerous taxes and fiscal obligations.¹⁷ At the same time, discontent was openly manifested in Peja against the *aşar* (tithe) tax. Armed Albanians appeared in front of the building of the *mutasarrıf*, while a portion of them surrounded the city barracks. However, following the intervention of Ottoman military forces - reinforced by units dispatched from Mitrovica and supported by artillery - the insurgents were forced to disperse.¹⁸ Despite the military intervention of Ottoman troops in both

¹⁴ Gazmend Riza, *Shqipëria e Sipërme 1800-1913*, Prishtinë 2011, 166.

¹⁵ Edith Durham, *Njëzet vjet ngatërresa ballkanike*, Tiranë 2001, 119.

¹⁶ Kristaq Prifti, *Doktor Ibrahim Temo - jeta dhe vepra 1865-1945*, Prishtinë 1996, 195-197.

¹⁷ J. Bajraktari, *Gjakova me rrethinë (1878-1912)*, 207.

¹⁸ Peter Bartl, *Myslimanët shqiptarë në lëvizjen për pavarësi kombëtare (1878-1912)*, Tiranë 2006, 185.

Peja and Drenica, Albanians continued to hold clandestine meetings, during which they discussed their grievances against Ottoman administrative officials and the reforms in the judicial and gendarmerie sectors. In Peja, the movement continued to be led by Sulejman Agha Batusha. Meanwhile, approximately 500-600 Albanians from Drenica proceeded to Vushtrria to stage protests in front of the administrative authorities. The proclamation of reforms in the financial sector likewise constituted a major catalyst for Albanian protests, organizational efforts and continued mobilization.¹⁹

The implementation of administrative reforms and the introduction of new taxes became the primary cause for the renewed organization of Albanian armed resistance in the Sanjak of Prizren, under the leadership of Ramadan Zaskoku. In April 1905, approximately 300 Albanians of Luma advanced toward Prizren and, from Vermica, submitted demands to the Ottoman authorities for the return of Luma inhabitants from exile. The Ottoman military authorities reacted immediately, confronting the Luma insurgents in order to prevent their entry into Prizren. Consequently, on 11-12 April 1905, an armed engagement took place between the two sides, resulting in considerable losses for both. In the weeks that followed, similar armed uprisings occurred in Peja, Gjakova and Podrima.²⁰ In the weeks that followed, similar armed uprisings occurred in Peja, Gjakova and Podrima. At the same time, Albanian armed groups were also active in the Ferizaj district, particularly in Zaskok and Greme. In Zaskok, armed clashes broke out between Albanian insurgents and Ottoman gendarmerie forces. Dissatisfaction among the Albanian population in this district persisted and later manifested itself in Shtime, primarily as a result of unbearable tax burdens.²¹ Albanians regarded the assessment and enforcement of the new taxes and levies as unjust and irresponsible. They declared that *we revolt and rightly protest when we see that these taxes and general state and municipal payments are heavier and greater here than elsewhere since almost nothing is spent locally (in the Kosovo Vilayet) from the revenues collected*. For the aforementioned economic reasons - combined with the use of force, the blockade of towns, the refusal to recognize Albanians as a distinct national element, the absence of national rights, opposition to the autonomy of Albanian - inhabited territories, and the prohibition of schooling in the Albanian language - Albanians stated that *we are preparing, on a much larger scale, a major and well-organized uprising against*

¹⁹ Документи о спољној политички Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књига I, Свеска 3/1 (1/14. јануар - 31. март/13. април 1905. године), Приредила Љиљана Алексић-Пејковић, Београд: Српска Академија и Уметности - Одељење Историјских Наука, 2014, 406-408, Report of the Serbian consul in Pristina, Dr. Miroslav Spalajković, sent to the Serbian Consul General in Skopje, Mihailo Ristić, Pristina, 1/14 March 1905.

²⁰ M. Prenkaj, *Prizreni dhe rrethina në shekullin XIX dhe në fillim të shekullit XX*, 298-299.

²¹ Shaban Hashani, *Ferizaj dhe rrethina 1873-1941 (Vështruar nga pikëpamja historike)*, Ferizaj 1998, 118.

*this administration.*²² In this context, with the aim of preventing the outbreak of further Albanian armed uprisings, Ottoman governmental authorities began to seriously consider the issue of repatriating several prominent Albanian figures of the Kosovo Vilayet who had been sent into exile. Accordingly, by a sultanic decree in 1905, a number of exiles from Prizren, Gjakova and Peja were granted amnesty.²³

The problems generated by internal reactions in Kosovo and other regions, as well as efforts to redefine the reforms in the „three Vilayets of Rumelia,” continued to be discussed at the highest diplomatic forums of the time. Accordingly, on 29-30 April 1905, a meeting was held in Venice, Italy, between the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tommaso Tittoni, and his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski. Among other issues, the discussions focused on the reorganization of financial affairs in the Vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica. In addition, official Rome and Vienna aimed to preserve the *status quo* in these vilayets; failing that, the parties agreed on the application of the *principle of autonomy in the Balkan Peninsula on the basis of nationality*. As allies within the framework of the Triple Alliance, the two sides reached a common understanding that, following the revision and reorganization of the reforms, the Albanian-inhabited territories of these vilayets should be attached to the Vilayets of Janina and Shkodra, thereby forming a single territorial and administrative unit.²⁴

In this regard, according to a report by the British ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Nicholas O’Conor-Don, addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice (Marquess of Lansdowne), on 24 November 1905, Austria-Hungary and Russia were exerting pressure on the Ottoman government because of delays and the lack of tangible results in the implementation of financial administrative reforms in the Vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica. The British ambassador also highlighted the rivalry among the various nationalities composing the population of these vilayets, which frequently resulted in armed conflicts. He emphasized that Austria-Hungary and Russia were categorically opposed to *the efforts of revolutionary groups seeking to perpetuate the disorder prevailing in the three vilayets*. In this context, the objectives of the Albanian political and insurgent movement, which predominated in Kosovo, ran counter to the interests of the Great Powers, who neither tolerated nor supported attempts to disrupt the existing political order in the Balkan Peninsula.²⁵ Consequently, the interventions

²² *Mendimi politik e shoqëror i Rilindjes Kombëtare Shqiptare (Përmbledhje artikujsh nga shtypi)*, Vëllimi I 1879-1908, mbledhur dhe përgatitur për shtyp nga Zihni Haskaj, Tiranë: Universiteti i Tiranës, Instituti i Historisë dhe i Gjuhësise, 1971, 192-193.

²³ Stavro Skendi, *Zgjimi kombëtar shqiptar 1878-1912*, Tiranë 2000, 190.

²⁴ Arben Puto, *Historia diplomatike e çështjes shqiptare 1878-1926*, Tiranë 2010, 60-61.

²⁵ *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. V – The Near East, The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia 1903-1909*, Edited by G. B. Gooch, D. Litt, F. B. A., and Harold Temperley, Litt. D, F. B. A., London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928, 95-

of the Great Powers and neighbouring Balkan states in Albanian-inhabited territories in fact provoked confrontation and exacerbated relations between Muslim and Christian communities.²⁶

In November 1905, the Monastir Committee „Për lirinë e Shqipërisë” („For the freedom of Albania”) was established under the leadership of Bajo Topulli. Among the principal factors leading to its formation were the creation of a central political organization capable of directing the Albanian National Movement, the territorial and national insecurity of Albanian-inhabited lands, the need to consolidate and unify Albanians in the face of contemporary threats, opposition to the implementation of reforms proposed by the Great Powers to the Ottoman Empire in Albanian territories, and the realization of national and political aspirations. According to its program, the Committee aimed to raise national consciousness, promote the civilizational advancement of Albanians, foster unity and brotherhood, open schools, expand education and publish books in the Albanian language, organize Albanian armed groups to liberate the population from Ottoman rule, and disseminate its ideas and program throughout all Albanian-inhabited regions. The Committee also extended its activities into the Kosovo Vilayet, including Skopje, Pristina, Tetovo, Gjakova, Peja and Gjiilan, where it exerted influence on socio-economic developments of a political and insurgent character. The Committee’s representative in the Kosovo Vilayet was Idriz Gjakova, whose mission was to propagate its ideas and establish local branches. As a teacher in Gjakova, he introduced the Albanian language into Ottoman schools, while in Peja the network of sympathizers expanded, promoting the use of Albanian in place of Ottoman Turkish within both administration and education.²⁷ Consequently, these ideas were rapidly embraced by the Albanian National Movement in Kosovo, which assumed new dimensions by organizing armed actions with both economic and political objectives.

Within this framework, the activities of nationalist forces and political activists advocating the Albanian cause were also evident in spreading and proclaiming the idea of an independent Albanian state among the Albanian population in Kosovo. Thus, toward the end of 1905, this mission was undertaken by Hysen Bey, the nephew of Ismail Qemali, who travelled from Montenegro to Prizren and remained there for approximately one month, promoting the idea of Albanian independence. Upon completing this political activity, he returned to Italy.²⁸

In the aftermath of these events, the Sultan’s Palace and the government in Constantinople instructed the highest administrative representatives in the Kosovo Vilayet to preserve calm and to avoid provoking conflicts with the

96, Report of the ambassador of the United Kingdom in Constantinople, Sir Nicholas O’Conor-Don, sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice (Marquess of Lansdowne), Pera, 24 November 1905.

²⁶ Edith Durham, *Shqipëria e Epërme*, Tiranë 2012, 263.

²⁷ Shukri Rahimi, *Gjurmime historike të Rilindjes Kombëtare*, Prishtinë 1986, 203-209, 216.

²⁸ N. Bozborra, *Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar në Perandorinë Osmane*, 229.

Albanians, particularly with their popular leaders. However, it proved impossible to neutralize the role of the Albanian chieftains and the national and political objectives they represented. In this context, at the end of December 1905, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizren, Wenzel Lejhanec, observed: *The fact that the mountain tribe of Bytyçi (12 km west of Gjakova), with a handful of determined men (some 30 individuals), managed to block the road between Prizren and Gjakova for an entire week demonstrates how powerless or unwilling the government is when confronted with the Albanians...*²⁹ Through customary promises, the Sultan's Palace and the government in Constantinople temporarily calmed the situation. Nevertheless, as a result of this policy, Albanian discontent in the Kosovo Vilayet remained persistent and continued to manifest itself actively through political and insurgent activity.

From socio-economic revolts to politically oriented movements

Throughout 1906, Ottoman authority in the Kosovo Vilayet continued to face strong resistance from the Albanian political and insurgent movement. Albanian resistance of a socio-economic character was utilized by clandestine committee networks in order to provide political direction to everyday grievances and demands. Albanians opposed compulsory military service, taxes and levies, and the judicial system, and resisted administrative officials who favored the implementation of the reforms. In February 1906, this movement also spread to the Sanjak of Peja, including the Rugova region, the Highland areas (*Malësia*), and surrounding territories. Thousands of insurgents marched toward Peja, engaging in armed clashes with Ottoman forces in several city neighborhoods and nearby villages, resulting in casualties and wounded on both sides. In addition to *Malësia* and Rugova, insurgents advanced toward Peja from other districts and villages of the Dukagjini Plain. The insurgents were led by Zenel Bey of Peja, Sulejman Agha Batusha, Shaban Binaku and others.

Military reinforcements dispatched from Mitrovica proved ineffective for the Ottoman forces. As a result of ambushes organized by the insurgents, ten Ottoman soldiers were killed, while the insurgents seized substantial quantities of Mauser rifles. This situation compelled the Ottoman divisional commander, Şemsi Pasha, to enter into negotiations with the Albanians and to conclude a ceasefire. As a result of these talks, the *mutasarrıf* of Peja was dismissed.³⁰ Şemsi

²⁹ *HHSt.A.P.A.A.* in *PGVK*, 388, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizren, Wenzel Lejhanec, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Prizren, 24 December 1905.

³⁰ *Документи о спољној политички Краљевине Србије 1903-1914*, Књига II, Свеска 1/I (1/14. јануар - 31. март/13. април 1906), Приредили Љиљана Алексић-Пејковић & Живота Анић, Београд: Српска Академија и Уметности - Одељење Историјских Наука, 2006, 564-569, Report of the Serbian consul in Pristina, Dr. Miroslav Spalajković, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, Vasilije Antoniћ, Pristina, 2/15 March 1906; Murat Ajvazi, *Çëshija shqiptare*

Pasha also agreed to the withdrawal of Ottoman troops and the restoration of order in Peja, as well as to the acceptance of Albanian demands of an economic nature, including a return to the former taxation system-the so-called four principal taxes: the tithe (*aşar*), the *vergi* (house and property tax), the tax on sheep and goats, and obligations related to military position or service. However, he refused to abolish reforms in the judicial sector and to dismiss Christian gendarmes.³¹ The Albanian demands in Peja were also supported by Isa Boletini, who had returned to Kosovo from his exile in Constantinople.³²

In February 1906, Albanians in Mitrovica, openly challenging the authority of the Ottoman government, demanded the removal of the notorious Şemsi Pasha from Mitrovica and Albanian-inhabited territories, refused to pay the unbearable taxes and called for the reorganization of Albanian lands within the framework of an autonomous Albania.³³ In the following month, the population of the Vushtrria district rose up against the enforcement of the livestock tax law. As a result, the Sublime Porte was compelled to suspend the implementation of the new tax legislation in the Vushtrria district.³⁴ At the same time, census and tax-collection officials were expelled from the districts of Pristina and Gjiilan.³⁵ Similarly, in Rožaje, insurgents expressed their opposition to the population census: the marketplace was closed and insurgents positioned themselves in front of the Ottoman administrative building.³⁶ Almost every town and village was subjected to the deployment of military units in an effort to coerce Albanians into paying the new taxes.³⁷

In August 1906, the uprising extended to Drenica, with principal demands including the abolition of taxes for public education, the removal of levies imposed for the purchase of armaments and the opening of schools in the Albanian language. Ottoman military forces commanded by Şemsi Pasha and Hasan Bey employed artillery against the insurgents, resulting in dozens of killed

në shtypin kroat (1881-1912), Prishtinë 2012, 55; Ethem Çeku, *Shqiptarët nën Perandorinë Osmane 1870-1908*, Prishtinë 2019, 368.

³¹ *HHSSt.A.P.A.A. in AIH*, Vj.16-4-578, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 14 March 1906.

³² Fatmira Musaj, *Isa Boletini (1864-1916)*, Tiranë 2015, 49-50; Tafil Boletini, *Kujtime - pranë Isa Boletinit (1892-1916)*, Tiranë 2003, 57.

³³ *HHSSt.A.P.A.A. in PGVK*, 394, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 18 February 1906.

³⁴ F. Musaj, *Isa Boletini (1864-1916)*, 49-50.

³⁵ *HHSSt.A.P.A.A. in PGVK*, 392-393, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 9 January 1906.

³⁶ *HHSSt.A.P.A.A. in AIH*, Vj.16-4-576, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 16 March 1906.

³⁷ Sh. Rahimi, *Gjurmime historike të Rilindjes Kombëtare*, 206.

and wounded.³⁸ The same movement began to spread to the districts of Pristina and Gjiilan, where continuous assemblies were held with the participation of 100-200 armed men.³⁹ Consequently, the Ottoman government's policy of disarming the rural and urban population had largely failed. *In Gjakova, the population remains armed, with the difference that instead of Martini rifles, they now possess Mausers* - observed the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur.⁴⁰

The Albanian National Movement in the Kosovo Vilayet continued to expand daily and to assume broader dimensions, while the Ottoman government persisted in its efforts to collect taxes and levies. Meetings and assemblies among Albanian popular leaders were frequent and ongoing. In February 1907, in Ribar near Lipjan, Albanian leaders from the Pristina district convened and swore a *besa* to resist the payment of taxes and the deployment of Ottoman gendarmes in villages, among other measures.⁴¹ This Albanian movement, despite the exposure and arrest of its propagandists, possessed not only a socio-economic but also a pronounced national character. It spread further to other regions and towns of the Kosovo Vilayet, including Llap, Drenica, Gjiilan, Presheva, Novi Pazar, Kaçanik and Tetova. In these and other locations, clandestine meetings were held during which *besa* pledges were sworn, demands were made for the suspension of taxes and levies, the abandonment of planned reforms and the rejection of Great Power interference in administrative affairs in Albanian-inhabited territories, while developments - particularly from the spring season onward - were anticipated.⁴² Among the prominent leaders of the Kosovo Vilayet who advocated the establishment of a general *besa* were Isa Boletini in Mitrovica and Novi Pazar, Zejnullah Bey in Vushtrria, Drenica and Pristina, Jahja Agha in Prizren and Luma, Sulejman Agha Batusha in Gjakova and Sulejman Kasapi in Peja, among others.⁴³

Within this framework, the Albanian National Movement maintained continuous contacts with representatives of the National Awakening both inside and outside the country. Particularly close ties existed with Albanian intellectuals and National Movement activists in Constantinople, who operated within the so-called „Secret Committee” and maintained links with its organizational structures

³⁸ *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar II*, 319.

³⁹ *HHSSt.A.P.A.A.* in *PGVK*, 460, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 12 September 1906.

⁴⁰ E. Çeku, *Shqiptarët nën Perandorinë Osmane 1870-1908*, 369.

⁴¹ *HHSSt.A.P.A.A.* in *PGVK*, 483, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 12 February 1907.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 485-487, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Skopje, Alfred Rappaport, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 10 March 1907.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, 487-488, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 15 March 1907.

in the Kosovo Vilayet. Through these channels, national ideas were disseminated among the Albanian population, primers, grammars and leaflets in the Albanian language were distributed and special emphasis was placed on the opening of schools offering instruction in Albanian. In this regard, on 30 March 1907, the Italian consul in Skopje, Augusto Stranieri, observed: *In the Kosovo Vilayet, a considerable propaganda effort is underway, as evidenced by the fact that in many towns of the vilayet... unknown individuals are distributing primers, small grammars, and propaganda leaflets even in rural areas.* In this context, support was sought from all social strata and efforts were made to unite them toward the formation of a political-military organization, akin to the League of Prizren, aimed at securing the freedom of Albanian-inhabited territories and at drawing Europe's attention *to understand once and for all that we Albanians constitute a nation in their own right.*⁴⁴ The activity of clandestine groups and committees dedicated to the dissemination of ideas concerning language, culture, education and national consciousness significantly raised the level of political and social awareness among Albanians, fostering a movement toward internal national unity that transcended geographic and religious divisions.

In July 1907, Albanians carried out an attack on the railway station in Lipjan and for a period opened fire on the station building, despite the presence of Ottoman gendarmes.⁴⁵ This insurgent activity also encompassed the regions of Llap and Gallap, concentrating its operations in Podujeva with the aim of opposing the payment of newly imposed taxes. Meanwhile, in Polac, in the Drenica region, on 4 July 1907, a *besa* was sworn, expressing readiness for a general uprising in Kosovo.⁴⁶

„Besa”, Serbian armed bands, and the results of the Albanian National Movement

During 1907, political and national assemblies and demonstrations were held in various centres of the Kosovo Vilayet, expressing protest against Ottoman state policies as well as against the territorial ambitions of the Great Powers and the Balkan states. These mobilizations assumed new dimensions, particularly with regard to the unification of Albanians through the swearing of the *besa*, the resolution of internal disputes, the suppression of blood feuds, and the punishment of those who violated these collective norms. In this context, in October 1907, the Society „Besa” was founded in Prizren. Its primary aim was the protection of Albanian national, political, and economic interests and rights, as well as the struggle against hostile internal and external circles. Among other

⁴⁴ M. Prenkaj, *Prizreni dhe rrethina në shekullin XIX dhe në fillim të shekullit XX*, 302-303.

⁴⁵ *HHS.A.P.A.A.* in *AIH*, Vj.17-7-747, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 12 July 1907.

⁴⁶ Fehmi Pushkolli, *Llapi gjatë historisë*, Prishtinë 1998, 89.

objectives, this political organization did not place its hopes for the resolution of the Albanian national question in the Great Powers or their international forums, such as the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. According to the program of the „Besa” Society, the only path capable of determining the future of the Albanians was armed struggle *for the freedom and unity of the fatherland*.⁴⁷

The International Hague Conference, which convened between June and August 1907 with the participation of the major world and European powers, as well as representatives of the Balkan states, was also addressed by Albanians through memoranda submitted by émigré colonies. These memoranda called upon the Conference to consider Albanian national demands of a political, economic and cultural-educational nature. The Albanians sought recognition of their language and nationality by the Ottoman Empire, administrative autonomy for Albania and international support for their national cause and cultural development. However, these demands were not taken into consideration during the proceedings of the Conference.⁴⁸

Furthermore, throughout the period 1904-1907, the Albanian National Movement in the Kosovo Vilayet faced the activity of dozens of Serbian *chetnik* bands, which often used Albanian national attire as a form of disguise. These bands were deployed to the Kosovo Vilayet under the pretext of protecting the Serbian population from alleged „oppressions” and during these years carried out operations in Skopje (Orman), Kumanova, Kičevo, Mitrovica, Peja⁴⁹, Presheva⁵⁰, Gjilan (Pasjan)⁵¹, Prizren (Hoçë e Madhe)⁵² and other localities.

Despite disagreements within Serbian political and diplomatic circles regarding the activities of Serbian armed bands in the Kosovo Vilayet - considered by some as a misguided and potentially disastrous policy - the Kingdom of Serbia did not abandon its territorial ambitions or its so-called

⁴⁷ *Akte të Rilindjes Kombëtare Shqiptare 1878-1912 (Memorandume, vendime, protesta, thirrje)*, Përgatitur nga Stefanaq Pollo dhe Selami Pulaha, Tiranë 1978, 180-182, Document no. 109, Decision on the establishment of the society “Besa” and a call to fight the enemies by relying on one’s own forces, Prizren, October 1907.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 168-178, Document no.103-106; Kristaq Prifti, *Dervish Hima 1872-1928*, Tiranë 1993, 171-181.

⁴⁹ Shaban Braha, *Gjenocidi serbomadh dhe qëndresa shqiptare (1844-1990)*, Tiranë 1992, 120-122; Zekeria Cana, *Shpallime historike*, Prishtinë 1998, 83-86; B. Dugolli, *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-serbe (1878-1912)*, 236.

⁵⁰ *HHS.A.P.A.A. in AIH*, Vj.13-2-260, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Skopje, Gottlieb Ritter von Pára, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Goluchowski, Skopje, 9 March 1904.

⁵¹ *Документи о спољној политички Краљевине Србије 1903-1914*, Књига II / Додатак 3, Организација Српска одбрана 1907. године, Приредили Љиљана Алексић-Пејковић & Живота Анић, Београд: Српска Академија и Уметности - Одељење Историјских Наука, 2008, 403-410, Telegraphic communications of Nikola Pašić with the head of the Vranje district, 7/20 July 1907.

⁵² M. Prenkaj, *Prizreni dhe rrethina në shekullin XIX dhe në fillim të shekullit XX*, 299.

*practical efforts to restore order and peace in the Kosovo Vilayet.*⁵³ According to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, the clashes between Albanians and Serbian *chetnik* bands constituted *a kind of test of Albanian vigilance* which fully achieved its purpose, since both the conduct of Albanians directly involved in the fighting and the immediate mobilization of the Albanian population clearly demonstrated that, should Serbian bands reappear in these areas, they would encounter resistance entirely different from that faced outside the Kosovo Vilayet. Moreover, the Albanian National Movement in Kosovo adopted a categorical stance toward punishing anyone who provided shelter to Serbian armed bands, explicitly declaring that such individuals' houses would be burned and that they would be expelled beyond the Serbian border.⁵⁴

In view of the negative attitude of the Great Powers toward Albanian demands, the aggression of Serbian and Bulgarian armed bands in the Kosovo Vilayet, and the silence or opposition of the Ottoman government, Albanians escalated their political and insurgent activities. Consequently, by the end of 1907, the active engagement of local committees and Albanian armed groups in the Kosovo Vilayet had expanded significantly. This development did not go unnoticed by foreign diplomatic representatives. The Serbian consul in Pristina, Milovan Milovanović Pećanac, observed that following a state of unrest that had become almost habitual, *a political movement has emerged among the Albanians, causing considerable difficulties for the Porte (the Ottoman government) and for certain foreign representatives.*⁵⁵ Undoubtedly, the activity of the Albanian National Movement - particularly in the temporary stabilization of the political situation, the strengthening of national consciousness, and the unification and preparation of all segments of Albanian society for the future realization of Albanian independence - may be regarded as a major ideological and political achievement.

⁵³ Документи о спољној политички Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књига II, Свеска 3/1 (1/14. јануар - 2/15 април 1907), Приредили Лиљана Алексић-Пејковић, Живота Антић, Београд: Српска Академија и Уметности - Одељење Историјских Наука, 2003, 415-416, Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia sent to the Serbian Consul General in Bucharest, Belgrade, 14/27 February 1907.

⁵⁴ HHS.A.P.A.A. in AIH, Vj.17-7-755, Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, Adolf Ritter von Zambaur, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, Mitrovica, 28 August 1907.

⁵⁵ Документи о спољној политички Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књига II, Свеска 4/I (1/14. јули - 30. септембар/13. октобар 1907), Приредили Лиљана Алексић-Пејковић, Живота Анић, Београд: Српска Академија и Уметности - Одељење Историјских Наука, 2008, 455, Report of Živojin Balugdžić from the Embassy of the Kingdom of Serbia in Constantinople, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, Nikola Pašić, Constantinople, 7/20 September 1907.

Summary

Between 1904 and 1907, the Kosovo Vilayet became one of the principal centres of Albanian political resistance and armed opposition within the Ottoman Empire. This period was marked by a complex interaction between Ottoman reform policies, international pressure from the Great Powers, and the growing national consciousness of the Albanian population. The reforms imposed by the Ottoman authorities - particularly in the fields of taxation, administration, justice, and the reorganization of the gendarmerie - were widely perceived by Albanians as oppressive, economically unsustainable, and politically threatening. Rather than stabilizing the region, these measures provoked persistent unrest and gradually transformed local dissatisfaction into a broader national movement.

The introduction of new and increased taxes, including levies on livestock, households, and income, deeply affected the predominantly agrarian Albanian population. Tax collection was often accompanied by coercion and military force, further alienating local communities from the Ottoman administration. Albanian resistance initially took the form of tax refusal, petitions to the Sultan, and peaceful protests, but rapidly escalated into armed uprisings when Ottoman authorities attempted to enforce reforms through disarmament and compulsory military service. The gendarmerie reform, in particular, was viewed as a direct assault on Albanian autonomy and traditional self-defence structures.

Armed resistance spread throughout the Kosovo Vilayet, encompassing regions such as Peja, Gjakova, Prizren, Drenica, Mitrovica, Pristina, Vushtrria, Gjilan and Novi Pazar. Local Albanian leaders emerged as key figures in organizing resistance, mobilizing thousands of fighters and coordinating actions across different districts. Ottoman officials, including *mutasarrıfs* and *kaymakams*, proved incapable of asserting effective control without extensive military support. Even large-scale deployments of Ottoman troops and artillery, under commanders such as Şemsi Pasha and with the direct involvement of Vali Shakir Pasha, failed to decisively suppress the uprisings. In several instances, Ottoman forces suffered setbacks, communications were disrupted, and negotiations were forced upon the authorities.

Over time, the Albanian movement in Kosovo evolved beyond its initial socio-economic character. By 1905, resistance increasingly adopted a political and national dimension. Alongside demands for the reduction or abolition of taxes, Albanians called for the return of internees, the release of political prisoners, the removal of foreign military and police officers, and the suspension of externally imposed reforms. More significantly, these demands were accompanied by aspirations for administrative autonomy, the unification of Albanian-inhabited territories, and official recognition of Albanian national identity within the Ottoman state. These goals reflected the growing influence of the Albanian National Renaissance (*Rilindja Kombëtare Shqiptare*), which provided ideological direction and organizational support to the movement.

The role of nationalist committees and secret organizations became increasingly important. The establishment of the Monastir Committee „Për lirinë e Shqipërisë” („For the Freedom of Albania”) in late 1905 and its expansion into the Kosovo Vilayet strengthened coordination between political activism and armed resistance. Intellectuals and activists based in Constantinople and in the Albanian diaspora disseminated nationalist ideas, distributed educational materials in the Albanian language, and encouraged the opening of Albanian-language schools. These activities significantly raised national awareness and challenged the cultural and administrative dominance of the Ottoman system.

International developments further complicated the situation. Diplomatic discussions among the Great Powers regarding reforms in the „Three Vilayets of Rumelia” intensified Albanian fears of territorial partition and foreign domination. Proposals for a „Macedonian” autonomous entity that would include Albanian lands were strongly rejected by Albanian leaders and intellectuals, who viewed such plans as a threat to the territorial integrity of Albanian-inhabited regions. Albanian memoranda submitted to international forums, including The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, articulated demands for linguistic, cultural, and administrative rights, but these appeals were largely disregarded.

The Kosovo Vilayet also witnessed increased violence from Serbian and Bulgarian armed bands operating under the guise of protecting their respective national interests. These incursions exacerbated insecurity and intercommunal tensions, prompting Albanian armed groups to organize defensive actions and enforce strict measures against collaborators. The use of the *besa* - a traditional Albanian oath - played a crucial role in unifying communities, suspending internal disputes, and ensuring collective discipline. Political societies such as the „Besa” organization founded in Prizren in 1907 reflected the movement’s growing organizational maturity and its commitment to armed struggle as the primary means of achieving national goals.

By the end of 1907, the Albanian political and insurgent movement in the Kosovo Vilayet had become more coherent, widespread, and ideologically defined. Although it did not achieve immediate autonomy or independence, it succeeded in undermining Ottoman authority, strengthening Albanian national consciousness, and mobilizing broad segments of society across regional, religious, and social divides. These developments laid the groundwork for subsequent uprisings and played a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of the Albanian national struggle, culminating in the declaration of Albanian independence in 1912.

Zaključak

Između 1904. i 1907. godine, Kosovski vilajet postao je jedno od glavnih središta albanskog političkog otpora i oružane opozicije unutar Osmanskog carstva. Ovaj period obilježen je složenom interakcijom između osmanskih

reformskih politika, međunarodnog pritiska velikih sila i rastuće nacionalne svijesti albanskog stanovništva. Reforme koje su nametnule osmanske vlasti - posebno u oblastima oporezivanja, administracije, pravosuđa i reorganizacije žandarmerije - Albanci su uveliko doživljavali kao represivne, ekonomski neodržive i politički prijetelje. Umjesto stabilizacije regije, ove mjere su izazvale trajne nemire i postepeno pretvorile lokalno nezadovoljstvo u širi nacionalni pokret.

Uvođenje novih i povećanih poreza, uključujući namete na stoku, domaćinstva i prihode, duboko je pogodilo pretežno agrarno albansko stanovništvo. Prikupljanje poreza često je bilo praćeno prisilom i vojnom silom, što je dodatno otuđilo lokalne zajednice od osmanske administracije. Albanski otpor se isprva manifestirao kroz odbijanje plaćanja poreza, peticije upućene sultanu i mirne proteste, ali je brzo prerastao u oružane ustanke kada su osmanske vlasti pokušale provesti reforme putem razoružavanja i obavezne vojne službe. Reforma žandarmerije posebno je shvaćena kao direktan napad na albansku autonomiju i tradicionalne strukture samoodbrane.

Oružani otpor se proširio širom Kosovskog vilajeta, obuhvatajući regije poput Peći, Đakovice, Prizrena, Drenice, Mitrovice, Prištine, Vučitrna, Gnjilana i Novog Pazara. Lokalni albanski prvaci pojavili su se kao ključne figure u organiziranju otpora, mobilizirajući hiljade boraca i koordinirajući djelovanja između različitih okruga. Osmanski zvaničnici, uključujući mutasarrife i kajmakame, pokazali su se nesposobnima da uspostave efikasnu kontrolu bez opsežne vojne podrške. Čak ni velike vojne operacije osmanskih trupa i artiljerije, pod zapovjednicima poput Šemsi-paše i uz direktno učešće valije Šakir-paše, nisu uspjele odlučno ugušiti ustanke. U više navrata osmanske snage su pretrpjele poraze, komunikacije su bile prekinute, a vlasti su bile primorane na pregovore.

S vremenom je albanski pokret na Kosovu prerastao svoje početne socio-ekonomske okvire. Do 1905. godine otpor je sve više poprimio političku i nacionalnu dimenziju. Pored zahtjeva za smanjenje ili ukidanje poreza, Albanci su tražili povratak interniranih osoba, oslobađanje političkih zatvorenika, uklanjanje stranih vojnih i policijskih službenika te obustavu spolja nametnutih reformi. Još značajnije, ovi zahtjevi bili su praćeni težnjama za administrativnom autonomijom, ujedinjenjem teritorija naseljenih Albancima i zvaničnim priznanjem albanskog nacionalnog identiteta unutar osmanske države. Ovi ciljevi odražavali su rastući utjecaj Albanskog nacionalnog preporoda (Rilindja Kombëtare Shqiptare), koji je pokretu pružio ideološki pravac i organizacionu podršku.

Uloga nacionalističkih komiteta i tajnih organizacija postajala je sve važnija. Osnivanje Monastirskog komiteta „Për lirinë e Shqipërisë“ („Za slobodu Albanije“) krajem 1905. godine i njegovo širenje na Kosovski vilajet ojačali su koordinaciju između političkog aktivizma i oružanog otpora. Intelektualci i aktivisti sa sjedištem u Constantinople i u albanskoj dijaspori širili su nacionalističke ideje, distribuirali obrazovne materijale na albanskom jeziku i

poticali otvaranje škola na albanskom jeziku. Ove aktivnosti su značajno podigle nacionalnu svijest i dovele u pitanje kulturnu i administrativnu dominaciju osmanskog sistema.

Međunarodni razvoj događaja dodatno je zakomplicirao situaciju. Diplomatske rasprave među velikim silama o reformama u „Tri vilajeta Rumelije“ pojačale su albanske strahove od teritorijalne podjele i strane dominacije. Prijedlozi za stvaranje autonomne „makedonske“ jedinice koja bi uključivala albanske zemlje snažno su odbacivani od strane albanskih vođa i intelektualaca, koji su takve planove smatrali prijetnjom teritorijalnom integritetu područja naseljenih Albancima. Albanski memorandumi podneseni međunarodnim forumima, uključujući Hašku mirovnu konferenciju 1907. godine, iznosili su zahtjeve za jezička, kulturna i administrativna prava, ali su ti apeli uglavnom ignorirani.

Kosovski vilajet je također svjedočio povećanom nasilju od strane srpskih i bugarskih oružanih četa koje su djelovale pod izgovorom zaštite vlastitih nacionalnih interesa. Ovi upadi su dodatno pogoršali nesigurnost i međunacionalne tenzije, potičući albanske oružane grupe da organiziraju odbrambene akcije i uvedu stroge mjere protiv saradnika. Upotreba bese - tradicionalne albanske zakletve - imala je ključnu ulogu u ujedinjavanju zajednica, suspendiranju unutrašnjih sukoba i osiguravanju kolektivne discipline. Politička društva poput organizacije „Besa“, osnovane u Prizrenu 1907. godine, odražavala su rastuću organizacijsku zrelost pokreta i njegovu posvećenost oružanoj borbi kao glavnom sredstvu za ostvarenje nacionalnih ciljeva.

Do kraja 1907. godine, albanski politički i pobunjenički pokret u Kosovskom vilajetu postao je koherentniji, rašireniji i ideološki jasnije definiran. Iako nije odmah ostvario autonomiju ili nezavisnost, uspio je potkopati osmansku vlast, ojačati albansku nacionalnu svijest i mobilizirati široke slojeve društva preko regionalnih, vjerskih i društvenih podjela. Ovi događaji postavili su temelje za kasnije ustanke i odigrali presudnu ulogu u oblikovanju toka albanske nacionalne borbe, koja je kulminirala proglašenjem albanske nezavisnosti 1912. godine.

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RUSKI CILJEVI U PRVOM SVJETSKOM RATU: PUTEVI PREMA ISTANBULU I BALKANSKE STRANPUTICE

Apstrakt: Status crnomorskih moreuza (Bosfor i Dardaneli) bio je višestoljetni, sastavni dio Istočnog pitanja. Početkom XX stoljeća u ruskom političkom fokusu bile su sudbine tih moreuza i balkanskih pravoslavnih država. Njihovo radikalno rješenje, pokazuje obimna literatura, povezivano je sa slomom Osmanskog carstva. Kada bi u tom carstvu, izbili nemiri, Rusija je procjenjivala mogućnosti za novi rat da bi se osvojio Istanbul i oslobodila “braća u vjeri koja su stenjala u turskom ropstvu”. Publicist Ivan Solonevič uspoređivao je svojedobno rusku stoljetnu težnju za osvajanjem Istanbula s “geološkim procesom”, sporim, ali neizbježnim. Velikoimperijalne pretenzije ipak nisu bile u skladu s ruskim stvarnim mogućnostima. Rusija je često stajala na vratima Istanbula, ali se to, pod pritiskom drugih sila, nije završilo ulaskom njene vojske u taj grad. Činilo se da je Prvi svjetski rat bio, iz ruskog ugla, predodređen za ispunjenje davnašnjih ciljeva Petrograda i okončanje priča o “bolesniku na Bosforu”. Razvijali su se grandiozni projekti. Rusija, jedina pravoslavna monarhija, zamišljena je kao središte cijelog pravoslavnog svijeta. Time se trebala ostvariti ideja o obnovi bizantske ekumene, zajednice pravoslavnih država na čelu s ruskim carem. Osvajanje Istanbula zamišljeno je kao stvar bliske budućnosti. Iz različitih perspektiva te su projekte razvijali političari i diplomati, generali, filozofi, publicisti i historičari. Rusija je ušla u rat 1914. pod lozinkom “opšteg slavenskog i religioznog jedinstva” i zaštite pravoslavne “balkanske braće”. Dok su vatreni govori političara i narodni entuzijazam ostajali na površini, razrađivane su vojne pripreme za iskrcavanje. Glavna misao ruskog cara bila je ona “o zauzimanju Dardanela i Konstantinopolja”, osnovnog preduslova za dalju rusku privrednu i političku ekspanziju. Izbijanjem svjetskog rata, snovi o svijetloj budućnosti i ideje o panslavenskoj državi s Carigradom kao glavnim gradom, su se učvrstili. Ruska diplomacija je pregovarala sa britanskim i francuskim saveznicima o planiranoj podjeli Osmanskog carstva.

Cilj Rusije bio je domoći se Istanbula i okolnih područja uz obale Bosfora. Time bi se postigao dugogodišnji ruski cilj: osiguranje sigurnosti južnih granica Rusije i oslobađanje levantinske trgovine. To je bio predmet pregovora između ruskog ministra spoljnih poslova Sazonova i britanskih i francuskih ministara 1914. i početkom 1915. godine. Da je nastala panslavenska konfederacija, njena bi uprava bila u rukama Rusije. Dominacija nad Bosforom i Dardanelima otvarala je vrata uticaju Rusije u crnomorskim i sredozemnim bazenima, ona bi postala izvor superiornosti nad balkanskim svijetom i zapadnom Azijom. U planovima ruskog vodstva, osvajanje Istanbula i moreuza je trebao biti početak dominacije na Bliskom istoku i preuzimanja vlasti na Sredozemlju. Događaji su se, ipak, odvijali mimo ruskih planova. Prvi svjetski rat označio je kraj prisustva starih imperija na Balkanu. Vojnici carske Rusije će ući u Istanbul, ali tek nakon okončanja svjetskog sukoba, kao izbjeglice iz vlastite zemlje, poražena strana u građanskom ratu (1918-1922) do koga je došlo nakon izbijanja boljševičke revolucije 1917. godine. Dio ruskih emigranata – civila i nekadašnjih vojnika, došao je i na Balkan koji je u poratnom vremenu dobio drugačiju političku fizionomiju od one koju je 1914. priželjkivala carska vlada u Petrogradu.

Ključne riječi: Prvi svjetski rat, Rusija, Osmansko carstvo, Istočno pitanje, politika, Istanbul, Bosfor i Dardaneli, Balkan.

RUSSIA'S WAR AIMS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR: THE ROUTES TO ISTANBUL AND BALKAN BLIND ALLEYS

Abstract: *The status of the Black Sea Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) was a centuries-long, integral part of the Eastern Question. At the beginning of the 20th century, the fates of these straits and the Balkan Orthodox states were at the center of Russian political focus. Extensive literature shows that their radical resolution was linked to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Whenever unrest broke out in that empire, Russia would assess the possibilities of a new war to conquer Istanbul and liberate the 'brothers in faith groaning under Turkish servitude.' The publicist Ivan Solonevich once compared Russia's centuries-long aspiration to conquer Istanbul to a 'geological process'—slow but inevitable. However, these grand imperial pretensions did not align with Russia's actual capabilities. Russia often stood at the gates of Istanbul, but under pressure from other powers, this never resulted in its army entering the city.*

From the Russian perspective, the First World War seemed destined to fulfill Petrograd's long-standing goals and bring an end to the story of the 'sick man on the Bosphorus.' Grandiose projects were being developed. Russia, the only Orthodox monarchy, was envisioned as the center of the entire Orthodox world. This was meant to realize the idea of restoring the Byzantine ecumene, a community of Orthodox states led by the Russian Tsar. The conquest of Istanbul was envisioned as a matter of the near future. These projects were developed

from various perspectives by politicians, diplomats, generals, philosophers, publicists, and historians. Russia entered the war in 1914 under the slogan of 'general Slavic and religious unity' and the protection of its Orthodox 'Balkan brothers.' While the fiery speeches of politicians and popular enthusiasm remained on the surface, military preparations for a landing were being worked out. The Russian Tsar's primary thought was that 'on the occupation of the Dardanelles and Constantinople,' which was seen as a fundamental prerequisite for further Russian economic and political expansion.

With the outbreak of the world war, dreams of a bright future and ideas of a Pan-Slavic state with Constantinople as its capital grew stronger. Russian diplomacy negotiated with its British and French allies over the planned partition of the Ottoman Empire. Russia's goal was to gain possession of Istanbul and the surrounding areas along the shores of the Bosphorus. This would achieve a long-standing Russian objective: ensuring the security of Russia's southern borders and liberating Levantine trade. This was the subject of negotiations between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, and the British and French ministers in 1914 and early 1915. Had a Pan-Slavic confederation been established, its administration would have been in Russia's hands. Dominance over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles opened the door to Russian influence in the Black Sea and Mediterranean basins, becoming a source of superiority over the Balkan world and Western Asia. In the plans of the Russian leadership, the conquest of Istanbul and the Straits was meant to be the beginning of dominance in the Middle East and the assertion of power in the Mediterranean.

However, events unfolded contrary to Russian plans. The First World War marked the end of the old empires' presence in the Balkans. Soldiers of Imperial Russia would enter Istanbul, but only after the end of the global conflict—as refugees from their own country, the defeated side in the civil war (1918–1922) that followed the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Some of the Russian emigrants—both civilians and former soldiers—also arrived in the Balkans, which in the postwar era assumed a different political landscape than the one desired by the Tsarist government in Petrograd in 1914.

Key words: *First World War, Russia, Ottoman Empire, Eastern Question, politics, Istanbul, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the Balkans.*

Evropa je pred rat 1914. bila militarizirana. Izbijanje svjetskog sukoba bilo je, piše Kristofer Klark (Christopher Clark), “vrhunac lanca odluka što su ih donijeli politički akteri koji su imali svjesno određene ciljeve”. Svaka je strana bila spremna optužiti drugu za agresivne namjere, predstaviti se kao žrtva koja se brani.¹ U Rusiji, Njemačkoj, Austro-Ugarskoj, Britaniji i Francuskoj, vojska je ostala podložna političkim i strateškim ciljevima državnog vrha.² Vladajući interesi svake države tokom tog rata nisu proizvod momenta, mahom su nasljeđeni, “imaju svoj istorijski izvor i tok, a zgusnuti su i iskazani u ratnim ciljevima u formulaciji gospodstvujuće klase i vlade”. Sam rat često teče mimo želje njegovih učesnika i donosi neželjene posljedice.³ Kad je rat započeo svi su zdušno bili za, iako je umijeće bilo ukloniti uzroke sukoba.⁴ Formulacija o „Moskvi kao Trećem Rimu” bila je politički program Rusije.⁵ Fragmentarni Balkan smatrala je idealnim prostorom za jačanje svoga uticaja.⁶ Car Nikolaj II nakon atentata u Sarajevu (rus. Сараевское убийство) i izbijanja političke krize, govori da Rusija “ни в коем случае не останется равнодушной к судьбе Сербии”.⁷ Ustvrdio je i da je opšti odnos snaga povoljan za rješavanje glavnog spoljopolitičkog zadatka Rusije: zauzimanje Istanbula (rus. naziv: Царьград, Константинополь) i moreuza.⁸ Uticaj slavenofilske tradicije, koja je crnomorski smjer i borbu za moreuze smatrala strateškim prioritetom Rusije, bio je jasno

¹ В. Д. Ермаков, Ужасно несуразный случай на Балканах: к 100-летию начала Первой мировой войны (1914–1918 гг.), *Вестник Санкт-Петербургского государственного института культуры*, № 3, Санкт-Петербург 2014, 180.

² Ch. Clark, *Mjesečari: kako je Europa krenula u rat 1914*, Zagreb 2018, 222.

³ Opšir. N. Popović, *Odnosi Srbije i Rusije u Prvom svjetskom ratu 1914–1918*, Beograd 2024.

⁴ D. Rudolf, Lekcije Prvoga svjetskoga rata: uz stotu obljetnicu Prvoga svjetskog rata 1914–1918. i dvjestotu Bečkoga kongresa 1814, *Adrias*, sv. 20, Split 2014, 107–108.

⁵ Metaforično, sukob Rusije i Nemačke koji se očekivao, bio je među ruskim intelektualcima određen terminima „mač” i „krst”. „Mač” je predstavljao ambicioznu moć njemačkog Rajha, a termin „krst” predstavljao je smjernost, pravdoljubivost i saosjećanje sa sunarodnicima i slavenskim narodima – S. Marković, „Krst” protiv „mača”. Rusija, intelektualci i nacionalna ideja 1914, *Sociološki pregled*, br. 3, Beograd 2017, 396–397.

⁶ Lj. Dimić, Srbija i Prvi svjetski rat – protivrečnosti epohe i uzroci sukoba, u: *Srbija i geopolitičke prilike u Evropi 1914. godine*, Lajkovac-Beograd 2015, 17. Balkan je specifičan po tome što je jedino na njemu još od 30-tih godina XIX stoljeća, zaključno s Prvim svjetskim ratom, došlo do usitnjavanja političkog prostora. Male države nisu bile dovoljno moćne da svoje teritorijalne ambicije ostvare bez pomoći velikih sila, tako da je i njihova sposobnost da očuvaju plodove svoje ekspanzije ovisila od podrške tih istih sila – a ona je bila varljiva – V. Trapara, Ofanzivni realizam i male države: slučaj Balkana u Prvom svjetskom ratu, *Politeia*, br. 8, Banjaluka 2014, 245–247.

⁷ В. И. Косик, Балканы, В. Н. Штрэндман и Первая мировая война, *Istorijski zapisi*, br. 3–4, Podgorica 2014, 89.

⁸ Za Rusiju su balkanski ratovi pokazali da se njen prastari cilj (zauzimanje Istanbula i moreuza) može ostvariti samo u okviru opšteevropskog rata. Car je govorio da priznaie «только одно решение этого вопроса; присоединение обоих проливов» – А. В. Игнатъев, Последний царь и внешняя политика, *Вопросы истории*, № 6, Москва 2001, 16.

vidljiv.⁹ Kako je primijetio epigon kasnog slavenofilstva, Danilevski (Николай Я. Данилевский): „Samo Crno more može Rusiji dati snagu i uticaj na morima”.¹⁰ Podrazumijevalo se da će to osigurati i određeni uticaj na zemlje Istoka. Dugotrajni ruski ciljevi vezani za Bosfor i Dardanele izazivali su zabrinutost Velike Britanije, najjače pomorske sile tog vremena. Kao što je 1892. zapazio budući klasik pomorske historije Mahan (Alfred Thayer Mahan): „Teško je zamisliti veću pretnju za pomorsku silu od one od zauzimanja pozicija na Crnom moru od strane energične države, koja je tako blizu velikom svetskom putu ka istoku, i njenog zauzimanja neosvojivog ulaza u to more”.¹¹ Mekmekin (Sean McMeekin) iznosi da je višestoljetni cilj Petrograda bio ruska kontrola nad Istanbulom i moreuzima. Ona se mogla ostvariti samo kroz uništenje Osmanskog carstva i preuzimanje moreuza: „Rusija je stotinama godina unazad koristila svaku priliku da bi došla do ostvarenja tog svog cilja”.¹² Kao snažnoj crnomorskoj državi to je more njoj postalo tijesno.¹³ General Palicin (Фёдор Ф. Палицын) je 1908. bio jasan: „Treba nam Bosfor. Njegovim osvajanjem riješićemo naš odbrambeni problem: prebacićemo odbranu crnomorske obale na jednu točku”. Ministar inostranih poslova Sazonov (Сергей Д. Сазонов), obrazlažući značaj ruske politike u regionu moreuza, piše 23. novembra 1913 caru: „Onaj koji vlada moreuzima posjeduje ključ za prodor u Malu Aziju i

⁹ Ruski filozofi su ukazivali da je pravoslavlje religiozni istočnik ruske ideje, a njen rast je i rast same Rusije - N. Popović, *Ruska ideja, Istorija 20. veka*, br. 2, Beograd 1994, 16.

¹⁰ *Европа и Россия в огне Первой мировой войны. К 100-летию начала войны*, Москва 2014, 88. „Štiteći svoje imperijalističke interese na Balkanu, u centralnoj Evropi i u Aziji”, Rusija “nije mogla dopustiti 'beskrvnu pobjedu' sila Centralne koalicije i nepromišljeno se odlučila na vojnu avanturu” – J. A. Pisarev, Sarajevo, julska kriza 1914. i ruska diplomatija, *Istorijski zapisi*, br. 3-4, Titograd 1974, 358.

¹¹ O. R. Ajrapetov, *Spoljna politika Ruske imperije 1801–1914*, II, Višegrad 2023, 421. Historijat planova osvajanja Bosfora pokazuje imperijalističku prirodu Rusije. Ideologija izgrađena na teoriji “Moskve kao Trećeg Rima” i tradiciji politike omogućila je militaristima da ostvare uticaj na cara - M. A. Фельдман, *Между войнами: восточная политика России глазами историка-фронтовика, Уральское востоковедение*, вып. 6, Екатеринбург 2015, 11.

¹² A. Rastović, *Srbi, Rusi i Prvi svetski rat – jedan primer revizije istorije*, *Istorijski časopis*, knj. LXIV, Beograd 2015, 365. M. Radivojević, *Veliki pokrovitelj i „pravi” saveznik: odnosi Srbije i Rusije 1913–1918*, Novi Sad-Beograd 2024, 15. Načelnik Crnomorskog operativnog sektora Mornaričkog generalštaba, Njomic (Александр В. Нёмитц), iznosi u februaru 1914: da Rusija na putu ka moreuzima “ima ozbiljne neprijatelje ne samo od strane Nemačke i Austrije. Ma koliko da su uspešne naše akcije na zapadnom frontu, one nam neće dati moreuze i Carigrad. Njih mogu zauzeti tuđe mornarice i vojske, dok traje borba na našoj zapadnoj granici (...) jedino što možemo je da zauzmemo Carigrad i moreuze uz pomoć naše vojske, da naše osvajanje ovih tačaka u trenutku mirovnih pregovora bude svršen čin” – A. Timofejev, *Balkan i rusko-srpski odnosi u Prvom svetskom ratu 1914–1917*, u: *Godine koje su promenile svet: Prvi svetski rat u istoriji i istoriografiji*, Višegrad 2019, 152.

¹³ В. Э. Молодяков, *Первая мировая: война, которой могло не быть*, Москва 2012, 65-66.

hegemoniju na Balkanu”.¹⁴ Ton ruskoj državnoj propagandi dao je manifest cara Nikolaja II od 1. augusta o objavi rata Njemačkoj, koji je proklamirao jedinstvo slavenskih naroda pred neprijateljem (“prateći svoje historijske zavjete, Rusija, ujedinjena u vjeri i krvi sa slavenskim narodima”). Vjerski motivi hrišćanskog jedinstva služili su zadatku nacionalne solidarnosti i mobilizacije. Prikazujući rusku vojsku kao “hristoljubivu vojsku” koja se bori za svetu stvar, vladini propagandisti nisu uzimali u obzir misli i vjerske osjećaje muslimana u Rusiji.¹⁵ Muslimanofobična kampanja, bazirana na antiosmanskim osjećajima, započela je nakon ulaska u oktobru mjesecu Osmanskog carstva u rat.¹⁶ Sve je to izazvalo zabrinutost muslimanskih zajednica.¹⁷ Rusko društvo je zahvatao patriotski zanos. Samo 4% vojnih obveznika u prvom mobilizacijskom talasu nije na vrijeme stiglo na mjesto registracije.¹⁸ Osmanski ulazak u rat zakomplicirao je položaj Rusije. Zbog zatvaranja moreuza izolirana je od saveznika. Uz nestašicu oružja i municije, postavljalo se i pitanje njene sigurnosti na Crnom moru. To je bila i prilika za vojno rješavanje pitanja moreuza.¹⁹ Postojala su mišljenja da bi

¹⁴ Bosfor i Dardaneli imali su poseban vojno-strategijski značaj za Rusiju. Zaklanjali su 2.100 km nezaštićene ruske obalske granice i istovremeno služili kao vrata za izlazak njene vojnomorske flote u Sredozemno more. „Moja misao je uvijek bila: Moreuzi!” - saopštavao je car Nikolaj II nekim britanskim diplomatama - J. A. Pisarev, Problem crnomorskih moreuza i Rusija uoči Prvog svjetskog rata, *Istorijski zapisi*, br. 4, Titograd 1986, 158-159.

¹⁵ Nakon što je Osmansko carstvo ušlo u rat na strani Centralnih sila, ideja slavenskog bratstva transformirana je u parole za rat hrišćana protiv muslimana. Isticani su hrišćanski simboli uz istovremenu zabranu muslimanskih. Vjersko-militaristička mobilizacija teško da je mogla pridonijeti porastu patriotizma među muslimanima u Rusiji. Krajem 1914. prvi osmanski ratni zarobljenici pojavili su se na ruskoj teritoriji. Njihov broj varirao je od 50.000 do 65.000 ljudi. Zbog straha od širenja panislamizma, vlasti su ih nastojale rasporediti u krajeve bez muslimana. Većina tih zarobljenika bila je prisiljena “postojano” izdržati sibirске mrazeve. Stopa smrtnosti među njima bila je visoka. Početkom 1916. policija je poduzela istragu o djelovanju “tatarsko-kurske organizacije” koja je navodno pripremala bijeg osmanskih zarobljenika iz Rusije. Osim izoliranih incidenata bijega, nikakva mreža nije identificirana, niti su policijski službenici uspjeli prikupiti dovoljno dokaza o tatarskom antipatriotizmu - Д. Усманова, Российские мусульмане и пропаганда в годы Первой мировой войны (1914–1916 гг.), *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Tomus 37, Sapporo 2016, 81, 100.

¹⁶ И. К. Богомолов, Большой человек на тонущем корабле: образ Турции в российской печати времен Первой мировой войны, *Имагология и компаративистика*, № 18, Томск 2022, 323-345.

¹⁷ Muslimanska javnost reagirala je na propagandu vlasti, veličanje pravoslavne vjere, slavenskog jedinstva, posebne misije ruskog naroda, njegove nadmoći, koja je sve više poistovjećivala patriotizam isključivo s pravoslavnom državom i ruskim carem – С. М. Исхаков, Мировая война и мусульманская общественность в России, *Вестник Тверского государственного университета, Серия История*, № 4, Тверь 2014, 29.

¹⁸ А. В. Олейников, О целях России в Первой мировой войне, *Caspium Securitatis*, № 3, Астрахань 2023, 75-79.

¹⁹ А. В. Никитина, Восточный вопрос в дипломатических переговорах между Россией и Антантой в годы Первой мировой войны, у: *Исторические и политические исследования в XXI веке: трансформация человека, сообществ, государств*, Томск 2022, 203. S druge strane,

njihovo zauzimanje dovelo do bržeg osmanskog sloma, te bi označilo radikalnu prekretnicu u ratu u korist Antante.²⁰

Rat 1914. nije izbio igrom slučaja na Balkanu. Postojali su za to brojni razlozi.²¹ Multiperspektivno poznavanje svjetske/evropske historije bitno je za shvatanje kompleksnih procesa, za stavljanje nacionalne i balkanske historije u širi kontekst.²² Početkom 1914. Rusija je bila spremna za vojnu akciju u trajanju od četiri do šest mjeseci. Za mobilizaciju njene javnosti bila je nužna motivirajuća ideja. Njemačka prijetnja probudila je društveni instinkt za samoodržanjem. Drugi poticaj za borbu je odbrana pravoslavne Srbije.²³ Rusija je 1914. postala de facto jamac nezavisnosti te države.²⁴ Rusija je željela ojačati svoje pozicije u evropskom i evroazijskom prostoru.²⁵ Religijski filozofi vjerovali su da ona "ima određenu religijsku misiju ne samo da poraziti Njemačku, već i da obnovi hrišćanske korijene evropske civilizacije". U historiji nacije i države postoji ciljevi kojima se stalno teži. Jedan od takvih ruskih ciljeva su Istanbul i osmanski moreuzi (Bosfor i Dardaneli). To je središnja tačka ruske spoljne politike nakon poraza u ratu s Japanom (1904-1905) i gubitka nade u

"из участия в войне Турции России удалось извлечь большую выгоду: она поставила на очередь разрешение своей исторической задачи по овладению проливами и занятию Великой Армении" – Д. Д. Оболенский, Император Николай II и его царствование (1894–1917): По материалам, собранным Старым профессором, у: *Николай II: pro et contra*, Санкт-Петербург 2019, 250.

²⁰ Ruski vojni vrh je smatrao da će rat biti odlučan na kopnu, porazom Njemačke i Austro-Ugarske. Raspoređivanje značajnijih snaga za operaciju na perifernom području, poput moreuza, bilo je u drugom planu - К. Б. Назаренко, Русский флот и Черноморские проливы во время Первой мировой войны, у: *Межевззовская научная конференция «Россия в Первой мировой войне: проблемы истории и историографии»*, Санкт-Петербург 2015, 64.

²¹ O. Janc, *14. Veliki rat*, Novi Sad-Beograd 2014, 6.

²² Opšir. В. П. Любин, Современная историография Первой мировой войны, *Известия Уральского федерального университета*, № 4(134), Екатеринбург 2014, 6-19. Neki ruski historičari smatraju da se ruska slavistika i balkanistika sa svojim postignućima nalaze na "передовых рубежах мировой науки"- П. А. Искендеров, Изучение истории Балкан на современном этапе: новые «вызовы» и подходы, у: *Славяне и Россия: Историческое славяноведение и балканистика*, Москва 2023, 371.

²³ Н. Н. Головин, *Россия в Первой мировой войне*, Москва 2014, 386-387. U austrijskoj historiografiji kao glavni razlog rata Austro-Ugarske protiv Srbije navodi se postojanje straha od Srbije, a preko Srbije – i od Rusije – V. Kazimirović, *Srbija i Jugoslavija 1914-1945*, I, Novi Sad 2022, 16.

²⁴ Я. В. Вишняков, *Российская дипломатия на Балканах в 1914–1916 гг.*, <https://history.milportal.ru/rossijskaya-diplomatiya-na-balkanax-v-1914-1916-gg/>.

²⁵ Opšir. S. Živanov, *Rusija u međunarodnim krizama (1908-1914)*, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, br. 73, Novi Sad 2006, 89-139. Balkan je Rusija tretirala kao jedan od najvažnijih geopolitičkih poligona za izgradnju zajedničkog sistema odnosa u Evropi - П. А. Искендеров, Политика России на Балканах накануне Первой мировой войны: ключевые аспекты проблемы, у: *Славяне и Россия. Россия: взгляд на Балканы. XVIII–XXI вв.*, Москва 2021, 371.

vodeću ulogu na Dalekom istoku.²⁶ Bjukenen (George W. Buchanan), britanski ambasador u Petrogradu ističe da je Rusija pronašla svrhu u svjetskom ratu: “Potreba za slobodnim pristupom moru postala je očita ruskom društvu, a njegov pogled okrenuo se prema Carigradu kao najvećem trofeju rata”.²⁷ Državna Duma se radovala poput djece pri samoj pomisli da će Istanbul biti ruski.²⁸ Rusija je iskazala upornost u pregovorima sa saveznicima o statusu moreuza i Istanbula. Osim strateških i ekonomskih aspekata, postojao je i sakralni faktor vezan za Istanbul.²⁹ Misao o zauzimanju moreuza bila je stalno prisutna kod Nikolaja II.³⁰ Još prije osmanskog ulaska u rat, ukazivao je francuskom ambasadoru Paleologu (Maurice Paleologue: “Ovaj rat će za nas biti besmislen ako nam ne osigura Carigrad i moreuze. Carigrad mora biti naš i samo naš”).³¹ Car je 1916. govorio: “Moramo završiti s Turskom; mjesto joj nije u Evropi”.³²

Rusija se pozicionirala kao “slavensko carstvo” po sastavu stanovništva i “ideološki” što je odbrani Srbije od austrougarske agresije dalo pragmatičan karakter. To je nalagao interes Petrograda za stvaranjem snažne prorúske srpske

²⁶ V. Britanija i Francuska nisu htjele da Istanbul i moreuzi padnu u ruske ruke. Iskoristile su ovu rusku opsjenu kaoamac. Borba s Njemačkom ne bi mogla biti moguća bez osiguravanja “tona ljudskog mesa” koje je Rusija imala na raspolaganju - Э. Д. ГРИММ, Политическая обстановка военных операций для захвата Константинополя и Проливов, 1915—1917 гг, в: *Константинополь и проливы: по секретным документам бывшего министерства иностранных дел*, ред. Е. А. Адамова, т. II, Москва 1926, 110; Д. А. Самородов, Россия в Первой мировой войне: была ли возможна победа?, *Царскосельские чтения*, т. 1, вып. XVIII, Санкт-Петербург 2014, 95.

²⁷ Ю. В. Лунева, Чей Константинополь? Споры о судьбе Османской империи в российских изданиях в эпоху Первой мировой войны, в: *Русская публицистика и периодика эпохи Первой мировой войны: поэтика и политика*, Москва 2013, 83. Drugačije planove britanskog imperijalizma otkrivao je publicista Džon Baker (James E. Barker). „Balkan i Mala Azija” - tvrdio je on, „najvažnija su strategijska pozicija u svijetu. Oni su, sami po sebi, jezgro i centar Staroga svijeta, razdvajaju i istovremeno spajaju tri kontinenta: Evropu, Aziju i Afriku. Balkan i Tursku Engleska može koristiti za vođenje rata, a takođe i za trgovinu. Oni se nalaze u regionu iz koga je moguće ugrožavati i voditi operacije protiv tri kontinenta” – J. A. Pisarev, *Problem crnomorskih moreuza i Rusija uoči Prvog svjetskog rata*, 160.

²⁸ Дж. Бьюкенен, *Мемуары дипломата*, Москва 1925, 147.

²⁹ В. Э. Молодяков, *Первая мировая: война, которой могло не быть*, 65-66; Е. И. Темчук, Российская дипломатия в борьбе за национальные интересы в годы Первой мировой войны, *Известия Алтайского государственного университета*, № 6(128), Барнаул 2022, 40.

³⁰ Nije ga nikad napuštala misao osvajanja «одновременно Босфором и Дарданеллами», da je to «дело нескольких часов». Držao se principa da Rusija mora pojačati uticaj na Bliskom, Srednjem i Dalekom istoku i da je car Nikolaj I bio u pravu kada je rekao da tamo “gdje ruska noga stane, ne treba odatle ići” – opšir. Б. В. Ананьич-Р. Ш. Ганелин, Николай II, *Вопросы истории*, № 2, Москва 1993, 58–76.

³¹ Е. Д. Зайцев, Эволюция идеи Константинополя и проливов в период I мировой войны ((по воспоминаниям французского посла М. Палеолога и английского посла Д. Бьюкенена), *Студенческий электронный журнал «СтРИЖ»*, № 6(47), Волгоград 2022, 39.

³² П. Н. Милуков, *Воспоминания*, Москва 1991, 306.

države, što se u uslovima rata moglo postići otimanjem Bosne i Hercegovine, Dalmacije i Banata (Vojvodine) od Austro-Ugarske.³³ U ruskom ministarstvu spoljnih poslova u novembru 1914. zaključeno je da Srbija treba da dobije Bosnu i Hercegovinu i dio Dalmacije do Splita.³⁴ Rusija je “garantirala” Srbiji ovo proširenje.³⁵ Ministar Sazonov je u intervjuu italijanskom listu “Corriere della Sera” 30. decembra izjavio da Srbi imaju pravo na ujedinjenje i izlaz na more, kao „drugi srećniji narodi Evrope”. Dalmacija, “skroz naseljena Srbima”, prema njemu je do „turske najeзде bila sastavni deo srpske države”. U buduće srpsko kraljevstvo trebalo je da uđu Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Dalmacija, dok je sudbinu Hrvatske trebala da odredi volja njenog stanovništva. Ako se ona „ujedini sa srpskim zemljama”, uvjeravao je da Italija nema razloga da se plaši novog susjeda. Neke ruske diplomate su izražavale bojazan da Srpska pravoslavna crkva nije pripremljena za suočavanje „s militantnim i spremnim katolicizmom” i tvrdile da je nemoguće reći u šta bi se pretvorila Srbija, „ako bi se više nego udvostručila brojem stanovnika”, koji će donijeti nove običaje i shvatanja.³⁶

³³ Iznimka u ruskim panslavenskim planovima bila je Bugarska zbog svrstavanja uz Centralne sile. Radi političkog manevriranja, krivnja za “izdaju slavenske stvari” svaljena je na bugarskog monarha: „Ferdinand od Coburga ostao je bugarski car samo u imenu... Rusija još nije izgubila nadu da se ruka Bugara, vjerna svojim historijskim zavjetima, neće dići protiv sinova ruskih vojnika koji su svoje kosti položili za Bugarsku” – E. И. Темчук, *Российская дипломатия в борьбе за национальные интересы в годы Первой мировой войны*, 41-43; O. R. Ajrapetov, Rusija između Srbije i Bugarske u Prvom svjetskom ratu, *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, br. 1-3, Beograd 2003, 66-67.

³⁴ Sve do ljeta 1915. na Srbiju je vršen pritisak da ustupi Bugarskoj dio Makedonije uz koncesije u Bosni i Hercegovini, dijelu Slavonije i Hrvatske – A. Rastović-S. Stamenković, Srbija ili Jugoslavija? Sto godina kasnije, u: *Nauka i savremeni univerzitet*, tom II, Niš 2014, 28.

³⁵ D. Mirović, Sazonov, Kraljevina SHS i sovjetska Rusija u kontekstu međunarodnog javnog prava i KiM, u: *Univerzalno i osobeno u pravu*, I, Kosovska Mitrovica 2018, 49. Rusija je tražila od saveznika garancije Srbiji za “присоединение Герцеговины, Боснии и части Далмации до Спалато”. Sazonov je poručivao britanskoj vladi da će se Dalmacija podijeliti između Srbije i Italije koja može dobiti samo Šibenik i Zadar. Južnije “sve” pripada Srbiji. Ujedinjenje Srbije i Crne Gore isticano je kao jedan od ruskih ciljeva – D. Mirović, Rusko-srpski odnosi 1903-1917. u kontekstu diplomatskog prava i formiranja Kraljevine SHS, *Nacionalni interes*, br. 2, Beograd 2018, 15-17.

³⁶ Ujedinjenje Srba i Hrvata (i Slovenaca) nije se nalazilo među spoljnopoličkim prioritetima Rusije. Kao glavni zadatak na tom području postavljalo se teritorijalno obezbjeđenje Srbije, na način i u vidu koji je odgovarao ruskim spoljnopoličkim interesima – M. Radivojević-Z. Bajin, Jugoslovenski program srpske vlade i Rusija na početku Prvog svetskog rata, *Srpske studije*, br. 14, Beograd 2023, 213-217; opšir. Ю. А. Писарев, Проекты образования югославского государства в годы Первой мировой войны (1914–1915) и Россия, u: *Балканские народы и европейские правительства в XVIII – начале XX в. (документы и исследования)*, Москва 1982, 256–277; А. Л. Шемякин, Югославянская программа Сербского королевства в первый период войны (август 1914 – октябрь 1915), u: *Первая мировая война: пролог XX века*, Москва 1998, 380–396.

Sazonov je tek tokom poodmaklog rata, “uz silno čuđenje, saznao da postoji jos jedan slavenski narod, Slovenci”.³⁷

Veliki rat je otpočeo kao rat između saveza Francuske, Velike Britanije i Rusije na jednoj i Centralnih sila na drugoj strani. Bio je to “последней войной для императорской России, как и для трех других империй - Германии, Австро-Венгрии и Османской Турции”.³⁸ Rusija je služila interesima saveznika: «Англичане готовы вести войну до последней капли крови русского солдата».³⁹ Romantizam i realizam, idealizam i realna politika u sklopu niza uzroka gurnuli su Rusiju u rat.⁴⁰ Ona je u njega ušla, zapaža Dominic Lieven, i iz razloga bezbjednosti, interesa i identiteta. Bezbjednost u odnosu na rastuću njemačku silu, interes zbog uticaja na Balkanu i Bosforu, a identitet u pogledu statusa velike sile i predvodnika pravoslavnih slavenskih naroda. U svakom od tih pogleda je izgubila. Iz rata je izašla ponižena i poražena i – više nije bila carska.⁴¹

Kada je Porta stupila u rat, za Rusiju, Veliku Britaniju i Francusku došao je trenutak da ustvrde da je to prilika da se okonča priča o “bolesniku na

³⁷ L. Vrkić, Istorijsko nasleđe konzervativne političke ideje, *Helsinki sveske*, br. 10, Beograd 2001, 102. Sazonov se izričito protivio stvaranju južnoslavenske države. Savjetovao je srpsko vodstvo da ne traži cijelu Hrvatsku i da dopusti stvaranje male katoličke hrvatske države, jer Rusiju sudbina Hrvata „ne interesuje”. Bio je potpuno ravnodušan prema Hrvatima i Slovencima. Njegov nasljednik na mjestu ministra spoljnih poslova Štjurmmer (Борис В. Штюрмер), ne mijenja politiku u vezi sa srpsko-hrvatskim ujedinjenjem. U Protokolu zasjedanja čelništva tog ministarstva kojim je predsjedavao posljednji ministar carske Rusije Pokrovski (Николай Н. Покровский), početkom 1917. pominje se jedino „ujedinjenje Srbije i Crne Gore” kao ruski cilj – D. Mirović, *Ruska elita protiv formiranja Jugoslavije 1877-1917*, u: *Istorija jedne utopije: 100 godina od stvaranja Jugoslavije*, I, Beograd 2018, 233-240.

³⁸ Upor. E. Hobsbaum, *Doba ekstrema: istorija Kratkog dvadesetog veka (1914-1991)*, Beograd 2002, 25; И. Э. Магадеев, Первая мировая как тотальная война, *Новая и новейшая история*, № 4, Москва 2014, 7-10; О. Р. Айрапетов, *Внешняя политика Российской империи (1801–1914)*, Москва 2006, 619.

³⁹ Ю. Бахурин, *Фронт и тыл Великой войны*, Москва 2019, 351; О овом ratu opšir. Г. Н. Трубецкой, *Российская дипломатия 1914–1917 гг. и война на Балканах*, Монреаль 1983; Ю. А. Писарев, *Великие державы и Балканы накануне Первой мировой войны*, Москва 1985; Ю. Н. Данилов, *На пути к крушению: очерки последнего периода Российской монархии*, Москва 2000; Н. Н. Головин, *Военные усилия России в Мировой войне*, Москва 2001; А. И. Уткин, *Первая мировая война*, Москва 2002; В. Е. Шамбаров, *За веру, царя и Отечество!*, Москва 2003; *Последняя война Российской империи: Россия, мир накануне, в ходе и после Первой мировой войны по документам российских и зарубежных архивов*, Москва 2006.

⁴⁰ А. А. Gromiko, *Setimo se velikog, zaboravljenog Drugog otadžbinskog rata*, u: *Prvi svetski rat i balkanski čvor*, Beograd 2014, 10.

⁴¹ Prema: B. Begović, Dominic Lieven, *Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia*, Allan Lane, London 2015 (prikaz knjige), *Anali Pravnog fakulteta*, br. 2, Beograd 2015, 232.

Bosforu”.⁴² Ove države su se dogovarale o podjeli Osmanskog carstva.⁴³ U manifestu u povodu osmanskog napada na Rusiju 2. novembra Nikolaj II navodi: “Zajedno s cijelim ruskim narodom, nepokolebljivo vjerujemo da će trenutna bezobzirna intervencija Turske u vojnim operacijama samo ubrzati kobni tok događaja za nju i otvoriti Rusiji put za rješavanje historijskih zadataka koje su joj predali njeni preci na obalama Crnog mora”.⁴⁴ Ruska štampa je jednodušno

⁴² Mnogi ruski intelektualci su pozivali, napisao je Petar Struve (Петр Б. Струве), da se “dovrši spoljna ekspanzija Ruskog carstva provedbom njegovih imperijalnih zadataka i slavenskog poziva”. Bilo je i skeptika, kritičara takvog ambicioznog plana. Pjesnik Brjusov (Валерий Брюсов) objavljuje na početku rata u listu «Русская мысль»: “Carigrad, očito, ostaje u rukama Turaka... Ali nema sumnje da će za nekoliko desetljeća, ako se ne dogode nepredviđeni događaji, ponovno biti okružen hrišćanskom vojskom... Turci su osuđeni na protjerivanje, baš kao što su Mauri bili osuđeni na izgon iz Španije”. Na stranicama lista «Русская мысль» historičar Kotljarevski (Сергей А. Котляревский) iznosi, pak, da: “dokazati nužnost i neizbježnost našeg utemeljenja u Carigradu gotovo znači provaliti na otvorena vrata. Ovdje je stvoreno rijetko jednomyšlje među našim različitim političkim skupinama; nema nikakvih razlika između tih skupina i odgovornih vođa naše politike. Imperativna historijska nužnost zahtijeva da se vjekovni posao dovrši u Carigradu, koji će ući u sastav ruske države, a ta se nužnost svakim danom sve više spoznaje, unatoč svim starim predrasudama” – Т. Г. Туманян, Восточный вопрос в российской публицистике: от философии к политике, *Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология*, вып. 4, Санкт-Петербург 2019, 550-551.

⁴³ A. Mitrović, *Vreme netrpeljivih: politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919-1939*, Beograd 1998, 28. Kada se Sovjet narodnih komesara (Совет Народных Комиссаров) 1917. nakon svrgavanja vlade Kerenskog (Александр Ф. Керенский), dokopao tajnih diplomatskih dokumenata o dogovorima sa saveznicima sklopanim tokom rata pokazalo se da Rusija nije stupila u rat da bi branila Srbiju, već da bi u dogovorima s V. Britanijom i Francuskom, “otele njemačke kolonije, opljačkala Austriju i podijelila Tursku”. Detalji tog plana razrađeni su u februaru 1916., i u maju tajno ratificirani od V. Britanije, Francuske, Italije i Rusije. Tajna diplomatija je bila sklona stavu da se u “podjeli azijske Turske” najprije ispresijeca Bliski istok na sfere uticaja, a onda na mandate ili na okupirane teritorije: “С того момента, у России больше не стало препятствий на пути осуществления своей давней цели. Николаю II было необходимо как можно быстрее присоединить Константинополь, чтобы укрепить веру православного населения этого города в необходимости продолжения войны” – *Мечта России о Константинополе: последняя попытка времен Первой мировой войны* (Феникс, Китай), <https://inosmi.ru/20190820/245656691.html>; E. Said, *Orijentalizam: zapadnjačke predodžbe o Orijentu*, Sarajevo 1999, 274; F. William Engdahl, *Stoljeće rata: anglo-američka naftna politika i novi svjetski poredak*, Zagreb 2000, 56-57.

⁴⁴ Jedna od vizija sudbine Istanbula bila je i ona mitropolita Hrapovickog (Антоний Храповицкий), koji je bio na čelu Ruske pravoslavne crkve u inozemstvu nakon sloma autokratije 1917. u Rusiji. On 1915. piše: “Naš narod gleda na pravi rat kao na oslobođenje hrišćanstva od jarma krivovjercata i muhamedanaca, a krajnji mu je cilj oslobođenje svetog Carigrada s crkvom sv. Sofije i Jeruzalema... u interesu istine, u interesu vjere i nauke, konačno, u interesu čisto ruskog nacionalnog Carigrad treba učiniti glavnim gradom Vizantijskog carstva, a sve grčke pokrajine Balkanskog i Maloazijskog poluostrva u nega treba uvrstiti ... ispuniće se da je Moskovsko kraljevstvo predodređeno da bude treći Rim” – В. И. Косик, Константинополь – русская дорога, *Славяноведение*, № 1, Москва 2015, 28. Filozof Trubeckoj (Евгений Н. Трубецкой) piše 1915. da je Carigrad “krstionica iz koje su kršteni naši preci i mjesto velikog pravoslavnog svetišta, koje je imalo snažan odlučujući uticaj na duhovni izgled pravoslavne Rusije. Govorim, naravno, o crkvi Aja Sofija koju su Turci pretvorili u džamiju. Voljom sudbine, s ovim hramom je povezano ono najdublje i najvrijednije što je u našoj duši kao narodu - središnja ideja ruske religioznosti, pa

zagovarala konačno rješavanje Istočnog pitanja. Liberalne i konzervativne novine nudile su različita ideološka opravdanja za aneksiju Istanbula.⁴⁵ Car je smatrao da će njemački poraz dovesti do propasti Osmanskog carstva. U vojnom vrhu se smatralo da «ключи от Босфора лежат в Берлине».⁴⁶ Romantične utopije slavenofilstva su se ponovno budile.⁴⁷ Ruski narod je trebao izvršiti “historijsku pravdu” - protjerati Turke iz “pravoslavnih zemalja”. Trebalo je riješiti i višestoljetno pitanje posjeda Istanbula, koji je u manifestu cara nazvan Cargrad na staroruski način (Царьград) radi jačanja patriotskog historijskog sjećanja. Historijski zadaci spomenuti u manifestu bili su jasni: zauzimanje Istanbula i moreuza.⁴⁸ Na početku rata, Kavkaski front se protezao 720 km od Crnog mora do jezera Urmija u iranskom Azerbajdžanu.⁴⁹ Pitanje je li rat doista služio nacionalnim i državnim interesima Rusije nije postalo predmetom ozbiljne rasprave.⁵⁰ Po ruskim selima, gdje je bilo malo pismenih, niko nije razumijevao uzroke i povode za izbijanje rata. Kada je o tome pitao vojnike general Brusilov (Алексей А. Брусилов) dobio je sljedeći odgovor: „Nekog tamo erc-herc-perca i njegovu ženu ubio je neko, a zatim su Austrijanci želeli da za to optuže Srbe. Međutim, ko su Srbi nije znao gotovo niko. Šta je slovenstvo bilo im je tek maglovito poznato, a zbog čega su Nijemci zbog Srbije namislili da ratuju bilo im je čudno”. Ljudi su vođeni u rat, prema nekim ocjenama, bez vidljivog razloga, “odnosno po hiru cara”.⁵¹ Postupci Rusije nisu bili povezani samo sa

upravo iz tog razloga - vjerska misija Rusije - taj evandeoski biser za koji mora biti spreman dati sve ima”; opšir. E. H. Трубецкой, *Национальный вопрос. Константинополь и Святая София*, Москва 1915.

⁴⁵ Religijski motivi bili su usko isprepleteni s nacionalnim i geografskim: „Dardaneli i Carigrad! Vrijeme je da oslobodimo sveti hrišćanski grad od azijske vlasti. Dolje muslimanski mjesec s kupole Aja Sofije, i neka časni, slavni i životvorni ruski pravoslavni krst zasja iznad njega!”, uzvikivao je kolumnist «Московских ведомостей» - И. К. Богомолов, “Больной человек” на тонущем корабле: образ Турции в российской печати времен Первой мировой войны, *Имагология и компаративистика*, № 18, Томск 2022, 328-329.

⁴⁶ Osmansko carstvo u ruskoj javnosti doživljavano je kao sporedni protivnik, ovisan o Njemačkoj. Bio je širok raspon ocjena i osjećaja prema osmanskoj strani: mržnja prema okrutnom i “nevjerničkom” neprijatelju, ali i poštovanje prema njegovoj hrabrosti - Е. С. Сеньявская, Образ Турции как противника России в Первой мировой войне в сознании армии и общества, у: *Россия и мир: из истории взаимовосприятия*, вып. 5, Москва 2009, 142-152.

⁴⁷ М. Ж. Палеолог, *Царская Россия во время мировой войны*, Москва 1991, 216-220.

⁴⁸ А. В. Никитина, Константинополь и проливы в общественном дискурсе России (1914–1917), у: *Миры прошлого и настоящего на переломе эпох: исследовательские подходы и практики*, Томск 2024, 135. Ruska flota i desantna vojska bili su nespremni za efikasniji napad na Istanbul. Tek su se 1915-1917. provodile mjere za jačanje flote - Н. П. Руткевич, Покровский о возникновении мировой войны, *Историк-марксист*, № 3, Москва 1938, 26.

⁴⁹ В. К. Шацкило, *Последняя война царской России*, Москва 2010, 131.

⁵⁰ *Первая мировая война и судьбы европейской цивилизации*, Москва 2014, 92.

⁵¹ Upor. N. Gusev, Da li su Rusi želeli rat? Ruska javnost i srpsko-austrijski konflikt 1912-1913. godine, *Vojnohistorijski glasnik*, br. 1, Beograd 2019, 85; Д. А. Самородов, *Россия в Первой*

željom da se spasi Srbija.⁵² Problem moreuza bio je za Rusiju najuže povezan sa stanjem na Balkanu, strateškim interesima u Sredozemlju i ekonomskim koristima od crnomorske spoljne trgovine.⁵³ Razmatranje ruskih vojnih planova u vezi s Osmanskim carstvom je nepotpuno bez spomena projekta desantne operacije 200 hiljada vojnika na Gornjem Bosforu i u području luke Trabzon (Trebizond). Taj projekt je razmatran od 1885, ali detaljno krajem 1913. - početkom 1914. pod uticajem djelovanja misije njemačkog generala L. fon Sandersa (Otto Liman von Sanders) u Istanbulu. Njemu je bilo povjereno i "командование всеми военными силами в турецкой столице и проливах".⁵⁴ Uprkos podršci Nikolaja II i ministra Sazonova, golemi materijalni troškovi koje bi pratili iskrcavanje ekspedicijskih snaga, kao i suzdržan stav drugih članica Antante, prisilili su Petrograd da odustane od "vojne prisile Turaka" kako je general Suhomlinov (В. А. Сухомлинов) naglasio u memoarima: "Naše iskrcavanje na Bosforu je skupa igračka i, štoviše, može dugo biti opasna zabava".⁵⁵

мировой войне: была ли возможна победа?, 97; Ю. Н. Данилов, *Россия в мировой войне 1914-1915 гг.*, Берлин 1924, 112.

⁵² В. В. Калашников, «Русские корни» Первой мировой войны в новейшей зарубежной историографии, у: *Межвузовская научная конференция «Россия в Первой мировой войне: проблемы истории и историографии»*, Санкт-Петербург 2015, 24.

⁵³ О. В. Павленко, Геополитическое проектирование «большой европейской войны» в 1910–1914 гг: российский ракурс, Вестник РГГУ (Российский государственный гуманитарный университет), *Серия "Международные отношения. Регионоведение"*, № 7(87), Москва 2012, 25; Д. Ю. Козлов, «Здесь была ахиллесова пята русского колосса...» К вопросу о роли и значении Черноморского театра Первой мировой войны, *Петербургский исторический журнал*, № 3, Санкт-Петербург 2025, 31-32.

⁵⁴ С. Сигрист, *У порога великой войны. Балканы как очаг европейских столкновений*, Петроград 1924, 96. Начелник Морнариčkog generalštaba viceadmiral Rusin (Александр И. Русин) je 24. juna 1914. pisao ministru mornarice da će Rusija biti spremna za rat na Crnom moru tek poslije 1917. godine, tj. u vrijeme kada ruska flota bude jača od osmanske – J. A. Pisarev, *Problem crnomorskih moreuza i Rusija uoči Prvog svjetskog rata*, 173.

⁵⁵ Е. Сергеев, Военные планы и стратегия России накануне Первой мировой войны, *Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis*, XXXI, Klaipėda 2015, 20. Ruski Generalaštab počeo je 1915. pripremati operaciju iskrcavanja trupa na zapadnoj obali Crnog mora. Rusima je pritom bilo ključno zauzeti bugarski grad Burgas. Admiral Bubnov (Александр Д. Бубнов) piše da je Burgas bio "jedina luka u blizini Bosfora gdje se mogla rasporediti velika desantna snaga", bez koje je bilo nemoguće poduzeti operaciju zauzimanja Bosfora. Tajni pregovori s Bugarskom nisu bili uspješni. Bosforska operacija je nekoliko puta odgađana. Rusija nije imala snage da je provede. Završni udarac toj operaciji zadat je 1916. potapanjem najmodernijeg bojnog broda Crnomorske flote "Carica Marija" («Императрица Мария»). Bila mu je dodijeljena glavna uloga u podršci iskrcavanju na osmanskoj obali. Ovaj brod je bio u luci Sevastopolj, kada je 7. oktobra 1916. na njemu izbio veliki požar u kojem je poginulo 225 mornara. Bojeći se da će se plamen proširiti na skladišta baruta u luci, zapovjedništvo je naredilo potapanje ovog broda - *Получила бы Россия после победы в Первой мировой Проливы?*, <https://topwar.ru/29023-karta-dnya-poluchila-by-rossiya-posle-pobedy-v-pervoy-mirovoy-prolivy.html>; М. В. Оськин, *Первая мировая война*, Москва 2010, 189-196.

Rusija nije raspolagala dovoljnim snagama za takvu operaciju.⁵⁶ Osvajanje Istanbula i moreuza trebao je biti početak njene dominacije na Bliskom istoku i Sredozemlju.⁵⁷ Uporni pobornik uključivanja Istanbula, moreuza i nekih područja evropskog i azijskog dijela Osmanskog carstva u sastav ruske imperije bio je Sazonov, koji je prijedloge Rusije iznio 4. marta 1915. u svom memorandumu.⁵⁸ Bio je to posljednji ruski projekt rješenja Istočnog pitanja. Sazonov piše britanskom i francuskom ambasadoru: “Tok nedavnih događaja dovodi Njegovo Veličanstvo cara Nikolaja II do zaključka da se pitanje Carigrada i moreuza mora konačno riješiti, u skladu s vjekovnim težnjama Rusije. Svako rješenje bilo bi nedovoljno i krhko osim ako grad Carigrad, zapadna obala Bospora, Mramorno more i Dardaneli, kao i južna Trakija do linije Enos-Midija, od sada ne budu uključeni u Rusko Carstvo. Slično tome, zbog strateške nužde, dio azijske obale, između Bosfora, rijeke Sakarija i tačke koja će se odrediti na obalama Izmirskog zaljeva, ostrva Mramornog mora i ostrva Imbros i Tenedos, moraju biti uključeni u Carstvo”.⁶⁰ Velika Britanija i

⁵⁶ Э. Урибес, Балканская политика России накануне Первой мировой войны в советской историографии 20-х — первой половины 30-х годов, *История и историки: историографический ежегодник 1978*, Москва 1981, 56.

⁵⁷ С. П. Борисевич, *Проблема черноморских проливов во внешней политике России в ходе Первой мировой войны*, https://legacy.inion.ru/index.php?page_id=525&printmode; В. Стоjković, Istočno pitanje i ukrajinsko pitanje, *Vojno delo*, br. 1, Beograd 2015, 33. Bosfor, kroz koji se izvozila roba, posebno žito, bio je ključan za rusku privredu. Nadalje, Rusija je pretendirala i na dio osmanske države - na istočnu Anadoliju. Ona je također imala za cilj da osvoji poljske teritorije koji su bili dio Austro-Ugarske i Njemačke – О. Смирнова, *100 лет назад Россия вступила в “забытую войну”*, https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/08/140714_war_begins_russia_ww1.

⁵⁸ Neke ruske diplomate (Григорий Н. Трубецкой) su izveštavale 1915. iz Srbije da su od svih balkanskih naroda samo Srbi “искренне желали присутствия России в проливах” - М. Радивоевич, Влияние соглашения о Константинополе и проливах на позицию России относительно переговоров Антанты с Италией о вступлении в Первую мировую войну. Положение Сербии, у: *Славянский мир: общность и многообразие*, Москва 2024, 123.

⁵⁹ Ishod rata, događaji u Rusiji 1917, te ugovor u Lozani 1923, stavili su tačku na ruske nade – В. А. Котельников, Восточный вопрос в русской политике и литературе, *Русская литература*, № 2, Санкт-Петербург 2004, 11-12.

⁶⁰ Opšir. М. С. Шаповалов, Согласование позиции стран Антанты по вопросу турецкого наследства в 1914-1916 гг, *Омский научный вестник*, № 1(85), Омск 2010, 32-35. Francuska je izrazila pristanak na ruske zahtjeve. Velika Britanija, iako nije osporavala predloženo uključivanje Carigrada u Rusiju, iskazala je želju u vezi s ekonomskim značajem grada: “S obzirom na činjenicu da će Carigrad uvijek ostati trgovačko skladište za jugoistočnu Evropu i Malu Aziju, Vlada Njegovog Carstva zatražit će da Rusija, kada ga preuzme, uspostavi slobodnu luku za tranzit robe koja se razmjenjuje između neruskih teritorija”. Petrograd je osigurao formalni pristanak Pariza i Londona na podjelu teritorija Osmanskog carstva kako bi Rusija dobila Istanbul - Д. Зыкин, *Константинополь - главная цель России в Первой мировой войне*, <https://zvezdaweb.ru/news/20191251347-iNFMp.html>; М. Смолин, *Долгая русская дорога в Константинополь*, <https://nbnasledie.ru/return-to-russia/dolgaya-russkaya-doroga-v-konstantinopol/>; А. Владимиров, *Не нужен нам берег турецкий?*, https://www.stoletie.ru/voyna_1914/ne_nuzhen_nam_bereg_tureckij_112.htm; М. Михайлов,

Francuska su formalno podržavale ruske zahtjeve.⁶¹ Ruski akademik Uspenski (Фёдор И. Успенский) pisao je 1915. kako se tok događaja približava sudbonosnom raspletu za Osmansko carstvo: “Predstojeća velika katastrofa otvara ogromne političke izgleda za Rusiju, ukorijenjene u vjerskim načelima, i, istodobno, pred nju stavlja obaveze od velike važnosti, u potpunosti shodno veličini očekivanih dobitaka”.⁶² Britansko-francuski pokušaj da zauzmu Dardanele (februar 1915. – januar 1916) izazvao je zabrinutost u ruskom Ministarstvu spoljnih poslova da će Rusija izgubiti moruze ako anglo-francuske snage budu uspješne.⁶³ Osmanske trupe uspjele su na Galipolju nadjačati desantne snage. Britanci i Francuzi su imali 74.635 poginulih i 174.634 ranjenih vojnika. Saveznici su 9. januara 1916. dovršili evakuaciju preostalih trupa s Galipolja. Osmanski gubici također su bili značajni: 180.000 poginulih i ranjenih. Međutim, osmanska armija imala je pravo na slavlje: odbili su anglo-francusku invaziju. Mit o vojnoj nadmoći svojih evropskih protivnika raspršen je u osmanskome društvu i vojsci.⁶⁴ Veliki rat je, s druge strane, trebao ostvariti višestoljetne snove ruskih političara.⁶⁵ Na Zakavkazju protiv osmanskih snaga i

Конец мечты о Константинополе. Почему Россия грезила Проливом,
<https://www.svoboda.org/a/konetz-mechty-o-konstantinople-pochemu-rossia-grezila-prolivami/33510245.html>.

⁶¹ В. П. Ранчинский, Распад Российской и Османской империй: единство и противоположности, *Вестник Брянского государственного университета*, № 2(32), Брянск 2017, 103. Rusija je imala sumnjive saveznike. Iako su joj obećali Istanbul, ove države su imale dogovor da Rusiji ne prepuste moreuze. London i Pariz su imali planove za podjelu Ruskog carstva nakon poraza Njemačke – o oduzimanju regija Visle, Baltik, Finska i, ako je moguće, Ukrajine i Kavkaza. - Д. А. Самородов, *Россия в Первой мировой войне: была ли возможна победа?*, 96-97.

⁶² Stoga je, naglašavao je Uspenski, „potrebno odmah staviti na dnevni red i raspraviti barem neka od pitanja s kojima ćemo se prvo susresti nakon zauzimanja Carigrada” - В. Г. Бухерт, “Нам нужно очень тщательно соизмерять наши первые шаги в Цареграде...” Записка академика Ф. И. Успенского. 1915 г, *Восточный архив*, № 1 (31), Москва 2015, 62.

⁶³ General Aleksejev (Михаил В. Алексеев), načelnik štaba vrhovnog zapovjednika, smatrao je planove za zauzimanje Bosfora i Dardanela kockanjem. Tvrdio je da su saveznici namjerno obećali Rusiji Istanbul da bi je prisilili da nastavi rat. Po njegovom sudu, zauzimanje moreuza bilo je nemoguće bez prethodne pobjede nad Njemačkom i Austro-Ugarskom - Н. В. Васильева, Черноморские проливы – императив российской/советской внешней политики в Восточном Средиземноморье: мифы и геополитические реалии (первая половина XX в), у: *Славяне и Россия: проблемы войны и мира на Балканах. XVIII–XXI вв*, Москва 2017, 412.

⁶⁴ Угор. Е. Ф. Лудшувейт, *Турция в годы первой мировой войны 1914-1918 гг*, Москва 1966, 131-132; П. М. Шорников, Почему не состоялась десантная операция на Босфоре?, *Русин*, № 2 (44), Кишинев 2016, 94-98.

⁶⁵ Cilj Rusije bio je osigurati za sebe Istanbul i okolna područja uz obale Bosfora. Pravili su se različiti planovi za “ruski Carigrad”, posebno mjesto zauzimali su projekti buduće crkvene strukture grada, obnove ruske patrijaršije; gdje će se nalaziti patrijaršijski tron?. Najsmjelije pretpostavke bile su sklone sugerirati da bi za potpunu obnovu vizantijske slike svijeta trebalo i rusko carsko prijestolje premjestiti u Istanbul. Autori tih projekata bili su crkveni hijerarzi, bizantolozi – Л. А. Герд, Еще один проект русского Константинополя”. Записка Ф. И.

na frontu protiv Austro-Ugarske ruska vojska bilježi uspjehe, dok u ratu s Njemačkom uglavnom trpi poraze. Ratni naponi su iscrpljivali Rusiju. Mada su joj prirodni i privredni resursi davali šansu da se postojano drži, loša organizacija, te politička i socijalna nestabilnost su uticale, da ona kao prva među velesilama izađe iz rata.⁶⁶

Veliki rat je počeo kao sudar imperija, klasičan rat velikih moćnika, ali je okončan s daleko većim moralnim i političkim nabojem – jednom krstaškom pobjedom za koaliciju koja je sebe proglasila nositeljem novog svjetskog poretka. Moralizacija i politizacija međunarodnih odnosa predstavljala je “kockanje s visokim ulozima”.⁶⁷ Slom ruske, njemačke, habsburške i osmanske monarhije u “Velikom ratu” učvrstio je evropsko republikanstvo.⁶⁸ Obnova Poljske i pojava novih država Čehoslovačke i Kraljevine SHS 1918. podstakla je neke tadašnje zapadnoevropske filozofe i diplomate da XX stoljeće nazovu “stoljećem Slavena”.⁶⁹ Evropska monarhijska kultura pod uticajem, posebno Oktobarske revolucije u Rusiji, dovedena je 1918. do sunovrata. Rušenjem carstava postale su anahrone i kraljevine.⁷⁰ Rusija je ušla u taj rat pod lozinkom “opšteg slavenskog i religioznog jedinstva” i zaštite “balkanske braće”.⁷¹ Glavna misao ruskog cara bila je ona “o zauzimanju Dardanela i Konstantinopolja”,

Успенского 1915 г. *Вспомогательные исторические дисциплины*, т. XXX, Санкт-Петербург 2007, 427-428.

⁶⁶ Revolucionarni događaji u Rusiji 1917. (februar i novembar) bili su rezultat unutrašnje krize i nezadovoljstva narodnih slojeva, socijalnom, ekonomskom, ratnom i političkom situacijom u zemlji – D. Petrović, *Rusija na početku XXI veka - geopolitička analiza, doktorska disertacija*, Prirodno-matematički fakultet, Novi Sad 2006, 131.

⁶⁷ A. Tuz, *Potop: Veliki rat i prekrajanje svetskog poretka 1916-1931*, Beograd 2019, 20-21.

⁶⁸ Evropskim državicima bilo je teško, valorizira Maks Hejstings (M. Hastings), da prilagode svoj način razmišljanja i ponašanja novom dobu, u koje su naglo ušli, ubrzanju komunikacija koje je izmijenilo život ljudi, i porastu vojnog razornog potencijala koji je malo ko shvatao. Staromodna, spora diplomatija, kao i vlast krunisanih glava pokazale su se neodgovarajućim za rješavanje kriza u dobu elektrike. Čerčil (Winston Churchill) 1930. piše: “Sve ono materijalno i ukorenjeno za šta su mi govorili da je večito, jedva da je potrajalo. Sve za šta sam verovao ili bio podučavan da je nemoguće – dogodilo se” – M. Hejstings, *Katastrofa: Evropa ide u rat 1914*, knj. 1, Beograd 2014, 49-50; opšir. Dž. A. Sanborn, *Apokalipsa imperije: Veliki rat i razaranje Ruskog carstva*, Beograd 2021.

⁶⁹ A. Čebotarev, Promišljanje nekih teza Contovog djela o Slavenima, *Povijesni prilozi*, br. 13, Zagreb 1994, 256.

⁷⁰ T. Kuljić, *Monumentalizacija srpske monarhije*, “Helsinška povelja”, br. 81-82, Beograd, mart-april 2005, 37.

⁷¹ Opšir. A. Rossos, *Rusija i Balkan: međubalkanska rivalstva i ruska vanjska politika 1908-1914*, Zagreb 1992. Rusija je na Balkanu Crnu Goru smatrala svojim glavnim saveznikom. Crna Gora se odlučila na rat s Austro-Ugarskom tek nakon stupanja Rusije u rat. Do 4. augusta 1914. crnogorska vlada je odugovlačila s objavom rata, ali čim je iz Petrograda dobila vijest da je između Rusije i Austro-Ugarske počeo rat, ubrzo je (6. augusta) i sama objavila rat Austro-Ugarskoj – J. A. Pisarev, Neki aspekti odnosa Rusije sa Crnom Gorom i Srbijom početkom Prvog svjetskog rata, *Istorijski zapisi*, br. 2, Titograd 1967, 231.

preduslova za rusku privrednu i političku ekspanziju.⁷² Vojne operacije nisu vođene na teritoriji same Rusije, već na drugim dijelovima Ruskog carstva: Poljskoj, Belorusiji i Ukrajini. To, za razliku Napoleonovog pohoda i njegovog ulaska u dubinu ruske teritorije, nije osiguralo onu količinu patriotizma potrebnu za očuvanja jedinstva zemlje.

Slom Rusije potirao je potrebu za održanjem Austro-Ugarske kao njene protivteže na Balkanu. Propasti starih kontinentalnih imperija Evrope označili su pobjedu demokratije, ali i, mnogo trajnije, nacionalizma. Načela narodnosti i samoodređenja naroda na koja su se mnogi pozivali tokom tog rata nisu dovela do formiranja samostalnih država svih naroda.⁷³ Slom ruske pravoslavne monarhije oslabio je preostale pravoslavne monarhije.⁷⁴ Ironijom sudbine, Rusija, koja je 1914. ušla u rat da zaštiti Srbiju, u vihoru rata i revolucije je nestala. Bosfor je privlačio rusko zapovjedništvo čak i kada su u zemlji započela revolucionarni previranja.⁷⁵ Jedan od ključnih igrača u pripremi planiranog iskrcavanja 1917. bio je zapovjednik Crnomorske flote, viceadmiral Kolčak (Александр В. Колчак).⁷⁶ Moral, psihološko stanje i disciplina vojske stalno su

⁷² Sudbina Južnih Slavena i njihovih država za Petrograd je bila moneta u trgovini s neprijateljem, kao i sa saveznicima. U Petrogradu su predlagali umanjjenje teritorije Habsburške monarhije, uz njen opstanak. Dio njenih slavenskih pokrajina planirali su pripojiti Srbiji – C. A. Романенко, *Югославия, Россия и “славянская идея”. Вторая половина XIX – начало XXI века*, Москва 2002, 98-99. Ekmečić navodi da su Sovjeti 1923. na pregovorima u Lozani, kada je formalno zatvoreno Istočno pitanje, zagovarali turski suverenitet nad moreuzima uz zabranu njihovog korišćenja u ratne svrhe. Zapadni saveznici su tada strahovali da je cilj Sovjeta bio da od Crnog mora stvore svoje “mare clausum”.

⁷³ Č. Ingraо, Deset nenaučenih lekcija o Srednjoj Evropi – pogled istoričara, *Helsinkiške sveske*, br. 10, Beograd 2001, 16-17.

⁷⁴ T. Kuljić, *Monumentalizacija srpske monarhije*, “Helsinkiška povelja”, br. 81-82, Beograd, mart-april 2005, 37.

⁷⁵ Posljednji put je pitanje Istanbula i moreuza s pompom otvoreno u decembru 1916. godine. Novi predsjednik vlade Trepov (Александр Ф. Трепов) je pred deputatima Dume istakao da Rusija pretendira da uspostavi vlast nad Istanbulom. Ova izjava je, kao deplasirana, naišla na osudu deputata i ruske javnosti – B. Stojić, Moris Paleolog (1859–1944) – posljednji francuski ambasador u carskoj Rusiji, *Istorijski časopis*, knj. LXVI, Beograd 2017, 485.

⁷⁶ A. Ю. Митрофанов, A. В. Колчак (1874–1920) на путях к Босфору: от боевого офицера к флотоводцу, *Русско-Византийский вестник*, № 4(19), Санкт-Петербург 2024, 227-233. Krajem novembra 1916. je usaglašen i pripremljen plan za operaciju na Bosforu. Poraz Rumunije prisilio je rusko zapovjedništvo da odgodi operaciju iskrcavanja na Bosforu do proljeća 1917. godine. Ta operacija više nije bila san nakon ruskog iskrcavanja u malom osmanskom obalnom gradu Orduu, koji je još u proljeće 1916. bio određen kao buduća željena rusko-osmanska granica. Tamo je 13(26) augusta 1917. iskrcana ruska 123. pješачka divizija. Dobila je zadatak da uništi skladišta hrane i hangare u blizini neutvrđenog grada. Ruska vojska se, međutim, pretvorila u hordu pljačkaša, razbojnika i nasilnika. Mnogi vojnici iskrcali su se s pripremljenim vrećama. Gomile ukradene robe vukle su se na brodove. Pokušaji oficira da uspostave red bili su uzaludni. Zадaci dodijeljeni desantnim snagama nisu izvršeni, uprkos nedostatku otpora. U gradu je izbila panika. Grčko stanovništvo okupilo se u luci, moleći da ih Rusi povedu, bojeći se osmanske osvete. Nije im bilo dopušteno ući u čamce ili na brodove. Operacija je ocijenjena kao štetna, pa je s terena

opadali.⁷⁷ Kriza u privredi uzrokovana i zatvaranjem osmanskih moreuza pomogla je u izbijanju revolucije 1917. godine. Francuski ambasador Paleolog zapaža potpunu apatiju ruskog naroda prema ratu, a posljedično i prema osvajanju Istanbula.⁷⁸ U aprilu 1917. on zapisuje: “Mora se priznati da rat više nije cilj ruskog naroda. Carigrad? Ali niko više ne sanja o toj himeri, osim nekih ‘patriotskih izuzetaka’”.

Dolazak boljševika na vlast predstavljao je raskid s prethodnim periodom.⁷⁹ Izlaskom Rusije iz rata 1917. Srbija je „definitivno izgubila najsnažniji oslonac svoje spoljne politike”. Uz rusku pomoć trebalo je riješiti glavni zadatak: “создать Великосербию, включив в нее все сербские территории”.⁸⁰ S padom carske Rusije ideja “Velike Srbije” izgubila je pokrovitelja, “идея великосербская проиграла”.⁸¹ Rusija nikada ne bi podržala

preporučivano ruskom vojnom vrhu da se suzdrži od ponavljanja takvih ekspedicija dok se ne formiraju pouzdane jedinice. Nemirna vremena svela su ambiciozne planove ruskih generala u područje fantazije. Neuspjeh ove operacije bio je posljedica sloma vojske, koji je proveo Petrogradski sovjet radničkih i vojničkih deputata (Петроградский Совет рабочих и солдатских депутатов). Istanbul i Bosfor nikada nisu doživjeli trijumf ruskog iskrcavanja - О. Айрапетов, *Колчак у ворот Цареграда: Планы десанта на Босфор в 1917 году*, <https://rodina-history.ru/2025/09/12/kolchak-u-vorot-caregrada.html>; П. Мультиатули, «Уничтожить германский милитаризм». Император Николай II и секретные договоренности с западными союзниками (1914—1917), *Свободная мысль*, № 1, Москва 2015, 170-171.

⁷⁷ Nizak moral među vojnicima: zabilježen, na primjer, u memoarima oficira: „Sa sigurnošću se može reći da se 1916. ruska vojska više nije htjela boriti” - piše pukovnik Vacetis (И. И. Вацетис) - О. В. Кепель, *Воинская дисциплина и моральный дух в русской армии в годы Первой мировой войны*, u: *От Первой мировой войны к Гражданской войне в России: уроки истории*, Москва 2018, 72, 82.

⁷⁸ U Petrogradu su već u zimu 1916. započeli nemiri. Te je godine Rusijom bjesnila jaka zima. Crnomorska flota pripremala se za napad na Bosfor, a trupe predvođene generalom Kolčakom okupljale su se u Odesi. Osmansko carstvo još se nije bilo oporavilo od operacije Dardaneli. Ministar spoljnih poslova Pokrovski (Николай Покровский) podnio je u martu 1917. Vrhovnom zapovjedništvu zahtjev za dopuštenje pokretanja specijalne operacije na Bosforu. Međutim, nije dobio nikakav odgovor ni od Nikolaja II niti od vojnog vrha. Radnici su izašli na ulice, započela je revolucija. Miljukov (Павел Миллюков), historičar i ministar spoljnih poslova u Privremenoj vladi, nazvao je rusko odustajanje od tog cilja “činom historijskog otpadništva”- *Мечта России о Константинополе: последняя попытка времен Первой мировой войны (Феникс, Китай)*, <https://inosmi.ru/20190820/245656691.html>.

⁷⁹ М. Radivojević, *Srbija i Rusija 1913–1918*, doktorska disertacija, Filozofski fakultet, Beograd 2019, 367.

⁸⁰ А. А. Герман, *Первая мировая война и Россия*, Известия Саратовского университета, т. 18, вып. 1, Саратов 2018, 27.

⁸¹ Ministar vanjskih poslova u Privremenoj vladi Tereščenko (М. И. Терещенко), 2(25) juna 1917. poslao je telegram Pelehinu (Б. П. Пелехин), отправнику послова при српској vladi, povodom potpisivanja poznate Krfske deklaracije: “S osjećajem posebnog iskrenog zadovoljstva, Privremena vlada se raspitala o odluci predstavnika iz južnoslavenskih zemalja da se okupe na Krfu radi zajedničke rasprave s predstavnicima srpskog naroda o pitanjima od interesa za Južne Slavene. Privremena vlada upućuje skupu svoje iskrene i bratske pozdrave i izražava svoje žarke želje da njegovi naponi budu okrunjeni potpunim uspjehom, kao pripremni rad za buduću uspostavu bliskog

stvaranje velike države na Balkanu bez primarno pravoslavnog karaktera. Za nju je postojala samo Srbija kojoj treba omogućiti izlaz na more i teritorijalno širenje.⁸² Ruska diplomatija saopštila je srpskim i crnogorskim predstavnicima još u junu 1915: „Koliko će Rusija u buduće voditi računa o kralju crnogorskom zavisice od toga, da li Srbija to želi”.⁸³ Rusija je preporučivala vladi Srbije da vodi računa da u svom teritorijalnom proširenju i izlasku do sjevernih dijelova Jadranskog mora ne primi odviše “katoličkog elementa” koji bi mogao dovesti u pitanje dominaciju srpstva. Carska Rusija je bila najjači oslonac Nikole Pašića, dugogodišnjeg vodećeg srpskog političara.⁸⁴ On u februaru 1917. govori: “Za nas, Srbe, ovde je u pitanju oslobođenje naše zemlje, prepuštene osvajaču, čija su počinjena nasilja poznata svima. Velika Srbija je živa u srcima svih Srba, i mi ćemo je sa našim Saveznicima i ostvariti”. Uzdanje u rusku pomoć u svim vlastitim projektima bilo je veoma rašireno u srpskoj vladi.⁸⁵ Pašić je s nespokojsvom primao vijesti o Februarskoj revoluciji i odlasku Nikolaja II s trona.⁸⁶ Državnik koji se tokom 40 godina bavljenoj politikom uglavnom

i trajnog jedinstva među Južnim Slavenima, temeljenog na samoodređenju, pravednom priznavanju međusobnih prava i usklađivanju političkih i privrednih interesa” - Я. В. Вишняков, Первая мировая война и Российская революция февраля-октября 1917 г. в сербской историографии, u: *Историческая политика в странах бывшей Югославии*, Санкт-Петербург 2022, 213-214.

⁸² S. Trifković-Ž. Budimir, Jugoslavija – neiznuđeni projekat srpske elite, *Nacionalni interes*, br. 1, Beograd 2019, 13-14.

⁸³ Nikolaj Jastrebov (Николай В. Ястребов, 1869–1923), profesor Petrogradskog univerziteta, objavio je obimnu studiju *Великая Сербия, как разрешение южно-славянского вопроса в великой войне 1914–15 гг.* Zaključio je „Ne samo ostvarenje ideala Velike Srbije već i dalji opstanak savremene male Srbije osigurace se uglavnom uz moć i pomoć Rusije” - A. Timofeev, *Balkan i rusko-srpski odnosi u Prvom svetskom ratu 1914-1917*, 144-145.

⁸⁴ Pašić je imao podršku vlasti tokom vladavine Aleksandra III i Nikolaja II, kao i posebno, cjelokupnog ruskog društva. Nikolaj II je govorio da je Pašić “stub zdrave politike Srbije” - A. L. Semjakin, Sa Krfa u Rusiju: Nikola Pašić u Petrogradu i Moskvi 1916. godine, u: *Prvi svetski rat, Srbija, Balkan i velike sile*, Beograd 2015, 198-1201.

⁸⁵ Pašićeva izjava je objavljena u “Srpskim novinama” 15(28) februara 1917. koje su izlazile na Krfu u Grčkoj. U njima je objavljen i tekst o ciljevima ruske spoljne politike vezanih za Istanbul: “Pitanje Carigrada jedna je hiljadugodišnja preokupacija celokupne ruske spoljne politike i celokupnog ruskog intelektualnog života (...) U tom istom smislu, Rusija je vodila ratove sa Turskom i u XIX veku, i tom je prilikom, da bi slovenstvo približila Carigradu, oslobodila i Bugarsku koja se, sada, zajedno s tom istom Turskom, bori protiv Rusije. Svi stariji i noviji slovenofili stvorili su bili od tog pitanja čitavu jednu ideologiju i čitav jedan socijalno-politički sistem. Rekama je prolivena ruska krv za taj ideal. Pesnici i filozofi, naučnici i državnici, vojnici i političari, pisali su o tome svaki na svoj način. Postoji o tome u Rusiji čitava literatura, i ona postoji od vjekada” - A. Ю. Тимофеев, “Тысячелетняя мечта”: Сербия и Россия накануне Февраля 1917 года, u: *Славяне и Россия: проблемы войны и мира на Балканах. XVIII–XXI вв.*, 316-317; A. Timofeev, *Balkan i rusko-srpski odnosi u Prvom svetskom ratu 1914-1917*, 155-156.

⁸⁶ Tokom teške zime s 1916. na 1917. ruski seljaci gomilali su zalihe hrane i prodavali je po visokim cijenama, a veliki industrijski gradovi trpjeli su akutne nestašice poljoprivrednih proizvoda i ogrjeva. Državne finansije bile su u rasulu. Inflacija je bjesnjela. Plate nisu mogle pratiti galopirajuće cijene. Ljudi su bili na rubu umiranja od gladi, dok je privilegirana manjina koja se

oslanjao na pravoslavnu monarhiju sa istoka, osjetio je prazninu. Nije bio jedini. Ruski vojni izaslanik general Artamonov (Виктор А. Артамонов) zapazio je da „svi Srbi” tuguju za „Gospodara Imperatora, zaštitnika srpskog naroda”, te da se boje za svoju budućnost.⁸⁷ Razvoj događaja ubrzao je donošenje odluke Pašića, mimo znanja zapadnih saveznika, o uspostavi nezvaničnih kontakata sa sovjetskom vladom. U decembru 1917. Pašić je uspostavio vezu s Trockim (Лев Д. Троцкий), jednim od boljševičkih vođa, a u januaru 1918. nezvanično je intervenirao da sovjetska vlada pruži podršku pokušajima dezaneksije Bosne i Hercegovine. Ta su nastojanja bila uzaludna.⁸⁸ Srbija “koja se dotad oslanjala na podršku Rusije, bila je prisiljena preorijentirati se prema Engleskoj i Francuskoj... Umjesto projekta ujedinjenja svih srpskih zemalja u okviru pravoslavne monarhije, započela je izgradnja multinacionalnog multikulturalnog južnoslavenskog projekta”.⁸⁹ Namjesto prvobitnih planova o proširenju granica Srbije na račun nekih “područja Austro-Ugarske (Vojvodine, Bosne i Hercegovine, dijelova Slavonije i Dalmacije s izlazom na more), radilo se o ujedinjenju Hrvata i Srba unutar jedne države uz potpunu likvidaciju Austro-Ugarske”.⁹⁰ Termini „Velika Srbija” i „Jugoslavija” za srpske vojnike često su

okoristila ratom živjela dobro. Rasla je mržnja prema caru i njegovoj vladavini. Veliki prosvjedni štrajkovi počeli su u januaru 1917. u Petrogradu i drugim gradovima. Nezadovoljstvo uslovima života povezano se s antiratnim osjećajima i neprijateljstvom prema režimu. Vojnici i mornari podržali su radničku pobunu u Petrogradu. Policija je pucala na prosvjednike, ali nije mogla zaustaviti štrajk u kojem je učestvovalo preko 200.000 radnika. Vlada nije mogla da okonča rastuću pobunu u oružanim snagama. Naredbe o gušenju pobune ostale su bez učinka. Radnici su formirali vlastite organe predstavničke vlasti: sovjete (vijeća). Poredak se raspadao. I vojnici su formirali svoje sovjete i zahtijevali uklanjanje cara. Kada se vojni i politički vrh saglasio da car treba otići, on je to i učinio abdicirajući 15. marta. Kako se raspoloženje vojnika sjedinilo s revolucionarnim raspoloženjem u gradovima i na selu, režimu su dani bili odbrojani; opšir. I. Kershaw, *Do pakla i natrag: Europa 1914–1949*, Zagreb 2017.

⁸⁷ M. Радивоевич, Русская революция 1917 года и Сербия, у: *Столетие Революции 1917 года в России*, ч. 1, Москва 2018, 470. Pašić je nakon Oktobarske revolucije „stalno govorio” o događajima u Rusiji. Oni su postali predmet „svih njegovih preokupacija” – M. Radivojević, Promene u Rusiji i stvaranje države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca – prilog istraživanju, u: *Kraj rata, Srbi i stvaranje Jugoslavije*, Beograd 2021, 608-609.

⁸⁸ M. Radojević, Razvoj jugoslovenske (srpske) istoriografije o „Velikom oktobru”, *Srpska politička misao*, br. 3, Beograd 2017, 27; upor. M. Ekmečić, *Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja: Istorija Srba u Novom veku (1492–1992)*, Beograd 2008, 372. Kontakti srpske vlade s boljševicima bili su mahom usmjereni u korist propagiranja nacionalnog programa Srbije. Pripadnost Antanti i ideološke razlike dovele su ubrzo do mimoiilaženja. Učešćem Dopunskog bataljona u borbama protiv boljševika na sjeveru Rusije, od sredine 1918., Srbija je stala je na stranu intervencije. Bošljevici su, pak, na njen integritet udarili stvaranjem jugoslovenske komunističke organizacije i poratnim slanjem emisara na njenu teritoriju radi ostvarenja ideje svjetske revolucije. Novostvorena Kraljevina SHS je odgovorila priznavanjem i podrškom vladama „belih” – M. Radivojević, *Srbija i Rusija 1913–1918*, 367.

⁸⁹ А. Ю. Тимофеев, Февральская революция 1917 г. и Сербия, *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*, № 3(54), Москва 2017, 36.

⁹⁰ “Predvođena “februarskim tvorcima” (”творцами Февраля”) ruska diplomatija poduprla je stvaranje “jugosferskog” modela buduće države, koji je u to vrijeme odgovarao

bili slični, ako ne i sinonimni.⁹¹ Uprokos željama nekih ruskih čelnika da ratom prošire teritorij, treba napomenuti da su već 1914. neki ruski političari upozoravali na pogubnost takvog puta za višenacionalnu državu s neruskim periferijama.⁹² Među Rusima je od zime 1915-1916, kružila fraza: “Saveznici su odlučili ratovati do posljednje kapi krvi ruskog vojnika”.⁹³ Rusko je društvo sve više srljalo u ponor unutrašnjih problema, a spoljna politika i ishod rata sve su ga manje zanimali.⁹⁴ Za samo nekoliko mjeseci 1917. najmoćnija evropska vojska svedena je na “nekontroliranu rulju u vojničkim šinjelima”.⁹⁵ Tokom prve tri ratne godine, stalno su kolale glasine da je ruska diplomatija vodila tajne pregovore s Centralnim silama radi zaključivanja separatnog mira.⁹⁶ Lenjin (Владимир И. Ленин) i boljševici su se od početka revolucije, plašili ponovnog uspostavljanja starog poretka; najsigurniji način da se to onemogući bio je čupanje tog poretka iz korijena i njegovo uništenje.⁹⁷

interesima Francuske i Velike Britanije. U ovom nadnacionalnom “proizvodu” one su vidjele način slabljenja političke ambicije Nijemaca i Italijana na Balkanu i ujedno sredstvo za neutraliziranje ruskog uticaja u samoj Srbiji” – Я. В. Вишняков, Сербское правительство и русская революция, *Вестник Рязанского государственного университета имени С. А. Есенина*, № 3(64), Рязань 2019, 107.

⁹¹ A. Miletić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije viđeni kroz službenu i privatnu vojnu prepisku 1914–1918, u: *Multietnička država i nacionalni identiteti: srpsko iskustvo u 20. veku*, Beograd 2024, 241.

⁹² Rusko sticanje novih teritorija, po tim sudovima, ne bi ojačalo njenu međunarodnu sigurnost, već bi stvorilo nove, ozbiljne probleme nacionalizma i separatizma - А. А. Герман, Первая мировая война и Россия (о некоторых уроках событий вековой давности), *Известия Саратовского университета*, т. 18, вып. 1, Саратов 2018, 27-28.

⁹³ S rastom umora od rata, u ruskoj javnosti je raslo naglašavanja primarne uloge Rusije u ratu i osuđivanje njenih saveznika koji su nastojali postići svoje ciljeve na njenu štetu - О. С. Поршнева, Союзники глазами русского общества в годы Первой мировой войны (1914 - февраль 1917), u: *Общество и война*, Екатеринбург 2010, 34.

⁹⁴ Zemlju su satirale злоупотребе represivnog režima. Kralj Hakon VII Norveški (Haakon VII), još prije rata je savjetovao Nikolaja II: “Dajte Poljacima autonomiju. Dozvolite Malorusima [Ukrajincima], Gruzinima i Jermenima da imaju sopstvenu lokalnu vlast i ne dirajte im u nacionalnost. Vratite mir na Kavkaz tako što ćete priznati prava tamošnjem narodu i prestanite s pokušajima da rusizujete Finsku... i neće biti nikakve žudnje za revolucijom”. Nikolaj II nije postupio po tom, kao ni po drugim razboritim savjetima rođaka s evropskih dvorova u godinama prije revolucije. Gledao je pravo u vjetar sujevjerja i vjere u sudbinu - Н. Рапарот, *Trka za spasenje Romanova*, Beograd 2019, 54-55.

⁹⁵ Carska ruska vojska je “практически была уничтожена. Массовыми явлениями того периода стали дезертирство, грабежи, пьянство и убийства” - Е. Бессчетнова, Развал Русской императорской армии в 1917 году, *Социологическое обозрение*, т. 17, № 2, Москва 2018, 300.

⁹⁶ Ž. Spalević-D. Jerotijević, Brestlitovski mir - uzroci, sporazum i posledice, *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta*, br. 2, Kosovska Mitrovica 2023, 212-213.

⁹⁷ Boljševici su ubrzo shvatili da ne mogu opstati bez znanja i vještina stare elite. Radnici i seljaci, u čije su ime boljševici vladali, nisu bili kvalificirani da upravljaju ogromnom državom. Tako je nastala nelagodna saradnja između starih i novih gospodara Rusije. Ona će potrajati više od dvije decenije. Carska vladajuća klasa – napuštena, raseljena i potlačena – prevazilazila je psihičke rane

Dolazak boljševika na vlast u Rusiji promijenio je prirodu srpsko-ruskih odnosa.⁹⁸ Srpska elita, koja je često izražavala simpatije prema Rusiji i njenom vladaru, nazivajući ih glavnim prijateljima Srbije, pomirila se s odlaskom s trona i hapšenjem cara i njegove porodice.⁹⁹ Pašić je u pozdravnom telegramu Miljukovu, novom ruskom ministru inostranih poslova u Privremenoj vladi, krajem marta 1917. istakao „uzvišeni primer patriotizma koji je car svojim odricanjem pokazao celom svetu, a u prvom redu Slovenima da bi se u interesu otadžbine” pribrala „sva snaga ruskih građana” i porazio neprijatelj. Slična Pašićevoj izjavi je i objava u “Srpskim novinama” 7. marta u kojoj je navedeno

nanešene gubitkom njenog svijeta. Trudila se da pronađe mjesto za sebe u novom poretku Sovjetskog Saveza – D. Smit, *Bivši ljudi: poslednji dani ruske aristokratije*, Beograd 2024, 40-42.

⁹⁸ Nakon prevage boljševika u Oktobarskoj revoluciji, nove vlasti su Centralnim silama poručile da su spremne da okončaju rusko učešće u ratu. Drugi sveruski kongres sovjeta radničkih i vojničkih deputata usvojio je 26. oktobra (8. novembra) 1917. Lenjinov “Dekret o miru” (“Декрет о мире”) i proglasio izlazak Sovjetske Rusije iz rata. U decembru je u Brest-Litovsku (današnji Brest u Bjelorusiji) najprije potpisana Konvencija o razoružanju sa Centralnim silama, nakon koje se stupilo u pregovore o potpisivanju mirovnog ugovora. Višemjesečni pregovori između ruskih vlasti i Centralnih sila su zaključeni (rus. Брест-Литовский мирный договор) početkom marta 1918. godine. Lenjin je bio za to da se Nijemcima prave ustupci: “Bez sumnje, mir koji sada moramo sklopiti je sramotan, ali ako počne rat, naša vlada će biti skinuta, a mir će biti sklopljen s drugom vladom”. Rusija je izgubila čitav Baltik, Poljsku, dio Bjelorusije, trebala je povući vojsku s teritorija Finske i Ukrajine, čiju neovisnost je morala priznati. Dio teritorija na Kavkazu je pripao Osmanskom carstvu. Rusija je morala demobilizirati vojsku, isplatiti kontribuciju, Nijemcima omogućiti povlašteni položaj u trgovini sve do 1925, dozvoliti bescarinski izvoz rude i drugih sirovina u Njemačku, kao i obustaviti propagandu protiv Centralnih sila. U Rusiji je ovaj sporazum imao efekt bombe koja je eksplodirala i doprinijela izbijanju građanskog rata. Rusija je istupila iz rata i počela da se usmjerava na rješavanje unutrašnjeg sukoba. Stotine hiljada njemačkih vojnika, motivirani pobjedom na istoku, stavljeno je u pogon za pokoravanje zapadne Evrope, a industrijski, infrastrukturni, energetske i drugi resursi kojih se Rusija odrekla prešli su u ruke Centralnih sila. Međutim, stupanje u rat više miliona američkih vojnika na Zapadnom frontu i ekonomsko iscrpljivanje prije svega njemačkog rivala zauzdaće napredovanje i preokrenuti tok rata. Pravosnažnost Brest-Litovskog sporazuma anulirana je 11. novembra 1918. aktom o primirju. Boljševici su, s druge strane, Brest-Litovski mir smatrali privremenom mjerom. On je 13. novembra 1918, prvog dana revolucije u Njemačkoj, poništen odlukom Sveruskog Centralnog izvršnog komiteta (Всероссийский центральный исполнительный комитет Советов рабочих и солдатских депутатов). Ubrzo je njemačka vojska počela povlačenje sa zauzetih teritorija nekadašnjeg Ruskog carstva. Za njom je odmah krenula Crvena armija, odlučna povratiti ono što je smatrala svojim – M. Petrović, *Vek od završetka Velikog rata: analitički osvrt na odabrana dokumenta iz istočnoevropske diplomatske istorije*, Beograd 2021, 41-45; M. П. Соболев, P. С. Еременко, Брестский мир, расколовший Россию и породивший войну, На пути к гражданскому обществу, № 2(34), Иваново 2019, 61-78; Б. Л. Хавкин, Революционный выход России из Первой мировой войны и Германия, *Новая и новейшая история*, № 2, Москва 2020, 96–107; В. Egorov, *Brestlitovski mir: Kako je Rusija izgubila milijun kvadratnih kilometara i 56 milijuna stanovnika*, <https://hr.rbth.com/povijest/91557-brestlitovski-mir>.

⁹⁹ А. Ю. Тимофеев, «Переворот в России»: Февральская революция глазами официальных представителей королевства Сербии в России, u: *Столетие Революции 1917 года в России*, I, Москва 2018, 501.

da je Nikolaj II „abdicirao na jedan svetao način”.¹⁰⁰ Pitanje azila za cara i njegovu porodicu bilo je komplicirano. Predstavljalo je ogromne političke, logističke i geografske izazove u vrijeme dok je Evropa još bila u ratu.¹⁰¹ Pašić je kraj “svete Rusije” doživio kao “najveću ličnu tragediju”.¹⁰² Kada su saveznici odlučili da „zamjene” Austro-Ugarsku za nekoliko „nacionalnih” država, Pašić se vratio svom „jugoslavenstvu”.¹⁰³ Orijentacija Srbije prema jugu u balkanskim ratovima, a u “Velikom ratu” prema zapadu, bila je izraz “imperijalne imaginacije”.¹⁰⁴ Slabljenje Rusije uticalo je na prevlast jugoslavenskog koncepta buduće države. Gubitak “ruskog pokroviteljstva” i preorijentacija na Veliku Britaniju i Francusku primorali su srpsku vladu na kompromis s Hrvatima i Slovencima.¹⁰⁵ Carska Rusija, koja je planirala veliku ulogu Srbije u budućnosti,

¹⁰⁰ Isticano je da je odluka o povlačenju s trona bila izazvana željom Nikolaja II da se „u današnjim momentima ne proliva krv između sinova Rusije”. Spomenuto je i da je on „istrkao mač iz korica, jer nije hteo dopustiti krvožednoj Austriji da uništi malu Srbiju, prema kojoj je Car uvek pokazivao veliku ljubav i naklonost (...) Srpski Mu narod duguje naročito zahvalnost i želi Njemu i Njegovom Domu dug i srećan život”. Već u prvim navodima o Oktobarskoj revoluciji u “Srpskim novinama” bila je ispoljena odbojnost prema novim vlastima u Rusiji – M. Živanović, *Slika poslednjeg ruskog cara kod Srba u 20. veku, u: Srbija i ruska revolucija 1917: nove teme i izazovi*, Beograd 2017, 262-263.

¹⁰¹ Nasilnu smrt sedmočlane carske porodice u julu 1918. u Jekaterinburgu (Екатеринбург), hitro je progutao mnogo jeziviji vir borbi i ubistava koji će odnijeti još jedanaest miliona ruskih života u godinama građanskog rata (1917–1922). Za neke će Romanovi predstavljati, u historijskom smislu, simbolične prve žrtve novog sovjetskog režima. Tu je, takođe, još jedan element koji održava ovu priču u svijesti ruske javnosti: uporan osjećaj – često nepotpuno shvaćen – da je regicid, ubistvo kralja ili cara, zapravo ubistvo božjeg pomazanika; da je regicid čin kojim se prekoračuje granica, nakon čega je svako zlo moguće – H. Rapaport, *Trka za spasenje Romanova*, 28-29.

¹⁰² L. Perović, *Ljudi, događaji i knjige*, Beograd 2000, 89. Miroslav Spalajković, nekadašnji ambasador Kraljevine Srbije u Rusiji, svojedobno izraziti rusofil, piše: “Slovenska Rusija, prava Rusija, tako draga srcu svih Srba, uvijena je u ogromni pokrov izatkan rukama Satane”. U boljševizmu je vidio “najcrnju tiraniju” i oligarhiju “ludaka, zločinaca i degenerisanih” – M. Spalajković, *Drama Rusije*, Beograd 1919, 5-11.

¹⁰³ “Njegova je politika bila vrlo fleksibilna. Nastojeći u svakom slučaju osigurati interese Srbije i srpskog naroda, on se, ovisno o promjenama međunarodnih prilika, “kolebao” od široke opcije do uske i natrag” – A. Л. Шемякин, Никола Пашич: на стыке унитаристских и федералистских устремлений, u: *До и после Версаля. Политические лидеры и идея национального государства в Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европе*, Москва 2009, 60.

¹⁰⁴ Pripadnost istočnoj crkvi, navodi Pašić u raspravi *Sloga Srbo-Hrvata*, davala je Srbima pravo na hegemoniju nad Hrvatima u zajedničkoj državi. U „kolu slovenskih sestara”, on je, poslije Rusije na prvom mjestu vidio Srbiju – L. Perović, *Ko je ubio Jovana Skerlića?*, Pešćanik.net, 8. juni 2022, <https://pescanik.net/ko-je-ubio-jovana-skerlica/>.

¹⁰⁵ Upor. F. Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti: rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja*, Zagreb 1989, 461; B. Petranović-M. Zečević, *Agonija dve Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1991, 17; Đ. Bodrožić, Srbi i Jugoslavija – roscerani narod u podeljenoj zemlji, *Nacionalni interes*, br. 1, Beograd 2019, 41; A. Л. Шемякин, Февральская революция 1917 г, Никола Пашич и Корфская декларация, *Русский сборник*, кн. XXII (1917 г), Москва 2017, 233-258; Я. Вишняков-А. Тимофеев-Г. Милорадович, *На дальних рубежах. Россия и Сербия в годы Первой мировой войны 1914–*

nije više postojala. Prema Pašiću, Jugoslavija, u obliku u kojem je rođena 1918., nastala je “možda upravo zbog odsustva Rusije na Balkanu”.¹⁰⁶ Lenjin je malo mario za srpske političke ciljeve.¹⁰⁷ Čičerin (Георгий В. Чичерин), narodni komesar za vanjske poslove pri sovjetskoj vladi, 1922. govori: “Ruski narod gaji najveće simpatije prema Srbima, kao i prema Hrvatima i Slovencima”.¹⁰⁸ Ruski socijalizam bio je, od početka, “nova vera”, “religija carstva zemaljskog”.¹⁰⁹ Pojava Sovjetske Rusije na međunarodnoj sceni dovela je do novog rasporeda političkih snaga i okončanja historije Istočnog pitanja.¹¹⁰

Srbija je tek pred kraj rata potpisala “Krfsku deklaraciju” o stvaranju Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.¹¹¹ Na to je pristala zbog promjena na međunarodnoj sceni. Padom carske Rusije, nakon Oktobarske revolucije, Srbija je izgubila na spoljopolitičkom planu tradicionalnu i veliku podršku, a raspadom Monarhije sile Antante njenim su narodima dali pravo na samoodređenje. Srbija je nastojala izvesti ujedinjenje što brže, kako bi ostala

1917, Москва 2018, 288; M. Subotić, Jugoslovenstvo i jugoslovenska država: ideje i učinci jednog geopolitičkog eksperimenta, *Nacionalni interes*, br. 3, Beograd 2018, 83; N. V. Vasiljeva, Uloga „ruskog faktora” u rešavanju jugoslovenskog pitanja u vreme Prvog svetskog rata, *Vesnik pravne istorije*, br. 1, Beograd 2022, 185.

¹⁰⁶ A. Ю. Тимофеев, «Великая русская революция принесла много зла»: разочарование сербской элиты во Временном правительстве и в революционной России весной-летом 1917. г., *Славянский альманах*, вып. 3-4, Москва 2017, 192.

¹⁰⁷ M. Ekmecić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, knj. 2, Beograd 1989, 795. “Unutar Srbije samo je deo elite bio za Jugoslaviju, ne i narod, dok su za Veliku Srbiju bili i elita (ili njen veći deo) i narod. Bez sumnje, skoro sve je upućivalo srpske političare i državnike na ujedinjenje srpskog naroda, ne i jugoslovenskih” – R. Ljušić, Jugoslovenstvo i srpstvo Milorada Ekmecića (marginalije povodom izlaska Sabranih dela), *Istorija 20. veka*, br. 2, Beograd 2023, 497.

¹⁰⁸ “Jačanju tih simpatija smetalo je to što su protivnici ruske revolucije nalazili pomoć u Beogradu” – B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslovenske države 1918-1941: diplomatsko-historijski pregled*, Zagreb 1975, 73.

¹⁰⁹ L. Perović, *Ruske ideje i srpske replike: (uvodi u čitanja istorijskih izvora)*, Sarajevo 2019, 323-324.

¹¹⁰ Ovo pitanje je prestalo biti “узлом международных противоречий” – А. С. Акопянц, *Восточный вопрос в геополитике России*, и: *Интерэкспо ГЕО-Сибирь-2015*, т. 2, Новосибирск 2015, 46.

¹¹¹ Pred Vaskrs 1915. kralj Petar Karađorđević je uputio čestitku načelniku Štaba vrhovne komande Radomiru Putniku, oficirima i obveznicima činovničkog reda sa željom da “uskoro svi zajedno proslavljamo Vaskrs i ujedinjenje vaskolikog srpstva”. Vrhovni komandant srpske vojske, prestolonasljednik Aleksandar Karađorđević, čestitao je iz Soluna vojsci Božić 1916. i novu 1917. godinu. Iskazao je uvjerenje da će srpska vojska postići svoj veliki cilj: “oslobođenje Srbije i celog srpstva”. U Božićnoj i Novogodišnjoj čestitci 1917. prestolonasljednik ukazuje na nove ciljeve srpske vojske – oslobođenje i ujedinjenje “zajedničke otadžbine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca”. Kralj Petar je, pak, u Vaskršnoj čestitci srpskoj vojsci 1918. iskazao uvjerenje u skori “vaskrs i ujedinjenje vaskolikog srpstva” – M. Milkić, Državni i verski praznici u vojsci Kneževine i Kraljevine Srbije, *Vojnoistorijski glasnik*, br. 1-2, Beograd 2007, 18.

jedini relevantni faktor u stvaranju nove države i ostvarila svoj primat.¹¹² Uloga srpske vojske u činu ujedinjenja odredila je metodologiju stvaranja države na drugi način od onog predviđenog 1917. Krfskom deklaracijom.¹¹³ Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (SHS) bila je jedna u nizu novih država nastalih 1918. na “granici epohe”, na ruševinama multietničkih monarhija.¹¹⁴

Prvi svjetski rat je radikalno izmijenio sliku svijeta i strateški položaj Rusije koja je ušla u zonu geopolitičkih potresa. Razmjere i oštrina političke krize u Rusiji bile su znatno veće nego u drugim evropskim državama.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Srpska vlada i Jugoslavenski odbor hrvatskog političara Ante Trumbića potpisali su deklaraciju 20. jula 1917. na grčkom ostrvu Krf (“Krfsku deklaraciju”), kojom su južnoslavenski narodi u Austro-Ugarskoj zatražili ujedinjenje sa Kraljevinom Srbijom u zajedničku državu pod nazivom Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, s dinastijom Karađorđević na čelu. U deklaraciji su također bila izložena sljedeća gledišta i zaključci – nova država je “ustavna, demokratska i parlamentarna monarhija”; njeni amblemi su “jedan državni grb, jedna državna zastava i jedna kruna”; ćirilica i latinica “takođe su potpuno ravnopravne”; “pravoslavna, rimokatolička i muhamedanska veroispovest” su ravnopravne “prema državi” i međusobno jednake; svi državljani “jednaki su i ravnopravni prema državi i pred zakonom”; izbornopravo “jednako je i opšte”. Od sredine 1918. neslaganja između Jugoslavenskog odbora i srpske vlade postaju sve oštrija i izrazitija – upor. N. Marković, Viđenje Hrvatske i Hrvata u Srbiji tokom rata 1914-1918. godine, *Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara*, sv. 4, Zagreb 2001, 102-104; G. Grbešić, Od ilirskoga pokreta i jugoslavenske ideje do neuralgičnih točaka u hrvatsko-srpskim odnosima u 20. stoljeću, *Diacovensia*, br. 1, Đakovo 2013, 99.

¹¹³ Lj. Petrović, Jugoslovensko društvo između dva svetska rata, *Istorija 20. veka*, br. 2, Beograd 2008, 30. Nikola Samardžić piše: “Krfska deklaracija Jugoslovenskog odbora 20. jula 1917. glasila je „da je ovaj naš troimeni narod jedan isti po krvi, po jeziku govornom i pisanom, po osećajima svoga jedinstva, po kontinuitetu i celini teritorije, na kojoj nepodvojeno živi, i po zajedničkim životnim interesima svoga nacionalnoga opstanka i svestranoga razvitka svoga moralnog i materijalnog života”. Ali je stvarnost bila od toga daleko složenija, isprepletana ozbiljnim međusobnim protivrečnostima – N. Samardžić, *Od prve moderne nezavisnosti do prve jugoslovenske integracije*, “Helsinška povelja”, br. 131-132, Beograd, septembar-oktobar 2009, 55.

¹¹⁴ Neki su verovali da će i Bugarska vremenom postati dio velike južnoslavenske države. Njihove nade ilustrira tekst „poluslužbenog” dnevnog lista, “Politika” od 4. decembra 1919. u kojem je sve objašnjeno riječima: „Krajevi koji su nam pripali Nejskim ugovorom o miru (Nejski mirovni ugovor je zaključen 27. novembra 1919. u pariskom predgrađu Neji sir Sen između zemalja Antante, kao pobjedničkog saveza u Velikom ratu, s jedne, i poražene Bugarske, s druge strane – prim. S. B) ostaju zauvek naši. O tome više ne može biti nikakve sumnje, i ljudi iz Sofije čine vrlo rđavu uslugu stanovništvu koje je do skora bilo pod njihovom upravom, ako ga o suprotnom uveravaju. To ipak ne znači da Caribrod, Bosiljgrad i Strumica neće opet jednog dana biti u istoj državi sa Sofijom, Plovdivom i Varnom. Na protiv, mi u to najdublje verujemo, onako isto kao što smo verovali da će Beograd, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, Cetinje i Bitolj biti pod jednom skiptrrom u vreme kada je ceo svet to smatrao kao maštariju” – D. Antić, *Pogled na srpsko-bugarske odnose s kraja XIX i početka XX veka, Godišnjak Pedagoškog fakulteta u Vranju*, knj. VII, Vranje 2016, 64.

¹¹⁵ “Specifičnost Rusije bila je u tome što je u očima većine stanovništva želja da se odmah okonča rat na bilo koji način postala imperativ ... U kontekstu pada autoriteta vrhovne vlasti, masovne manifestacije nacionalnog ili socijalnog nezadovoljstva postale su nekontrolirane, a vlast se suočila s masovnim protestnim pokretom. U glavama ruskih radnika i seljaka želja za okončanjem rata bila je kombinirana sa željom da se slomi državni stroj i uništi sistem odnosa privatnog vlasništva” –

Apokaliptična iskustva kroz koja je Rusija prošla tokom svjetskog, kao i građanskog rata, zapaža Sanborn (Joshua A. Sanborn), predstavljala su ranu fazu “dramatične, ali bolne globalne istorije. Fenomen urušavanja imperija ili dekolonizacije još više daje na značaju Velikom ratu, kao jednom od centralnih događaja u narativu istorije XX veka”. Ruski građanski rat odnio je oko 10 miliona života, zbog čega se smatra jednim od najsmrtonosnijih, a više od polovine žrtava nastradalo je zbog bolesti i gladi.¹¹⁶ Ruska dijaspora, ili, kako se još naziva, “Rusi izvan domovine” (“русские за границей”), povećala se milionima koji su bježali od građanskog rata između 1917. i 1921. godine.¹¹⁷ Odlazak Rusa u Istanbul odvijao se u tri etape, koje se razlikovale jedna od druge prije svega socijalno-ekonomskim statusom izbjeglica.¹¹⁸ Prva etapa emigracije odnosi se na 1919. godinu. Jezgrom ovog talasa bili su aristokrati, koji su pokušavali da stignu u zapadno-evropske prijestonice, prije svega u Pariz, gde se nalazila privremena ruska vlada. Istanbul je za njih bio prolazni punkt. Znatno brojniji talas emigranata nagrnulo je u Istanbul u februaru 1920. nakon zauzimanja Odese od strane boljševika.¹¹⁹ Masovna evakuacija sprovedena je iz Odese i Novorosijske luke. S ovim talasom emigranata evakuirao se i carski general Denikin (Антон И. Деникин) zbog čega je taj talas i nazivan “denikinski”. Učesnici ovog talasa pripadali su različitim slojevima društva. Nakon osam mjeseci počela je i treća etapa - posljednji i najbrojniji talas izbjeglica.¹²⁰

Ю. А. Петров, Россия и окончание Первой мировой войны, 1918–1922, у: *Kraj rata, Srbi i stvaranje Jugoslavije*, Beograd 2021, 127, 136-137.

¹¹⁶ Опšir. Е. Ю. Баранов, Потери населения России в XX веке: оценки и дискуссии в современной историографии, у: *Демографическая и семейная политика в контексте целей устойчивого развития*, том II, Екатеринбург 2018, 17-29. Procjene o broju ljudi koji su napustili Rusiju nakon revolucije i građanskog rata, variraju od 635.000 do oko tri miliona. U junu 1921. osnovana je, nakon pritiska na Društvo naroda, kancelarija Visokog komesara za ruske izbjeglice (engl. High Commissioner for Russian Refugees), preteča današnjeg Visokog komesara Ujedinjenih nacija za izbjeglice - M. Štambuk, Ruska izbeglička kriza i odgovor međunarodne zajednice, у: *Sedam decenija pravne zaštite izbeglica*, Beograd 2021, 25.

¹¹⁷ Američki Crveni krst izvijestio je da je 1. novembra 1920. bilo 1.963.500 emigranata. Već 1921. broj izbjeglica iz Rusije dosegao je oko 2.935.000 lica; опšir. Т. А. Баран, Жизнь русских эмигрантов в Стамбуле в эпоху перемирия, Жизнь русских эмигрантов в Стамбуле в эпоху перемирия, *Журнал исследовательского центра Ататюрка*, т. 22, № 64–66 (март, июль, ноябрь), Анкара 2006, https://www.dk1868.ru/statii/Istanbul_Rus.htm.

¹¹⁸ “Многи су емигранти оставили за собом родбину и пријатеље, супруге и дјecu... Било је сирочица, удовица и усамљених старијих особа које је цунами грађанског рата избацио на турске обале” – О. Уравелли, Турецкий берег (русская эмиграция в 1920-1930-х гг), у: *Российские соотечественники в Турции: история и современность*, Стамбул 2008, 99-100.

¹¹⁹ U evropskoj Rusiji rat se završio boljševičkim zauzimanjem Krima 1920, a na Dalekom istoku 1922. s osvajanjem Vladivostoka – О. Ајрапетов, *Rusija 1917: propast carstva*, Beograd 2017, 481.

¹²⁰ Т. Олдџај, Руси на турској обали: Бела емиграција 1920.-1930-их година, у: *Ruski egzodus – vek sećanja*, Beograd 2021, 33-34.

Istanbul je 1920. imao oko 1,2 miliona stanovnika, od čega 560.434 muslimana, 384.689 Grka-fanariota, 118.000 Jermena i 44.795 Jevreja.¹²¹ U novembru 1920. ostaci ruske carske armije, s mnogo civila, pod komandom generala Vrangelja (Пётр Н. Врангель, 1878-1928), u šarenoj floti preko stotinu brodova, izbjeglih s Krima, svog zadnjeg uporišta, uplovili su u Zlatni rog. U Istanbulu se prvobitno očekivao dolazak 30.000 ljudi. U stvarnosti ih je bilo pet puta više – 150.000. Među njima su bile dvije trećine vojske i jedna trećina civila (13.000 muškaraca, 30.000 žena i 7.000 djece). Prema sovjetskim podacima – 86.000 vojnika i oko 60.000 civila.¹²²

Prema riječima mnogih emigranata ukrcanih na ruske brodove, “put od Krima do Turske bio je izuzetno težak. Nije bilo dovoljno hrane i vode - jeli su haringe i pili morsku vodu. Pogača se dijelila na 50 ljudi. Od brašna dobivenog iz skladišta pravili su se kolači i “pekli” na parnim cijevima. Ljude su mučili glad, žeđ, crijevne bolesti, prljavština i insekti. Štakori su bili nepodnošljivi: noću su se spuštali sa stropova i zidova i škripeći prelazili preko ljudi koji su spavali jedni pored drugih. Puno je bolje bilo onima koji su imali sreću doći na strane brodove”.¹²³ Jedan osmanski savremenik je pisao da je sam pogled na teretne brodove pristigle s Krima “najstrašniji, najkatastrofalniji, najjadniji, diže vam se kosa na glavi. Kad je jedan od tih brodova ušao u moreuz i mogao se vidjeti izbliza, jedan od mojih drugova je primijetio da nikada neće zaboraviti toliku gomilu naroda. Ne mogu čak ni da pretpostavim šta se dešavalo unutra, ali spolja, od jarbola do sidra, ljudi su visili jedan na drugome kao grozdovi. Na malim čamcima koji su visili sa obe strane broda, nalazilo se po mojoj skromnoj procjeni po 50-60 ljudi. Neki su napola visili iznad vode, držeći se samo jednom rukom za užu. Sve što sam vidio potsjećalo je na gomilu prljavih i izgubljenih ljudskih

¹²¹ R. Radić, *Jugoslovenska kolonija u Carigradu između dva svjetska rata, Tokovi istorije*, br. 3-4, Beograd 2008, 203.

¹²² Koncentracija 150.000 ljudi u istanbulskim lukama izazvala je organizacijske probleme. Francuske okupacione vlasti započele su pregovore s vladama balkanskih zemalja za prihvata dijela tih emigranata. U organizaciji prijema, te medicinske i dobrotvorne pomoći izbjeglicama, Francuzi su se našli usamljeni jer su britansko zapovjedništvo i britanska vlada odbili podržati izbjeglice. Važno političko pitanje na kojem su Britanci insistirali bilo je raspoređivanje ruske vojske izvan blizine Istanbula (tj. uklanjanje vojske iz područja moreuza). Krajem 1920. broj Rusa u gradu, uključujući i prethodne talase, dosegao je maksimum od 167.000-170.000. Međutim, iz različitih razloga, broj Rusa u Istanbulu je opadao. U prvoj polovini 1921. u gradu je bilo 90.000-99.000, krajem 1921. - samo 30.000, a prema drugim izvorima 11.000 Rusa – М. Иванович, *Русская эмиграция на Балканах 1920-1940*, Москва 2005, 90-91; С. Н. Утругаури, *Белые русские на Босфоре: 1919-1929*, Москва 2013, 51.

¹²³ U cjelini, uslovi evakuacije u Istanbul bili su teški. Svi su brodovi bili krcati, neki nisu imali dovoljno pijaće vode. Na nekim brodovima vladala je prljavština, gužva, glad, a višak prtljage bacan je u more. Drugi su nosili vodu i namirnice. Emigrantima je bilo dopušteno da sa sobom ponesu što god žele. Kasnije, u Istanbulu, mogli su se vidjeti kompleti namještaja, kavezi s kokošima i lučna električna svjetla kako se njišu na vitlu. Sve su to ljudi donijeli u obliku “valute”. Ona je zauzimala toliko mjesta na nekim brodovima da mnogi nisu mogli ući u njih; opšir. С. Н. Утругаури, *Белые русские на Босфоре: 1919-1929*, Москва 2013, 46-47.

oblik stvorova. Ovi ostaci jučerašnje veličanstvene Ruske imperije, ostali su u našem pamćenju u obliku bezimenih, bezobličnih, dušeparajućih i tužnih slika”.¹²⁴ Oko 150.000 Rusa našlo se u srcu Istanbula (“Konstantinopolja”) o čijem su osvajanju maštale ne samo generacije slavenofilskih ekspanzionista.¹²⁵ Mirovni ugovor u Sevru 1920. lišio je Osmansko carstvo mnogih prava suverene države. Okupirana od armija država Antante u novembru 1918. prijestonica ovog carstva i sama je preživljavala težak period. Kao posljedica okupacije, u Istanbulu je bilo razmješteno «10 hiljada britanskih, 8 hiljada indijskih, 8 hiljada francuskih, 2 hiljade italijanskih vojnika i nešto malo Japanaca». Vojnici ruske carske armije su uspjeli da uđu u ovaj velegrad, ali ne kao osvajači, već kao izbjeglice. Suočili su se s neočekivanom dobrodošlicom osmanskih vlasti.¹²⁷ Osmanska reakcija na dolazak Rusa bila je djelimično akt pažnje “jednog umirućeg carstva prema drugom”.¹²⁸ Život ruskih vojnih kontingenata na

¹²⁴ Većina emigranata je bila u teškom stanju. Mnogi su davali u zalagaonice ili su prodavali svoje skupe stvari. U potrazi za sredstvima za život počeli su da niču ruski buvljaci, gdje se prodavale stvari donešene iz Rusije. Osim toga, u novinama svakodnevno se pojavljivalo mnoštvo oglasa o prodaji dragulja, tepiha, ikona, monokli; opšir. T. Oldžaj, *Rusi na turskoj obali: Bela emigracija 1920-1930-ih godina*, u: *Ruski egzodus – vek sećanja*, Beograd 2021, 34-36.

¹²⁵ Britanci i Francuzi su, starajući se o logističkoj strani operacije zbrinjavanja ovih izbjeglica, sproveli više od 25.000 Rusa u svoj stari logor na Galipolju. Istanbul je postao privremeno sjedište “izgnane Rusije”, ili *Emigracije* (Эмиграция), kako su izbjeglice nazivale svoju novu, “prenosnu domovinu”. Armija “bijelih” bila je impresivna po veličini – kružile su i glasine da će Rusi pokušati da preotmu vlast od saveznika, ali su to bile “neosnovane besmislice”. Ruski carski vojnici bili su izbjeglice čiji je svijet nestao pod ruševinama, bez jasnije perspektive gdje će osvanuti narednih mjeseci. Boljševička vlast će uskoro poništiti njihove pasoše, pretvarajući ih u lica bez domovine. U Istanbulu se otvaraju ruski restorani, barovi i kafei s muzikom. Bez obzira na zvanja, znanja, nivo obrazovanja, Rusi se prihvatili bilo kog posla: postajali su tesari, kamenorezci, kovači, vozači, kuvari, konobari, portiri, bavili se ribarstvom, pleli ribarske mreže, pravili su užad, abažure, dječije igračke, ženske torbice. Drugi su nalazili posao kao vrtlari, konjušari, fijakeristi, bravari, popravljali su vodovode, kolica, kočije, fijakere, drvena kola pa čak i šivaće mašine. Široke istanbulske bulevare i aleje preplavili su ruski oficiri kao vozači taksija, prodavci odjeće, knjiga i zlatnika na bazarima. Mnogi su išli gladni, u sve odrašanijoj obući i odjeći, bez dovoljno novca da kupe nešto novo. Život mnogih izbjeglica pretvorio se u puku borbu za opstanak – opšir. T. Rajs, *Orijentalista: rešavanje misterije jednog neobičnog i opasnog života*, Beograd 2014, 125-126; C. H. Утупраури, *Белые русские на Босфоре: 1919–1929*, 134-136; T. Oldžaj, *Rusi na turskoj obali: Bela emigracija 1920-1930-ih godina*, 36-37; T. A. Баран, *Жизнь русских эмигрантов в Стамбуле в эпоху перемирия, Журнал исследовательского центра Ататюрка*, т. 22, № 64–66 (март, июль, ноябрь), Анкара 2006, https://www.dk1868.ru/statii/Istanbul_Rus.htm.

¹²⁶ T. Oldžaj, *Rusi na turskoj obali: Bela emigracija 1920-1930-ih godina*, 34.

¹²⁷ М. Сигирджи, *Спасибо, Константинополь! По следам белоэмигрантов в Турции*, Санкт-Петербург 2018.

¹²⁸ Oktobarska revolucija potpuno je pobrkala sve planove. U apelu sovjetske vlade „Svim radnim muslimanima Rusije i Istoka” («Ко всем трудящимся мусульманам России и Востока») koji su 20. novembra (3. decembra) 1917. potpisali predsjednik Vijeća narodnih komesara V. I. Uljanov (Владимир И. Ленин - настоящая фамилия Ульянов) i narodni komesar za nacionalna pitanja Džugašvili (Иосиф Виссарионович Джугашвили Сталин), navedene su i sljedeći redovi: “Izjavljujemo da su tajni sporazumi svrgnutog cara o zauzimanju Carigrada, koje je potvrdio

području Istanbula i na Bosforu u to je vrijeme u naučnoj literaturi dobio je naziv «Галлиполиийское сидение».¹²⁹ Turske novine «İleri» u julu 1922. u članku pod naslovom «Rusi i Turci» pisale su da su Rusi ranije imali imidž da ne mogu bez zabave i da ne razmišljaju o budućnosti. Sada su oni prihvatili bilo koji posao, postali su konkurencija lokalnom stanovništvu za posao. «Da je politika cara Nikolaja II bila uspješna, ne mislim da bi Istanbul postao više rusificiran nego što je sada», napisao je autor članka.¹³⁰

Dio emigranata uputio se ubrzo preko osmanske države, nakon odobrenja vlade u Beogradu, ka novoformiranoj jugoslavenskoj državi. Između 41.000 i 44.000 lica je, iz više pravaca, u pet većih talasa od 1919. do 1923. pristiglo u ovu državu. U okviru prvog talasa koji je trajao od maja do kraja novembra 1919, u zemlju je pristiglo oko 1.600 izbjeglica. Ubrzo po završetku tog talasa – januara, odnosno marta 1920, započeo je drugi talas. U periodu od pet mjeseci doselilo se još oko 7.000–8.000 ljudi. Od kraja oktobra do sredine novembra 1920. nove 2.053 izbjeglice su upućene u Kraljevinu, a već od kraja novembra do kraja decembra te godine, u narednoj evakuaciji, oko 21.350 lica. U posljednjem većem talasu (od juna do novembra 1921, februara 1922. i maja 1923.) u zemlju je pristiglo oko 11.500 ljudi, uglavnom iz jedinica vojske

svrgnuti Kerenski - sada pocijepani i uništeni. Ruska Republika i njezina vlada, Vijeće narodnih komesara, protiv su zauzimanja strane zemlje: Carigrad mora ostati u rukama muslimana» – B. И. Косик, *Константинополь – русская дорога*, 31.

¹²⁹ Vlade Francuske i Velike Britanije prestale su smatrati rusku carsku vojsku vojnom kartom u političkoj i diplomatskoj igri sa Sovjetskom Rusijom, doprinoseći njezinoj disperziji po različitim zemljama; opšir. A. В. Радков, *Русская армия генерала Врангеля в эмиграции (ноябрь 1920-сентябрь 1924 гг) военно-политический и социальные аспекты*, Диссертация на соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук. Работа выполнена в ГОУ ВПО «Самарский государственный педагогический университет», Самара 2007.

¹³⁰ Е. В. Бахревский-И. А. Свистунова, *Образ России в Турции. Историческое развитие и современное состояние*, Москва 2019, 113. Savremenici su bilježili novotarije koje su izbjeglice unijele u istanbulski život: «Mnogi, previše da bi ih se moglo prebrojati, dobili su uši od prljavštine i siromaštva. Iz tog razloga žene šišaju kosu na ćelavo kako bi spriječile uši. Uprkos siromaštvu, nastojali su izraziti svoju individualnost ukrašavajući se što je više moguće. Vítke, plavooke plavuše, ruske žene (tada su njih nazivali «karašo») proizvodile su zapanjujući utisak. Njihova modna odeća «predstavljala je veliki kontrast sa običnom osmanskom i smatrana je kao posljednji evropski trend u muslimanskom Istanbulu». Ruskinje «karašo» donijele su u Istanbul stil posljednje evropske mode: nepokrivena glava, kratka frizura «zvono», tanka ešarpa oko glave dobile su kod Turkinja naziv «Rus başı» («ruska glava»). Od siromašnih izbjeglica, osmanske moderne dame i gospoda preuzeli su modu šarenih pelerina. Odjeća s izlzanim naramenicama odmah je postala moderna. Dolazak emigranata postao je izvor «vojne mode» («моды на военное») i «ruske mode» («русской моды»). Zajedno s iseljeništvom u Istanbulu, promijenio se koncept «mjesta za šetnju». Umjesto na Bosfor, turisti su odlazili na ostrva. Stanovnici Istanbula počeli su se kupati u moru. Ruske izbjeglice donijele su sa sobom modu za odmor na plaži; opšir. Т. Oldžaj, *Rusi na turskoj obali: Bela emigracija 1920.-1930-ih godina*, 38-39; Т. А. Баран, Жизнь русских эмигрантов в Стамбуле в эпоху перемирия, Жизнь русских эмигрантов в Стамбуле в эпоху перемирия, *Журнал исследовательского центра Ататюрка*, т. 22, № 64–66 (март, июль, ноябрь), Анкара 2006, https://www.dk1868.ru/statii/Istanbul_Rus.htm.
https://www.dk1868.ru/statii/Istanbul_Rus.htm.

posljednjeg glavnokomandujućeg Ruske armije generala Vrangelja. Nasuprot patosu o sveslavenskom jedinstvu stajala je realnost međusobnog nepoznavanja. Univerzalni problem odnosa prema „drugom” postojan je samo u svojoj promjenljivosti.¹³¹

Uloga Kraljevine SHS bila je da sprječava reviziju poratnog uređenja Evrope i da bude jedna od prepreka eventualnom širenju sovjetske države na Zapad. To je bila znatno drugačija funkcija od uloge koju je imala Kraljevina Srbija kao prijateljska država i štitenica Ruskog carstva.¹³² Raniji odnosi Srba i Rusa u “velikoj meri su izgubili predznak. Nastupila je era ideologije”.¹³³ U Kremlju se promijenila zvanična politika prema Balkanu. Iz tradicionalnih okvira okrenuta je ka revolucionarnim tokovima. Gledano iz ugla kraljevskog režima u Beogradu, “prva zemlja socijalizma” doživljavana je kao opasnost po postojeći poredak, “država revolucija i revolucionarnog terora”.¹³⁴ Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević održavao je nekoliko godina i iluzornog ambasadora carske Rusije u Beogradu, Vasilija Štrandmana (Василий Н. Штрандман), ruskog otpravnika poslova još iz vremena austrougarskog ultimatum a i objave rata Srbiji 1914. godine.¹³⁵ Vidjeći u sovjetskom režimu prevratnički režim koji je uništio carsku vlast i u ime internacionalizma potisnuo pravoslavlje i slavenstvo, kralj Aleksandar je vjerovao u obnovu Ruskog carstva, prihvatajući zato i rusku emigraciju.¹³⁶ Vasпитан na petrogradskom dvoru, zanosio se mislima da dinastija

¹³¹ M. Jovanović, Slika „drugog”: ruske izbeglice u zemljama Balkana (1920–1940), *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, br. 1-3, Beograd 1998, 43, 64. Izveštaj upućen decembra 1920. vladinom opunomoćeniku za smještaj ruskih izbeglica u Kraljevini SHS predstavio je prijem pridošlica u tradicionalno rusofilski orijentiranom istočnom dijelu kraljevine: „Pre svega potrebno je primetiti neobično topao, čak oduševljen odnos Srba prema Rusima bez razlike. Prvim grupama ruskih izbeglica koje su došle iz Odese priređivani su trijumfalni susreti tokom čitavog puta kojim su išli, sa učešćem najviših predstavnika vojnih i građanskih vlasti i mnoštvom naroda koji je radosno pozdravljao Ruse”. Međutim, slika prijema pridošlica nije bila idilična - M. Živanović, „Naši ili njihovi”: ruske izbeglice u jugoslovenskoj javnosti (1920–1941), u: *Između slobode i teskobe: nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd 2023, 120–125.

¹³² Kulturna razmjena s “prvom zemljom socijalizma” je smatrana za mogući kanal neprijateljske propagande, pa je suzbijana. Takav odnos je proizilazio, pored ideoloških razlika u odnosu na sovjetsku vlast, i iz međunarodne uloge Jugoslavije kao dijela “francuskog sistema” bezbjednosti u Evropi – G. Miloradović, *Ruski/sovjetski kulturni uticaj u Srbiji/Jugoslaviji u XX i XXI veku*, <https://www.isac-fund.org/download/VII-Goran-Miloradovic-CIR.pdf>.

¹³³ A. Silkin, “Velikosrpska hegemonija” i teška sudbina “nesrpskih naroda” u Kraljevini SHS/Jugoslaviji: od dokumenata Kominterne do savremene ruske historiografije, u: *Srbija i ruska revolucija 1917: nove teme i izazovi*, Beograd 2017, 410.

¹³⁴ A. Životić, *Moskovski gambit: Jugoslavija, SSSR i prodor Trećeg rajha na Balkan 1938–1941*, Beograd 2020, 13.

¹³⁵ S. Pribećević, *Diktatura kralja Aleksandra*, Beograd 1952, 251; M. Jovanović, Kraljevina SHS i antiboljševička Rusija 1918–1924: skica za sveobuhvatno tumačenje, *Tokovi istorije*, br. 1-2, Beograd 1995, 125–126.

¹³⁶ B. Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*, knj. 1, Beograd 1988, 201. Kategoričko odbijanje Nikole Pašića priznanja Sovjetskog Saveza povezano je sa sopstvenim rusofilstvom, emigracijom

Karađorđević zaposjedne čak i romanovski tron.¹³⁷ Vlasti u Beogradu su pomagale borbu bjelogardejskih snaga (Bijeli pokret – “Белое движение”; “Белое дело”; “Белая идея”) dok je trajao građanski rat u Rusiji. U Kraljevini SHS je 1920. došlo 22.000 vojnika carskog generala Vrangela. U Sarajevu je radila vojna akademija koja je obučavala pitomce i spremala ih potom na Krim.¹³⁸ Preko Boke Kotorske slata je svojedobno američka pomoć u municiji i naoružanju bjelogardejskim (“белогвардейцы”, “белые”) snagama na Krimu.¹³⁹

Prijem ruskih izbjeglica na teritoriju Kraljevine SHS bio je 1918.-1920. formuliran kao “vraćanje duga Rusiji” za njenu podršku Srbiji 1914. i kasnije tokom “Velikog rata”.¹⁴⁰ Najveći broj emigranata je pristizao brodovima do Istanbula i Soluna, pa dalje vozovima preko Đevđelije do gradova u Kraljevini SHS, ili preko jadranskih luka. Ova kraljevina je bila jedina zemlja u Evropi koja je državno-pravno institucionalizirala njihov prihvata.¹⁴¹ Primala ih je i zbog pritiska

u carsku Rusiju, činjenicom da je ona bila njegov najjači oslonac, kao i osjećajem duga prema caru Nikolaju II koji mu je prilikom audijencije početkom 1914. obećao: „Za Srbiju ćemo sve uraditi”. Stoga je i razumljiv njegov stav po pitanju uspostavljanja diplomatskih odnosa sa SSSR-om: „Dok sam ja živ – to ne može biti. Sad od toga nikakve koristi ne bi imali, a docnije bi nam to samo škodilo”. U redovima Srpske pravoslavne crkve Nikolaj II je opisivao kao „spasilac naše zemlje, otac jedinstva naše braće” koji je „mučenički pao za našu pravednu stvar”. Imenovan je za „blaženopočivšeg” i „neumrlog mučenika našeg nacionalnog jedinstva” – M. Živanović, *Slika posljednjeg ruskog cara kod Srba u 20. veku*, 265-266.

¹³⁷ U beogradskoj “Politici” se našla i notica kako je kralj Aleksandar planirao da za nasljednika, kada se mislilo da ne može imati poroda, uzme sina svoje sestre Jelene (Елена Петровна Сербская, 1884-1962), udate za ruskog velikog kneza Ivana Romanova (Иоанн (Иван) К. Романов, 1886-1918). “Politika” je navodila da mogući novi prestolonasljednik Vsevolod (Всеволод Иоаннович, 1914-1973) ima u svojim žilama krvi tri dinastije: romanovske, karađorđevićevske i njegoševske – V. Dedijer, *Novi prilozii za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, knj. 1, Rijeka 1980, 77-78.

¹³⁸ Ni u jednom gradu u Jugoslaviji Rusi nisu bili uočljiviji nego u Sarajevu, zahvaljujući kadetskom korpusu. Ponekad je nedjeljom u parku cara Dušana svirao kadetski orkestar. Dobiti poziv za kadetski bal smatralo se privilegijom. Oficiri koji su služili u korpusu nosili su ruske uniforme unutar zgrade korpusa kao i u po gradu. Ta zgrada je bila jedna od atrakcija Sarajeva. Pitomci su priređivali koncerte horske muzike, priredbe, organizirali književne večeri, prikazivali gimnastičke (sokolske) vježbe. Ovaj korpus se 5. septembra 1929. preselio u Belu Crkvu (Banat). Umrli činovi Kadetskog zbora i kadeti pokopavani su na Starom vojničkom groblju u Sarajevu, na posebnoj parceli, uz vojne počasti. Na tom prostoru su pokopavani i članovi ruske kolonije u Sarajevu. Tu je stajao ružičasti mramorni krst s natpisom: “Mir vama”. U razdoblju 1920.-1940. pokopano je tu sedam oficira i devet pitomaca. U podnožju zajedničkog spomenika u obliku krsta sahranjen je organizator i prvi upravitelj korpusa, general-pukovnik Adamovič (Б. В. Адамович) – А. Б. Арсеньев, *Русская эмиграция в Боснии и Герцеговине (1919–1990-е гг.)*, *Ежегодник Дома русского зарубежья имени Александра Солженицына*, № 1, Москва 2011, 155.

¹³⁹ D. Petrović, *Jugoslovenska politička javnost i SSSR 1922-1941*, doktorska disertacija, Filozofski fakultet, Novi Sad 2014, 140-141.

¹⁴⁰ M. Jovanović, Kraljevina SHS i antiboljševička Rusija 1918-1924, *Tokovi istorije*, br. 1-2, Beograd 1995, 100; Ю. А. Петров, *Россия и окончание Первой мировой войны 1918–1922*, 135.

¹⁴¹ Potresan je bio običaj sahranjivanja preminulih izbjeglica sa šakom ruske zemlje ponijetom na put i s nadom u skori povratak – M. Knežević, Rusi u Srbiji između dva svetska rata, *Nasleđe*, br.

Velike Britanije i Francuske koje su željele ojačati borbu protiv boljševičke Rusije: “Rusi su tada ulazili u srpsku zemlju, neometani nikakvim kvotama, vizama, ograničenjima, pasošima itd.”.¹⁴² Sjećanje na bratstvo po oružju iz svjetskog rata živjelo je među ruskim emigrantima koji su pronašli svoje najsigurnije utočište upravo u istočnim dijelovima Kraljevine SHS, odnosno u predratnoj Srbiji.¹⁴³ U izvještajima ruskih zvaničnika, zaduženih za smještaj izbjeglica, naglašavan je 1920. “neobično topao, čak oduševljen odnos Srba prema Rusima bez razlike. Prvim grupama ruskih izbjeglica koje su došle iz

37/2, Kragujevac 2017, 186. U monarhističkoj jugoslavenskoj državi 1918.-1941. osjećao se, navodi Nikola Samardžić, dvostruki ruski uticaj: na razvoj radničkog i komunističkog pokreta, i u građanskom društvu koje je prihvatilo izbjeglice od boljševičkih progona (“beli” emigranti). Najveći dio nastanio se u Beogradu: vojni i državni vrh Rusije, Sveti sinod Ruske pravoslavne crkve u rasejanju, naučnici, umjetnici, arhitekta, ljekari, inženjeri. U Beogradu su sahranjeni glavni komandant ruske “bele” armije Petar Vrangel, i 30 članova državne Dume. Ruska emigracija doprinijela je razvoju Beograda, koji je oskudijevao u stručnjacima, i suočavao se s posljedicama ratnog razaranja. Njihov kulturni i društveni uticaj osjećao se u klerikalizaciji javnog života, prodoru teorija zavjera, antizapadnjačkih osjećanja i stavova, antisemitizma. Kraljevina Jugoslavija priznala je Sovjetski Savez tek 1940., sedam godina pošto su to učinile SAD; opšir. N. Samardžić, *Limes: istorijska margina i poreklo posebnosti Jugoistočne Evrope*, Beograd 2017; B. C. Путятин, *Российские профессора югославских университетов: 1920-1941*, Диссертация на соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук, Московский государственный университет им. М. В. Ломоносова, Москва 2010.

¹⁴² “Odnos prema ruskim emigrantima u Jugoslaviji, a posebno u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, bio je poseban. Tradicionalni odnos ovih pravoslavnih naroda prema historijskoj Rusiji, čiji su preživjeli bili dio u očima lokalnog stanovništva, prenio se na ruske izbjeglice. Stoljetna ruska odbrana interesa pravoslavnih Slavena, a posebno uloge Rusije i cara Nikolaja II u zbivanjima Prvog svjetskog rata, nije mogla ostati bez odgovora. I u Jugoslaviji su shvatili da je, prema definiciji prof. Pio-Uljskog (Георгий Н. Пию-Ульский), “gubitak domovine od strane Rusa posljedica rata”, rat za odbranu Srbije. Opšte raspoloženje savršeno je izrazio predsjednik Ministarskog vijeća Nikola Pašić 25. januara 1922. na sjednici Skupštine: “Što se tiče Rusije, stvar vam je dobro poznata. Mi, Srbi, kao i druga naša braća koju smo imali priliku osloboditi i ujediniti, svi smo zahvalni velikom ruskom narodu, koji nam je pohitao u pomoć od propasti kojom nam je Austro-Ugarska prijetila objavom rata. Da Rusija nije uradila ovo, da nije stala u našu odbranu, umrli bismo... (Rusija) je uvukla i svoje saveznike, a mi smo spašeni od smrti. To ne možemo zaboraviti. Sad smo prihvatili ruske emigrante i prihvaćamo njih bez razlike u kojoj su stranci” – Е. Бондарева, *Русская эмиграция в Югославии (1920–1945)*, http://www.perspektivy.info/rus/rassey/russkaja_emigracija_v_jugoslavii_19201945_2007-03-19.htm; Н. Бондарев, *Россия и русские в истории Сербии, (III)*, <https://russkiymir.ru/publications/85034/>.

¹⁴³ N. Kopilov, *Savremena ruska historiografija o rusko-srpskim odnosima za vreme Prvog svjetskog rata i Ruske revolucije, Tokovi istorije*, br. 1, Beograd 2022, 297, 934. U Beogradu je 1934, pri ponovnom sahranjivanju posmrtnih ostataka ruskih vojnika, srpski patrijarh Varnava kazao da ništa ne može da ugasi osjećanja ljubavi i zahvalnosti prema carskoj Rusiji i ruskom narodu: „Svi mi dobro znamo kako su se naša severna braća, Rusi, zajedno s nama borili i ginuli u bitkama na teritoriji Srbije i svojom krvlju, svojom smrću potvrdili svoju ljubav prema nama, svojoj mlađoj braći” – N. V. Vasiljeva, *Uloga „ruskog faktora” u rešavanju jugoslovenskog pitanja u vreme Prvog svjetskog rata*, 195.

Odese priređivani su svečani dočeci”.¹⁴⁴ Ukupan broj ruskih izbjeglica u Kraljevini SHS do 1923., kada su pristigli posljednji vojnici generala Vrangela iz Istanbula, iznosio je između 41.000 i 44.000.¹⁴⁵ Između 1920. i 1930. godine 15 ruskih naučnika primljeno je u članstvo Srpske kraljevske akademije (SKA), “nijedna nacionalna skupina u Kraljevini SHS nije bila razmjerno brojna u SKA kao ruski emigranti”.¹⁴⁶ Mnoštvo ruskih školskih ustanova, kulturnih, naučnih i sportskih organizacija, sirotišta bilo je pod pokroviteljstvom vladajuće kuće Karađorđevića”.¹⁴⁷ Pokroviteljski odnos jugoslavenske države stvorio je “povoljni socio-kulturni uslovi za rusku vojnu emigraciju, osigurali su joj prilično visok pravni status i uslove svakodnevnog života”.¹⁴⁸ Pitanje reguliranja

¹⁴⁴ U drugim izvještajima je stajalo: “Srbi, prijatelji stare Rusije, za sve su im izlazili u susret, i Rusi, obasipani pažnjom sa svih strana, osećali su se skoro kao kod kuće” - M. Živanović, *Sudbina nasleđa ruske emigracije u Jugoslaviji 1944-1945*, *Istorija 20. veka*, br. 1, Beograd 2021, 77-78.

¹⁴⁵ M. Živanović, *Sudbina nasleđa ruske emigracije u Jugoslaviji 1944-1945*, 77. Na Balkan je do 1923. emigriralo oko 200.000 izbjeglica, prevashodno s juga SSSR-a - mahom iz Ukrajine i Donske oblasti. Dio njih se 1923-1926. odselio u Zapadnu Evropu, pretežno u Francusku i Belgiju. Oko 1931. broj ruskih izbjeglica na Balkanu smanjio se na oko 55.000-60.000. Uoči Drugog svjetskog rata bilo ih je između 40.000 i 50.000. Mahom su bili koncentrisani u Jugoslaviji i Bugarskoj - D. Petrović, *Jugoslavenska politička javnost i SSSR 1922-1941*, 305-306.

¹⁴⁶ M. Н. Потёмкина-А. Л. Черемисин, *Сербия и Сербия в освещении российской прессы: стереотипы и образы*, *Nasleđe*, br. 37/1, Kragujevac 2017, 16; opšir. M. Ю. Сорокина, *Русское научное зарубежье и Сербская академия наук и искусств в XX веке*, u: *Столетие двух эмиграций. 1919-2019*, Сборник статей, Москва-Белград 2019, 229-238. Izbjegli ruski kaluđeri su obnovili monaški život u nekim opustjelim manastirima. Značajan broj ruskih teologa (profesora Bogoslovije) angažiran je u daljem razvoju pravoslavnog vjerskog života i nastave, naročito u srpskim gradskim sredinama - D. Tanić, Ključni momenti srpsko-ruskih kulturoloških i duhovno-ideoloških prožimanja od Svetog Save do vladike Nikolaja, u: *Igumanija Ana (Adžić)*, Jagodina Kragujevac 2019, 73-74.

¹⁴⁷ Л. В. Кузьмичева, *Деятельность Королевского Двора Югославии по организации помощи русским эмигрантам*, u: *Столетие двух эмиграций. 1919-2019*, Москва-Белград 2019, 147.

¹⁴⁸ Odseljavanje iz Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije iz niza razloga, svelo je 30-ih godina rusku emigrantsku populaciju na oko 30.000 ljudi. Približavanje jedinica Crvene armije granicama Jugoslavije u jesen 1944. stavilo je preostale emigrante pred dilemu – ostanak ili novo izbeglištvo. Oni koji su ostali palili su dokumente iz ličnih arhiva, fotografije u uniformama, krili ordenje i relikvije iz carskog vremena. Od oko 30.000 emigranata koji su živjeli u jugoslavenskoj državi predd rat 1941., u Jugoslaviji je u novembru 1945, prema sovjetskim podacima, ostalo 12.519 (s tim da su u ovu brojku uključeni Rusi koji nisu imali državljanstvo Jugoslavije ili neke druge države). Sredinom 1949. broj Rusa u Jugoslaviji je, prema podacima Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova FNRJ, iznosio 13.057 – sovjetsko državljanstvo je imalo 5.874, a jugoslavensko 6.887 – M. Živanović, *Sudbina nasleđa ruske emigracije u Jugoslaviji 1944-1945*, 79-80; F. Škiljan, *Rusi u Hrvatskoj između 1991. i 2011.*, *Studia lexicographica*, br. 2(9), Zagreb 2011, 22; opšir. C. H. Дычко, *Российская военная эмиграция в Югославию в 1920-1945 гг.: институционализация и деятельность*, Диссертация на соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук, Москва 2006; M. Jovanović, *Doseljavanje ruskih izbeglica u Kraljevinu SSHS 1919-1924*, Beograd 1996. Dio oficira imao je, nakon njemačkog napada 1941. na Jugoslaviju, našao se pred novim iskušenjima: “В 1941 г, во время германо-югославской войны часть русских офицеров воевала в югославской армии и была увезена в плен в Германию. Но большинство офицеров

odnosa Jugoslavije sa Sovjetskim Savezom je dugo bilo predmet sporova niza političkih faktora u Kraljevini.¹⁴⁹

Zaključak

Želja za zauzimanjem crnomorskih moreuza ili za stvaranjem režima koji bi jamčio njihovu otvorenost i sigurnost crnomorske obale, bila je dominantan faktor ruske spoljne politike otkako se Rusko carstvo pozicioniralo u toj regiji. Strateški značaj Bosfora i Dardanela uvijek je bio u fokusu, ali je radikalno rješavanje tog pitanja, odgađano do trenutka “kada će Rusija na to moći koncentrirati sve svoje snage”. Između ambicija ruskog carizma i njegovih moći postojao je, uz izostanak podrške drugih velikih sila, “bitni i suštinski nesklad”. Za Petrograd su podjednako bila važna tri aspekta njegove balkanske politike: odnosi s Portom, s velikim silama, te s pravoslavnim državama i narodima Balkana. Ulazak Osmanskog carstva u rat na strani austro-njemačkog bloka zatvorio je moreuze Bosfor i Dardanele Rusiji i pogoršao njenu ekonomsku situaciju. Želja za osiguranjem pristupa Sredozemnom moru, središtu globalnih trgovačkih ruta i potreba za razvojem južne morske rute gurnuli su Rusiju u globalni sukob. Evropske napetosti, koje su se za Rusiju prvenstveno koncentrirale na Balkanu, također su ovisile o sudbini moreuza i Istanbula. Posljednji ruski car Nikolaj II, bliže je srcu nego bilo koji drugi ruski vladar primio slogan “krst na Aja Sofiju!”. Zauzimanje Istanbula i moreuza ostalo je strateški cilj ruske vojske tokom njenog učešća u Prvom svjetskom ratu. Značaj pitanja moreuza se shvaćao kao dobijanje dominantnog položaja na Bliskom istoku. Njihovo posjedovanje smatralo se pružanjem „ključeva vlastitog doma” i iskorakom prema dobijanju odlučujućeg uticaja na Balkanu, u Maloj Aziji – od Egejskog mora do perzijske granice, pa i dalje od nje, gdje je Rusija težila prema jugu i natjecanju s Velikom Britanijom. Rusija je na “putu za Konstantinopolj”

служили в Русском Корпусе и других русских антисоветских объединениях... После войны многие из них были арестованы, частично расстреляны, частично вывезены в СССР” – Т. В. Татоли, Русская военная эмиграция в Сербии (20-30 гг. XX в), в: *Исторические связи России и Сербии*, Белград 2019, 166.

¹⁴⁹ Stvari su se krajem 30-ih godina, sa zaoštavanjima prilika u Evropi, počele mijenjati. Pišući o pobjedi srpske vojske na Ceru 1914, Štrandman, nekadašnji ruski carski diplomata i poslanik u Srbiji, u svojim *Uspomenama* prisjećao se jednog događaja iz augusta 1939. godine: „Ko bi tada poverovao da posle 25 godina, na svečanu proslavu jubileja srpske pobjede, nismo bili pozvani ni ja, koji sam imao zvanični status u Beogradu, ni general Artamonov... Sudeći po iscrpnim novinskim izveštajima i pričama očevidaca, u govorima predsednika ministarskog saveta Dragiše Cvetkovića, patrijarha Gavrila i generala Dušana Trifunovića nisu spomenuti ni car Nikolaj ni Rusija uopšte. To je neverovatno, ali je ipak tako. Moje i Artamonovljevo prisustvo na ovoj svečanosti se smatralo nepoželjnim. Nisu želeli da se sećaju spasilačke ruke carske Rusije pružene Srbiji. To je učinjeno da bi se dodvorili boljševicima”. Nakon što je u junu 1940. Jugoslavija priznala Sovjetski Savez, iz štampe postepeno iščezavaju tekstovi o ruskoj emigraciji, caru Nikolaju II i carskoj Rusiji i ustupaju mjesto prosovjetskim – M. Živanović, *Slika posljednjeg ruskog cara kod Srba u 20. veku*, 273.

trebala i saveznike u “balkanskim poslovima”. Žudeći za Istanbulom, nije htjela “uvrijediti Evropu”. Aneksiju Istanbula i moreuza smatrala je zasluženom nagradom za svoje učešće u svjetskom ratu. Međutim, ruski saveznici Britanci i Francuzi činili su sve što su mogli da to onemoguće. Nikada nisu dali jasno obećanje; sve se ograničavalo na usmene sporazume ili neke memorandume. Ruski Generalaštab također nije bio u stanju, iz više razloga, izvesti operaciju zauzimanja moreuza. U proljeće 1915. Nikolaj II je potpisao direktivu za iskrcavanje na obale Bosfora. U tu svrhu, unutar Odeskog vojnog okruga formirana je 7. armija, koja se sastojala od dva korpusa. U isto vrijeme, britanske trupe već su se iskrcale na obale Dardanela. Ranije su V. Britanija i Francuska potpisale tajni sporazum s Rusijom kojim su priznate ruska “prava” na Istanbul. Ove države nisu smatrali ozbiljnim svoje obećanje Rusiji o predaji moreuza. S izbijanjem njemačke ofanzive, ruske trupe namijenjene iskrcavanju korištene su da bi se popunile rupe na tom frontu. Kada je početkom 1917, ruski car ponovno naredio pripreme za iskrcavanje, nije bilo snage da se izvrše te naredbe: u zemlji je izbila revolucija s dalekosežnim posljedicama. Vojnici carske Rusije će ipak ući u Istanbul, ali nakon okončanja svjetskog sukoba, kao izbjeglice, poražena strana u građanskom ratu u Rusiji (1918-1922). Dio ruskih emigranata – civila, nekadašnjih vojnika i oficira, došao je i na Balkan koji nakon 1918. nije postao ono što su 1914. carske vlasti u Petrogradu zamišljale.

Summary

The desire to capture the Black Sea straits, or to establish a regime that would guarantee their openness and the security of the Black Sea coast, had been a dominant factor in Russian foreign policy ever since the Russian Empire positioned itself in the region. The strategic importance of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was always in focus, but a radical resolution to this issue was postponed until the moment “when Russia would be able to concentrate all its forces on it.” Between the ambitions of Russian tsarism and its capabilities, along with the lack of support from other great powers, there existed an “essential and fundamental discord.” For Petrograd, three aspects of its Balkan policy were of equal importance: relations with the Porte, with the great powers, and with the Orthodox states and peoples of the Balkans.

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Austro-German bloc closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to Russia and worsened its economic situation. The desire to secure access to the Mediterranean Sea—the hub of global trade routes—and the need to develop the southern sea route pushed Russia into a global conflict. European tensions, which for Russia were primarily concentrated in the Balkans, also depended on the fate of the straits and Istanbul. The last Russian Tsar, Nicholas II, took the slogan “the cross on Hagia Sophia!” closer to heart than any other Russian ruler. Gaining control of Istanbul

and the straits remained a strategic goal of the Russian military throughout its participation in the First World War.

The significance of the straits issue was understood as securing a dominant position in the Middle East. Possessing them was seen as providing the “keys to one's own home” and a step toward gaining a decisive influence in the Balkans, in Asia Minor—from the Aegean Sea to the Persian border, and even beyond, where Russia strived southward and into competition with Great Britain. On the “path to Constantinople,” Russia also needed allies in “Balkan affairs.” Yearning for Istanbul, it did not want to “offend Europe.” It considered the annexation of Istanbul and the straits to be a well-deserved reward for its participation in the world war. However, Russia's British and French allies did everything they could to prevent this. They never gave a clear promise; everything was limited to verbal agreements or certain memorandums.

The Russian General Staff was also unable, for several reasons, to carry out the operation to capture the straits. In the spring of 1915, Nicholas II signed a directive for a landing on the shores of the Bosphorus. For this purpose, the 7th Army, consisting of two corps, was formed within the Odessa Military District. At the same time, British troops had already landed on the shores of the Dardanelles. Earlier, Great Britain and France had signed a secret agreement with Russia, recognizing Russian “rights” to Istanbul. These states did not seriously consider their promise to hand over the straits to Russia. With the outbreak of the German offensive, the Russian troops intended for the landing were used to plug holes on that front.

When, in early 1917, the Russian Tsar once again ordered preparations for the landing, there was no strength to carry out those orders: a revolution with far-reaching consequences had broken out in the country. The soldiers of Imperial Russia would nevertheless enter Istanbul, but only after the end of the global conflict—as refugees, the defeated side in the Russian Civil War (1918–1922). A portion of the Russian emigrants—civilians, former soldiers, and officers—also came to the Balkans, which after 1918 did not become what the tsarist authorities in Petrograd had envisioned in 1914.

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AGRARIAN REFORMS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND SERBIAN COLONIZATION OF KOSOVO 1918-1924

Abstract: *During the period between the two World Wars, the displacement of Albanians from Kosovo became routine. Continuous repression by Serbia was creating conditions for the mass displacement of Kosovo Albanians. The Albanian government, powerless to prevent this process, addressed its prefectures through an official notice requesting that refugees fleeing from Yugoslavia to Albania be granted easier access to residence permits, or be facilitated in migrating from Albania to a third country.*

The Serbian army claimed that it was pursuing the rebellious elements of the Kaçak Movement in Kosovo; however, in reality, its primary target was consistently the Albanian population living in their native lands. Civilians were not spared; consequently, they bombarded, burned, and destroyed everything that could be considered "Albanian property." It was these same civilians who suffered the most from the actions of the Serbian army and police, as they were used as the (alleged) targets in the disarmament campaigns carried out by Serbian forces against Albanians.

The reoccupation of Kosovo by Serbo-Montenegrin forces in October 1918 was carried out through systematic and organized violence by their military. Their objective was the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and the creation of suitable conditions for the settlement of Serbian colonists in Albanian-inhabited areas. In order to ensure the success of this ethnic cleansing, Serbia employed all mechanisms of the state apparatus, as well as violent measures that preceded and accompanied the process in question: killings, imprisonment, the alteration of people's names, the forced relocation of populations, and the conversion of

their religion from Islam and Catholicism to Orthodoxy. Furthermore, the Agrarian Reform was used as an instrument through which the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and other Albanian-inhabited territories outside Albania could be presented as a legitimate undertaking.

All of these acts had a single objective: to intimidate the Albanian population so that Kosovo would remain a Serbian land, as Serbian propaganda had consistently claimed.

Key words: *Agrarian reform, albanians, displacement, Kosovo, Serbia.*

AGRARNE REFORME U JUGOSLAVIJI I SRPSKA KOLONIZACIJA KOSOVA 1918–1924.

Apstrakt: *Tokom perioda između dva svjetska rata, raseljavanje Albanaca s Kosova postalo je uobičajeno. Neprekidna represija od strane Srbije stvarala je uslove za masovno raseljavanje kosovskih Albanaca. Albanska vlada, nemoćna da spriječi ovaj proces, obratila se svojim prefekturama službenim obavještenjem u kojem je tražila da se izbjeglicama koje bježe iz Jugoslavije u Albaniju omogući lakši pristup boravišnim dozvolama ili da im se olakša migracija iz Albanije u treću zemlju.*

Srpska vojska je tvrdila da progoni pobunjeničke elemente kačaćkog pokreta na Kosovu; međutim, u stvarnosti, njena primarna meta konstantno je bilo albansko stanovništvo koje je živjelo na svojoj rodnoj zemlji. Civili nisu bili pošteđeni; stoga su bombardovali, palili i uništavali sve što bi se moglo smatrati „albanskom imovinom“. Upravo su ti civilni najviše stradali od akcija srpske vojske i policije, jer su korišteni kao (navodne) mete u kampanjama razoružavanja koje su srpske snage provodile protiv Albanaca.

Ponovna okupacija Kosova od strane srpsko-crnogorskih snaga u oktobru 1918. godine izvršena je kroz sistematsko i organizovano nasilje njihove vojske. Njihov cilj bio je etničko čišćenje Kosova i stvaranje pogodnih uslova za naseljavanje srpskih kolonista u područja naseljena Albancima. Kako bi osigurala uspjeh ovog etničkog čišćenja, Srbija je koristila sve mehanizme državnog aparata, kao i nasilne mjere koje su prethodile tom procesu i pratile ga: ubistva, zatvaranja, promjenu ličnih imena, prisilno preseljavanje stanovništva i prevođenje njihove vjere iz islama i katoličanstva u pravoslavlje. Nadalje, agrarna reforma je korištena kao instrument pomoću kojeg se protjerivanje Albanaca s Kosova i drugih teritorija naseljenih Albancima izvan Albanije moglo prikazati kao legitiman poduhvat.

Sva ova djela imala su samo jedan cilj: zastrašiti albansko stanovništvo kako bi Kosovo ostalo srpska zemlja, što je srpska propaganda neprestano tvrdila.

Ključne riječi: *Agrarna reforma, Albanci, raseljavanje, Kosovo, Srbija.*

Introduction

During the period following the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, Kosovo underwent significant political and socio-economic changes. Agrarian reform, officially aimed at abolishing feudal relations and redistributing land, became a central state policy. In practice, however, it was closely linked to colonization efforts and demographic transformation. The Albanian majority population faced land expropriation, political pressure, and displacement. This study examines the conditions in Kosovo, the structure of land ownership, and the implementation and consequences of agrarian reform and colonization policies between 1918 and 1924.

Conditions in Kosovo after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes

Serbs are best realizing the ethnic cleansing of Albanians via the agrarian reform. This reform is supported on two principles adopted by the National Assembly of the SCS (Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia Kingdom):

1. The elimination of all feudal relations which still exist in the territories of SCS, with the primary goal of abolishing slavery with fair compensation, as well as all privileges stemming from feudal relations;
2. For general public purposes, particularly for the division and colonization among the broader layers of the agrarian economy.¹

The Kingdom of SCS drafted a program for the cleansing of territories inhabited by Albanians.² In support of this program, the Serbian army and gendarmerie from 1919 to 1921 destroyed 182 Albanian villages and carried out numerous massacres against the civilian population.³ The colonization of Kosovo with the Serb-Montenegrin settlers was primarily concentrated in the Dukagjin and Kosovo Plains, as well as in areas of strategic interest to the Kingdom of SCS.⁴ Serbia was trying to award even Montenegro in some way, by colonizing Kosovo and North Macedonia. By offering favorable conditions through the Agrarian Reform, many Montenegrin settlers were established in Kosovo and North Macedonia. The Kingdom of SCS was highly focused on Kosovo with the aim of ethnic cleansing, expelling Albanians, and establishing

¹ Milovan Obradović, *Reformat agrare dhe kolonizimi në Kosovë 1918-1941*, Instituti i Historisë-Prishtinë, Prishtinë 2005, 52.

² *Qarkore Prefekturave*, Fletorja zyrtare, (1923, qershor 8), 15, 2.

³ Ali Sh. Berisha, *Gallapi i Prishtinës III 1912-1941*, Printing Press, Prishtinë 2009, 114.

⁴ Ramiz Zekaj, *Zhvillimi i Kulturës Islame te Shqiptarët gjatë shekullit XX*, Instituti shqiptar i mendimit dhe qytetërimit islamik, Tiranë 1997, 33.

a Serb-Montenegrin demographic balance.⁵

Structure of the population and land ownership in Kosovo

The population structure of Kosovo in the period following 1918 was characterized by a clear Albanian majority, estimated at around 70–75%, while Serb-Montenegrins and other minorities comprised no more than 24% of the total population in Kosovo during 1919 – 1920.⁶ Considering the growth rate of the Albanian population, which was larger than that of the Serbs in Kosovo and North Macedonia, colonization using old methods did not achieve the desired effects. Therefore, it was recommended by the Serbian government to increase efforts for the settlement of colonists within the southern region of the SCS Kingdom, aiming to achieve a higher number of Serb population.⁷ To implement its policy of ethnic cleansing, Serbia used the so-called agrarian reform, through which, between 1918 – 1941 alone, it expropriated around 380,000 – 400,000 hectares of land, mostly private property of Albanians. This land was then allocated to 15,000 settler families from Serbia and Montenegro.⁸ A Yugoslav government's decree, dated February 25, 1919, officially abolished the feudal form of property ownership.⁹

With the implementation of the agrarian reform and the colonization of Albanian land, property for independent economic development was reduced, and poverty emerged among the peasants. Survival was already difficult, further exacerbated by the continuous pressure from the settlement of Serbo-Montenegrin colonists, who took land right up to the doorstep of Albanian homes.¹⁰ The population of Kosovo was primarily engaged in agriculture. Yields were low, and as a result, the standard of living was very poor as well.¹¹

Yugoslav officials claimed that they were implementing an agrarian reform to dismantle large feudal estates, enabling the colonization of Southern Serbia (Kosovo and North Macedonia) with the aim of preserving the economic,

⁵ Veli Kryeziu, *Ndryshimet Politiko-Shoqërore në Kosovë 1918-1941 sipas shtypit mbarë shqiptar*, Lena Graphic, Prishtinë 2021, 24.

⁶ Hamit Kokolari, *Kosova djep i shqiptarizmit*, Masagjerit shqiptare, Tiranë 1943, 61.

⁷ Esat Stavileci, *Rrugëtimi dhe labirintet e Kosovës dhe të shqiptarëve – pavarësia e Kosovës fakt i ligjshëm që nuk mund të zhbëhet*, Forumi për Iniciativë Demokratike, Gjakovë 2009, 172.

⁸ Ramiz Avdyli, *Politika serbe e gjenocidit ndaj Kosovës dhe shqiptarëve*. *Kosova*, Nr. 2, Instituti i Historisë, Prishtinë 1994, 25-33; Cfr. Hakif Bajrami, *Kosova 1918-1941*, Shkrola Print Prishtinë 2017, 49; Cfr. Enver Maloku, *Dëbimet e shqiptarëve dhe kolonizimi i Kosovës 1877-1995*, Instituti i Historisë i Kosovës, Prishtinë 1997, 43.

⁹ Ramiz Avdyli, *Shpronësimi i fshatarësisë dhe kolonizimi serbo-malazez i trojeve etnike shqiptare 1912-1942*, *Gjenocidi dhe aktet gjenocidiale të pushtetit serb ndaj shqiptarëve nga Kriza Lindore e këndeje*, Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës Prishtinë 1995, 119-128.

¹⁰ Seit Lipa, *Kosova në periudhën e rindërtimit*. Instituti i Historisë së Kosovës, Prishtinë 1982, 8.

¹¹ Hakif Bajrami, *Kosova 1918-1941*, Shkrola Print, Prishtinë 2017, 49.

national, and cultural interests of the Yugoslav state.¹² Yugoslavia passed a decree on September 14, 1920, which was dedicated to the southern regions and applied exclusively to Albanians in Kosovo and North Macedonia. This law was to be enforced through the agrarian reform commission for the confiscation – expropriation of lands belonging to 10,000 landowners who were either ‘rebels’ (kaçakët) or their supporters. These lands would then be transferred to state ownership, deemed to be of special significance to the Yugoslav state. Through this decision, conditions were created for the expulsion of Albanians to Albania or Turkey.¹³

Political and legal measures of the regime and preparation for the implementation of agrarian reform and colonization

Following the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the state undertook a series of political and legal measures aimed at restructuring land ownership and facilitating colonization in Kosovo and other southern regions. Through decrees and institutional mechanisms, the agrarian reform was designed not only to abolish feudal relations but also to enable the redistribution of land in favor of state interests. These measures created the legal and administrative framework necessary for the implementation of colonization policies, particularly in areas with a dense Albanian population, thereby preparing the ground for broader demographic and socio-economic changes.

The Ministry of Agrarian Reform administered its activities through several sections:

1. The General Section – which included the minister’s cabinet;
2. The Agrarian Section – responsible for the agrarian reform;
3. The Colonization Section;
4. The Finance Sector.

The ministry implemented its activities for agrarian reform in Southern Serbia (Kosovo and North Macedonia), while the main directorate for agrarian reform was headquartered in Skopje.¹⁴ The director of agrarian reform, Sreten Vukosavljević, sent a report from Skopje to the Minister of Agrarian Reform in Belgrade on August 26, 1919, clarifying that the settlement of colonists should

¹² Ali Hadri, Pozita dhe gjendja e Kosovës në Mbretërinë e Jugosllavisë. *E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllav*, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë-Instituti i Historisë Tiranë 1990, 238-252.

¹³ Ramiz Avdyli, *Shpronësimi i fshatarësisë dhe kolonizimi serbo-malazez i trojeve etnike shqiptare 1912-1942*, Gjenocidi dhe aktet gjenocidiale të pushtetit serb ndaj shqiptarëve nga Kriza Lindore e këndeje, Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës Prishtinë 1995, 119-128.

¹⁴ Jusuf Osmani, Organet për zbatimin e reformës agrare dhe të kolonizimit të Kosovës ndërmjet luftërave botërore, *Kosova*, Nr. 15, Instituti i Historisë së Kosovës, Prishtinë 1986, 193-197.

first occur in areas where the Albanian population was most dense.¹⁵ Such a directorate for agrarian reforms began its work under the order of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Ferizaj on February 12, 1920.¹⁶ As a result of this reform, many Albanians from Kosovo were forced to flee to Turkey under the pressure of the regime.

The process of implementing agrarian reform and colonization and its consequences

The implementation of agrarian reform and colonization in Kosovo was carried out through a combination of legal measures, administrative actions, and systematic pressure on the local population. While officially presented as a socio-economic transformation aimed at redistributing land and improving agricultural structures, in practice this process was accompanied by displacement, coercion, and demographic engineering. The redistribution of land and the settlement of colonists had far-reaching consequences for the Albanian population, affecting their economic stability, social structure, and presence in their ancestral territories.

As a result of the implementation of the agrarian reforms, between 1918 and 1923, the number of displaced Albanians who arrived in Turkey reached up to 40,000. This number increased significantly by 1941.¹⁷ During the years 1918 to 1941 alone, approximately 240,000 Albanians were displaced from Albanian-inhabited regions in Yugoslavia.¹⁸ According to researcher Bajrami, the number of displaced individuals from Kosovo to Turkey during the years 1918-1941 reached a total of 255,878, all of Albanian origin.¹⁹

The agrarian reform in Kosovo and North Macedonia aimed to nationalize the Albanian population in Kosovo and the Albanian-Bulgarian population in North Macedonia, in order to create a balance between the native population and the colonists brought from Serbia, while achieving a separation between the Albanians and the Serbs. However, the assimilation of the Albanian

¹⁵ Marenglen Verli, *Reforma agrare kolonizuese në Kosovë e viset tjera shqiptare në Jugosllavi pas Luftës së Parë Botërore. E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllav*, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë-Instituti i Historisë, Tiranë 1990, 277-288.

¹⁶ Shaban Hashani, *Reforma agrare dhe kolonizimi në rrethin e Nerodimes (Ferizajt) midis dy luftërave botërore 1918-1941. Kosova*, Nr. 20/21, Instituti i Historisë-Prishtinë, Prishtinë 1998/1999, 147-162.

¹⁷ Zamir Shtylla, *Shpërngulja me dhunë e shqiptarëve në vitet 1912-1941, E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllavi*, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, Tiranë 1990, 255-261.

¹⁸ Hevzi Islami, *Kosova dhe shqiptarët qështje demografike*. Rilindja, Prishtinë 1990, 65.

¹⁹ Hakif Bajrami, *Shpërngulja e shqiptarëve në Turqi gjatë viteve 1912-1941, Gjenocidi dhe aktet gjenocidiale të pushtetit serb ndaj shqiptarëve nga Kriza Lindore e këndeje*, Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës, Prishtinë 1995, 143-158.

population in Kosovo was never achieved.²⁰

The agrarian reforms and the institutional apparatus of violence of the occupying Serbia in Kosovo during the years 1918-1919 brutally killed over 11,000 Albanians in the most inhumane manner, and completely destroyed 5,000 – 6,000 Albanian homes. The figures speak of 20,000 Albanians imprisoned. All these crimes were carried out with the approval of the government in Belgrade. These Serbian crimes continued into 1920-1921.²¹ A large number of displaced Albanians, apart from going to Albania, also went to Turkey. According to the newspaper *Shqipëri e Re* Constanta, dated June 23, 1913, no. 136: 'It is concerning news that there are continuous new arrivals of emigrants from Kosovo, who have headed to Istanbul. We believe that these people have been both deceived and betrayed, but above all, they are forced by the Serbian regime, which is why the editorial policy appeals to everyone not to facilitate their escape from Kosovo.' Furthermore, it is stated that these people are encouraged to flee Kosovo even by corrupt imams and their leaders who serve Serbian interests, whom Serbia directly controls.²²

In the same issue newspaper *Shqipëri e Re* no. 136, it is mentioned that these days we have also registered a number of Albanian refugees arriving from Prishtina, with their number reaching 750 individuals. In just the last three days, 4 people have died from the hardships and exhaustion during their journey. Turkey has denied them visas to enter the country, while the Yugoslav government does not allow them to return, arguing that they have nowhere to go back to since they already sold their properties in Kosovo. The newspaper *Shqipëri e Re* Constanta, September 2, 1923, no. 143, reports on the refugees from Kosovo who were staying in Sofia waiting to go to Turkey. Fortunately, a significant number of them were stopped and redirected to Albania by the former deputy of Drin, Avni Gjilani, who with his wisdom, convinced them to go to Albania – the motherland of the Albanians of Kosovo.²³

The newspaper *Zëri i Popullit* Korce, dated February 24, 1923, no. 22, states that the agreement reached between Albania and Yugoslavia regarding the border resulted in territorial losses for Albania. Yugoslavia gained a portion of the territory in the regions of Gjakova, Prizren, Dibra, and Podgorica, thereby reducing the neutral zone by a total of 1 km, dividing it into 500 meters in Albania and another 500 in Yugoslavia. There were again disagreements over certain border areas, with Yugoslavia claiming more territory from Albania, in addition

²⁰ Ali Hadri, Pozita dhe gjendja e Kosovës në Mbretërinë e Jugosllavisë. *E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllav*, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë-Instituti i Historisë, Tiranë 1990, 238-252.

²¹ Jusuf Osmani, Pushtimi dhe kolonizimi serb në trevat shqiptare ndër shekuj, *Buletin i Fakultetit Filozofik*, nr. XXIX/2014, Fakulteti Filozofik UP, Prishtinë 2014, 233-249.

²² Emigrantët e Kosovës dhe detyra kombëtare, *Shqipëri e Re*, nr. 136, Konstancë, 24 qershor 1923, 2.

²³ Refugjatët e Kosovës shkuan për Shqipëri, *Shqipëri e Re*, nr. 143, Konstancë, 2 shtator 1923, 1.

to what it had unjustly acquired since 1913.²⁴

The newspaper *Zëri i Popullit* Korce, december 3, 1922, no. 3, writes that the Conference of Ambassadors decided that Saint Naum should remain part of Albania.²⁵ The Thessaloniki newspaper "*To Fos*" also published an article dedicated to the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Its information was based on a report from Belgrade, which stated that the Albanian government had taken appropriate measures to protect its territory, as the serbs frequently destroyed the border markers placed by the International Border Commission.²⁶ The Albanian government protested to the Council of Ambassadors, stating that the actions of the serbs would lead to unprecedented troubles for the region as well.²⁷

The Albanian newspaper *Shqipëri e Re* dated 6 january, 1924, in Constanța, Romania, under the headline *What are the Albanians who are being sent to Turkey suffering?* writes about the hardships of 92 Albanians who had been stranded for more than a month in the port of Thessaloniki. They could neither go to Turkey nor were they allowed to return to Kosovo or disembark in Greece. Sadly, 22 albanian families, including women and children, after many efforts and with the help of the diaspora, which had managed to gather a sum of money to give to the Greek captain in order to allow them to go to Vlora from the port of Thessaloniki achieved their goal, and they were able to return to Albania.²⁸

Regarding the suffering and horror experienced by the albanians of Kosovo, who were being violently expelled from Kosovo at gunpoint, wrote the newspaper *Drita* based in Gjirokaster, dated february 10, 1924, issue no. 158. It references the press of Turkey, specifically the newspaper "*Vatan*," dated january 14, 1924, Stamboll, under the headline *A tragedy*. It describes the suffering of over 160 albanians from Kosovo who were left on a ship without food or water, as the Turkish government has not allowed them to disembark. They have been stranded on the steamship in the port of Istanbul for over a month.²⁹ The immediate reaction of the Yugoslav legation, which, through its intrigues and fabrications, attempted to deny the news, claiming that all citizens in Yugoslavia enjoy full freedom and rights. However, Serbia regrets that it cannot stop the emigration of those who "wish to leave and see the world".³⁰ This denial is an insult to those children, women, and elderly who were forcibly compelled to abandon their ancestral homes. The Chairman of the Committee of Albanians in Turkey, Mr. Jonuz Kolonja, countered the claims of the Serbian legate. He argued

²⁴ Kufiri shqiptaro-jugosllav si dhe pretendimet e Qeverisë së Beligradit, *Zëri i Popullit*, nr. 22, Korçë, 24 shkurt 1923, 3.

²⁵ Shën Naumi i mbetj Shqipërisë. *Zëri i Popullit*, nr. 3, Korçë, 3 dhjetor 1922, 1.

²⁶ Kufit me Serbinë, *Zëri i Popullit*, nr. 70, Korçë, 13 tetor 1923, 1.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ Ç 'vuajnë shqiptarët qi duan ti qojnë në Turqi, *Shqipëri e Re*, nr.161, Konstancë, 6 janar 1924, 4.

²⁹ Korabi, Këndova dhe u Turpnova, *Drita*, nr. 158, Gjirokastër, 10 shkurt 1924, 1.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

that all the displaced individuals coming from Kosovo were being forcibly driven out of their lands.³¹ Serbia, while pursuing the fighters of the Kaçak Movement, who opposed Serbian occupation, mercilessly killed men, women, and children, burned the properties of Albanians, and expelled hundreds of families from Kosovo. The number of Albanians killed in 1919 was estimated to be around 2,000 to 5,000. They were brutally murdered by Chetnik bands led by the Serbian army.³²

The suffering of Albanians knows no end. The newspaper *Kosova*, based in Constanta, dated November 28, 1932, issue No. 15, published an article revealing the Serbo-Montenegrin massacres against the albanians of Plava and Guci, where 42 individuals were massacred, including children and women. Similarly, on may 20, 1919, the Serb-Montenegrins killed 19 albanians and burned down entire villages.³³

The newspaper *Shqipëri e Re*, based in Constanta, dated October 17, 1926, issue no. 284-285, writes that the albanian diaspora, whether in Romania, Europe, or America, continuously worked towards the unification and preservation of the national values of the Albanian people. It mentions that such an effort was also seen in the activities of Shaqir Curri, who appealed to Kosovo albanians to join the New Federation:³⁴ “Brothers – every Albanian that has been working with national matters knows the dirty deeds committed by Ahmet Zogu against your Kosovo brothers ever since he was made Minister of Internal Affairs. The Kosovar nationalists, expelled by the mercenary Italian government and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Albania, Ahmet Zogu, are as follows: Hasan Prishtina,³⁵ Bedri Pejani, Rexhep Mitrovica, Dervish Mitrovica, Ibrahim Jakova,³⁶ Niman Ferizi, Qamil Bala, etc.³⁷ In Yugoslavia, specifically in Gjakova, some highlanders under the leadership of Sali Mani: *Avdil Qerimi, Magjun Nimani, etc.* From the intellectual youth are as follows: *Imer Krasniqi, Feri Imami, Hamdi Zajmi, Ibrahim Fehmiu, Qazim Bakalli and many more.* From Mitrovica: *The son of Isa Boletini- Adem Boletini.*³⁸ *The honor of the name you bear calls upon you to extend a helping hand to one another and unite under the Sacred Federation.* The letter was written by Shaqir Curri.³⁹

It is heartbreaking just to think about the suffering endured by the

³¹ Korabi, Këndova dhe u Turpnova, *Drita*, nr. 158, Gjirokastrë, 10 shkurt 1924, 1.

³² Zamir Shtylla, Shpërngulja me dhunë e shqiptarëve në vitet 1912-1941, *E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllavi*, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, Tiranë 1990, 255-261.

³³ Tragjedia e Kosovës, *Kosova*, nr. 15, Konstancë, 28 Nëntor 1932, 5.

³⁴ Shaqir Curri, Kosovarëve, *Shqipëri e Re*, nr. 284-285, Konstancë, 17 tetor 1926, 2.

³⁵ Veli Kryeziu & Bujar Dugolli, *The Armed Resistance Movement in Kosovo 1918-1928 according to the Albanian press. Historia i Świat*, nr. 11, 237-250, 2022. (<https://doi.org/10.34739/his.2022.11.14>).

³⁶ Ministria e Arsimit, falënderim e përgëzim me popullin e Prefekturës së Kosovës, *Fletorja Zyrtare*, nr. 45, Tiranë, 2 shtator 1923, 3.

³⁷ Shaqir Curri, Kosovarëve, *Shqipëri e Re*, nr. 284-285, Konstancë, 17 tetor 1926, 2.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

Albanians of Kosovo. The newspaper *Kosova*, from Constanta, dated April 9, 1933, issue no.28, through the headline *The Tears of Dukagjini – Enslaved Kosovo*, brought to its readers the news of the violence and punishments that were carried out by the Serbian army against the residents of Peja, Gjakova, and some villages of Istog. All this violence was systematically carried out by the Serbian gendarmerie.⁴⁰

The Albanians of Kosovo made an extraordinary contribution to the political life in Albania through active participation in elections and parliament. The *Fletorja Zyrtare*, Tirana, december 21, 1923, issue no. 69, writes that the displaced Albanians of Kosovo primarily settled in Albania. Albania strived to keep the kosovare spirit alive even when the situation on the land was quite difficult. The state employed the strategy of integrating political representatives from Kosovo into the Albanian Parliament. In a telegram received from the Prefecture of Kosovo, it was announced that Avni Rustemi and Riza Drini were also candidates from this Prefecture, joining the list that included: Niman Ferizi, Bedri Pejani, and Rexhep Mitrovica.⁴¹

List of elected officials from the Kosovo Prefecture: *Dr. Fahriu, Dervish Mitrovica, Avni Rustemi, Niman Ferizi and Hoxhë Kadri Prishtina*.⁴² The debates that unfolded among parliamentary representatives in Albania revolved around the question of whether the Kosovo migrants (muhaxhirët) had the right to vote or not. Imam Kadriu reacted by saying: “These poor souls who are here, are they not the ones who fought against the enemy? Shouldn’t the migrants also participate? We are deputies of Albania, for we are brothers”.⁴³ Hasan Prishtina, in his speech, also stated: “You who wish to or have already taken the fate of Albania into your hands, do not concern yourselves with personal matters, because the greatest interest of all of us is the interest of Albania. Therefore, look to the national interest, and do not act like the Turks who declare that we could lose Rumelia, as long as we do not keep Hasan Beg as a deputy. Supporting Imam Kadriu’s speech – I recognize myself as a deputy of Dibra, but first and foremost, I am a representative of Albania.”⁴⁴

In a debate at the National Council, Hasan Prishtina, on behalf of this same council, proposed that: Our government should take special care of the Albanians who are outside of Albania, meaning all Albanians wherever they may be – in Istanbul, Romania, Kosovo, and Çameria – because looking after them is

⁴⁰ D. Gj. Bisak, Lotët e Dukagjinit – Kosova e Robnueme, *Kosova*, nr. 28, Konstancë, 9 prill 1933, 2.

⁴¹ Kandidatët për Prefekturën e Kosovës, *Fletorja Zyrtare*, nr. 69, Tiranë, 21 dhjetor 1923, 4.

⁴² Misët e Kuvendit Kushtetues nga Prefektura e Kosovës, *Fletorja Zyrtare*, nr. 71, Tiranë, 31 dhjetor 1923, 3; Cfr. Zgjedhjet për Asamble në Shqipëri morën fund- të zgjedhurit për Prefekturën e Kosovës, *Paqja*, nr. 9, Stamboll, 11 janar 1924, 4.

⁴³ Debat në këshillin kombëtar lidhur me të drejtat e Muhaxhirëve për të votuar, *Bisedimet e Këshillit Kombëtar*, nr. 24, Tiranë 1921, 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

Albania's duty and national obligation.⁴⁵

Deputy and activist Hasan Prishtina addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in Geneva, His Excellency Sir Eric Drummond. This letter was published in the newspaper "Shqipëri e Re," issue no. 455, dated february 5, 1931. The letter discusses a protest note from the Albanians of Kosovo, who addressed the League of Nations, "Through this four-point protest, we inform you that the Albanians of Kosovo are at the mercy of fate there:

1. Approximately 1 million Albanians that live in Kosovo and North Macedonia have no schools in the Albanian Language;⁴⁶

2. Yugoslavian Government is using every measure to annihilate the Albanians of Kosovo and North Macedonia;

3. Albanians are having their property confiscated without compensation and being given to Serbs and Montenegrins for use, with the aim of altering the population structure. Evidence of this is the percentage of the Serbian population in Gjakova. Ten years ago, there were no Serbs, but now they reach about 20% of the population in the area.

4. Yugoslavian Government persecutes catholic Albanians. Many priests were killed and many religious properties got confiscated.⁴⁷

In a letter from the Embassy of Albania sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, it also addresses the response given to Hasan Prishtina's letter by the Council of the League of Nations regarding the complaint about the opening of the Albanian schools in Kosovo, among other things.⁴⁸

The League of Nations had appointed a commission to verify the accusations made by Hasan Prishtina and many other activists of the national cause. Among this delegation was even the British Minister of Foreign Affairs himself. However, based on their contact with the government in Belgrade, this commission was convinced by Belgrade's declarations and expressed satisfaction regarding the implementation of minority rights in Yugoslavia.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the committee of the League of Nations explains that in schools where Albanian children are educated in Kosovo and North Macedonia, teaching should be organized in the Albanian language.

Now, it remains for Hasan Prishtina and other Kosovars to address the

⁴⁵ Propozim i Hasan Prishtinës pran Këshillit Kombëtar, *Bisedimet e Këshillit Kombëtar*, nr. 3, Tiranë 1924, 40.

⁴⁶ Veli Kryeziu & Dugolli B, *The changes that followed the First World War and the political situation in Kosovo according to the albanian press. Annals of the University of Craiova*, 1(37), 2020, 71–81. Retrieved from https://www.istoriecraiova.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020_1_ANALE.pdf

⁴⁷ Hasan Prishtina, Protesta e Kosovarëve në Lidhjen e Kombeve, *Shqipëri e Re*, nr. 455, Konstancë, 5 shkurt 1931, 2.

⁴⁸ Aagjencioni Shtetëror i Arkivave të Kosovës, (ASHAK), *Komiteti Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës*, F. nr. 872, m.f. nr. 00280, Ambasada e Shqipërisë në Beograd letër Ministrit të Punëve të Jashtme të Shqipërisë Z. Rauf Fico, Tiranë, 3 shkurt 1930.

⁴⁹ ASHAK, *Komiteti Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës*, F. nr. 872.

League of Nations and declare that in Kosovo, there are no schools in the Albanian language, and that students, are forced to study in the Serbian language instead. We also inform you that the Agrarian Reform is continuing and is progressively taking land from Albanians.⁵⁰

The Charge d’Affaires of Yugoslavia to the League of Nations in Gjeneva, I. Andriç, addresses the Secretary-General of the League of Nations regarding the review of the petition submitted by Don Jean Bisaku, Don Etienne Kurti, and Don Luis Gashi. These individuals, through a petition, had complained that the Government of Yugoslavia, during the Agrarian Reform, was not adhering to the law on minority rights and was not treating Albanians in Kosovo and North Macedonia equally, as their property was being seized without any criteria.⁵¹

According to Andriç, what was stated in this petition “*does not hold.*” He argues that his government, during expropriation, adheres to the Agrarian Reform Law of June 11, 1931. According to this law, every head of the family is entitled to five hectares 5ha of land, each married family member receives four hectares, unmarried individuals aged 16-21 receives two hectares, unmarried individuals over 21 receive 3 hectares, and every male child or student is entitled to one hectare of land.⁵² Although, according to the reform law, everything appeared to be in order – at least on paper – when it came to the implementation of this law in Kosovo and North Macedonia, only the confiscation of property was practiced under the guise of the Agrarian Reform Law. Meanwhile, the actual enforcement of this law was not carried out by the Serbian authorities in Yugoslavia.

According to the newspaper “New Albania,” Constanta, dated February 5, 1931, issue no. 455, it states: The Government of Yugoslavia has chosen the method of denying minority rights, in violation of the Minority Treaty approved by the League of Nations. Through this letter, we inform you that in Kosovo and North Macedonia, over 1 million Albanians live without any basic rights.⁵³

Vaso Çubriloviç, in one of his reports, analyzing the statistics of 1921 – 1931 and the results of colonization in Kosovo, states that even their colonization policy has been defeated by the birthrate of Albanian mothers, as Albanian nationalism is growing day by day. If they remain silent in the face of this, Yugoslavia could be plunged into conflict, and their goals in the south of Serbia could be called into question.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ ASHAK, *Komiteti Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës*, F. nr. 872.

⁵¹ ASHAK. *Komiteti “Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës” në luftë për konsolidimin e politikës së brendëshme shqiptare. Letra e I. Andriçit drejtuar Sekretarit Gjeneral në Lidhjen e Kombeve*, F. Hakif Bajrami, Gjenevë, 23 janar 1932, 72-74.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁵³ Hasan Prishtina, *Protesta e Kosovarëve në Lidhjen e Kombeve, Shqipëri e Re*, nr. 455, Konstancë, 5 shkurt 1931, 2.

⁵⁴ Vaso Çubriloviç, *Shpërngulja e arnautëve - Referat i mbajtur në klubin serb të kulturës në Beograd më, 7 mars 1937*, Elaborat i Vaso Çubriloviç. E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllavi, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë Tiranë 1990, 331.

The Serbianization of Kosovo was not going well, according to him, and this remained a concern for the security of future Serbian generations in Kosovo, as the birthrate of Albanians was significantly higher than that of Serbs in Kosovo.

- The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia were expelled from their ancestral lands under the pretext of the so-called Agrarian Reform, directed toward Turkey and other Western countries;
- Where the "legal" reform did not succeed, the Serbian occupiers ensured that draconian punishments were imposed on Albanians who opposed the reform, including the execution of opponents;
- The Albanian state was unable to defend the interests of Albanians outside the political borders established in 1913;
- The occupying Serbia, through institutional means, carried out genocide and ethnic cleansing of Albanians from their historical lands.

Summary

The analysis presented in this scientific study clearly demonstrates that the policies of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes toward the Albanian population of Kosovo during the period 1918–1941 were characterized by systematic repressive measures aimed at altering the ethnic structure of the region. The agrarian reform, officially presented as a measure intended to abolish feudal relations and promote the development of the agricultural economy, was in practice used as a political instrument for the expropriation of Albanian lands and the colonization of these territories by Serb and Montenegrin settlers. Through this reform, hundreds of thousands of hectares of land—primarily owned by Albanians—were confiscated and subsequently distributed to thousands of colonist families from Serbia and Montenegro.

This policy was not limited solely to the economic sphere, but was also accompanied by organized state violence. The documents and reports discussed in this scientific study indicate the destruction of hundreds of Albanian villages, the killing and imprisonment of thousands of civilians, and the burning of numerous homes. The violence exercised by the army, the gendarmerie, and Chetnik bands created an atmosphere of terror that forced a large number of Albanians to abandon their ancestral lands. As a result of this continuous pressure, hundreds of thousands of Albanians were displaced to Albania and Turkey, creating a significant wave of forced migration.

The colonization of Kosovo with Serb and Montenegrin settlers formed part of a broader state strategy aimed at establishing a new demographic balance and weakening the Albanian presence in the region. Nevertheless, despite the intensive efforts of the Yugoslav state, these policies did not significantly alter the population ratio in favor of the Serbian population, as Albanians remained

the overwhelming majority and continued to demonstrate a higher natural population growth rate.

In addition to economic and physical repression, Albanians also faced restrictions on their cultural and educational rights, including the lack of schools in the Albanian language and discrimination in property rights. These injustices were denounced by prominent Albanian political figures and intellectuals, who submitted complaints to international institutions such as the League of Nations. However, the international response was often limited and failed to fully halt the discriminatory policies implemented by the Yugoslav authorities.

In conclusion, the events described in this scientific study demonstrate that the agrarian reform and colonization policies in Kosovo were not merely economic measures, but rather part of a broader and organized state strategy aimed at transforming the ethnic composition of the region and weakening the Albanian element. Although these policies caused significant suffering, displacement, and losses for the Albanian population, they ultimately failed to eliminate the identity and presence of Albanians in Kosovo, who continued to preserve their culture, language, and national aspirations.

Zaključak

Analiza predstavljena u ovoj naučnoj studiji jasno pokazuje da su politike Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca prema albanskom stanovništvu Kosova u periodu od 1918. do 1941. godine bile okarakterisane sistematskim represivnim mjerama s ciljem izmjene etničke strukture ove regije. Agrarna reforma, zvanično predstavljena kao mjera s ciljem ukidanja feudalnih odnosa i podsticanja razvoja poljoprivredne ekonomije, u praksi je korištena kao politički instrument za eksproprijaciju albanske zemlje i kolonizaciju ovih teritorija srpskim i crnogorskim naseljenicima. Kroz ovu reformu, stotine hiljada hektara zemlje – prvenstveno u vlasništvu Albanaca – konfiskovano je i naknadno podijeljeno hiljadama kolonističkih porodica iz Srbije i Crne Gore.

Ova politika nije bila ograničena isključivo na ekonomsku sferu, već je bila praćena i organizovanim državnim nasiljem. Dokumenti i izvještaji o kojima se raspravlja u ovoj naučnoj studiji ukazuju na uništavanje stotina albanskih sela, ubistva i zatvaranja hiljada civila, te spaljivanje brojnih domova. Nasilje koje su provodili vojska, žandarmerija i četničke bande stvorilo je atmosferu terora koja je primorala veliki broj Albanaca da napuste zemlju svojih predaka. Kao rezultat ovog neprekidnog pritiska, stotine hiljada Albanaca raseljeno je u Albaniju i Tursku, što je stvorilo značajan talas prisilne migracije.

Kolonizacija Kosova srpskim i crnogorskim naseljenicima činila je dio šire državne strategije usmjerene na uspostavljanje nove demografske ravnoteže i slabljenje albanskog prisustva u regiji. Ipak, uprkos intenzivnim naporima jugoslovenske države, ove politike nisu značajnije promijenile omjer

stanovništva u korist srpskog življa, budući da su Albanci i dalje činili premoćnu većinu i nastavili pokazivati višu stopu prirodnog priraštaja stanovništva.

Pored ekonomske i fizičke represije, Albanci su se suočavali i s ograničenjima svojih kulturnih i obrazovnih prava, uključujući nedostatak škola na albanskom jeziku i diskriminaciju u imovinskim pravima. Ove nepravde osudile su istaknute albanske političke ličnosti i intelektualci, koji su podnosili pritužbe međunarodnim institucijama poput Liga naroda. Međutim, međunarodni odgovor je često bio ograničen i nije uspio u potpunosti zaustaviti diskriminatornu politiku koju su provodile jugoslovenske vlasti.

U zaključku, događaji opisani u ovoj naučnoj studiji pokazuju da agrarna reforma i politika kolonizacije na Kosovu nisu bile puke ekonomske mjere, već dio šire i organizovane državne strategije s ciljem transformacije etničkog sastava regije i slabljenja albanskog elementa. Iako su ove politike donijele značajnu patnju, raseljavanje i gubitke za albansko stanovništvo, one na kraju nisu uspjele eliminisati identitet i prisustvo Albanaca na Kosovu, koji su nastavili čuvati svoju kulturu, jezik i nacionalne težnje.

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DOPRINOS HAFIZA SALIHA EF. SIVČEVIĆA REFORMI BEHRAM-BEGOVE MEDRESE U TUZLI (1922-1941)

Apstrakt: *Medrese su srednje ili više škole za obuku u vjeri, vjerskim i šerijatsko-pravnim znanostima. U medrese se polazilo nakon završene mektebske nastave. U Bosni i Hercegovini osnivanje medresa se vezuje za osmanski period. Ne zna se tačno ko je sagradio prvu medresu u Bosni, kada i na kojem mjestu. Poznato je da je prije Gazi Husrev-begove medrese podignuta u Sarajevu medresa, koju je sagradio bosanski sandžak-beg Firuz-beg (1505-1512), koja se može svrstati u red najstarijih medresa. U XVI i XVII stoljeću je podignut značajan broj medresa u Bosni. Najpoznatija i najznačajnija je Gazi Husrev-begova medresa u Sarajevu, koju je podigao veliki bosanski sandžak-beg i vakif Gazi Husrev-beg. Pored ove medrese u Bosni je podignuto u toku osmanske uprave više desetina medresa. Jedna od medresa je i Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli. Tačno se ne zna kada je počela sa radom ova medresa. Historijski izvori potvrđuju da je radila 1626. godine. Oskudni su podaci iz ranijeg perioda rada Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli. Ono što se zna, jeste, da se u vrijeme osmanske uprave dio prihoda od slanih bunara u Tuzli davao za prosvjetne svrhe i rad ove medrese, kao i drugih vjersko-obrazovnih ustanova. Pred kraj osmanske uprave 1871. godine u velikom požaru u Tuzli stradala je Behram-begova medresa. U vremenu austrougarske uprave ova medresa nastavlja svoj rad, pri čemu su značajan doprinos dali pojedini znameniti Tuzlaci i muderisi. U ovom periodu i pored brojnih poteškoća, Behram-begova medresa se afirmisala i radila kao jedna od najuspješnijih bosanskih medresa. O radu Medrese u toku Prvog svjetskog rata nemamo pouzdanih podataka. Nakon Prvog svjetskog rata Behram-begova medresa je obnovila rad. Posebno plodonosan rad je bio u vrijeme dok je na čelu Medrese kao njen upravitelj bio hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević. Riječ je o uzoritom alimu i muderisu, koji se nakon završetka visokih škola u Istanbulu vratio u Bosnu, uključivši se u obrazovne tokove kao muderis i upravitelj Behram-begove medrese. U dva navrata je bio njen upravitelj. Godine*

1928. izabran je za člana Uleme medžlisa Sarajevo, gdje je obnašao ovu odgovornu funkciju do donošenja Zakona o Islamskoj zajednici u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1930. godine. Nakon toga, vraća se u Behram-begovu medresu, gdje radi kao muderis i upravitelj iste. U vremenu njegovog službovanja provedena je široka odgojno-obrazovna reforma u Behram-begovoj medresi. Ista je podrazumijevala unapređenje nastavnih planova i programa, uvođenje pored vjerskih i svjetovnih predmeta, obogaćivanje nastavnih sadržaja, uvođenje internatskog sistema obrazovanja te niz drugih važnih odgojno-obrazovnih mjera. Reforma je podrazumijevala i proširenje prostorno-smještajnih kapaciteta i opremanje škole. Svemu tome veliki doprinos je dao hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, kao dugogodišnji muderis i upravnik škole. Zajedno sa drugim muderisima i svjetovnim profesorima, doprinio je da ova škola postigne visok stepen obrazovno-odgojnog razvoja. Ovaj period se smatra iznimno plodnim u radu Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli. Zbog postignutih rezultata na odgojno-obrazovnom planu, Behram-begova medresa je bila izuzetno cijenjena na cijelom području tadašnje države, što ukazuje veliki interes učenika za školovanje u istoj. Po završetku medrese, značajan broj softa-učenika je nastavljao svoje školovanje na višim vjerskim školama, ali i na ondašnjim svjetovnim školama. Neki medresanati po okončanju školovanja su radili kao vjerski službenici, pri čemu je bio prepoznatljiv njihov vjerski rad i djelovanje. Jedan broj istih završio je učiteljsku i druge škole i fakultete te dao nemjerljiv doprinos obrazovanju i drugim profesijama. Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli u ovom vremenu je bila prepoznatljiva vjersko-obrazovna ustanova, jedna od najboljih medresa tog vremena, čemu je posebno zapažen rad hafiz Saliha ef. Sivčevića, kao i rad drugih muderisa i profesora škole.

Ključne riječi: Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, Behram-begova medresa, muderisi, učenici-softe, reforma, vjerski i svjetovni nastavni predmeti, nastavni planovi, internat.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF HAFIZ SALIH EF. SIVČEVIĆ TO THE REFORM OF THE BEHRAM-BEG MADRASA IN TUZLA (1922–1941)

Abstract: Madrasas are secondary or higher schools for education in religion, religious sciences, and Sharia law. Students enrolled in madrasas after completing their maktab (primary religious) education. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the establishment of madrasas is linked to the Ottoman period. It is not known exactly who built the first madrasa in Bosnia, nor when or where. It is known, however, that prior to the Gazi Husrev-bey Madrasa, a madrasa was established in Sarajevo by the Bosnian Sanjak-bey Firuz-bey (1505–1512), which can be classified among the oldest. In the 16th and 17th centuries, a significant number of madrasas were built across Bosnia. The most famous and significant among them is the Gazi Husrev-bey Madrasa in Sarajevo, founded by

the great Bosnian Sanjak-bey and benefactor (waqif), Gazi Husrev-bey. In addition to this one, dozens of madrasas were established in Bosnia during the Ottoman administration. One such institution is the Behram-beg Madrasa in Tuzla. The exact date it began its operations is unknown, though historical sources confirm it was active in 1626. Records from the early period of the Behram-beg Madrasa's work are scarce. What is known is that during the Ottoman era, a portion of the revenue from the salt wells in Tuzla was allocated for educational purposes and the operation of this madrasa, as well as other religious-educational institutions. Near the end of the Ottoman administration, in 1871, the Behram-beg Madrasa was damaged in a major fire in Tuzla. During the Austro-Hungarian administration, the madrasa continued its work, with significant contributions made by several prominent Tuzla citizens and mudarrises (professors). During this period, despite numerous difficulties, the Behram-beg Madrasa established itself and operated as one of the most successful Bosnian madrasas. Reliable data regarding the Madrasa's work during World War I is unavailable. After the war, the Behram-beg Madrasa resumed its activities. Its work was particularly fruitful during the period when Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević served as its director. He was an exemplary scholar (alim) and mudarris who, after graduating from higher schools in Istanbul, returned to Bosnia and joined the educational system as a mudarris and director of the Behram-beg Madrasa. He served as its director on two occasions. In 1928, he was elected a member of the Sarajevo Ulema-Majlis, where he held this responsible position until the adoption of the Law on the Islamic Community in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1930. Subsequently, he returned to the Behram-beg Madrasa, serving as its mudarris and director. During his tenure, a comprehensive educational reform was implemented at the Behram-beg Madrasa. This included the modernization of curricula and syllabi, the introduction of secular subjects alongside religious ones, the enrichment of instructional content, the introduction of a boarding school system, and a series of other important educational measures. The reform also involved expanding the physical capacity and equipping the school. Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević made a great contribution to all these efforts as a long-time mudarris and school director. Together with other mudarrises and secular professors, he helped the school achieve a high level of educational development. This period is considered exceptionally productive in the history of the Behram-beg Madrasa in Tuzla. Due to the results achieved in education, the Behram-beg Madrasa was highly esteemed throughout the country at the time, as evidenced by the high level of student interest in enrolling. Upon completing the madrasa, a significant number of students (softas) continued their education at higher religious schools, as well as at secular schools of the time. Some graduates worked as religious officials, where their religious and social engagement was highly recognized. A number of them completed teacher training and other schools or faculties, making an immeasurable contribution to education and other professions. During this era, the Behram-beg Madrasa in Tuzla was a prominent religious-

educational institution and one of the best madrasas of its time—a status achieved through the particularly notable work of Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, as well as the efforts of other mudarrises and professors.

Key words: *Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, Behram-beg Madrasa, mudarrises (professors), sofita students, reform, religious and secular subjects, curricula, boarding school (dormitory).*

Uvod

Srednjoškolsko obrazovanje u osmanskome periodu (1463-1878) u Bosni i Hercegovini sticalo se uglavnom u medresama. Medrese su muslimanske vjerske škole koje su učenici pohađali nakon završenog mektebskog školovanja. U Bosni i Hercegovini u vrijeme osmanske uprave u brojnim većim mjestima postojale su medrese. Dostupne informacije ukazuju, da je prije Gazi Husrev-begove medrese, bosanski sandžak-beg Firus-beg (1505-1512) podigao u Sarajevu medresu. Nije poznato da li je bila najstarija, ali u svakom slučaju može se svrstati u red najstarijih.¹ U narednim stoljećima u Bosni je otvoreno više desetina medresa, koje su radile sa ustaljenom osmanskome tradicijom kao hiradž (vanjske) i dahil (unutrašnje) medrese. Najpoznatija i najznačajnija je bila Gazi Husrev-begova medresa u Sarajevu, koju je podigao ovaj veliki bosanski sandžak-beg, vojskovođa i vakif 1537/1538. godine. Ova medresa je sve do austrougarske okupacije (1878), odškolovala 350 generacija² i dala nemjerljiv doprinos obrazovanju u Bosni i Hercegovini. U skladu sa ustaljenom praksom u osmanskim medresama, i u medresama u Bosni i Hercegovini nastava je izvođena na tradicionalan način, uspostavljen još u Nizamiji, a donekle modificiran s potrebama carstva i sklonostima muderisa, koji su bili nosioci sistema.³ Školovanje u medresama je trajalo više godina, zbog poteškoća u savlađivanju gradiva u udžbenicima koji su pisani arapskim i perzijskim pismom. Tako su neki učenici-softe pohađali medresu od 12 do 16 godina, a bilo je slučajeva da su pojedini učenici učili u medresama i po 20 i više godina.⁴ Važnu ulogu u radu medresa imali su muderisi, koji su bili sa ogromnim moralnim i intelektualnim integritetom u društvu i činili su glavni nastavni kadar.

¹ Izet Šabotić, Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli u vremenu reformi (1922-1941), *Kapija vremena-Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola povodom 390 godina Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, Tuzla 2017, 29-30. (dalje: I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*); Hajrudin Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. godine*, Sarajevo 1965, 102.

² I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 31; Omer Nakičević, *Gazi Husrev-begova medresa za vrijeme osmanske Turske, 450 godina Gazi Husrev-begove medrese u Sarajevu*, Sarajevo 1988, 26.

³ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 31; Ismet Kasumović, *Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave, Školstvo i obrazovanje*, Mostar 1999, 153.

⁴ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 31; H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo u BiH*, 123.

Oni su vodili sve akademske aktivnosti i bili su potpuno odgovorni za njih.⁵ U početku se nastavni kadar u medresama dovodio iz različitih obrazovnih i kulturnih centara islamskog svijeta, da bi se kasnije isti regrutovao iz reda svršenika sopstvenih medresa. Postavljena muderisa, njihove radne obaveze, plaće i sve drugo se utvrđivalo u dokumentima o zadužbini (vakufnami).⁶ Predavanja su održavana u dershani, predavaonici, gdje su učenici-softe, sjedeli u više halki, radeći paralelno. Po potrebi, muderisi su radili ponaosob sa softama. Medrese su odigrale najznačajniju ulogu u obrazovnom sistemu osmanske države. Na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine medrese su nastavile rad i nakon povlačenja Osmanlija iz Bosne 1878. godine, te su radile sve do početka uspostave komunističke vlasti nakon Drugog svjetskog rata.

Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli, od prvog pomena do obnove 1921. godine

Među značajnijim medresama u Bosni i Hercegovini, bila je i Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli. Istu je podignuo vakif Behram-beg, nedaleko od svoje Stare Atik džamije u Tuzli, prije 1626. godine.⁷ Behram-begovu medresu u Tuzli spominje i biskup Olovčić 1674. pod latinskim nazivom „Collegium imporom Softarum (kolegij nevjerni softi).⁸ O ranom periodu rada Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli podaci su oskudni. Nije sačuvana ni vakufnama. Ono što se zna, jeste da se Behram-begova medresa, kao i druge vjerske ustanove u Tuzli dijelom finansirala od prihoda slanih izvora u Tuzli.⁹ Behram-begova medresa je imala uspona i padova. U nekoliko navrata je stradala. Jedno od stradanja bilo je i ono u velikom požaru 1871. godine.¹⁰ Nema pouzdanih podataka o obnavljanju zgrade Medrese do kraja osmanske uprave. Ono što se pouzdano zna jeste da je Behram-begova medresa obnovljena u vrijeme austrougarske uprave 1893. godine, kada je sagrađen objekat u arapskom stilu, koji nije bio prilagodljiv klimatskim uslovima ovog područja, te je zgrada brzo propadala.¹¹ Svečano otvaranje Medrese uz veliku svečanost održano 29. decembra 1893. godine.¹² U kasnijem periodu Zemaljsko vakufsko povjerenstvo za Bosnu i Hercegovinu je

⁵⁵ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 31; Ismet Bušatlić, *Islamske institucije (Hrestomatija)*, Sarajevo 2006, 57.

⁶ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 32; Bilal Hasanović, *Islamske obrazovne ustanove u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1850. do 1941. godine*, Zenica 2008, 33.

⁷ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 32; I. Kasumović, *Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosnskom ejaletu*, 152.

⁸ I. Kasumović, *Školstvo i obrazovanje*, 152.

⁹ *Isto*.

¹⁰ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 33, *List Bosna*, br. 274, od 19. septembra 1971, 1.

¹¹ Samija Sarić, *Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli*, *Stav*, br. 8-9, Tuzla 2004, 92.

¹² *Bošnjak*, br. 1-4, januar 1894, 3.

izdvajalo značajna finansijska sredstva za adaptaciju objekta Medrese. Jedna sveobuhvatnija adaptacija je izvršena u vremenu od 1905. do 1907. godine.¹³

U austrougarskom periodu, Behram-begova medresa je imala različite promjene u oblasti nastave. Tome su posebno doprinjeli njeni muderisi hadži hafiz Mehmed ef. Čokić i Šahbaz ef. Husić, koji su radili potpuno odvojeno. Mudris Čokić je predavao arapski jezik i koristio se gradivom iz udžbenika na arapskom jeziku, dok je mudris Šahbaz ef. Husić predavao turski jezik i koristio se udžbenicima na turskom jeziku.¹⁴ U ovom periodu Behram-begova medresa se afirmisala i radila kao jedna od najuspješnijih bosanskohercegovačkih medresa, ponajviše zahvaljujući izvrsnim muderisima. Iškolovala je dobar sveštenički kadar, a jedan broj medresanata je nastavio školovanje na drugim poznatim školama izvan Bosne i Hercegovini, postajući dobrim alimima, koji su dali doprinos očuvanju vjere i orijentalne kulture i tradicije u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Od osnivanja, jedan od najznačajnijih faktora rada ove škole bili su njeni muderisi i profesori. Prvi muderis Behram-begove medrese o kome postoje sačuvani podaci bio je hafiz Tosun ef. Kifić. Nešto više podataka imamo o muderisima iz druge polovine 19. vijeka hafiz Šahbazu ef. Husiću i hafiz Muhamedu ef. Čokiću,¹⁵ te s kraja ovog i početka 20. vijeka, kada su kao muderisi u Behram-begovoj medresi radili: Abdurahman ef. Čokić. Hadži Mehmed Teufik ef. Azapagić i Ahmed ef. Čokić.¹⁶ Svi oni su dali nemjerljiv doprinos uzdizanju ove škole. O radu Behram-begove medrese u vrijeme Prvog svjetskog rata nemamo podataka, tako da se pretpostavlja da je ista, usljed ratnih okolnosti prekinula rad, te je nastavila sa radom tek 1921. godine. Pripreme za ponovno pokretanje Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli su se odvijale u složenim društveno-političkim i privrednim okolnostima, jer položaj muslimana u novoj državi Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca je bio veoma težak i složen. Centralistička vlast iz Beograda je imala negativan odnos prema Islamskoj zajednici koju je željela staviti pod svoju kontrolu, te joj nije išlo u prilog obnavljanje rada klasičnih medresa kakva je bila Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli. No, zahvaljujući upornosti nekih bošnjačkih uglednika i predstavnika uleme, rad ove škole je obnovljen, i tako je ista ušla u jednu novu, i po mnogo čemu posebnu etapu svoga rada i djelovanja.

Nakon obnove rada Behram-begove medrese 1921. godine, kao muderisi u školi su radili i ostavili vidan trag brojni muderisi i profesori: hafiz Sivčević ef. Salih, hafiz Šabić ef. Ševket, hafiz Čokić ef. Ibrahim, Husić ef. Muhamed,

¹³ Samija Sarić, Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli, *Glasnik Islamske zajednice*, br. 3-4, Sarajevo 2004, 358; *Sarajevski list*, br. 55, od 10. maja 1907.

¹⁴¹⁴ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 35; Hivzija Suljić, Kratke bilješke o Behram-begovoj medresi, *Hikmet*, br. 15, Tuzla 1994, 383.

¹⁵ Midhat Spahić, Mudrisi Behram-begove medrese do 1949. godine, *Kapija vremena, Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola povodom 390 godina Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, Tuzla 2017, 91-92.

¹⁶ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli*, 36.

Aganović ef. Sabit, Smajlović ef. Hasan, hafiz Redžepbašić ef. Ahmed, Hodžić ef. Šaban, te profesori svjetovnih predmeta: Dubravić Husein, prof. Džudža Omer, prof. Selimović Mehmed, prof. Gagić Muhamed, prof. Bise Adem, prof. Imamović Ibrahim i Salihsahić Mehmed.¹⁷ Svi navedeni muderisi i profesori su udarili trajan pečat radu Behram-begove medrese i razvoju školstva na širem tuzlanskom području i u Bosni i Hercegovini. Za ovu priliku daćemo širi osvrt na rad Behram-begove medrese od 1922. godine pa do početka Drugog svjetskog rata, kada je u dva navrata njen upravitelj i muderis bio hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević. U tom vremenu u Behram-begovoj medresi su provedeni značajni reformski procesi.

Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, muderis, alim i reformator

Salih ef. Sivčević je rođen 1885. godine u Vražićima nedaleko od Brčkog, kao najmlađe dijete Abdul Kerima i majke Begije Kovačević. Potiče iz bogate zemljoradničke porodice, koja je uz zemljoradnju nudila i bogate hanske usluge na starom drumu Tuzla-Brčko. U vlasništvu porodice Sivčević bio je poznati han koji se nalazio na raskrsnici puteva Tuzla-Brčko i Koraj-Čelić-Vražići-Velijino Selo. Salih Sivčević je u rodnim Vražićima završio mekteb iptidaije, a nakon toga 1897. godine upisuje „Čačak medresu“ u Brčkom i uspješno je završava 1903. godine. Godine 1904. zajedno sa svojim vršnjakom i prijateljem iz Vražića Alijom Livadićem odlazi u Istanbul, gdje se upisuju u Medresu u klasi čuvenog muderisa hafiza Mehmeda Teufika bin Mehmeda Sabita. Nakon deset godina



Prilog 1. Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević.

slušanja njegovih predavanja, Salih Sivčević je 1914. godine dobio idžazetnamu (diplomu), kojom se *proglasa* sposobnim za sva islamska vjerska znanja. Potpis muderisa na idžazetnami ovjerilo je Ministarstvo prosvjete Turske, Odjeljenje za vjeru i Ministarsko vanjskih poslova Turske.¹⁸ U toku školovanja u Istanbulu, Salih ef. Sivčević je uspio završiti hivz i postati hafiz. Sa vanrednim


¹⁷ Sead Selimović, Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli u periodu 1918-1941. godine, *Kapija vremena, Zbornik radobva sa okruglog stola povodom 390 godina Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, Tuzla 2017, 73. (dalje: *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*).

¹⁸ Arhiv Tuzlanskog kantona (dalje: ATK), Zbirka dokumenata: *Hafiz dr. Salih ef. Sivčević, članci dokumenti iz personalnog dosijea, od 1885. do 1942. godine*. (dalje: ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*), knj.1. Prevod Izadžetname iz 1914. godine, za čiji tačan sadržaj jamči Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin ef. Čaušević, br. 2508/28-3, od 23. novembra 1928. godine.

glasom i mekamom, nastavlja školovanje i upisuje se na Darul-halife - reformisanoj visokoj školi u Istanbulu. Studij na ovoj visokoj školi uspješno završava kao odličan student u rekordnom roku 1918. godine. Na ovoj visokoj školi dobio je diplomu kojom se *proglašava sposobnim za najveća islamska vjerska zvanja*. Diplomom je potpisalo deset muderisa (profesora) raznih nastavnih oblasti, a istu je ovjerio Prosvjetni inspektorat za vjere i Šejihul islam-vrhovni islamski starješina, Esseid Nuri.¹⁹ Godine 1918, kao redovan student nastavlja školovanje na Sulejmaniji – Darul Mutehassisin – Velikoj reformisanoj školi za sticanje doktorata. Nakon trogodišnjeg slušanja predavanja, polaganja predviđenih ispita uspješno je savladao i ovaj program doktorskog studija. Ukupno je na ovom studiju položio ispite iz 12 različitih naučnih oblasti. Iz svih ispita pismenog rada dobio je ocjenu ondur (deset).

Nakon uspješne odbrane pismene radnje za doktorat, godine 1921. stiče diplomu koja mu daje najveći stepen obrazovanja u oblasti teoloških (vjerskih) nauka, čime je *proglašen sposobnim za sva najveća islamska vjerska zvanja, kao doktor teologije*. Potpise pet profesora na diplomi ovjerio je Prosvjetni inspektorat za vjeru i Ministarstvo prosvjete Odjeljenje za vjeru Turske. Tačnost sadržaja i prijevoda istog na Bosanskom jeziku, kao i sadržaj sve tri idžazetname potvrdio je Reis ul ulema Džemaludin ef. Čaušević.²⁰ Tako je

ukupno školovanje Salih ef. Sivčevića trajalo 17. godina. Nakon završenog školovanja, javio se kao dobrovoljac u Tursku armiju, kao oficir pod imenom Salih Sabri, te učestvovao u ratu protiv Grčke do oslobođenja 1922. godine.²¹



Prilog 2. *Prevod Idžazetname po kojoj je Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević proglašen sposobnim za sva islamska vjerska zvanja.*

¹⁹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1. Prevod Izadžetname iz 1918. godine, za čiji sadržaj jamči Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin ef. Čaušević, br. 2508/28-2, od 23. novembra 1928. godine.

²⁰ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj.1. Prevod Izadžetname iz 1921. godine, za čiji sadržaj jamči Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin ef. Čaušević, br. 2508/28-1, od 23. 11. 1928. godine..


²¹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj.1.

Kao široko obrazovan i iskusan alim, pored primamljivih ponuda za visoke vjerske pozicije u Turskoj, opterećen nostalgijom za rodnim krajem, 1921. godine vraća se u Bosnu, u grad Tuzlu. U januaru 1922. godine, a nakon što je obnovljena Behram-begova medresa, postavljen je za njeog upravitelja.²² Po preuzimanju ove odgovorne dužnosti, pokazao je upornost, znanje i svjesnost u obavljanju poslova koji su mu povjereni. Izvori ukazuju da je po prirodi bio skroman, dobrodušan, druželjubiv, veseo i susretljiv čovjek. Brzo je upoznao mentalitet tadašnjeg bosanskog čovjeka i osvojio sredinu u kojoj se obreo. Veoma snažan utisak je ostavio na džematlije Behram-begove džamije, tuzlansku

čaršiju i širu okolinu. Posebno su bile zapažene njegove vazi nasihatime (savjetni govori) u pomenutoj džamiji, koje je obavljao čitavo vrijeme svog života i rada u Tuzli. Njegovi vazi nasihati, svakog petka u Behram-begovoj džamiji u Tuzli i Mišćinoj džamiji u Sarajevu (za vrijeme rada i službovanja u Sarajevu) bili su jako popularni među džematlijama.²³ Kao honorarni vjeroučitelj radio je u Trgovačkoj školi u Tuzli od 18. februara 1922. do 23. novembra 1923. godine.²⁴

Svojim radom u Behram-begovoj medresi i djelovanjem u

Dobrotvornom društvu „Merhamet“, čiji je bio član i funkcioner, uspostavio je dobre odnose sa viđenijim ljudima, alimima i drugim građanima Tuzle, šireg tuzlanskog područja i Bosne i Hercegovine. Stoga je hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević bio



Prilog 3. *Priznanje od Reis-ul-uleme za Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčevića za hvale vrijedan rad u Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli.*

²² ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1. Dekret Reis-ul-uleme Džemaludina Čauševića o postavljenju hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića za upravitelja Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli, br. 202/21, od 14. januara 1922. godine.

²³ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

²⁴ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1. Uredovna potvrda o hafiz Salih ef. Sivčeviću u Trgovačkoj školi u Tuzli, br. 341, od 3. decembra 1923. godine.

dobro prihvaćen od svih. Godine 1922. godine, stupio je u brak sa Đulzarom Sijerčić, kćerkom Ahmed-bega Sijerčića, trgovca, veleposjednika i doživotnog mutevelije vakufa u Tuzli. U braku su imali šestoro djece. Brak sa Đulzarom Sijerčić je imao značajnog uticaja na njegov život i profesionalni rad. Svo vrijeme službovanja u Tuzli, živio je u Džindić Mahali.²⁵ Salih ef. Sivčević je sedmično jednom vazio u Šarenoj (Atik) džamiji u Tuzli, a često je odlazio na poziv mještana da vazi na pojedinim dovištima širom tuzlanskog područja i Bosne i Hercegovine. Svojim nastupima hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević je podučavao muslimanski narod vjeri islamu i stekao kod njega veliko poštovanje.²⁶

Salih ef. Sivčević je 27. oktobra 1928. godine imenovan članom Ulema medžlisa u Sarajevu.²⁷ Nakon nametanja Ustava Islamske zajednice (IZ) 1930. godine,²⁸ čime je reorganizirana IZ, zajedno sa drugim istaknutim vjerskim službenicima, stavljen je prvo na raspolaganju, a potom je otpušten iz službe kao član Ulema medžlisa. Iste godine postavljen je ponovo za muderisa u Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli, a 1934. ponovo mu je povjerena pozicija upravitelja Behram-begove medrese. Kao upravitelj i muderis ostao je na čelu Medrese do svoje smrti 29. marta 1943. godine.²⁹

U vremenu od 1929. do 1933. godine, hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević je bio član Hodžinske kurije –Vrhovne vjerske kurije muslimana u zemlji i kandidat Kurije za Reis-ul-ulemu. Kurija se u tom vremenu sastojala od 24. člana. Ista je imala ingerencije izbora Reis-ul-uleme i članova Ulema medžlisa, izvršnog organa Islamske zajednice, koji je vodio poslove vrhovnog vjerskog povjereništva u zemlji. Sjednicama Ulema medžlisa presjedavao je Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin ef. Čaušević. Članovi Ulema medžlisa bili su najugledniji vjerski autoriteti IZ. Članove Ulema medžlisa koje je imenovala Hodžinska kurija, prema tada važećem Statutu IZ i važećim zakonima, svojim *Ukazom* s kraja oktobra 1928. godine, potvrdio je kralj Kraljevine SHS.³⁰ Zbog neslaganja s kraljevom politikom prema Islamskoj zajednici, hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević je kraljevim ukazom razriješen dužnosti člana Ulema medžlisa IZ, nakon čega je ostao bez posla.³¹ Da je savjesno obavljao dužnost člana Ulema medžlisa potvrđuje zahvala upućena od strane Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludina ef. Čauševića.³²

²⁵ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

²⁶ Hivzija Suljić, *Reformator i pedagog*, *Misak*, br. 2, Tuzla 1997, 25. (dalje: H. Suljić, *Reformator i pedagog*).

²⁷ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2. Dopis muftije Tuzlanske oblasti br. 753/28, od 5. novembra 1928. godine, upućen Kotarsko-vakufskom mearifskom povjereništvu u Tuzli, o imenovanju hadži Saliha ef. Sivčevića za člana Ulema medžlisa Sarajeva.

²⁸ Ustav Islamske zajednice Kraljevine Jugoslavije nametnut je od strane režima 9. jula 1930. godine.

²⁹ H. Suljić, *Reformator i pedagog*, 25.

³⁰ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1, Ukaz kralja Aleksandra Karađorđevića, V.M. br. 5598, od 27. oktobra 1928. godine.

³¹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2. Dopis Ministarstva pravde Kraljevine Jugoslavije, br. 44254, od 2. januara 1930. godine, o otpustu hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića iz državne službe.

³² ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2. Dopis Ulema medžlis za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, br. 665/930, od 119. maja 1930. godine.

Od ukupno 21 godinu radnog staža, hafiz Salih ef. Sivčevića, 17. godina je proveo na reformi, razvoju i podizanju ugleda Behram-begove medrese. Zajedno sa Nastavničkim vijećem škole, ukupnim radom na podizanju nivoa obrazovanja učenika (softe), uspio je, da Behram-begova medresa prednjači među svim medresama istoga tipa u Bosni i Hercegovini. Njeni učenici su se posebno isticali u poznavanju arapskog jezika, a u znanjima iz svjetovnih predmeta nisu zaostajali za ostalim školama. Gotovo pola generacije svršenih učenika školske 1941/1942. godine, nastavilo je školovanje u novoosnovanoj Učiteljskoj školi u Tuzli. Više učenika Behram-begove medrese nastavilo je studije islamskih i orijentalnih nauka u islamskim zemljama.³³

Pored aktivnosti na reformi Behram-begove medrese, hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević je veliki doprinos dao kao predavač: arapskog i turskog jezika, tefsira, ahlaka i akaida. Bio je aktivan i na širem vjerskom obrazovanju stanovništva. Po pozivu džemata, držao je dersove vazi nasihate na brojnim vjerskim skupovima diljem sjeveroistočne Bosne. Za svaki svoj ders pisao je pismene pripreme na turskom i arapskom jeziku, što upućuje na zaključak, da iako je bio odličan retoričar, ništa nije prepuštao slučaju. Kod muslimanskog življa je stekao izuzetno poštovanje. Svoje bogato iskusto u držanju vazova, iskazao je u svom članku objavljenom u *El Hidaji*, godina 2, br, str. 82. Bio je veoma aktivan u društvu Ilmije „El Hidaje“, čiji je član ostao sve do smrti. Redovno je biran za člana Glavnog odbora i podpredsjednika Društva, dok je bio predsjednik Društva „El Hidaje“ u Tuzli.³⁴

Pored angažovanja u vjerskim i humanitarnim organizacijama. „El Hidaje“, „Merhametu“, „Vakufskom povjerenstvu“, „Džematskom medžlisu“, bio je i član udruženja „Muslimanski kulturni dom u Tuzli“. Cilj ovog udruženja je bio kulturno i vjersko uzdizanje muslimana u Tuzli i Tuzlanskom srezu. Bio je među potpisnicima *Rezolucije o autonomiji Bosne i Hercegovine* u svojim historijskim granicama, koja je potpisana od strane uglednih Tuzlaka 20. novembra 1939. godine. Poslije Drugog svjetskog rata, pod izgovorom obračuna sa tzv. „domaćom reakcijom“, pohapšeni su i osuđeni svi ugledni Tuzlaci koji su potpisali *Rezoluciju*,³⁵ izuzev Murad-bega Zaimovića, koji se pridružio partizanima 1943. godine.³⁶

Salih ef. Sivčević, se u svom radu iscrpljivao, što se odrazilo na njegovo zdravlje, teško je obolio od upale pluća, te je tražio od Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo da mu prizna radni staž dok je radio u ovom organu, a kako bi mogao ostvariti

³³ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

³⁴ *Isto*.

³⁵ Među uglednim Tuzlacima, *Rezoluciju* su potpisali: Lutvi-beg Sijerčić, bivši gradonačelnik, Čazim-aga Žunić, bivši gradonačelnik, Sead-beg Kulović, veleposjednik, dr. Bahrija Kadić, advokat, Alija Morankić, trgovac, Mustafa Muharemagić, trgovac, Alija Mehmedbašić, advokat, Osman Vilović, Adem Bise, prof, Adem Azderović, prof, Omer Džudžo, prof, i Murad-beg Zaimović. ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

³⁶ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2.

svoje pravo odlaska u penziju.³⁷ Međutim, ukupno mu 6 godina radnog staža nije priznato, Primopredaja dužnosti upravitelja Medrese hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića i Muhameda ef. Husića izvršena je 26. juna 1942. godine,³⁸ kada je dotadašnji upravitelj Medrese hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević otišao na šestomjesečno bolovanje.³⁹ Dana 29. marta 1943. godine u 57. godini umro je tiho kako je živio i djelovao. U prisustvu velikog broja građana Tuzle i okoline, svojih učenika, prijatelja i saradnika iz cijele Bosne i Hercegovine, ukopan je na tuzlanskom mezarju „Borić“.⁴⁰

Behram-begova medresa u vrijeme reformi

Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je obnovila svoj rad 1921. godine, godinu dana prije nego što je hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević postavljen na mjesto upravitelja iste. Tada je Medresa bila organizirana na klasičan način. Nastava se izvodila individualno, po nastavnim predmetima i muderisima. Dolaskom na čelu Medrese, zatekao je mali broj učenika u Medresi, svega njih 9.⁴¹ Zbog složenih društveno-političkih i privrednih prilika po Bošnjake, opadao je interes učenika za upisivanje u medrese.

Svjestan činjenice da je Medresa bila pred zatvaranjem, napojen reformskim idejama koje je zahvatio turski obrazovni sistem u kojem je školovan, protežirao je ideju reformisanja Behram-begove medrese, a kako bi ista bila moderna obrazovna ustanova u kojoj bi se pored vjerskih usvajala i svjetovana znanja. Stoga je njegova vizija reformisanja Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli, podrazumijevala:

- ukidanje individualne nastave i uvođenje razredne nastave u petogodišnjem trajanju;
- uvođenje u Medresi potrebne školske dokumentacije i administracije, po uzoru na gimnazije;
- postepeno uvođenje u nastavni program pored vjerskih i svjetovne predmete: *Matematiku, Bosanski jezik, Historiju, Prirodopis, Fiziku, Zemljopis, Krasnopolis, Higijenu, Domaćinstvo, Zadrugarstvo, Gospodarstvo, Građanske nauke i administraciju*.⁴²

³⁷ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, Molba hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića, upravitelja Niže okružne medrese u Tuzli upućena Ulema međžlisu Sarajevo, da mu se dozvoli komisijski pregled radi njegove bolesti, od 29. aprila 1942. godine.

³⁸ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, Zapisnik o primopredaji uprave „Niže okružne medrese u Tuzli“, između hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića i Muhameda ef. Husića, od 25. juna 1942. godine.

³⁹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, Dopis hafiza Salih ef. Sivčevića, upravitelja Niže okružne medrese u Tuzli Ulema međžlisu Sarajevo, od 25. juna 1942. godine.

⁴⁰ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

⁴¹ *Isto*.

⁴² ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je prva od bosanskohercegovačkih medresa započela proces reformi, ponajviše zahvaljujući njenom upravitelju hafizu Salihu ef. Sivčeviću. Medresa je prva 1923. godine uvela prijemni ispit iz *Kirajeta*, koji je bio uslov uz završenu četvorogodišnju školu za upis u prvi razred Medrese.⁴³ Druge medrese u Bosni i Hercegovini ovu obavezu su uvele tek 1931. godine.

Kad je došao na čelu Medrese, Salih ef. Sivčević je zatekao klasični sistem rada s učenicima-softama u neuslovnim prostorijama. Godine 1923. uvodi se nastava po razredima. Učenici su podijeljeni po razredima, Od tog vremena se formira razred po razred, dok se nije formiralo pet razreda. U školskoj 1923/1924. godini upisana su dva odjeljenja učenika prvog razreda.⁴⁴ Važan dio reformskog procesa ticao se upisne politike, koju je vodila Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli. Naime, novina kod upisa u prvi razred Medrese se odnosila na činjenicu da su istu mogli upisati učenici sa svjedočanstvom svršene osnovne škole. Pored toga, upis učenika u prvi razred je predviđao polaganje prijemnog ispita iz Kuranikerima. Prijemni ispit zajednički su sprovodili muderis, predsjednik Vakufsko-mearifskog povjerenstva, te još jedan član iz ove institucije, koji su zajednički odlučivali o prijemu kandidata u Behram-begovu medresu u Tuzli.⁴⁵

Kako bi se u boljim uslovima odvijao odgojno-obrazovni proces, uprava Behram-begove medrese je značajnu pažnju posvetila obnovi zgrade Medrese. Prva obnova zgrade Medrese izvršena je 1923-1924. godine, priložima građana Tuzle. Ovom obnovom, po prvi put su stvoreni uslovi da se Medresa organizira kao odgojno-obrazovna ustanova internatskog tipa. Učionice su opremljene dovoljnim brojem školskih klupa, a internatske spavaonice željeznim krevetima. Važna novina odnosila se na otvaranje učeničke kuhinje, čime su stvoreni daleko povoljniji uslovi za rad i boravak učenika u školi. Sastavni dio reformi odnosio se za jasno utvrđen kućni red Medrese i internata. Sve to je davalo sliku jedne dobro organizirane obrazovno-odgojne ustanove. Od 1924. godine uprava Medrese premješta se iz Vakufske kuće u obnovljne prostorije Medrese. Time su stvoreni bolji uslovi za postepeno reformisanje ove škole. U isto vrijeme uvedena je i obaveza ljekarskog pregleda za učenike Medrese, te je u okviru iste otvorena školska ambulanta.⁴⁶

Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, kao upravitelj škole provodi široke aktivnosti na reformi iste, a kako bi Medresa odgovorila u obrazovno-odgojnom i vjerskom pogledu zahtijevima vremena. Rezultati rada hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića su vidljivi već 1924. godine, što potvrđuje i *Priznanje* dato istom prilikom posjete Medresi Reis-ul-uleme Džemaludina Čauševića,⁴⁷ kao i od Vakufsko-

⁴³ Isto.

⁴⁴ Isto.

⁴⁵ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 39; ATK, Behram-begova medresa Tuzla (dalje: BMT), kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 347/31.

⁴⁶ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

⁴⁷ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, kn. 1. *Priznanje* Reis-ul-uleme Demaludina Čauševića, br. 1152/924, od 8. decembra 1924. godine.

mearifskog saborskog odbora u Sarajevu.⁴⁸ Bila je to jasna potvrda da su reformske mjere koje je provodio upravitelj Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević bile prepoznate od najznačajnijih institucija Islamske zajednice u zemlji.

Jedna od bitnijih mjera koja je od strane rukovodstva škole poduzeta, bila je dopuna i inoviranje nastavnih planova i programa. Riječ je o procesu koji nije bio nimalo jednostavan i odvijao se u vremenu prvog upraviteljskog mandata hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića.⁴⁹ Zvanično od dolaska hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića 1922. godine za upravitelja škole, pa sve do 1939. godine radilo se po po internom reformisanom nastavnom planu i programu koji je uz odobrenje Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo primjenjivan u ovoj školi. Ulema medžlis Sarajevo je tek 21. februara 1939. godine donijela novi nastavni plan i porogram za niže medrese.⁵⁰ Reformatorske ideje hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića, podrazumijevali su uvođenje potrebne školske dokumentacije i administracije, po uzoru na tadašnje gimnazije.⁵¹ Reformisani plan i program pored vjerskih, obuhvatao je i svjetovne predmete. Od dolaska Saliha ef. Sivčevića na mjesto upravnika Medrese, kao izvrsnog učenjaka i pedagoga zavedene su neophodne mjere odgoja i obrazovanja. On je uveo pet dnevnih namaza u džematu. Pod njegovom kontrolom softe su obavljale sabah u Šarenoj džamiji.⁵²

Kao novina u radu Medrese bilo je uvođenje svakodnevne korepticije (grupnog učenja), a što je bilo pod nadzorom dežurnih muderisa i starijih učenika medrese.⁵³ U ovom vremenu uvodi se i pozicija softa-baše, kao glavnog, odgovornog učenika medrese, koji je biran između odličnih učenika IV razreda. Mandat softa-baše je trajao dvije godine. Radilo se o odgovornom učeniku Medrese, koji je imao zadatak da prati sveukupno stanje učenika vezano za vladanje, pohađanje i ukupnu disciplinu istih. Softe baše su bili uzorni učenici i u svakom pogledu dobar primjer drugima. U svemu su se isticali, u dobrom ponašanju i uspjehu. Neki od njih, pored odličnog uspjeha u toku školovanja u Medresi, završili su hifz i postali hafizi.⁵⁴ Među softa-bašama iz ovog perioda rada Medrese, posebno su se isticali: Abdulrahman ef. Hukić, Ibrahim ef. Drljača, Husein ef. Mujić, Mehemd ef. Sadiković i dr. Neki od njih su kasnije završili visoke škole i svojim radom znatno uticali na razvoj islamske svijesti i kulture.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1. Dopis Vakufsko mearifskog sborskog odbora Sarajevo, br. 4.638/25, od 28. oktobra 1925. godine.

⁴⁹ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 38-39, ATK, BMT, dok. br. 1942/29.

⁵⁰ Omer Zulić, Uvođenje i značaj izučavanja svjetovnih predmeta u Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli, *Kapija vremena, Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola povodom 390 godina Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, Tuzla 2017, 106. (dalje: O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*).

⁵¹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2.

⁵² H. Suljkić, *Reformator i pedagog*, 25.

⁵³ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

⁵⁴ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 43.

⁵⁵ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

Važna reformska mjera koja se uvela u ovom vremenu jeste ocjenjivanje učenika po gimnazijskom principu i praksi Gazi Husrev-begove medrese u Sarajevu, pri čemu su polugodišnji izvještaji o uspjehu učenika štampani na posebnim obrascima. Na kraju školske godine izdavala su se godišnja svjedočanstva, koja su pored nastavnih predmeta sadržavala ocjene ispisane arapskim pismom i latinicom, kao i sve druge generalije o učenicima.⁵⁶

Među važnim reformskim novinama u Berham-begovoj medresi, bilo je osnivanje Biblioteke 1924. godine. Ista je posjedovala izuzetno vrijedan knjižno-bibliotečki fond. Jedan broj knjiga je nabavljen kupovinom, a značajan broj je sakupljen darivanjem građana i profesora Medrese. Vrijedne knjige, koje je donio iz Istanbula, Biblioteci je poklonio hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević. Već 1925. godine biblioteka je imala solidan broj knjiga, koje su značajno pomogle u izučavanju kako vjerskih tako i svjetovnih sadržaja i predmeta.⁵⁷ Osnivanjem biblioteke pri Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli, istoj su dostavljani brojni glasnici poput: *Behara*, *Bisera*, *Mishaba* i drugih, što je značajno olakšalo učenicima pristup istim. Jedan broj ovih glasila je poklanjao najboljim učenicima Medrese.⁵⁸ Biblioteka Behram-begove medrese je bila važnim stubom reforme i uzdizanja Medrese na obrazovno-odgojnom planu u ovom vremenu. Nažalost, nakon što je 1943. godine njemačka vojska zaposjela zgradu Medrese, knjige biblioteke su izmještene u Ured Imamata Tuzla, a potom u Sagrdžan ili Bijelu džamiju u mahali Tušanj. Na navedenom mjestu Biblioteka je ostala do 1948. godine, kada je od strane komunističke vlasti uništena-spaljena.⁵⁹ Među spaljenim knjigama bile su i one od izuzetne vrijednosti na arapskom i turskom jeziku, koje je hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević donio iz Istanbula, nakon što je završio svoje fakultetsko obrazovanje.⁶⁰

Jedan od najbitnijih segmenta reforme Behrm-begove medrese odnosio se na uvođenje svjetovnih predmeta. Isti su uvedeni postepeno. U školskoj 1924/1925. godini su uvedeni neki svjetovni predmeti, a po osnovu naređenja Uleme međžlisa u Sarajevu.⁶¹ Sama ideja o uvođenju svjetovnih predmeta prihvaćena je i podržana od strane nastavnog kadra u Tuzli. Nekoliko tadašnjih profesora tuzlanskih srednjih škola je podržalo tu ideju, te se stavilo na raspolaganju da besplatno drže nastavu iz svjetovnih predmeta, četiri sata sedmično, godinu dana.⁶² Ovaj nastavni kadar se ponudio da zajedno sa upravom i muderisima Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli, urade program rada, što je odobrio Reis-ul-ulema Čaušević.⁶³ Proces uvođenja svjetovnih predmeta u

⁵⁶ Isto.

⁵⁷ Isto.

⁵⁸ ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, serija 6262/35.

⁵⁹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

⁶⁰ Isto.

⁶¹ ATK, BMT, dok. br. 1093/24, od 4. novembra 1924. godine.

⁶² O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 107; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 3/24. Dopis upućen 10. novembra 1924. godine Muftijskom uredu u Tuzli.

⁶³ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 107; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1. Dopis od 9. septembra 1926. godine.

Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli se odvijao sa dosta poteškoća, ponajviše zbog nedostatka nastavnog kadra. No, na poboljšanju stanja po ovom pitanju organizirano su pored rukovodstva Medrese raili i Muftijstvo u Tuzli, kao i Ulema medžlis za Bosnu i Hercegovinu na čelu sa Reis-ul-ulemom Džemaludinom ef. Čauševićem. Na tom planu, provođene su aktivnosti i data podrška od navedenih institucija IZ u 1927. godini, kada je zaključeno da se svjetovni predmeti uvedu u školskoj 1927/1928. godini.⁶⁴ Poseban dio reforme odnosio se na udžbeničku problematiku u Behram-begovoj medresi. Jedan broj gimnazijskih udžbenika je našao primjenu u Behram-begovoj medresi. Međutim, osjećao se nedostatak udžbenika i nastavnih pomagala. U nastavnom procesu za svjetovne predmete se upotrebljavalo više od 10 udžbenika.⁶⁵ Na taj način, učenici Medrese su se upoznivali sa gimnazijskim nastavnim sadržajima. Osim toga, Ulema medžlis Sarajevo, je izvršio određene promjene udžbenika za arapski jezik i vjeronauku, a što je predstavljalo određenu sadržajnu novinu.⁶⁶

Prvi predavači svjetovnih predmeta bili su Mustajbeg Kršlak i Mehmedalija Džinić. Rad nastavnika na svjetovnim predmetima je honorisan od Vakufskog povjerenstva u Tuzli.⁶⁷ Nastavnici svjetovne grupe predmeta su nakon prve dvije školske godine od uvođenja istih, konstatovali da su učenici iskazali interes za iste i savlađivanje svjetovnih nastavnih sadržaja. Nastavnici svjetovnih programa su predlagali da se sadržaji svjetovnih programa u Medresi, izjednače programima istih predmeta u Gimnaziji i Gazi Husrev-begovoj medresi u Sarajevu.⁶⁸

Uvođenje svjetovnih predmeta u nastavni proces u Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli, dodatno je opteretio učenike obimom nastavnih sadržaja. To je imalo odraza na ukupan uspjeh učenika, koji nije bio zadovoljavajući u prvim godinama rada Medrese po reformisanom programu. Naime, iz dostupnih izvještaja o uspjehu učenika, vidljivo je, da je znatan broj učenika imao negativne ocjene iz svjetovnih predmeta, te da su bolji uspjeh učenici pokazali iz vjerskih predmeta.⁶⁹ Iz tog razloga, nameće se pitanje, je li to rezultat teškoća u savlađivanju nastavnih svjetovnih sadržaja, nezainteresiranosti učenika, ili visok kriterij ocjenjivanja, prenesen iz Gimnazije. U kasnijim godinama rezultai i ukupan uspjeh učenika se znatno popravio, pa tako i iz svjetovnih predmeta.

U prvom svom mandatu (1922-1928), hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević je predano radio na reformisanju Berham-begove medrese u Tuzli. Aktivnosti uprave medrese na čelu sa hafizom Salihom ef. Sivčević i postignuti rezultai bili su

⁶⁴ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 107; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 4/27. Dopis Kotarskog vakufsko-mearifskog povjerenstva Tuzla upućen Muftijskom uredu, br. 371/27, od 2. oktobra 1927. godine.

⁶⁵ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj.1.

⁶⁶ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 41; ATK, BMT, dok. br. 1861/32, od decembra 1932.

⁶⁷ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 109; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 1/28 Z.

⁶⁸ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 110; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 1/28 Z.

⁶⁹ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 111-114.

vidljivi i prepoznati od šire zajednice, pri čemu je Behrambegova medresa uživala sve veći ugled.⁷⁰

Hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića je na mjestu upravnika Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli, početkom 1929. godine zamijenio Hasan ef. Smajilović, zbog njegovog odlaska u Sarajevo, kada je izabran za člana Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo.⁷¹ Od 1929. godine Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je definitivno uređena kao petorazredna niža medresa u kojoj su se izučavali predmeti vjerske i svjetovne provenijencije. Učenici su kroz petogodišnje obrazovanje stjecali znanja i vještine iz dvadeset i jednog predmeta.⁷² Hasan ef. Smajilović, kao upravitelj Medrese nastavio je za reformskim procesima u istoj. Reforma je podrazumijevala i poboljšanje statusa rukovodioca i drugih radnika u Behram-begovoj medresi, što je i ostvareno u 1931. godini.⁷³ S ciljem unapređenja odgojne komponente, Ulema medžlis za Bosnu i Hercegovinu je preko Muftijskog ureda u Tuzli zahtijevao od Uprave Medrese da izradi nacrt disciplinskih pravila po uzoru na Gazi Husrev-begovu medrsu.⁷⁴ Ulema medžlis je 1930. godine usvojio novi plan za predmete vjerske provenijencije u prvom, drugom i trećem razredu medrese, dok se u četvrtom i petom radilo prema starom planu. U svih pet razreda bilo je 75 sati.⁷⁵ Sve su to bili reformski dodaci u radu Medrese.

Određenih poteškoća bilo je u finansiranju nastavnika svjetovnih predmeta, jer u godišnjom proračunu nije bilo dovoljno sredstava za tu namjenu. Međutim, uprava Medrese je iznalazila mogućnosti ne samo da zadrži postojeći kadar, već da se škola kadrovski ojača. Tako se uprava Medrese obratila Vakufsko-mearifskom povjereništvu u Tuzli, tražeći kredit za plaćanje nastavnika svjetovnih predmeta za mjesec septembar, oktobar, novembar i decembar 1930. godine. Isti dopis je upućen i Ulema medžlisu Sarajevo, tražeći da se što prije riješi pitanje traženog kredita, a kako bi se nastavnici svjetovnih predmeta uveli u nastavni proces. Predloženo je, da se u nastavu svjetovnih predmeta uvede Danilo Salom, profesor Gimnazije u Tuzli, koji bi predavao matematiku u tri razreda i fiziku u trećem razredu. Predloženo je da se u nastavni proces u sva tri razreda uvede i nastavnik crtanja Gimnazije Tuzla Ante Marković.⁷⁶ Uključivanjem dodatnih svjetovnih nastavnika u nastavni proces, Medresa je potvrđivala da je istrajna na reformskom kursu, te je tu praksu snažila i u narednom periodu, kada se broj svjetovnih predmeta i nastavnika povećavao.

⁷⁰ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

⁷¹ ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 47/30. Dopis od 13. novembra 1930, kojim uprava Behram-begove medrese upoznaje Kotarsko vakufsko povjereništvo u Tuzli o ostupanju dr. Salih ef. Sivčevića na mjestu upravitelja Medrese.

⁷² S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, 57.

⁷³ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 39; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 9/31.

⁷⁴ S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, 58; ATK, BMT, kutija 2, Dopis Reis-ul-uleme za Bosnu i Hercegovinu Muftijskom uredu u Tuzli, Sarajevo, 23. april 1929.

⁷⁵ S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, 58.

⁷⁶ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 115-116; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 8/30. Dopis broj 31/30.

Godine 1931. u nastavni proces je uključen Muhamed ef. Husić, nastavnik Građanske škole u Tuzli, koji je predavao više svjetovnih predmeta: *Gospodarstvo, Higijena, Povijest, Krasnopis i Srpsko-hrvatski jezik*. U nastavi je umjesto nastavnika Mustajbega Kršlaka, koji je otišao u Sarajevo, 1931. godine uvedeni prof. Adem Bise, sa pet sati sedmično i Safet Burina sa 12 sati sedmično.⁷⁷ Kasnije, u školskoj 1932/1933. godini, u Medresi su uvedeni predmeti Fizika i Crtanje,⁷⁸ te su se kao honorarni nastavnici u Berham-begovoj medresi uključili: Džinić Mehmedalija, Danilo Solom, Safet Burina i Ante Marković.⁷⁹ U ovoj školskoj godini škola je imala problema oko angažmana nastavnika svjetovnih predmeta, jer je Ministarstvo prosvjete dalo odobrenje za rad tek krajem oktobra 1932. godine.⁸⁰ Nekim profesorima, kao što je bio profesor Adem Bise, Ministarstvo prosvjete nije dalo saglasnost za angažman u Behram-begovoj medresi.⁸¹ U školskoj 1933/1934. godini u Medresi je uveden šesti razred, a kako bi učenici kroz tu godinu prešli gradivo iz novog nastavnog programa za niže medrese, koje nisu imali u prvih pet razreda.⁸² U ovoj školskoj godini u nastavni proces bio je uključen i Mehmed Meša Selimović, a u narednim školskim godinama sve do 1939. godine kao nastavnici svjetovnih predmeta; *Prirodopis, Gospodarstvo, Zemljopis, Matematika, Fizika, Historija, Srpsko-hrvatski jezik, Krasnopis, Higijena*, bili su uključeni: Svjetislav Plavšić, Husein Dubravić, Danilo Salom, Mehmed Meša Selimović, Mehmed ef. Husić.⁸³

Značajne promjene su učinjene i kada je riječ o ocjenjivanju učenika, koji su u ovom vremenu ocjenjivani kao i učenici u gimnazijama i Gazi Husrev-begovoj medresi u Sarajevu. To je podrazumijevalo posebne polugodišnje izvještaje o uspjehu učenika, pri čemu su štampani posebni obrasci na bosanskom jeziku. Na kraju školske godine, uspjeh učenika se evidentirao kroz posebna svjedočanstva, koja su sadržavala sve nastavne predmete, te rubrike za ocjene iz istih koje su upisivane arapskim pismom i latinicom,⁸⁴ Navedena svjedočanstva su predstavljala validan zvaničan dokument kojim se potvrđivao uspjeh učenika Medrese. Novina u Behram-begovoj medresi se odnosila na polaganje zvršnog ispita nakon završenog petog razreda.⁸⁵

⁷⁷ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 116; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 16/31.

⁷⁸ S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzlu*, 59.

⁷⁹ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 117; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 51/32.

⁸⁰ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 41; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 114/32.

⁸¹ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 41; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 183/32.

⁸² O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 117; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 10/33.

⁸³ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 119; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 2, signatura 2/35.

⁸⁴ I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 43.

⁸⁵ ATK, BMT, kutija 2, Dopis uprve Behram-begove medrese Ulema medžlisu u Sarajevu, Tuzla, 16. mart 1932.

Hadži Salih ef. Sivčević je nakon što mu je prestao mandat člana Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo, a nakon donošenja novog *Zakona o Islamskoj zajednici*, postavljen u novembru 1930. godine za muderisa u Behram-begovoj medresi na nekoliko vjerskih predmeta.⁸⁶ Tako je bio u prilici da i s pozicije muderisa predavača učestvuje u radu na reformi škole. Na mjestu upravitelja Behram-begove medrese po drugi put postavljen je 1934. godine.⁸⁷ Nakon postavljenja za upravnika Medrese nastavio je sa brojnim aktivnostima kako bi se ista što bolje organizirala i postizala što bolje odgojno-obrazovne rezultate. Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je tada prednjačila u odnosu na druge medrese ovog ranga, što potvrđuje činjenica da njeni učenici nisu bili samo sa područja sjeveroistočne Bosne već iz drugih djelov Bosne, Srbije i Sandžaka: Kotor Varoši, Bugojna, Glamoča, Ustripače, Priboja na Limu, Jajca, Bihaća, Bosanskog Petrova, te iz Malog Zvornika i Loznice.⁸⁸

Učenika je u Medresi bilo sve više, a postojeći smještajni i radni prostori nisu više mogli odgovoriti potrebama škole. Iz tih razloga, hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević kao upravitelj škole pokreće brojne aktivnosti (sergije, donacije) kako bi se sakupila neophodna sredstva za dogradnju i opremanje medrese. Tim povodom hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević je tražio od Uleme medžlisa Sarajevo dozvolu za prikupljanje sredstava za dogradnju Medrese u Tuzli.⁸⁹ Ulema medžlis Sarajevo je preko Upravnog odbora Vakufsko mearifskog vijeća dala saglasnost da se sredstva za ovu namjenu mogu prikupljati već od Bajrama.⁹⁰ Posebnim aktom Sreskog mearifskog povjerenstva u Tuzli, od 13. maja 1936. godine,⁹¹ upućenim Naibu IZ u Sarajevu, isti je obaviješten da je ovo *Povjerenstvo* ovlastilo hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića, Muhameda ef. Husića i Šefketa ef. Šabića, muderise Behram-begove medrese, da mogu sakupljati dobrovoljne priloge za gradnju i proširenje te nabavku opreme za potrebe Medrese u Tuzli. Naglašeno je da je ove školske godine Medresu upislo 141 učenik, od kojih je u internat moglo biti primljeno svega 81 učenik.⁹² Značajan dio sredstava dala je Vakufska direkcija u Sarajevu. Zapaženo je da je vidan doprinos u prikupljanju sredstava za ove potrebe, pored navedenog Odbora, dao Muhamed Pandža, član Ulema medžlisa IZ. Značajna sredstva za rad Medrese, kao i za njenu obnovu dao je i

⁸⁶ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, *Dopis Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo*, od 9. novembra 1930. godine; I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 39; ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 1570/930.

⁸⁷ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, *Rješenje Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo*, o postavljenju Saliha ef. Sivčevića za upravitelja Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli, br. 2035/34, od 25. jun 1934. godine.

⁸⁸ S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, 60.

⁸⁹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1. Dopis hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića Salim ef. Muftiću, predsjedniku Ulema medžlisa Sarajevo, od 26. februara 1936. godine.

⁹⁰ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1. Dopis Ulema Medžlisa Sarajevo Upravnom odboru Vakufsko-mearifskog vijeća u Sarajevu, br. 2669/36, od. 13. aprila 1936. godine.

⁹¹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, Akt Sreskog mearifskog povjerenstva u Tuzli, br. 556/36, od 13. maja 1936. godine.

⁹² ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

Tuzlanski vakuf na čelu sa Ahmed ef. Sijerčićem, kao i Vakuf Hadži Hasanove (čaršijske) džamije u Tuzli.⁹³

Godine 1938. Berham-begova medresa je dograđena novim učionicama, spavaonicama, kuhinjom i trapezarijom te magacinskim prostorom. Poslije dogradnje, Medresa je raspolagala sa 23 prostorije u kojima se nesmetano mogla odvijati nastava i provoditi obrazovno-odgojni proces i život za 150 učenika. Novodograđena Berham-begova medresa otvorena je 1939. godine. Tada se u Behram-begovoj medresi izučavalo ukupno 21. nastavni predmet, od čega je svjetovnih bilo 11 i vjerskih 10. predmeta. Po osnovu ovog reformskog zahvata bilo je predviđeno da se koristi više desetina udžbenika i priručnika. Reformom su obuhvaćeni i vjerski predmeti, u smislu da se programski sistematičnije realiziraju nastavni sadržaji uz primjenu jasno predloženih udžbenika.⁹⁴

Uredbom o nižim medresama od 3. aprila 1939. godine, Medresa u Tuzli svoj rad nastavila je pod nazivom „Niža medresa u Tuzli“.⁹⁵ Ovim je Medresa u Tuzli dovedena u rang niže gimnazije. Od marta 1939. godine u Behram-begovoj medresi je uvedeno izučavanje Fizike i Hemije, Gimnastike, a od 1941. kao fakultativni predmet uveden je njemački jezik, kao neobavezni jezik, za koji je postojao veliki interes.⁹⁶ Sve je to predstavljalo nastavak reformskog kursa kojeg je na obrazovno-odgojnom planu realizirala Behram-begova medresa u ranijem vremenu. Sretna okolnost bila je ta, da je na čelu Medrese i dalje bio hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević.⁹⁷ U školskoj 1939/40. nastavu su osim hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića izvodili slijedeći nastavnici: Ibrahim Čokić, Muhamed Husić, Ibrahim Imširović, Šefket Šabić, Ahmed Redžebašić, Husejn Dubravić, Omer Džudža, Mehmed Meša Selimović, Muhamed Gagić i Mehmed Salihspahić.⁹⁸ Ukupno je učenika u prvom polugodištu školske 1939/40. godine bilo 135.⁹⁹ Vladanje i uspjeh učenika bilo je na zavidnom nivou, 120 učenika (93,02%) uspješno je završilo školsku godinu, a 9 učenika (6,98%) je palo.¹⁰⁰ Sve je to ukazivalo da reformski procesi koji su provođeni u Medresi nisu bili uzaludni.

Sastavni dio reformskih procesa kojima je bila obuhvaćena Behram-begova medresa odnosio se na planirane odmomore-raspuste učenika. Pored redovnih dnevnih odmora, učenici Medrese su imali pravo odmora u vrijeme vjerskih (Bajram) i državnih praznika (Dan ujedinjenja K SHS, 1. decembar). Učenici su bili slobodni od nastave u vrijeme ljetnjeg-godišnjeg raspusta koji je trajao od 25. juna do 5. septembra, te ramazanske ferije od 27. šabana do 6.

⁹³ Isto.

⁹⁴ Isto.

⁹⁵ S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, 61.

⁹⁶ O. Zulić, *Uvođenje i značaj svjetovnih predmeta*, 119-120; ATK, BMT, kutija 2, fascikla 1, signatura 22/41.

⁹⁷ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 2, *Zapisnik o polagaanju zakletve Salih ef. Sivčevića*, upravitelja Niže medrese u Tuzlu, od 24. aaprila 1940. godine.

⁹⁸ S. Selimović, *Djelatnost Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli*, 63.

⁹⁹ Isto, 64.

¹⁰⁰ Isto, 70.

ševala. Osim toga, nastava se nije izvodila petkom, na državne praznike, novu godinu po Hidžri, te Mevlud uoči mubarek noći Lejlei-regaiba i Lejlei-berata.¹⁰¹

Zahvaljujući provedenim reformskim procesima, Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je dobila na značaju i interesovanju učenika ne samo sa šireg tuzlanskog područja, već i iz sredina u kojima su postojale medrese koje su radile po starom klasičnom sistemu. To potvrđuje i zahtjev Vakufsko-mearifskog povjereništva u Novom Pazaru, koji traži od uprave Behram-begove medrese upis troje djece sa ovog područja.¹⁰² Da je Behram-begova medresa bila na dobrom glasu, potvrđuje poziv Uleme medžlis Skoplje hafizu Salihu ef. Sivčeviću da se prijavi na konkurs za direktora novoosnovane medrese u ovom gradu.¹⁰³ Navedeni poziv bilo je priznanje i Behram-begovoj medresi i hafizu Salihu ef. Sivčeviću za predan rad koji je doprinio odgojno-obrazovnom uzdizanju ove Behram-begove medrese u Tuzli. Osim toga, ista je u kod šire javnosti uživala veliki ugled, kao i njen upravitelj hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, koji je pozivan i rado slušan kao predavač u mnogim mjestima na širem tuzlanskom području i u Bosni i Hercegovini.¹⁰⁴

Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je bila dobar primjer drugim medresama i vjerskim školama da se novim reformskim pristupom i predanim pregalačkim radom mogu postići dobri odgojno-obrazovni rezultati. To najbolje potvrđuju generacije medresanata, koje su se školovale u ovom vremenu u Behram-begovoj medresi, koji su postali dobri alimi, vjerski službenici, ali i učitelji, profesori ali i stručnjaci u drugim profesijama. Reformskim procesima Behram-begova medresa je odgovorila svom vremenu, te ovaj period njenog djelovanja se smatra posebno značajnim i uspješnim.

Zaključna razmatranja

U vremenu od 1922. godine, pa sve do Drugog svjetskog rata, provedeni su brojni reformski procesi u Behram-begovoj medresi u Tuzli, a u cilju osavremenjavanja i podizanja ove škole na veći odgojno-obrazovni nivo. Reformski procesi su rezultat jasne vizije i predanog rada, prije svega hafiza Saliha ef. Sivčevića, koji je u dva navrata bio upravnik škole, ali i drugih profesora i muderisa, poput: Hasan ef. Smajilovića, Mehmeda ef. Husića i Šefketa ef. Šabića, koji su bili nosioci reformskih procesa u Medresi. Reforma je podrazumijevala široke odgojno-obrazovne, suštinske, organizacione i tehničke aktivnosti. Individualna nastava je zamijenjena uvođenjem razredne, Medresa je postala škola internatskog tipa, uvedena je školska dokumentacija i administracija po uzoru na gimnazije, kao i sistem ocjenjivanja učenika. Uveden je obavezan prijemni ispit za upis učenika u prvi razred Medrese. U procesu

¹⁰¹ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj.1.

¹⁰² ATK, BMT, kutija 1, fascikla 1, signatura 883/35; I. Šabotić, *Behram-begova medresa*, 45.

¹⁰³ ATK, ZD, *Salih ef. Sivčević*, knj. 1.

¹⁰⁴ *Isto*.

reforme je izvršeno unapređenje nastavnih planova i programa, pri čemu su značajno obogaćeni nastavni sadržaji. Pored vjerskih, uvedeni su svjetovni predmeti, uspostavljene su norme poštivanja i njegovanja moralno-odgojnih principa učenika. Sistem zdravstvene zaštite učenika i nastavnika je značajno unaprijeđen otvaranjem školske ambulante. Sve to je doprinijelo podizanju odgojno-obrazovnog nivoa u Medresi. Za modernu odgojno-obrazovnu ustanovu neophodno je bilo obezbijediti potrebne radne i smještajne uslove. Stoga se u dva navrata u ovom periodu radilo na proširenju prostorno-smještajnih kapaciteta škole. Ista je zahvaljujući agilnosti upravitelja škole hafiza Saliha Sivčevića, opremljena potrebnom školskom i internatskom opremom. Otvaranjem kuhinje za učenike značajno su poboljšani uslovi boravka učenika u internatu. Poseban značaj za uspješno izvršavanje odgojno-obrazovnih procesa imalo je osnivanje Biblioteke, koja je posjedovala potreban broj knjiga i glasila neophodnih nastavnicima i učenicima u realizaciji nastavnih sadržaja. Reformski procesi su se ogledali i u uvođenju prava učenika na dnevne odmore i godišnji raspust.

Navedene reformske mjere su doprinijele da Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli izraste u jednu prepoznatljivu odgojno-obrazovnu ustanovu, koja je iškolovala dobar kadar, kako vjerski tako i svjetovni. Zbog sve većeg ugleda kojeg je škola imala, inters za upis u istu je bio sve izraženiji, i to ne samo od strane učenika sa šireg tuzlanskog prostora, već i iz drugih krajeva tadašnje zajedničke države. Očito je, da je Behram-begova medresa, za ondašnje društveno-političke i ekonomske prilike bila savremena odgojno-obrazovna ustanova, koja je uz preneseno znanje učenicima, kod istih razvijala odgojno-moralne vrijednosti. Za prepoznatljivi uspon i uspjeh Medrese među najzaslužnijim je njen dugogodišnji upravitelj hafiz Sallih ef. Sivčević, kao i njeni muderisi i profesori koji su znalački nosili reformske procese. Zahvaljujući svima njima, Behram-begova medresa u Tuzli je u vremenu između dva svjetska rata bila odgojno-obrazovna ustanova od ugleda i za primjer drugima.

Summary

In the period from 1922 until the Second World War, numerous reform processes were carried out at the Behram-beg Madrasa in Tuzla with the aim of modernizing the institution and elevating it to a higher educational standard. These reforms were the result of a clear vision and dedicated work, primarily by Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, who served as the school's director on two occasions, as well as other professors and mudarrises such as Hasan ef. Smajilović, Mehmed ef. Husić, and Šefket ef. Šabić, who were the key proponents of these changes. The reform encompassed wide-ranging pedagogical, substantive, organizational, and technical activities. Individualized instruction was replaced by the introduction of classroom-based teaching, and the Madrasa transitioned into a boarding-type school. School documentation and administration were established following the model of gymnasiums (grammar schools), alongside

the implementation of a formal student grading system. Furthermore, a mandatory entrance exam was introduced for students enrolling in the first grade. As part of the reform process, curricula and syllabi were modernized, significantly enriching the educational content. In addition to religious sciences, secular subjects were introduced, and norms for respecting and nurturing the moral and ethical principles of students were established. Student and teacher health care was significantly improved through the opening of a school clinic. All these measures contributed to raising the overall educational level of the Madrasa. To function as a modern educational institution, it was essential to provide adequate working and living conditions. Consequently, the school's spatial and residential capacities were expanded on two occasions during this period. Thanks to the agility of the director, Hafiz Salih Sivčević, the institution was outfitted with the necessary school and dormitory equipment. The opening of a student kitchen significantly improved the living conditions within the boarding school. Of particular importance for the successful execution of the educational process was the founding of the Library, which possessed the necessary books and periodicals required by both teachers and students. The reform processes were also reflected in the introduction of students' rights to daily breaks and annual holidays.

These reform measures allowed the Behram-beg Madrasa in Tuzla to grow into a recognizable educational institution that produced highly qualified personnel in both religious and secular fields. Due to the school's growing reputation, interest in enrollment became increasingly pronounced, drawing students not only from the wider Tuzla region but also from other parts of the then-common state (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). It is evident that, given the socio-political and economic circumstances of the time, the Behram-beg Madrasa was a modern educational institution that, in addition to imparting knowledge, fostered moral and ethical values in its students. The primary credit for the Madrasa's notable rise and success goes to its long-time director, Hafiz Salih ef. Sivčević, as well as the mudarrises and professors who skillfully spearheaded the reform processes. Thanks to their collective efforts, the Behram-beg Madrasa in Tuzla stood as a prestigious institution and an example to others during the interwar period.

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USPOSTAVA USTAŠKE VLASTI I RATNA SVAKODNEVICA U BRČKOM (1941-1945)¹

Apstrakt: Rad analizira uspostavu ustaške vlasti i ratnu svakodnevicu u Brčkom tijekom razdoblja Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941–1945), s posebnim naglaskom na demografske, gospodarske i društvene procese koji su oblikovali lokalnu zajednicu uoči i tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata. Brčko je u prvoj polovici 20. stoljeća bilo područje intenzivnih migracija i gospodarskih promjena, smješteno na dodiru hrvatskih, srpskih i bošnjačkih etničkih prostora, s višekonfesionalnom i etnički raznolikom populacijom. Nasljeđe osmanske i austro-ugarske uprave, razvoj prometnih mreža i trgovine te migracijski tokovi odredili su njegovu strukturu stanovništva i društvene odnose.

U radu se prvo razmatraju migracije i demografski razvoj do 1941, uključujući procese naseljavanja, gospodarske transformacije i društvene odnose u međuratnom razdoblju. Analiza pokazuje da je područje Brčkog bilo obilježeno visokim natalitetom, složenom vjerskom strukturom i gospodarskim oscilacijama između agrarne tradicije i sporog industrijskog razvoja. Ovi su procesi stvorili okvir unutar kojega su ratna zbivanja imala snažan utjecaj na lokalnu zajednicu.

U drugom dijelu rada istražuje se uspostava ustaškog režima, organizacija lokalne vlasti i represivne mjere prema Srbima, Židovima i političkim protivnicima. Brčko je zbog svoga prometnog i strateškog položaja

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postalo važno vojno uporište i mjesto sukoba okupacijskih snaga, ustaša i partizanskog pokreta. Analiziraju se procesi ustašizacije civilnih vlasti, odnosi između ustaških struktura i redovnih upravnih tijela, kao i primjeri nasilja, deportacija, prisilnih konverzija i masovnih zločina. Posebna se pažnja posvećuje svakodnevici stanovništva, uključujući strah, prisilne migracije, gospodarsko propadanje i pokušaje preživljavanja u ratnim uvjetima.

Rad također uspoređuje situaciju u Brčkom s drugim pograničnim područjima sjeveroistočne Bosne, ukazujući na šire obrasce nasilja i represije, ali i na specifičnosti lokalne dinamike moći i međunacionalnih odnosa. Zaključno, autori pokazuju kako su demografske i gospodarske okolnosti iz međuratnog razdoblja, u kombinaciji s politikom ustaškog režima i ratnim sukobima, dovele do dubokih društvenih promjena, trajnih trauma i dugoročnih posljedica za međunacionalne odnose i kolektivno pamćenje stanovništva Brčkog i njegove okolice.

Ključne riječi: *Brčko, Drugi svjetski rat, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, ustaški režim, migracije, međunacionalni odnosi, ratna svakodnevica, represija.*

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF USTAŠA AUTHORITY AND WARTIME EVERYDAY LIFE IN BRČKO (1941–1945)

Abstract: *This paper analyzes the establishment of Ustaša rule and everyday life during wartime in Brčko during the period of the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (1941–1945), with special emphasis on the demographic, economic, and social processes that shaped the local community before and during the Second World War. In the first half of the twentieth century, Brčko was an area marked by intense migration and economic change, situated at the intersection of Croatian, Serbian, and Bosniak ethnic territories, with a multi-confessional and ethnically diverse population. The legacy of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule, the development of transport networks and trade, and migration flows significantly influenced its demographic structure and social relations.*

The paper first examines migration patterns and demographic development up to 1941, including settlement processes, economic transformations, and social relations in the interwar period. The analysis shows that the Brčko area was characterized by high birth rates, a complex religious structure, and economic oscillations between agrarian traditions and slow industrial development. These processes created the framework within which wartime events profoundly affected the local community.

The second part of the study explores the establishment of the Ustaša regime, the organization of local authorities, and repressive measures directed against Serbs, Jews, and political opponents. Due to its transportation links and strategic position, Brčko became an important military stronghold and a site of conflict between occupying forces, Ustaša units, and the Partisan movement. The

processes of the „Ustašization” of civilian authorities, the relationship between Ustaša structures and regular administrative bodies, as well as instances of violence, deportations, forced conversions, and mass crimes are analyzed. Particular attention is devoted to everyday life under wartime conditions, including fear, forced migrations, economic decline, and attempts at survival.

The paper also compares the situation in Brčko with other border areas of northeastern Bosnia, highlighting broader patterns of violence and repression as well as the specific features of local power dynamics and interethnic relations. In conclusion, the authors demonstrate how interwar demographic and economic circumstances, combined with the policies of the Ustaša regime and wartime conflicts, led to profound social changes, lasting trauma, and long-term consequences for interethnic relations and the collective memory of the population of Brčko and its surroundings.

Key words: *Brčko, Second World War, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, Ustaša regime, migrations, interethnic relations, everyday wartime life, repression.*

Uvod

Područje Brčkog i njegove okolice tijekom prve polovice 20. stoljeća predstavljalo je prostor izrazite imigracije, gospodarskih promjena i složenih međunacionalnih odnosa, oblikovanih dugotrajnim migracijskim procesima, nasljedem osmanske i austro-ugarske uprave te razvojem prometnih i trgovačkih mreža. Smješteno na razmeđu triju etničkih i konfesionalnih zona – hrvatske Županjske posavine, bošnjačkih obronaka planine Majevice i srpskog zaleđa prema istoku – Brčko je do Drugoga svjetskog rata izraslo u važno regionalno središte čiju su strukturu stanovništva i ekonomske prilike određivali i prirodni uvjeti i politički lomovi širih razmjera.

Uspostava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941. godine, ratne operacije i provedba represivne politike prema Srbima, Židovima i političkim protivnicima pretvorile su taj prostor u poprište masovnog nasilja, prisilnih migracija i dubokih društvenih poremećaja. Istodobno, strateški položaj Brčkog na prometnici Zagreb–Beograd učinio ga je važnim vojnim uporištem, izloženim stalnim sukobima okupacijskih snaga i partizanskog pokreta. Ovaj rad analizira kako su se demografski i gospodarski procesi iz međuratnog razdoblja prelamali s ratnim okolnostima, oblikujući lokalnu dinamiku moći, nasilja i preživljavanja u jednome od ključnih prostora sjeveroistočne Bosne tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata.

Migracije, ekonomski i demografski razvoj do 1941. godine

Razlike u perspektivi života stanovništva dinarskih krajeva, u odnosu na plodne ravničarske krajeve Posavine bit će uzrokom mnogih seoba: nerodne godine, oskudice, višak stanovništva i slične okolnosti predstavljat će značajne faktore poticanja. Kao rezultat ovih kretanja područje grada Brčkog, i njegove okolice, našlo se na razmeđu etničkih regija Bosne i Hercegovine uspostavljenih još za vrijeme osmanske vladavine. Prirodno zaleđe grada dio je Posavine uglavnom naseljeno Hrvatima, zaleđe i obronci Majevice bili su naseljeni Bošnjacima, dok je svojim istočnim i jugoistočnim zaleđem Brčko pretežito bilo naseljeno Srbima. Popis stanovništva koji je 1879. provela Austro-Ugarska vlast pokazuje da je na području Brčkog gustoća stanovništva iznosila 40 po km², u odnosu na prosjek Bosne i Hercegovine od 23 po km². Vjerska struktura brčanskog područja 1879. sastavljena je od 46% muslimana, 27% pravoslavaca i 27% katolika. Spolna struktura ukazuje na viši postotak muškog stanovništva (52%), na žensku populaciju koja veoma rano stupa u brak, rađa i umire uslijed komplikacija u porodu, ali i na visoku stopu smrtnosti dojenčadi. Radilo se o mladom stanovništvu s oko 22% djece do 7 godina starosti u ukupnom udjelu populacije. Razdoblje austrougarske vladavine ovim područjem karakterizira nova etapa useljavanje, posebice u gradove koji poput Tuzle i Brčkog rastu stopama većim od 100%. Pri kraju vladavine Dvojne Monarhije dolazi do opadanja broja stanovnika muslimakse vjere. Na području Brčkog njihovo se učešće smanjilo s 46 na 34%, povećava se pravoslavno na 32% i katoličko na 34%. U samom gradu udio muslimana smanjen je sa 63 na 48%, pravoslavnog stanovništva sa 32 na 27%, dok je broj katolika značajno porastao s 3 na 21%. Muslimani se iseljavaju, dok je porast gradskog stanovništva bio povezan s useljavanjem katolika (u Tuzli su, primjerice, 1879. činili 5% stanovništva, dok se njihov udio 1910. povećava na 31%). Iz prethodnog proizlazi da je masovno useljavanje proizlazilo iz razvoja trgovine, obrta, prometa i industrije.²

Prema popisu stanovništva iz 1931. na kotaru Brčko živjelo je 97.962 stanovnika, većinu čine katolici s 42.208 pripadnika, pravoslavaca je bilo 34.956, muslimanskih vjernika 20.443, 109 evangelika i 105 pripadnika drugih kršćanskih zajednica, na kotaru je bilo i 141 židovski vjernik od kojih 112 u Brčkom i 29 u Bosanskom Šamcu. Samo Brčko je u ukupnom broju stanovnika kotara bilo šesto sa 7.780 stanovnika, iza naselja Gornji Rahić koje je imalo 11.749 (većinu čine pripadnici muslimanske vjeroispovijesti, oko 59%), Donja Mahala sa 11.714 (većinu čine katolici – gotovo 99%), Čelići sa 11.624 (oko 51% muslimanskih vjernika i oko 40 % pravoslavnih), Bukvik sa 11.419 (oko

² Dušan Penezić, Šefik Mulabegović, Božidar Stavrić, *Ekonomski razvoj Brčkog i okoline, Brčko i okolica u radničkom pokretu i NOB* (ur. Zdravko Antonić), Tuzla 1985, 88-95. Smješteno na sjevernoj granici područja koja su u Bosni i Hercegovini naseljavali pretežito Bošnjaci, uskog pojasa uz rijeku Savu koji su naseljavali pretežito Hrvati (od Bosanskog Broda do Brčkog). Oblasti naseljene pretežito Srbima dosezale su na sjeveru do rijeke Save područjem koje se protezalo od ušća rijeke Drine do Brčkog i pravcem prema Vlasenici i Višegradu.

74% katolici, oko 25% pravoslavci) i Obudovac sa 8.200 stanovnika (oko 78% stanovništva pravoslavne vjere i oko 22% katolici). U samom Brčkom većinu su činili pripadnici muslimanske vjere oko 51%, zatim slijede katolici s oko 23%, pravoslavci s oko 21%, evangelici oko 1% i Židovi oko 1%. Broj Židova u Brčkom se povećava pred početak Drugog svjetskog rata. Radilo se o emigrantima koji 1938. emigriraju iz Austrije u Jugoslaviju, gdje se prvo nastanjuju u Fužinama, da bi zbog skupoće života preselili u Brčko gdje su živjeli smješteni u nekoliko kuća. Radilo se o stotinjak osoba, što bi ukupan broj Židova u Brčkom porastao na 250, prema procjenama. U međupopisnom razdoblju 1921. – 1931. grad je narastao za 13,9% stanovnika (sa 6.832 na 7.780), dok je okolica narasla po stopi većoj od 20%. Brčanski kotar se u Kraljevini ubraja u područja s atipično visokom stopom nataliteta (46 živorođene djece na 1.000 stanovnika i s 25 umrlih na 1.000 stanovnika godišnje). Porast stanovništva bio je posljedica visokog nataliteta, dok useljavanje više nije imalo bitnu ulogu u porastu stanovništva. Pred početak Drugog svjetskog rata grad Brčko je imao oko 8.900 stanovnika.³

Austro-Ugarska je vlast od okupacije 1878. do kraja svoje vladavine djelovala kao faktor modernizacije kroz kapitalističke društvene odnose. Dominantna ekonomska aktivnost stanovništva područja bila je obilježena poljoprivredom, koja je u isto vrijeme bila utemeljena na feudalizmu. Na području Brčkog 81% populacije se 1910. bavilo poljoprivredom (prosjek Bosne i Hercegovine 90%), dok je u samom gradu tek 13,5% stanovništva živjelo od ove djelatnosti (Bjeljina 56%, Gračanica 61%, Tuzla 22,5%, Banja Luka 36%). Obrtima i industrijama (drvena i prerada na razini rezbarstva, prerade hrane, obrti vezani uz odijevanje i kovački obrti) bavilo se oko 25% aktivnog stanovništva. Oko 18% stanovništva bilo je zaposleno u trgovini, 18% stanovništva radi kao posluga i u drugim poslovima za nadnicu, dok je 39% aktivnog stanovništvo bilo zaposleno u ugostiteljstvu, prometu i javnim službama. Od ukupno 3.867 poljoprivrednih domaćinstava na području Brčkog bila su 52 zemljoposjednička koja su imala kmetove i 34 bez kmetova. Slobodnih seljačkih imanja bilo je 1.708 (manje od 50%), dok je 1.790 domaćinstava bilo kmetskih, ostala su bila mješovita (između kmetskih i slobodnih). U uvjetima feudalizma i u poluovisnosti živjelo 15.000 stanovnika (u 2.000 kmetskih ili mješovitih domaćinstava), na zemljištu koje je bilo u rukama 90 zemljoposjedničkih obitelji.⁴

Začetci industrijskog razvoja bili su povezani s prehrambenom industrijom. Strani kapital se ulagao u djelatnosti koje su uključivale niže stope

³ *Narodne Novine*, 8. srpnja 1941. br. 70. *Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 31. marta 1931. godine, Knjiga II prisutno stanovništvo po veroispovesti*, Beograd 1938, 36; Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima u Brčkom u periodu 1941. do 1945. godine, Brčko i okolica u radničkom pokretu i NOB*, 316; Arhiv Brčko Distrikta (dalje: ABD), Fond Jevreji Brčko, Zemaljska komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača u Zagrebu, br. 54/45, G.G.K. br. 219. *Zapisnik izjave Albine Goldstein od 19. 7. 1945.*

⁴ D. Penezić, Š. Mulabegović, B. Stavrić, *Ekonomski razvoj Brčkog i okoline*, 85, 91-99.

ulaganja, a visoke profite. Prerada: šljiva, krušaka i jabuka u pekmeze i sušionicu voća, koju 1888. otvaraju braća Vajs iz Münchena, uklapale su se u lokalnu ponudu poljoprivrednika. Seljaci brdovitih područja Majevice se uz stočarstvo bave i voćarstvom. Prvi industrijski kapacitet u Brčkom podignut je 1919. koji pokreće zagrebački poduzetnik Konter. Radilo se o pogonu za destilaciju nafte za koju prvi kvalificirani radnici dolaze iz Zagreba, no većinu zaposlenih čine domaći ljudi. Pogon je u narednim godinama preorijentiran u preradu špirita na bazi kukuruza i drugih škrobnih sirovina koje su uzgajane, manje-više, u ravničarskom kraju brčanske Posavine. U međuratnom razdoblju ekonomski razvoj stagnira uslijed gubitka tržišta i potražnje Austro-Ugarske Monarhije.⁵

Kretanja određena ratnim prilikama i uspostavom ustaškog režima

Stvaranje Banovine Hrvatske i uključivanje kotara Brčko u njezin sastav raspiruje političkih strasti etnički određenih političkih grupacija područja. Fikreta Jelić-Butić piše o zabrinutosti kotarskog načelnika Brčkog, iz redova Hrvatske seljačke stranke (u nastavku HSS), koji banskoj vlasti u Zagrebu prosljeđuje informacije o akcijama srpskih političara radi izdvajanja kotara Brčko, Gradačac i Derventa iz Banovine. Njegova zabrinutost bila je usmjerena i na akcije muslimanskog stanovništva koje se okupljalo s ciljem formiranja zasebne autonomije. Osim navedenih političkih akcija, na području kotara djelovala je i ustaška propaganda, koja je u stvaranju nezavisne Hrvatske neizostavno računala na teritoriju BiH. Među domaćim Nijemcima djelovala je Njemačka narodna skupina okupljena oko lokalnog Kulturbunda.⁶

Nakon Travanjskog rata jedinice 2. armije jugoslavenske vojske stacionirane na području Slavonije i dijela Vojvodine povlače se 11. travnja 1941. u Brčko. Na funkciji pomoćnika načelnika štaba tada se nalazio pukovnik Draža Mihailović dok će uloga četnika, zbog blizine granice sa Srbijom ovoga područja, imati značajan utjecaj. Vojska kraljevine je 12. travnja srušila most na Savi, a istog je dana štab 2. armije prebačen u Gračanicu. Odmah nakon povlačenja kraljevske vojske u Brčko dolazi jedna njemačka operativna jedinica koja su u gradu zadržala mjesec dana. Istovremeno dolazi i do okupljanja Hrvatske seljačke zaštite koja je preuzela na sebe zadatak održavanja reda, vršili su i razoružavanje kraljevske vojske. Ovo oružje je razdijeljeno hrvatskom stanovništvu, većinom seljacima, s opravdanjem da im je ono potrebno zbog obrane od četnika. Uskoro su pripadnici zaštite na rukave postavili trake sa slovom „U“. Organizaciju je vodio Ilija Reba (star između 45 i 47 godina) po zanimanju trgovac željezarijom, zapovjednik im je bio Josip Marjanović (oko 35 godina starosti) činovnik bratske blagajne rodom iz Slavonije i Ljubo Palošek iz

⁵ D. Penezić, Š. Mulabegović, B. Stavrić, *Ekonomski razvoj Brčkog i okoline*, 91-99; Esad Tihić, *Posavsko-trebatavski NOP odred*, Beograd 1983, 34-37.

⁶ F. Jelić-Butić, Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima u Brčkom u periodu 1941. do 1945. godine, 315-318; Vidi i: E. Tihić, *Posavsko-trebatavski NOP odred*, 37 -39.

Bjeljine koji je u prvim danima okupacije vršio dužnost šefa policije. Ukupan broj osoba uključenih u ovu lokalnu miliciju, a iz koje su se formirale brčanske ustaše, nije prelazio 30 osoba. Većinom su to bili Hrvati i iz okolnih sela, iako je bilo došljaka iz Županje, pa i s Korčule (odvjetnik Ante Cebalo). Osim Hrvata, miliciji su se manjim dijelom priključili Bošnjaci i domaći Folksdojčeri. Za provedbu naloga viših vlasti ustaška država se u Brčkom nije mogla oslanjati na domaću rulju, zainteresiranu za pljačku i vlast, zbog toga odgovorni kadrovi dolaze sa strane. Nakon prvih likvidacija brčanskih građana, povratnika iz vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Rade Divljaka i Antonija Antića – obojica brčanski trgovci, u gradu se kao izvršitelji zlodjela profilira Dane Babić – poštanski službenik iz Brčkoga.⁷

Upravni aparat kotara Brčko, zajedno s načelnikom Petrom Puškarićem, 14. travnja 1941. polaže zakletvu novoformiranoj Hrvatskoj Državi. Radilo se o odgovoru na poziv vodstva HSS-a na čelu s Vladkom Mačekom, da sve osobe na upravnim položajima (kotarski odbornici, načelnici općina i odbornici) surađuju s novim režimom. Ustaše u Brčkom i okolnim selima formiraju ustaški logor i tabore u lipnju, dok je ustaški stan djelovao i ranije. Od prvih dana uspostave NDH aktivno su uključeni u upravljanje kadrovima u upravnim službama, traže da se iz službe otpuste „nepoćudni elementi“. Za prvog logornika Glavni ustaški stan u Zagrebu u lipnju je imenovao Martina Petrovića, dok je za vršitelja dužnosti gradonačelnika Brčkog bio imenovan Ante Marić. Kotar Brčko je povećan općinama Koraj i Orašje, dok je u sustavu ustaške upravne vlasti pripao Velikoj župi Posavje kojoj je na čelu bio Vladimir Sabolić. Velika župa je bila sastavljena od kotara Bijeljina, Brčko, Derventa, Gradačac, Slavonski Brod i Županja.⁸

Uspostavu novog poretka drastično je obilježila šovinistička i rasistička politika njezinih protagonista. Ustaški ministar Mile Budak u Slavonskom Brodu 15. lipnja 1941. u obraćanju javnosti objašnjava da hrvatsku naciju sačinjava narod katoličke i muslimanske vjere. Srbe je posebno označio kao neprijatelje „koji dođoše simo, pa moraju i seliti bilo silom bilo milom“. Oni su u ove krajeve došli u vrijeme osmanskih osvajanja, ako tko želi biti Srbin, neka se iseli u Srbiju, objašnjavao je Budak. Slavonskobrodske novine „Posavska Hrvatska“ u duhu ovakve racionalizacije nastavlja da kao došljaci nemaju prava narodne manjine. Ovakve izjave nisu bile iznimka. Drastičan primjer, karakterističan za manifestaciju ustaške, povjerenik je Vrbaske banovine, ustaški stožernik Viktor

⁷ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, inv. broj 48649. *Zapisnik od 25. i 26. aprila 1946. Sastavljen u uredu Gradskog NO Brčko saslušanje svjedoka po počinjenim zločinima u Brčkom – svjedoci Đuka Kolak, Dragoljub Marković, Ibrahim Suljagić*; Arhiv Jugoslavije (dalje: AJ), fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača (dalje ZKRZ), kut. 493, 76-77. inv. broj: 48649 *Zapisnik po predmetu počinjenja zločina u Brčkom bez datuma*; E. Tihić, *Posavsko-trebatavski NOP odred*, 56.

⁸ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 316-318; AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kutija 493, *Omot dos br. 4906 F – 24383, 50 Zapisnik od 8. i 10. rujna 1946. o Nijemcima*.

Gutić. U tek oformljenim banjalučkim novinama „Hrvatska Krajina“ 28. svibnja 1941. objašnjava „nikakve milosti bivši Srbi nemaju očekivati nego samo ekonomsko uništenje i konačno istrebljenje. S toga im već sada preporučujem, da je najbolje da se odavle izsele... jer su se ogriješili o gostoprimstvo.“ Prilikom političkog mitinga u Banja Luci 25. svibnja 1941. objašnjava da je za drastične mjere dobio odriježene ruke od poglavnika. „Čuo sam kako se jedan advokat drznuo uvrijediti našu državu (Dole). Ali od sutra ću pritegnuti. Pucat će kičma...“ U govoru se osvrće se i na poglavnikovu izjavu, da na ljutu ranu treba staviti ljutu travu, i da je on za taj posao spreman. „Ja sam do sada metnuo samo malu travicu. Ali ona velika rana zahtjeva veliki plast trave. Ja ću ga i metnuti. (Odobranje, Tako je).“ Nekoliko dana kasnije u Sanskom Mostu Gutić, prenosi „Hrvatska Krajina“, izjavljuje „Nema više Srbije... nema više ciganske dinastije Karađorđevića, a i kod nas – uskoro – drumovi će poželjati Srba... Izdao sam drastične naredbe za njihovo potpuno ekonomsko uništenje, a slijede nove za potpuno istrjebljenje... Držite uvijek na umu, da su to bili naši grobari, i uništavajte ih gdje stignete, a blagoslov našeg Poglavnika i moj neće vam uzmanjkati.“⁹

Sukladno prethodnim izjavama u istim je novinama objavljen popis od 168 imena otpuštenih činovnika s objašnjenjem da u Bosni niti jedan Srbin ne može biti činovnik. „Strancima i tuđim plaćenicima nema mjesta ovdje. Mi ćemo po svaku cijenu, svako selo, svaku općinu, svaki kotar i svako mjesto očistiti od takvih ljudi... Židove i Srbe danas nesmije nitko braniti...“ stoji u banjalučkim novinama od 6. srpnja 1941. godine. Slična se retorika može osetiti i u ostatku zemlje, ministar Milovan Žanić u govoru, koji prenosi „Hrvatski list“ iz Osijeka 5. lipnja 1941, tvrdi: „Došli su u ove krajeve onda, kada je za turskih ratova izginulo mnogo naših ljudi i kada su opustjeli naši domovi... počeli nas ugrožavati i skoro ugrozili.... Mi ustaše znademo, dok se to pitanje Srba ne riješi, da će nam država biti uznemiravana. Znademo, da imamo pravo kad tražimo: Preko Drine!“ Uočavamo da je izvještavanje Hrvatskog lista, o drastičnim mjerama koje su se provodile u Bosni, imalo za cilj upozoriti javnost na sve ono što je moguće. Utoliko je i kotar Brčko, koji je imao znatnu srpsku zajednicu, trebalo preobraziti u prostor nove hrvatske nacije. Ovo je pretpostavljalo vjerske prijelaze, iseljavanje, a posljedično i ubijanja. Likvidacije započinju kao osobne osvete, ali one u režiji ustaških naredbodavaca imaju svrhu zastrašivanja stanovništva, poput ubojstva banjalučkog episkopa Platona i narodnog poslanika Dušana Subotića, sveštenika iz Bosanske Gradiške. Obojica su 5. svibnja 1941, bez sudske presude ubijeni. O njihovoj sudbini se ništa nije znalo dok „nije voda izbacila njihove osakaćene i iznakažene leševe.“ Na meti nisu bile samo

⁹ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 318; AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 279, Dokumenti 239-244, Prijepisi iz novina *Hrvatska krajina*, br. 18. od 28. svibnja 1941. izjave dr. Gutića; *Isto*, kut. 279. Govor Viktora Gutića u Sanskom Mostu od 30. svibnja 1941. *Hrvatska krajina*, god. 1, br. 30, Banja Luka.

društveno istaknute osobe, ustaše odvođe seljake iz njihovih kuća, da bi se njihovi posmrtni ostaci kasnije pronalazili po šumama i potocima.“¹⁰

Borba za ustašizaciju civilnih vlasti

Tijekom travnja, dok je u gradu boravila njemačka vojska, pod prijetnjom sile izvedeni su bogatiji građani Srbi i Židovi na lokalnu tržnicu. Cilj ove akcije bio je zaplašiti okupljene suočene s dva mitraljeza koje je na tržnicu postavila njemačka vojska. Pripadnici Njemačke narodne skupine tom su prilikom izvršile anketu u kojoj su popisali imovnu okupljenih, nakon čega je uslijedila pljačka. Domaća rulja uz njemačku vojsku i ustaše išli su od kuće do kuće i oduzimali sve vrijednosti. Nedugo nakon grabeži spaljena je židovski templ, a teroriziranja židovskog stanovništva bila su neprestana. Pljačkom je rukovodio Kristijan Miler (48 star) građevinski poduzetnik iz Brčkog koji se 1944. preselio u Austriju.¹¹

Prve mjere koje su provođene od strane ustaške milicije odnosile su se na postavljanje povjerenike u srpske i židovske trgovačke i obrtničke radnje. Zatvaraju se sva srpska kulturna društva i započinju hapšenja komunista, ali i srpskih seljaka iz okolice pa i viđenijih ljudi u samom Brčkom. Zatvaranja Srba se provode pod sumnjom ili kvalifikacijom da se radi o četnicima koji su tijekom prethodnog režima provodili političko nasilje nad muslimanskim i katoličkim stanovništvom. Zapovjednik ustaškog logora Petrović naredio je rušenje spomenika dobrovoljcima iz Prvog svjetskog rata, organizira prikupljanje kontribucije kako bi se bogatije osobe otkupile od zatočeništva. Protiv svih ovih postupaka kotarski predstojnik Puškarić šalje žalbe Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova, jer se radilo o zadiranju u poslove javnih vlasti čije funkcije ustaški logori nisu imali. Posebno nam se čini interesantna opaska da u Brčkom ustaški logor „smjenjuje i imenuje povjerenike u židovskim i inim radnjama, iako je za te poslove bilo nadležno Ministarstvo na prijedlog upravne vlasti.“ Osim navedenog izdaju propusnice za kretanje po državi (ne priznajući one koje izdaje kotarska uprava), kažnjavaju i ubiru pristojbe radi redarstvenih prekršaja. „Vrše

¹⁰ AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 279, Dokumenti 239-244, *Prijepisi iz novina "Hrvatska krajina"*, br. 18. od 28. svibnja 1941. izjave dr. Gutića; *Zločini na Jugoslavenskim prostorima u Prvom i Drugom svjetskom ratu Zbornik dokumenata, Tom 1: Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945*, (ur. Slavko Vukčević), Beograd 1993, 970.

¹¹ AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 493. Omot Dos br. 4906 F – 24383, 50 *Zapisnik od 8. i 10. rujna 1946. o Nijemcima* - Od pripadnika Njemačke narodne skupine koji su sudjelovali u pljački i kasnije kao protagonisti poretka spominju su: Hinko Libman (60) preselio u Austriju, Antun Bader (60) preselio u Austriju, Vilhelm Kles (40) sodar i šef Kulturbunda, odselio 1944. u Austriju. Franz Menrad (40) soboslikar, poginuo. Eduard Arled (42) gostioničar, preselio u Pečuhu. Antun Perl (42), odselio u Suboticu. Adam Konrad (42) odselio 1944. u Austriju; AJ 110, kut. 493. 493 – 51, *zapisnik od 25 i 26. aprila 1946*; AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 493, 76-77. inv. broj: 48649 *Zapisnik po predmetu počinjenja zločina u Brčkom bez datuma*; E. Tihić, *Posavsko-trebavski NOP odred*, 89-90.

se hapšenja i drže uhićenici duže vremena u zatvoru a da o tome ne predaju prijave redovnim vlastima na postupak“. Kao suradnike logornika Petrovića u pljački i nasilju navode se Dane Babić, Marko Tubić, Miroslav Štemer, Bakija Selimović, Abdulah Bukvica (liječnik iz Brčkog), Salko Ibrahimović, Ante Marić (liječnik iz Brčkog) i Marko Vuletić. Kao ideologijski začetnik nasilnog djelovanja protiv Srba spominje se Ivica Kalmer rodnom iz Velike Kopanice, ekonom bolnice u Vinkovcima. Kalmer je uz pomoć ustaša uspostavio novu upravu u kulturno prosvjetnom društvu „Napredak“ preko kojega je kao predsjednik vršio ustašku propagandu. Uz njega se spominje i Anto Oršanić, ustaški logornik županjskog kotara. Oršanić je po zanimanju bio prosvjetni radnik u Županji, svjedoci ustaškog terora za istoga navode: „Uopće to je bio zao duh koji u ovim krajevima mnogo doprineo da su se izvršila mnoga zločinstva.“¹²

Kotarski načelnik Puškarić, kojeg je ustaška vlast naslijedila kao HSS-ov kadar, nije bio voljan raspirivati međuetničko nasilje. S obzirom da se nalazio na poziciji važnoj za protokoliranje nacionalizacije imovine nepoćudnih osoba, ustaškom logoru u Brčkom je predstavljao smetnju. Početkom srpnja 1941. u dopisu Ministarstvu o situaciji u gradu navodi da su se ugledniji građani srpske nacionalnosti još uvijek uhapšeni pod paskom ustaša. Postavlja pitanje zakonske osnove uhićenja i kršenja osnovnih ljudskih prava, planirao je protiv ustaškog logora pokrenuti postupak. Dana 11. kolovoza 1941. godine stiže anonimni dopis iz Brčkog velikom županu u Slavonskom Brodu u kojem stoji da su upravo danas divlji ustaše najvidljivije djelovali i vršili nasilje po kotaru. Dječacima daju u ruke puške i oni po volji puškaraju i time ugrožavaju živote mirnih građana. Ovi divlji ustaše sve rade na svoju ruku, mimo redovnih i protiv redovnih vlasti...

Njihovim radom ovdanji ustaški pokret gubi na ugledu, pa vas molim da spriječite na vrijeme njihov štetni rad.¹³ Oko istog vremena sve je više bilo vijesti o masovnim ubojstvima Srba u okolnim mjestima i o sporadičnim akcijama ugroženih skupina protiv NDH. Za razliku od Puškarića, kotarskih načelnik Bijeljine Ivan Tolj nije nalazio zapreka u djelovanju na temelju objektivne odgovornosti Srba. Zbog akta sabotaže na telefonskoj i telegrafskoj mreži, u suradnji s ustašama iz Srijemske Mitrovice i Bijeljine, u kolovozu 1941. dao je zatočiti oko 150 viđenijih Srba iz mjesta kotara. Budući da nisu pronašli odgovorne za akt sabotaža, ustaše su počele sa strijeljanjem talaca. I ovdje se javio netko tko je protestirao zbog ovih nezakonitih postupaka. Zapovjednik redarstva pukovnik Krešimir Pavelić upozorava Tolja da njegove akcije izazivaju strah i paniku kod stanovništva Bijeljine. Prema njemu, takav je postupak bio nepotreban s obzirom da se narod Bijeljine unatoč svemu prema vlastima ponašao potpuno korektno. Moramo zaključiti da su ustaška hapšenja s

¹² *Zločini na jugoslavenskim prostorima*, 167-168; ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, inv. broj 48649. *Zapisnik od 25. i 26. aprila 1946.*, svjedoci Đuka Kolak, Dragoljub Marković, Ibrahim Suljagić; o djelovanju ustaškog aparata pri arijanizaciji imovine nepoćudnih osoba i uspostavi sprege ustaških i civilnih vlasti vidi Hrvoje Volner, *Gradsko poglavarstvo Osijeka i Holokaust, Radovi zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu*, 55 (2), Zagreb 2023, 264-266, 277-281, 288.

¹³ Hrvatski državni arhiv (dalje: HDA), Velika župa Posavje, kutija 2, Vrlo tajni spisi, bb/1941.

pristankom upravnih vlasti, ili bez njihova pristanka, uvijek vodila nasilju i ubojstvima, koja u pravnom postupku ne bi bila izvjesna.¹⁴

Sukob ustaša s domobranima u Brčkom započinje benignim prijedorima o načinu održavanja reda i mira u mjestu. O postupanjima kotarskog predstojnika i domobranskog zapovjednika mjesta bojnika Mileusnića brojne su pritužbe ustaškog logora. U dopisu Uredu poglavnika stoji da su prilike u Brčkom bile najgore što potkrepljuje tezom da su Srbi i Židovi uživali sve povlastice. Oko istog vremena Brčko postaje punkt preko kojeg se provodilo masovno iseljavanje srpskog stanovništva iz Slavonije u Srbiju. Iseljavani su Srbi koje je Kraljevina Jugoslavija naselila tijekom agrarnih reformi i kolonizacija, no u smislu asimilacije Srba katoličkom vjerom u hrvatsku naciju, iseljavani su trebali biti i Srbi višeg obrazovanja (učitelji, intelektualci) i oni boljeg materijalnog statusa (poduzetnici i bogati seljaci). U srpnju 1941, primjerice, u Brčko je stigao transport s oko 500 Srba koji su iz Gunje preko Brezovog Polja i Bijeljine trebali biti repatriirani u Srbiju. Sprovodile su ih ustaše, a zapovjednik transporta bio je ustaški satnik Penava. Radilo se većinom o ženama s djecom prema kojima su ustaše postupale bez plana i bez jasnog cilja kuda ih vode. Ustaški satnik Penava bojniku Mileusniću prenosi zapovijed, da kod Brezovog Polja preveze Srbe preko Save i dalje ih sprovede u Srbiju. Prema domobranskom natporučniku Nadvorniku, iz naloga se moglo razabrati da je intencija satnika mogla biti i likvidacija, jer je za provedbu naloga dana najšira sloboda.¹⁵

Nadvornik je organizirao prijevoz preko Save i prihvata u Brezovom Polju, budući da je Njemačka komanda u Srbiji zatvorila granicu, organizirao im je smještaj u selu. „Ništa im se nije dogodilo, jer bi se, da je bilo drugačije, o tome pronio glas.“ Prema izvještaju zapovjedništva 4. oružničke pukovnije od 27. lipnja 1941. u čišćenju Srijema i Slavonije od srpskog stanovništva u Srbiju je prebačeno oko 6.000 osoba „i to kriomice bez ikakve organizacije“. Oko 4.000 ljudi bilo je smješteno po srpskim selima u Bosni gdje su čekali priliku za prelazak. S druge strane Njemačke vojne vlasti su zatvorile granicu, konfiscirali sva prijevozna sredstva za prijelaz preko rijeke, a prijelaze stavili pod stražu. Izvještaj kotarske oblasti u Vinkovcima navodi da je preko njihovog područja srpsko stanovništvo iz kotareva Virovitica, Slatina, Đakovo, Osijek, Valpovo, Našice, Požega, Donji Miholjac i dijelom Vukovara doputovalo posebnim vlakovima i prevezeno do stanice u Gunji. Iz Gunje su iseljenici otišli u Brčko i Bijeljinu gdje su bili smješteni u po okolnim selima. Prema procjenama ondje se u srpnju 1941. nalazilo oko 20.000 iseljenika.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Zločini na jugoslavenskim prostorima*, 300, 516.

¹⁵ ABD, Fond Jevreji Brčko, Zemaljska komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača u Zagrebu br. 67/45, *Svjedoči Branislav Nadvornik u Zagrebu 2. 8. 1945*; ABD, Fond Jevreji Brčko, K 76, inv. broj 48648 *Zemaljska komisija Zapisnik od 24. aprila 1946*.

¹⁶ *Zločini na Jugoslavenskim prostorima*, 156, 354; Pavle Gregorić, Zdravko Krnčić, *Narodnooslobodilački pokret u Slavoniji 1941. godine, Slavonija u narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi* (ur. Martin Kaminski), Slavonski Brod 1967. 26-27.

Sastavljanje kartoteka srpskog stanovništva i onih koji su nekada bili pravoslavne vjere zahtijevalo je u srpnju 1941. Ravnateljstvo ustaškog redarstva u Zagrebu. Za ustaše na području Brčkog ovo je predstavljalo velik poduhvat jer je zadatak iziskivao popisivanje približno 40.000 ljudi. Do kraja mjeseca Velika župa Posavje ustaškom logoru u Brčkom prenosi naredbu Glavnog ustaškog stana da „valja početi postepeno i faktički pritvarati i otpremati u zbirni logor 'Gospić' Srbe iz pojedinih takozvanih pravoslavnih otoka, ...otpremati u grupi od 20 do 30 ljudi“. Uz iseljenike iz Slavonije, sličnu sudbinu su dijelili i domaći Srbi, a na područje Brčkog doseljen je izvjestan broj obitelji iz Slovenije koje su protjerali Nijemci. Niti se posao sastavljanja popisa srpske populacije mogao kvalitetno dovršiti, niti su pojedinci određeni za ustaška zbirališta skrštenih ruku čekali da ih se odvede. Ustaški logor Brčkog u dopisu nadležnima objašnjava da je dobar dio muške populacije izbjegao u šume i da je na kotaru, praktički, ratno stanje.¹⁷

Preklapanje civilne vlasti s ustaškom

Logornika Petrovića mijenja Mato Rajić (20 godina star) iz Konjica, koji će u odnosu na svog prethodnika dodatno pojačati nasilje. Hapsi ugledne Srbe iz Brezovog Polja i okolnih sela i tjera ih preko Bijeljine u sabirne logore. U kolovozu 1941. Rajić iz Slavenskog Broda dovodi ustaše koje se izživljavaju nad Srbima pritvorenim u brčanskom zatvoru. Organizira oružane akcije prema raznim srpskim selima na Majevici u kojima se vrše ubojstva, palež i pljačka. Prema izvaji više svjedoka, vjerojatno je i osobno sudjelovao u klanjima. Uz njega se isticao se i Josip Mrđanović, gostioničar iz Županje i predratni ustaša, koji se u Brčkom zadržao čitavo vrijeme rata i provodio zločine. Budući da je ustaški logor imao ovlasti nadzora nad tijelima civilne vlasti, Rajiću je uspjelo, uz pomoć veza brčanskog ustaše Ante Marića (kum ustaškog ministra Ivana Petrića), s pozicije kotarskog predstojnika smijeniti Petra Puškarića koji odlazi u Travnik. Na njegovo mjesto u kolovozu dolazi Većeslav Montani, podrijetlom iz Splita, pravnik verziran u policijskim poslovima.¹⁸

Dolaskom Monatinja nastaje dugo očekivana sprega ustaških vlasti s redovnim civilnim vlastima. U Brčkom je počeo djelovati i pokretni prijetni sud

¹⁷ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 320-321.

¹⁸ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, inv. broj 48649. *Zapisnik od 25. i 26. aprila 1946*; ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, K. 76, inv. broj 48648 *Zemaljska komisija Zapisnik od 24. aprila 1946. sastavljen u Gradskom NO Brčko, svjedok Faik Sejdić*; F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 318-321. Vješeslav Montani je rođen 1901. u Splitu. Pravni fakultet u Zagrebu upisuje 1920. godine. Tijekom studija bio je uključen u režimsku organizaciju ORJUN, da bi se od 1923. nalazio u policijskoj službi u raznim mjestima. Od 1929. do 1939. bio je šef političko odsjeka u Upravi grada Beograda. Nakon formiranja vlade Cvetković-Maček dodijeljen je u Mačekov kabinet kao policijski komesar. Za kapitulacije Jugoslavije bio je u Zagrebu, uključuje su u rad ustaškog Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova. U lipnju je bio u općinski načelnik Gradačca, nakon toga u kolovozu je premješten u Brčko odakle odlazi u veljači 1942. Kasnije postaje šef policije u Senju – u Tuzli osuđen na smrt 1946.

(od sredine kolovoza 1941. do kraja siječnja 1942. godine). Time je teror nad Srbima, Židovima i građanima, naročito ljevičarima, dobio svojevrsnu auru procedure. Izdaje naređenje za ograničavanje kretanja i uvodi propusnice, štampa proglase i letke, zabranjuje sastajanje Hrvatima i Bošnjacima sa Srbima i Židovima. Urede u kotarskim i gradskim službama popunjava sebi odanim ljudima, pooštava režim nad zatvorenicima, uvodi obavezno šišanje muških i ženskih zatvorenika. Povezuje se s župnikom katoličke crkve u Brčkom Ilijom Violonijem i odvjetnikom Antom Cebalom koji su, kao ugledne osobe, na ostale u pokretu djelovali kao autoritet. Odmah po Montanijevom dolasku streljane su 22 osobe iz brčanskog zatvora. U rujnu 18. ustaška satnija provodi čišćenje terena u kojem je streljano 40 seljana koji su živjeli na putu Brčko-Tuzla. Uz Montanija kao izvršioci terora spominju se Dane Babić i Rašid Užićanin, pomoćnik ustaškog logornika. Srbi su u Brčkom po Montanijevom dolasku morali u vlastitoj režiji napisati na kućama veliko slovo „P“. Kazna za neizvršenje ove zapovjedi bila je provedena na jednoj starijoj ženi koja je javno ošišana „na nulu“.¹⁹

Zatvori su bili pretrpani pa je u gradu formiran sabirni logor. Ondje su u početku stražu držali domobrani, kao ispomoć redovnim sudskim organima, i utoliko su njihovi zapovjednici očekivali funkcioniranje logora kao sudskog zatvora. Ubrzo dolaze u sukob sa ustašama jer njima nije bila potrebna nikakva formalna odluka da upadaju u logor. Svoje postupke su argumentirali stavom da je ovo ustaška država i da se njima nema nitko pravo odupirati. Protive se da se zatočenicima daje slama, umjesto da spavaju na podu, onemogućavaju liječnički pregled bolesnim osobama. Provede pljačku nad zatočenima, a na upozorenje i pokušaj istrage redovnih organ vlasti protiv njihovih postupaka, prijete ubojstvima. Nad zatočenicima se i dalje provode najstrože kazne bez ikakvog formalnog opravdanja. Kako bi se prikrila strijeljanja, noću bi organizirali puškanja na straže mjesta pri čemu su stvarali alternativni zvučni efekt – nikakvih drugih vojnih djelovanja u takvim prilikama protiv stražara nije bilo.²⁰

Do sukoba s domobranskim zapovjednicima dolazi zbog proturječnih izvještaja slanih Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova. Montani u više navrat piše Ministarstvu da je Brčko pred padom, u cilju poduzimanja represalija protiv pravoslavnih stanovnika okolnih sela. Sve dopise koji su tražili vojna pojačanja domobranski zapovjednik bi telefonskim putem opovrgavao. Prema Montaniju, popustljiv stav bojnika Mileusnića prema Srbima posljedica je njegovog mješovitog braka, supruga mu je bila Srkinja. S obzirom na duh novog poretka, objašnjava, vojne i građanske vlasti su u svakom pogledu postupale vrlo mlitavo i neodlučno. Mileusnić i Nadvornik su konačno završili u Jasenovcu zbog pružanja zaštite Srbima i Židovima, jugoslavenstva, destruktivnog rada,

¹⁹ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, inv. broj 48649. *Zapisnik od 25. i 26. aprila 1946.*; isto, br. 67/45, *Svjedoči Branislav Nadvornik u Zagrebu* 2. 8. 1945.

²⁰ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, br. 67/45, *Svjedoči Branislav Nadvornik u Zagrebu* 2. 8. 1945; ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, K. 76, inv. broj 48648 *Zemaljska komisija Zapisnik od 24. aprila 1946.*

sprječavanja kotarskog predstojnika u zatvaranju komunista. Mileusnićevu ženu Montani je dao internirati u Gradišku gdje je i umrla.²¹

Stanje na području kotara uistinu nije bilo dobro budući da su partizani djelovali na području Brezovog Polja i Čelića. Stoga su u studenom 1941. ustaške snage zajedno s domobranima poduzele akciju čišćenja trokuta Brezovo Polje-Čelić-Brčko.²²

Na mjesto zapovjednika ustaškog logora promoviran je u rujnu 1941. brčanski ustaša Marko Tubić. U izvještaju Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova naglašava da je dolaskom Montanija napokon došlo do sprege između upravnih vlasti i ustaških ustanova. Tubiću su dane široke ovlasti da djeluje protiv pojedinaca za koje je znao ili sumnjao da su protuustaški nastrojeni. U provedbi nasjtrožih mjera oslanjao se na šefa policije Palošeka i njegovog zamjenika Slaka Salkovića i Vladimira Lastrića – tabornici u Čeliću. Spominju se i tabornici u Brčkom Ante Šimić i Refik Azapagić, kao i Đuro Đuraković – bivši općinski policajac i mnogi drugi. Prekršavanja srpskog stanovništva u Brčkom provodio je župnik Ilija Violoni, no u tom kontekstu, pripisuje mu se izjava da jamči za duše prijelaznika, no ne može jamčiti i za njihova tijela. Budući da je nasilje režima isprovociralo ustanak, lokalnim ustašama pomoć su pružale 5. i 18. ustaška satnija stacionirane u Brčkom kojima će se kasnije pridružiti i druge ustaške i domobranske postrojbe.²³

Krajem 1941. i početkom 1942. ustaški teror u Brčkom je dosegao vrhunac, a započeo je masovnim hapšenjem u sklopu akcije prekrštavanja Srba 29. studenom 1941. godine. Srbe su na vjerski prijelaz nagovarali Montanijevi agenti Josip Vrbanić, rodom iz Slavonije, Stjepan Tkalec iz Slavenskog Broda i Franjo Ulaković iz Borova. Budući da je reakcija pravoslavaca bila nezadovoljavajuća, vlasti su zatražile da se izvjestan broj ljudi okupi u zgradi

²¹ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, br. 67/45, *Svjedoči Branislav Nadvornik u Zagrebu 2. 8. 1945; Isto, K. 76, inv. broj 48648 Zemaljska komisija Zapisnik od 24. aprila 1946; F. Jelić-Butić, Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 318-323, 327-328. u Brčko je 11. rujna 1941. došao podžupan Šefkija Kadić iz Slavenskog Broda i održao konferenciju s predstavnicima upravnih, ustaških i vojnih vlasti. U izvještaju MUP-u konstatira se da u mjestu postoji velika bojazan od upada buntovnika u samo mjesto i to iz pravaca Lopare – Čelić, od Žabara i od Brezovog Polja. Utoliko je smatrao da se u mjesto trebaju stacionirati jače vojne snage jer postojeće vojne snage nisu bile dovoljne ni za obranu grada, a kamo li za akcije u smislu pacifikacije okolice. Zapovjedništvo II domobranskog zbora smješteno u Slavenskom Brodu u izvještaju Glavnom stožeru iznosi 6. prosinca 1941. da kotar Brčko pripada glavnim centrima ustanika. Pojačano djelovanje ustaških i domobranskih snaga potpomognute lokalnim jedinicama nije osujetila općenarodnu pobunu pravoslavnog stanovništva.;

²² HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 2, 887/1941.

²³ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, Zemaljska komisija br. 67/45, *Svjedoči Branislav Nadvornik; Isto, K. 76, inv. broj 48648 Zemaljska komisija Zapisnik od 24. aprila 1946; F. Jelić-Butić, Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 318-323, 326. Po dolasku Montanija, prilikom prvih diverzantskih akcija kidanja telefonskih veza između sela Čelića i Lopara, Montani se povodom toga 23. kolovoza 1941. obraća velikoj župi Posavje sa zahtjevom da pohapsi ozvjestan broj Srba i da ih odmah u znak odmazde strijelja. Prema podatku štaba Majevičkog NOP odreda, 28. kolovoza 1941. bilo je izvedeno iz zatvora u Brčkom 60 talaca koji su streljani na rijeci Brusnici kod mosta koji su prethodnog dana partizani srušili.

gimnazije. Odazvalo se oko 150 osoba nad kojima je započela tortura, svučeni su do gola, udarani kundacima i drugim predmetima. Naposljetku, oni koji su mogli hodati, gotovo goli i bos, na temperaturi nižoj od -10 °C prebačeni su preko pontonskog mosta²⁴ u Gunju gdje su na željezničkoj stanici 24 sata bili zatvoreni u stočnim vagonima. Idući dan kotarski predstojnik Montani ih obavještava da će biti pušteni pod uvjetom da podnesu molbu za prekrštavanje. Župnik je prekrštavanje proveo na temelju izdane dozvole o čestitosti, radilo se o tada uobičajenoj praksi kako se nedostojnoj osobi ne bi omogućio prelazak na katoličku vjeru. Podnošenje molbe i izdavanje potvrde o čestitosti trebalo je platiti (često se radilo o cijenama koje bi lokalna vlast proizvoljno određivala). Postupak nam ukazuje i na simbiozu lokalnih vlasti s- upravnom vlašću katoličke crkve na terenu.²⁵ Prema dokumentima ustaške provenijencije vidljivo je da su u mjestu Brčkom svi grčkoistočnjaci poslali pozdravni brzojav Poglavniku, te da svaki dan pohađaju vjersku poduku u rkt. Crkvi i svečani prijelaz će biti obavljen koncem mjeseca siječnja.²⁶ Činjenica je, pak, da je u studenom 1941. na području Bosanskog Šamca i Tramošnice bilo svega 16 Srba od 9658 pravoslavnih.²⁷

Pravoslavni hram je opljačkan i spaljen 2. prosinca 1941, a pravoslavno groblje je demilirano. Njemački izvještaj od 8. siječnja 1942. opisuje: „ustaški 'kazneni odred' je očistio okolicu i prekrstio sve Srbe iz Brčkog, spalio srpsku crkvu, porušio groblje, satjerao i prodao svu stoku iz okolnih sela...“ Nakon toga je uslijedila je likvidacija brčanskih Židova. „Rekvirirali su čekeće od većeg broja bravara i kovača te ih sve u noći pobili. Poslije dva dana... satjerali su i sve Jevreje – emigrante zajedno s djecom, na srpsko groblje, gdje su također pobijeni i zatrpani u masovni grob.“ Odmah po uspostavi NDH Židovi dolaze pod nadzor lokalnih ustaških ustanova. Drže ih u kućnom pritvoru, obilježeni su žutim trakama i bili su određeni na prisilan rad – čiste ulice i javne klozete. Česta su hapšenja pojedinih Židova, u svrhu iznuda njihove imovine, i zatvaranja u magazine na željezničkoj stanici i drugim mjestima u gradu. U Brčkom je uz domaće bilo i oko stotinjak Židova koji su pobjegli u Jugoslaviju nakon okupacije Austrije od strane Njemačke 1938. godine. Refik Piskavica spominje ukupno 250 Židova koje su ustaše u dva navrata likvidirale. Prvo su poubijani domaći Židovi, noću 7. prosinca 1941. izvedeni iz zatvora i magazina, vezanih ruku odvedeni na pontonski most na Savi kod stare Agencije u Srpskoj varoši i na svirep način ubijeni. Tri noći kasnije, 10. prosinca 1941, ustaše su poubijale i sve obitelji emigranata. Emigranti su bili smješteni u nekoliko kuća u Brčkom, prema izjavi Amalije Goldstein, živjeli su po 30 do 40 osoba u svakoj kući. Do dolaska kotarskog predstojnika Montanija, nadzor nad emigrantima vršio je

²⁴ Pontonski most na Savi kod Brčkog bio je jedina poveznica ovog dijela Bosne i Slavonije. Činjenica je da se žurilo s obnovom toga mosta, pa je most trebao biti obnovljen do 15. siječnja 1942. godine. HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 3, 47/1942.

²⁵ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, inv. broj 48649. *Zapisnik od 25. i 26. aprila 1946*; Esad Tihčić, *Posavsko-trebački NOP odred*, 61.

²⁶ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 2, 887/1941.

²⁷ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 3, 310/1942.

pripadnik Njemačke narodne skupine Wilhelm Kles. O uništenju domaćih Židova u vrijeme događaja Amalija nije ništa znala, o tome se osvjedočila kada je slična sudbina zadesila njezina supruga. Emigranti su bili pozvani da se jave u općinu, ne znajući za razlog okupljanja, svi su se odazvali pozivu (ona kao „arijevka“ nije, sklonila se jednom poznaniku). Nitko se od Židova nije vratio, ubijeni su mitraljezom i pokopani na pravoslavnom groblju pored stare tuzlanske ceste.²⁸

Likvidacija Židova nastupila je nakon oduzimanja njihove imovine tijekom ljeta i jeseni 1941. godine. Nad njima su izvršena dva pokolja, prema postojećim svjedočanstvima pokolj su izvršile domaće ustaše, tzv. „kazneni odred“, no među njima je bilo i pripadnika drugih ustaških postrojbi. Posebno se ističe 18. ustaška satnija u čijem sastavu su uglavnom bili emigranti. Imenom se spominju Josip Kurelac (navodno iz Osijeka) i zapovjednik spomenute satnije Viktor (Ventura) Beljak. Akcija je započela Montanijevim proglasom u kojem je pozvao sve Židove da se okupe u dvorištu gimnazije radi popisa i slanja u koncentracijske logore. Gradski narodni odbor Brčkog, uz prisustvo pravnog referenta zemaljske komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih zločina Ćamila Hasanbegovića, u rujnu 1946. sastavlja, na temelju iskaza Miće Ignjatovića i Fehima Sajdića, popis od 121 osobe predratne židovske zajednice u Brčkom ubijene od strane ustaša. Od emigranata je svjedocima po imenu bio poznat jedino Ervin Braun (60 godina star) trgovac iz Graza i ime njegove kćeri Greta (19 godina stara), drugima nisu znali ime.²⁹

Na području Brčkog se zbog partizanskih akcija i sukoba ustaša i partizana našlo oko 1000 izbjeglica. Radilo se uglavnom o muslimanima s područja Ključa, Olova, Maglaja i okolice Brčkog.³⁰ U kasnijem periodu pojavili su se i izbjeglice iz Foče i iz Hercegovine.³¹ Do 7. ožujka 1943. na području čitavog kotara bilo je 3.763 izbjeglice, od čega čak 1.175 iz Čajniča i okolice.³² Broj izbjeglica je kako je rat odmicao sve više rastao. Tako je broj izbjeglica izbjeglica iz Čajniča narastao do svibnja 1943. na 2.032, iz Foče na 1.126, iz Trebinja na 539, iz Nevesinja, na 463, iz Gackog na 142, iz Ravnog na 88, iz

²⁸ Refik Piskavica, Pokolj Jevreja u Brčkom 1941. godine, *Brčko i okolica u radničkom pokretu i NOB*, 493-494; ABD, Fond Jevreji Brčko, *Zemaljska komisija*, br. 54/45, G.G.K. br. 219. *Zapisnik izjave Albine Goldstein* od 19. 7. 1945.

²⁹ ABD, fond Jevreji Brčko, inv. broj 48649. *Zapisnik* od 25. i 26. aprila 1946; AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 493. *omot dos br. 4906 F-24383*, 48-60, *Gradski narodni odbor Brčko Zapisnik* 8, 9. i 10. rujna 1946. *sastavljen o zločinima na području Brčkog*; isto, kut. 529, *dokument* 280. *Zapisnik* od 8. 9. i 10. 9. 1946; *Isto*, kut. 493, 51. *Zapisnik* od 25 i 26. aprila 1946. godine. Kako navode, ova ubistva izvršili su ustaše 18. i 20. satnije, uz pripomoć Burhe Behrića ustaškog tabornika iz Koraja koji je po našim vlastima obješen kod Lopara, Slavko Salković, Dane Babić, Rašid Užićnin, Marko Tubić, Đuro Đuraković, Ivan Janko, Janko Birošević, Ljubo Palošek, Josip Marjanović, Vlado Lastrić, a kao zapovjednici ustaških postrojbi spominju se Josip Kurelac i Viturina Valjak iz 18. satnije i Franjo Furlan 20. satnija, Ivo Grgić ustaški zastavnik, Frano Kasa ustaški zastavnik iz Zagreba.

³⁰ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 3, 155/1942.

³¹ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 4, 1689/1942.

³² HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 7, 587/1943.

Bileće na 45, iz Stoca na 98, iz Konjica na 5, iz Višegrada na 5, iz Zvornika na 6, iz Drijenče na 5, iz Petrovca na 3 i iz Posušja na 10. Činjenica je da je kotar morao izdvajati velike količine novca za prehranu izbjeglica, a novac je stizao od Velike župe Posavje.³³

U travnju 1942. žandarmerijska komanda Brčko u osvrtu na prethodno razdoblje iznosi da su zbog samovoljnog postupanja Tubića i njegovih suradnika slane pritužbe u Zagreb, no da u njima nije iznesena ni desetina onoga što se u Brčkom događalo.³⁴ Mnoge kriminalne radnje nisu policijskim putem utvrđene jer onaj koji bi provodio izvide bio bi u opasnosti „da ga nestane jedne noći kao i mnogih drugih lica iz Brčkoga...” Prema žandarmerijskom izvješću, Židovi su bili pod pritiskom Montanija da se sprema za koncentracijske logore, ponijeli su sa sobom veće količine odijela, novaca i raznih dragocjenosti. Računa se da je u noći kada su brčanski Židovi poubijani, od njih oduzeta značajna suma novca i dragocjenosti. I kotarski sud u Brčkom je u više navrata nastojao provesti izvide zbog pojedinih krivičnih djela, „...ali je uvijek u tome spriječen bilo prijetnjom smrti ili više vlasti.”³⁵

Provedbom terora na kotaru Brčko bilo je nezadovoljno i Njemačko veleposlanstvo u Zagrebu, zbog jačanja Narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta. Zahtijeva se od Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova da se u Bosanskoj posavini, a posebice na području kotara Brčko, provede postupak protiv ustaških vlasti. U izvještaju Njemačke ambasade posebno se navode ubojstva velikog broja pravoslavaca u okolici Brčkog. Kotarski predstojnik Montani čini sve što je moguće kako bi osigurao da Srbi ne budu u stanju ovršiti svoju pšenicu, stoji u izvještaju. Saveznice se pitaju, je li cilj ustaša primiriti situaciju na području Posavine. Nasilni vjerski prijelazi u Brčkom bili su tek dio zamjerki ustaškom režimu. Prema raspoloživim izvorima izvjesno je da je župan Velike župe Posavje Sabolić okrivljene ustaše uzeo pod svoju zaštitu. Prema njemu, Tubić, Montani i ostali su se isticali u održavanju reda i mira, a da su glasine o razbojstvima i pljački bile potpuno neosnovane. Na optužbe usmjerene protiv Rašida Užićanina da je krvoločan, silovatelj i lopov, župan odgovara je da se radi o neobično hrabrom devetnaestogodišnjaku. Prema njemu Užićanin je neprestano bio u prvim redovima u borbi, smatrao je da bi mu bilo potrebno stotinu takvih da Majevicu očisti od pobunjenika. Montani i Tubić, prema županu, bili su poznati kao beskompromisni ustaški borci.³⁶

U siječnju 1942. povodom bijega određenog broja komunista iz brčanskog zatvora Montani naređuje hapšenje 80 mještana, među kojima je dominirala muslimanska omladina, iako je među uhapšenima bilo i nekoliko imućnijih prijelaznika na katoličku vjeru. Od spomenutog broja u pritvoru je

³³ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 9, 1562/1943.

³⁴ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 4, 1768/1942. Iz tih je dokumenata vidljivo koliko su pojedinci uzeli vlast u svoje ruke.

³⁵ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 324-325.

³⁶ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 324-325; Esad Tihić, *Posavsko-trebavski NOP odred*, 75; *Zločini na jugoslavenskim prostorima*, 977-980.

zadržano 60 osoba, zbog kojih se podiglo javno mnijenje u Brčkom. Montani je u dogovoru s župskim redarstvom sve uhićene proslijedio u sabirni logor. Od spomenute grupe 16 je streljano u Jasenovcu, dok je veći broj uhapšenih, uz prosvjede župana Sabolića, pušten kućama. U veljači 1942. Montani odlazi na drugu dužnost, a na njegovo mjesto dolazi Antun Paulić koji na funkciji kotarskog predstojnika djeluje umjerenije.³⁷ Župan Sabolić kao i mnogi dojučerašnji Montanijevi suradnici žale za njegovim odlaskom. Župan u izvještaju Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova od 27. siječnja 1943. navodi da je Montani u potpunosti djelovao u sporazumu sa ustaškim tijelima u Brčkom što je u potpunosti odgovaralo politici Velike župe Posavje.³⁸

Brčko – punkt okupacijskih snaga uz prugu Zagreb – Beograd

Posavina je s dva prometna kraka bila povezana željezničkom prugom Beograd – Zagreb. Jednim krakom pruga je išla od Brčkog do Vinkovaca, a drugim od Slavnog Šamca do Vrpolja. Od Bosanskog Šamca prostirale su ceste koje su povezivale sva mjesta u Posavini, dok je Brčko na jugu cestom povezano s Tuzlom, a na istoku s Bijeljinom. Cesta od Brčkog prema Orašju vodila je na Bosanski Šamac, a odatle na jug prema Modriči i Gradačcu. Ceste odatle jednim krakom vode prema Doboju, a drugim prema Derventi. Željeznička linija Zagreb – Beograd bila je ključan prometni pravac za povezivanje srednje Europe s Balkanom. Omogućavala je transport vojnika, oružja, municije, vojne opreme, sirovina i poljoprivrednih proizvoda neophodnih za ostvarenje vojnih planova nacističke Njemačke. Prekidanje prometa ovim pravcem diverzijama najznačajniji je doprinos partizanskog djelovanja ometanjem ratnih planova sila Osovine. Prostor bosanske Posavine i Trebave pravcem sjeveroistok i jugoistok presijecao je put Brčko – Srnice – Gračanica – Doboj koji je kao hipotenuza na rijeke Savu i Bosnu sastavljao pravokutni trokut. Na kojem će se tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata voditi intenzivne borbe.³⁹

Od proljeća 1943. ustašku vlast na području Brčkog ugrožava snažna partizanska prisutnost. Velik broj građana bježi na oslobođenu teritoriju, policijski izvještaji govore da je 90% stanovništva grada partizanski nastrojeno:

³⁷ Paulić tako predlaže u prvoj polovici 1942. puštanje određenog broja političkih zatočenika iz zatvora na slobodu župskoj redarstvenoj oblasti u Brodu, što redarstvena oblast djelomično odbija. HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 6, 3583/1942. Zanimljivo je da komandant Trebavskog četničkog odreda 1942. traži da se iz zatvora puste simpatizeri četnika, budući da bi njihovo odvođenje u logore, kako navodi, neprijateljima naših odnosa – kao nacionalnih snaga – učinilo najveću uslugu. HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 6, 3719/1942. O suradnji ustaških vlasti sa četnicima govori niz dokumenata koji sugeriraju da ondje gdje kontrolu provodi Trebavski četnički odred ne treba provoditi represiju na srpskim stanovništvom. HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 9, 1715/1943.

³⁸ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 329-331. Izvještaj II komande domobranskog zbora početkom veljače 1942. spominje 57 osoba za koje navode vjersku pripadnost: 28 muslimana, 26 pravoslavaca, 1 grkokatolik, 2 katolika.

³⁹ E. Tihić, *Posavsko-trebavski NOP odred*, 32-33.

„napadno upada u oči da u kratkim vremenskim razmacima u dvojkaama ili trojkama bježe učenici ovdašnje Trgovačke akademije, pa je razumljivo, da ovo bježanje među mladeži djeluje poput zaraze i može zahvatiti i šire razmjere...“ Ustaške vlasti situaciju nastoje primiriti represijom prema članovima obitelji „odbjeglih“, slanjem na prisilan rad pri čemu je postojala opasnost da završe u Jasenovcu. Vidljivo je da su četničke snage na području kotara Brčko također snažne te da tijekom ljeta 1943. prelaze gotovo svakodnevno rijeku Savu i prelaze na županjsko područje gdje pljačkaju i maltretiraju lokalno stanovništvo.⁴⁰ Navodno je posebno bilo pročetnički orijentirano selo Vučilovac nedaleko rijeke Save.⁴¹ Za suradnju s četnicima bio je optužen i predstojnik kotara Brčko Antun Paulić koji se morao i očitovati o tome.⁴² Tijekom ljeta 1943. partizani oslobađaju Gradačac, Modriću, Bosanski Šamac, Orašje, a u listopadu 1943. i Tuzlu. U tome trenu dolazi veliki broj izbjeglica s područja sjeverne Bosne na područje kotara Županja, odnosno u naselja preko puta Brčkog.⁴³ Brčko postaje važan strateški punkt neprijateljskim snagama zbog svoje lokacije na obali rijeke Save, povezanosti sa zaleđem i blizine važne komunikacije Zagreb – Beograd. Grad je sredinom kolovoza bio okružen jakim partizanskim snagama, u ispomoć iz Požege Brčkom dolazi 5. i 8. domobranska pukovnija s oko 5.500 ljudi i jedna artiljerijska jedinica. Ondje se već nalazio inženjerijski bataljun, domobranska dobrovoljačka bojna „Brčko“, ustaše i njemačka vojna policija.⁴⁴

Nakon Tuzle partizanske snage započinju trodnevnu bitku za oslobađanje Brčkog, od 19. do 22. studenog 1943. godine. U sklopu akcije 18. studenog partizanske snage napadaju Gunju koju osvajaju idući dan. Partizanske snage uspijevaju probiti dio rovova i bunkera smještenih oko grada, no naišli su na snažan protunapad branitelja. Istovremeno iz pravca Vinkovaca stizale su njemačke snage koje su ponovno zauzele Gunju. Kao rezultat ovog napada, osim velike materijalne štete na prometnoj infrastrukturi, željezničkoj stanici Gunja, rušenju mosta preko Save, partizani uspijevaju uništiti niz obrambenih utvrđenja. Nakon osvajanja Gunje njemačke postrojbe grade pontonski most preko Save i preko rijeke prebacuje tenkove, artiljeriju i pješadiju. „Nemci drže čitavu levu obalu Save a garnizon u Brčkom stalno pojačavaju novim snagama...“, stoji u izvještaju štaba 16. Narodnooslobodilačke udarne divizije.⁴⁵

Nakon napada na grad, osumnjičene partizanske suradnike hapsi njemačka vojna policija, na temelju popisa koji sastavlja brčanski ustaški logornik Anto Šimić. U Vinkovce odvođe veći broj građana, među njima Martina Volovskog (41 godina starog), katolika iz Brčkog, koji nakon boravka u njemačkom logoru u Vinkovcima biva prebačen hrvatskim vlastima u Slavonski

⁴⁰ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 10, 2340/1943.

⁴¹ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 10, 2711/1943.

⁴² HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 10, 2711/1943.

⁴³ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 12, 892/1944.

⁴⁴ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 335-336; E. Tihčić, *Posavsko-trebavski NOP odred*, 33, 132-139.

⁴⁵ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 337-338.

Brod. Nakon saslušanja, narednih je 19 dana ostao u zatvoru, kao partizanski suradnik, u svojstvu taoca. U istoj grupi našla se i Mila Ahmetović (28 godina stara), koja je nakon Vinkovaca u zatvoru u Slavonskom Brodu zadržana 12 dana, da bi pri povratku u Brčko ponovno bila uhićena i zadržana u zatvoru narednih šest tjedana. Čitava obitelj Pavla Pavlovića (58 godina star) zemljoradnika iz Brčkog, kao suradnike partizana, njemačka vojna policija tjera u logor u Vinkovce. Pavlovići su bili pravoslavne vjere, Pavle navodi da su u zatvoru proveli ukupno 25 dana od kojih 15 dana u Slavonskom Brodu. Po povratku u Brčko sva imovina od stoke do stočne hrane, namještaja i kućnih potrepština bila im je pokradena. Sličnu izjavu daje i Milica Srdić (48 godina stara), koju je nakon zatočenja u Vinkovcima i Slavonskom Brodu također dočekala opljačkana kuća.⁴⁶

Do kraja godine njemačke i ustaško-domobranske postrojbe vraćaju Tuzlu, no uslijed stalnih partizanskih napada koncentracija jakih okupatorskih snaga bila je stalno prisutna na ovom prostoru. Iz Vinkovaca u ožujku 1944. u Brčko dolazi 28. puk 13. SS Handžar divizije, a uz pomoć njemačke komande, na žalost ustaša, ponovno oživljava četnička aktivnost. Zatvor u Brčkom ponovno postaje mjesto odakle se odvoze i dovoze zatočenici. Handžar divizija provodi masovne pokolje na području kotara od kojih je najveći bio u Loparima gdje je ubijeno 300 ljudi. Svjedoci ratnih stradanja govore i o masovnim grobnicama iskopanim preko rijeke Save u koje su pokapane žrtve podrijetlom iz Brčkog, ali i iz drugih mjesta. Mićo Ignjatović spominje veći broj zatočenih, od kojih navodi poimence ili nadimcima 11 osoba (ostalima nije znao imena), koje su njemačke snage 1944. odvele na stratište u Podgajačku šumu u Slavoniji. Ondje je tijekom rata poubijano oko 500 osoba. Navodi i da je iz Brčkog izveden i veći broj ratnih zarobljenika, partizana Srbijanaca, koji su strijeljani u Staroj Gunji.⁴⁷ Da su pojedinci, poput ustaškog logornika Ante Mrkonjića iz Bosanskog Šamca na svoju ruku likvidirali zatočenike govore izvještaji upravitelja kotarske ispostave u Bosanskom Šamcu koji je pisao kako je Mrkonjić na svoju ruku uhapsio i likvidirao osmoricu muslimana koji su se vratili kući iz partizana privučeni Pavelićevom amnestijom te da je poubijao 75 mještana pravoslavne vjeroispovijesti iz Bosanskog Šamca i Tišine.⁴⁸

U jesen 1944. Brčko postaje neprijateljsko središte za područje sjeveroistočne Bosne i utoliko je ojačano jakim njemačkim i ustaško – domobranskim snagama. U prvoj polovici prosinca 1944. njemačke postrojbe se povlače iz zapadne Srbije pri čemu i ojačavaju postrojbe smještene na

⁴⁶ AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 493, 56. *Zapisnik od 16. svibnja 1945.*, isto, *Zapisnik 55. od 16. svibnja 1945*; Isto, *Zapisnik 56. od 19. svibnja 1945*; Isto, 57. *Zapisnik od 18. svibnja 1945*; Isto, 58. *Zapisnik od 13. lipnja 1945*; Isto, *Zapisnik 59. Milice Sudić*.

⁴⁷ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 338; AJ, fond 110, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, kut. 493, 60. *Zapisnik od 27. travnja 1946. svjedoči Mićo Ignjatović*.

⁴⁸ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 14, 91/1945.

Srijemskom frontu. U povlačenju kod Zvornika grade mostobran odakle nastavljaju prema Bijeljini. Slavonski partizani iz 21. Slavonske i 25. Brodske brigade naći će se krajem 1944. na položajima ispred Bijeljine, da bi tijekom siječnja i veljače 1945. u sastavu 28. divizije 2. Jugoslavenske armije (u nastavku JA) sprječavali povezivanje neprijateljskih garnizona u Bijeljini s onima u Brčkom. Borci 21. Slavonske brigade 23. i 24. srpnja 1944. forsiraju rijeku Savu kod Davora, a borci 25. Brodske brigade zajedno s 28. divizijom Savu prelaze 13. i 14. rujna 1944. kod Slavanskog Kobaša. Ove postrojbe će na području od Bosanskog Broda do Doboja i od Majevice prema Loparima i Koraju, sve do njihovog prelaska u Srbiju, biti angažirane u protjerivanju četnika. Krajem siječnja 1945. u Brčkom se nalazio štab SS „Prinz Eugen“ divizije, kao i štab 12. domobranske divizije čija je zadaća bila braniti mostobran kod Brčkog. U zadnjim mjesecima rata, cesta od Vlasenice prema Bijeljini i Brčkom bila je smjer kretanja njemačkih kolona – 22. njemačke divizije. Snage 21. Slavonske brigade djelovat će na liniji Bijeljina – Čelić – Brčko. Brigada je u napadu na Bijeljinu krajem siječnja 1945. preživjela značajne gubitke (gotovo 10 % sastava). U Bijeljini su branitelji organizirali bespriječan vatreni sistem kojem partizanske snage, zbog manjka iskustva u upotrebi artiljerije, nisu uspjele parirati. Uz navedeno, na prostoru su u suradnji s okupacijskim snagama u pozadini djelovali i četnici koji su djelovali na razvlačenju partizanskog napada. U pomoć 22. diviziji njemačke vojske, kojoj je prijetilo potpuno uništenje, komanda armije „E“ iz Vinkovaca prebacuje 734. puk 104. lovačke divizije ojačan tenkovima i artiljerijom. Njima se pridružuje dio postrojbi 12. domobranske divizije smješten u Brčkom, kao i jedinice iz Bijeljine potpomognute četnicima. Uspješno su deblokirali njemačke postrojbe koje se izvlače iz teškog položaja. Ove se postrojbe povlače u Brčko gdje do 13. ožujka 1945. osiguravaju mostobran, da bi se nakon toga povukle na Srijemski front.⁴⁹ Vidljivo je i iz dokumenata kotarske oblasti u Brčkom da je početkom siječnja 1945. godine tek u tri općine (Mahala, Orašje i Brčko) od njih devet je moguće uspostaviti državni vlast, dok u ostalima vlast drže partizani ili četnici (Obudovac, Koraj, Čelić, Brezovo Polje, Bukvik i Gornji Rahić).⁵⁰

Završetkom zimskih operacija i prelaskom 22. divizije s područja rijeke Drine, težište borbi se prenio na donji tok rijeke Bosne i k Brčkom. U povlačenju dolinom rijeke Bosne neprijatelj se oslanja na jaka uporišta poput Brčkog, koje je povezivalo front sjeverno od Save sa frontom u Bosni. Padom Brčkoga olakšalo bi se djelovanje 1. armiji JA na Srijemskom frontu. Partizanskim djelovanjem otežavalo je povlačenje neprijateljskih snaga dolinom rijeke Bosne prema Brčkom, zbog toga je 19. ožujka 1945. štab grupe armija „E“ pokrenuo akciju odbacivanja 2. armije do doline rijeke Bosne i Save. Napad se koncentrirao na područje od Brčkog – Gračanice – Doboja omeđen rijekama Savom i Bosnom,

⁴⁹ Bogdan Bosiočić, *21. Slavenska udarna brigada*, Beograd 1981, 203, 257-280; Nail Redžić Jamba, *25. Brodska brigada*, Beograd 1976, 183-184, 189-190.

⁵⁰ HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 13, 2601/1944.

s ciljem ovladavanja prometnicama kako bi se omogućilo povlačenje. Nakon neuspjeha okupacijskih snaga u provedbi akcije „Majska ruža“ štab 2. armije JA uočava malodušje u neprijateljskim redovima, slabo ukopavanje, pasivnost, nedovoljna organizacija obrane. Otpor neprijatelja je trajao do početka travnja, kada je u sklopu oslobađanja istočne Bosne 2. armija JA 7. travnja 1945. oslobodila Brčko.⁵¹ O oslobođenju Brčkog piše i kotarski načelnik Brčkog koji je bio u odsustvu u vrijeme kada su Brčko zauzeli partizani. Naime, nakon isteka godišnjeg odmora krenuo je prema Brčkom, ali je u Županji doznao da je Brčko već palo u partizanske ruke. Cjelokupna arhiva kotarske oblasti također je ostala u Brčkom, a kotarski načelnik 13. travnja podnosi izvještaj o »padu Brčkog« u Brodu na Savi.⁵²

Zaključak

Razvoj Brčkog i njegova kotara do Drugoga svjetskog rata pokazuje kako su dugoročni migracijski procesi, gospodarske promjene i složeni etničko-vjerski odnosi stvorili društveni okvir koji je rat 1941–1945. radikalno destabilizirao. Uspostava ustaške vlasti, provođenje rasnih i nacionalnih politika te preklapanje civilnih i represivnih struktura doveli su do masovnih progona, nasilnih vjerskih prijelaza i likvidacija, osobito nad srpskim i židovskim stanovništvom, ali i nad politički sumnjivim građanima različitih nacionalnih i vjerskih pripadnosti. Brčko je istodobno postalo važno prometno i vojno uporište, zbog čega je bilo izloženo neprestanim borbama, represalijama i migracijama.

Ratna zbivanja pokazala su kako lokalni sukobi, osobne inicijative pojedinih nositelja vlasti i intervencije viših političkih i vojnih struktura nisu djelovali odvojeno, nego su se međusobno pojačavali u stvaranju spirale nasilja. Analiza brčanskog slučaja upućuje na to da su procesi državne represije, kolaboracije i otpora duboko zahvatili svakodnevni život zajednice te trajno izmijenili demografsku i društvenu sliku ovoga prostora, čineći Brčko paradigmatskim primjerom ratne transformacije lokalne sredine u sjeveroistočnoj Bosni.

Summary

The development of Brčko and its district leading up to World War II demonstrates how long-term migration processes, economic changes, and complex ethno-religious relations created a social framework that was radically

⁵¹ F. Jelić-Butić, *Prilog istraživanju politike ustaškog režima*, 339; B. Bosiočić, *21. Slavonska udarna brigada*, 283-288, 296.;

⁵² HDA, Velika župa Posavje, kutija 15, 903/1945.

destabilized by the 1941–1945 war. The establishment of Ustaša authority, the implementation of racial and national policies, and the overlap between civil and repressive structures led to mass persecutions, forced religious conversions, and liquidations, particularly targeting the Serb and Jewish populations, but also politically suspicious citizens of various national and religious backgrounds. At the same time, Brčko became a vital transport and military stronghold, leaving it exposed to constant combat, reprisals, and migrations.

Wartime events showed that local conflicts, the personal initiatives of individual power-holders, and interventions from higher political and military structures did not operate in isolation; rather, they reinforced one another, creating a spiral of violence. An analysis of the Brčko case suggests that the processes of state repression, collaboration, and resistance deeply permeated the everyday life of the community and permanently altered the demographic and social landscape of the area, making Brčko a paradigmatic example of the wartime transformation of a local environment in northeastern Bosnia.

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BOSNIAN MUSLIMS IN HUNGARY AFTER 1945

Abstract: *In this study¹ I present a less researched and less known period of the history of Bosnian Muslims living in Hungary, the period after World War II. After the First World War, hundreds of Bosnian soldiers and officers who had been sent to Hungary from Bosnia and Herzegovina or from the fronts, who had recovered from their wounds or had fled here, remained mostly in Budapest. In 1931, together with members of their Hungarian families, they founded the Independent Hungarian Autonomous Islamic Religious Community of Buda, named after Gül Baba, which operated de facto between 1931 and 1945. The Community was led by Husein Hilmi Durić (1887-1940) K. und K. military officer, Military Chief Imam, who later became Grand Mufti of Buda in our country. After the Second World War, the position of Islam in Hungary became more difficult and from 1947, the domestic practice of Islam was not acceptable, and its adherents were generally subjected to discrimination and some persecution. Yet, even in the darkest years of communist oppression of the fifties, these hard-working, battle trained, ageing, cohesive, mutually supportive Bosnian Muslim believers secretly went up and down to the Gül Baba Tomb at the Rose Hill of Buda, to pray. One focus of the paper is the Tomb ("Türbe") itself, which was the main sacral place of Islam in Hungary even during the period of illegality. In this study I would like to show how the Bosnian believers and their family members who survived World War II in Hungary lived in the 1950s and 1960s, what their fate was, what they did, how they were controlled and harassed by the communist regime. I would like to put special emphasis on the life and activities of the Bosnian Muslims buried in the 124th Muslim plot of the New Public Cemetery in Rákoskeresztúr. Of particular note are the lives of*

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Mustafa (Mujaga) Topčagić, Hajdar Hajdić, Avdo Ozmanbašić, Salko Mulić, Ismail Mehmedagić, Hassan Jamaković, Abdullah Endrenić, among others. I would also like to present the carrier of one of the most renowned Bosnian Muslim leaders, Mehmed Resulović, who left for the Vienna after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, and then moved to Federal Republic of Germany to continue his successful profession as a fencing coach. The last Bosnian veteran, Abid Čatić, died in April 1977 in an elderly home in Újpest, Budapest. The time frame of the research and study is therefore between 1945 and 1977. Unfortunately, the finite human lifespan, and the fact that wives, children and grandchildren mostly did not follow the Islamic faith, put an end to the "Bosniak" chapter of the history of Islam in Hungary. In the first chapter I will write about the Muslims clustered around Gül Baba Türbe, in the second part I will outline the lives and fates of a few Bosnian Muslims in Hungary, mostly post-WWII, mainly based on press sources.

Key words: Muslim, Islam, Bosniak, Budapest, Gül Baba Tomb (Türbe), Hungary, state security, Muslim plot.

BOSANSKI MUSLIMANI U MAĐARSKOJ NAKON 1945. GODINE

Apstrakt: U ovoj studiji predstavljam manje istraženo i manje poznato razdoblje u historiji bosanskih muslimana koji žive u Mađarskoj, period nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. Nakon Prvog svjetskog rata, stotine bosanskih vojnika i oficira koji su u Mađarsku upućeni iz Bosne i Hercegovine ili sa ratišta, koji su se oporavili od svojih rana ili su ovdje izbjegli, ostali su uglavnom u Budimpešti. Godine 1931, zajedno sa članovima svojih mađarskih porodica, osnovali su Nezavisnu mađarsku autonomnu islamsku vjersku zajednicu u Budimu, nazvanu po Đul Babi (Gül Baba), koja je de facto djelovala između 1931. i 1945. Zajednicu je predvodio Husein Hilmi Durić (1887–1940), austrougarski (K. und K) vojni oficir i vrhovni vojni imam, koji je kasnije postao veliki budimski muftija u našoj zemlji. Nakon Drugog svjetskog rata položaj islama u Mađarskoj postao je teži, a od 1947. godine praktikovanje islama u zemlji više nije bilo prihvatljivo, dok su njegovi sljedbenici uglavnom bili izloženi diskriminaciji i određenom progonu. Ipak, čak i u najmračnijim godinama komunističkog ugnjetavanja pedesetih godina, ovi vrijedni, borbena iskusni, ostarjeli, kohezivni i međusobno solidarni vjernici bosanski muslimani tajno su odlazili do turbeta Đul Babe na budimskom Brdu ruža (Rózsadomb) kako bi se molili. Jedan od fokusa rada je samo turbe („Türbe”), koje je bilo glavno sakralno mjesto islama u Mađarskoj čak i tokom perioda ilegalnosti. U ovoj studiji želim prikazati kako su bosanski vjernici i članovi njihovih porodica, koji su preživjeli Drugi svjetski rat u Mađarskoj, živjeli tokom 1950-ih i 1960-ih godina, kakva je bila njihova sudbina, čime su se bavili te kako ih je komunistički režim kontrolisao i uznemiravao. Poseban naglasak želim staviti na život i aktivnosti bosanskih muslimana

sahranjenih na 124. muslimanskoj parceli Novog javnog groblja u Rákoskeresztúru. Između ostalih, posebno se ističu životi Mustafe (Mujage) Topčagića, Hajdara Hajdića, Avde Ozmanbašića, Salka Mulića, Ismaila Mehmedagića, Hasana Jamakovića, Abdullaha Endrenića i drugih. Također želim predstaviti karijeru jednog od najuglednijih bosanskih muslimanskih vođa, Mehmeda Resulovića, koji je nakon Mađarske revolucije i borbe za nezavisnost 1956. godine otišao u Beč, a potom se preselio u Saveznu Republiku Njemačku kako bi nastavio svoju uspješnu karijeru mačevalačkog trenera. Posljednji bosanski veteran, Abid Čatić, preminuo je u aprilu 1977. godine u domu za stara lica u Újpeštu u Budimpešti. Vremenski okvir istraživanja i ove studije je, dakle, između 1945. i 1977. godine. Nažalost, ograničeni ljudski životni vijek, kao i činjenica da supruge, djeca i unučad uglavnom nisu praktikovali islamsku vjeru, stavili su tačku na „bošnjačko” poglavlje u historiji islama u Mađarskoj. U prvom poglavlju pisat ću o muslimanima okupljenim oko turbeta Đul Babe, dok ću u drugom dijelu, uglavnom na osnovu novinskih izvora, prikazati živote i sudbine nekolicine bosanskih muslimana u Mađarskoj, većinom iz perioda nakon Drugog svjetskog rata.

Ključne riječi: Musliman, Islam, Bošnjak, Budimpešta, turbe Đul Babe, Mađarska, državna sigurnost, muslimanska parcela.

Introduction

As I have pointed out in several of our previous studies² and other Hungarian researchers³ have also dealt with this issue, after the First World War, many Bosnian veterans, privates, non-commissioned officers and officers who could not or dared not return home, chose Hungary, mostly Budapest, as their new home. In 1931, an Independent Hungarian Autonomous Buda Islamic Religious Community, named after Gül Baba, was founded, which de facto functioned until 1945.

² Zoltán Bolek, Zsolt Udvarvölgyi, 'A Unique and Great Period of History of Islam in Hungary: The Community of Bosnian Veterans (1931-1947)'. *Yeni Türkiye* 23/97 (2017), 86-100; Zoltán Bolek, Zsolt András Udvarvölgyi, 'Episodes in the life of the Bosnian Muslim Community in Hungary (1920-1945)'. *Historijski pogledi*, Vol. 5, No. 8, Tuzla 2022, 112-133. (<https://doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2022.5.8.112>); Zsolt Udvarvölgyi, 'Az iszlám Magyarországon' [Islam in Hungary], Adamo Books, Budapest 2009. Accessed February 14, 2022, <https://adamobooks.com/termek/Az-izslam-Magyarorszagon-4.html>.

³ György Lederer, 'A magyarországi iszlám újabb kori történetéhez' I-II. [To the recent history of Islam in Hungary], *Keletkutatás [Orientalism]*, Autumn (1988), 29-49, Spring (1989), 53-72; György Lederer, 'Islam in Hungary', *Central Asian Survey*, 11 (1992), 1-23; Zoltán Bolek, 'Islám Enciklopédia' [Islamic Encyclopaedia], Magyar Iszlám Közösség, Budapest 2005; Zoltán Bolek, 'A Monarchia muszlimjai. Avagy elfelejtett muszlim háborús hőseink' [The Muslims of the Monarchy. Or as our forgotten Muslim war heroes], Magyar Iszlám Közösség, Budapest 2016; Zoltán Bolek, 'Az utolsó dzsihád' [The last jihad], Magyar Iszlám Közösség, Budapest 2020.

Much less is known about the history of Islam after 1945. Even film footage of the funeral of Hilmi Durić Hussein in February 1940⁴ has survived and newspapers have published obituaries⁵. György Lederer also deals with this period in his pioneering, thorough and excellent study. At the end of his two-part study on this period, published in *Keletkutatás* [Orientalism], which is still niche piece and a fundamental work⁶, he writes: “In February 1940, Hussein Hilmi Durić died of a lung disease in the János Hospital (...), and in September 1946 Abdul-Latif⁷ closed his eyes for ever. The two opponents are buried in plot 124 of the New Cemetery in *Rákoskeresztúr*, just a few steps away from each other.” The author later concludes his study in this way: “In 1949, a period begins in the history of our country and of the people’s democracies in general, in which the circumstances are not favourable to the development of the churches and the unfolding of religious life. This is even more, true for the smaller congregations with an unclear status than for the large churches, although they too are emerging from the ordeal. Yet the Legislature of the Hungarian Republic abolished the distinction between established and recognised denominations in 1947.”⁸ Speaking in Parliament on this occasion was the Minister of Religion and Public Education, Gyula Ortutay⁹:

“I must also mention, as a curiosity, Article XVII of Law 1916, which, apparently in connection with the political necessities of the First World War, declared the Islamic religion a recognised denomination in Hungary, which at that time had about 300 members, and this recognition has not made it necessary or possible for a recognised religious denomination of Islam to be established here in Hungary. This fact also shows how in the relations between church and state the churches have often been shamed by this dependence on the state, which some of them have so willingly assumed and even demanded for themselves.”¹⁰ Lederer aptly observes in his paper that, “there are those who dispute how much this “dependency” was in reality reduced by the mere passage of Act XXXIII of 1947, one thing is certain: domestic practice of Islam was not acceptable from 1947 onwards, its adherents were generally subjected to discrimination and some degree of persecution. Despite this, Bosnian Muslims in the capital occasionally gathered in secret to pray at the Gül-Baba Tomb (*Türbe*) in the 1950s. Mehmed

⁴ Magyar Világhírado [Hungarian World News] 834. 1940. február: ‘Huszein Hilmi temetése Rákoskeresztúron.’ [Funeral of Huszein Hilmi in Rákoskeresztúr.] in: Filmhíradók [Film News] Online. <https://filmhíradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=3665>, accessed May 8, 2024.

⁵For example: [N. A]: ‘Eltemették a budai nagymuftit’ [The Grand Mufti of Buda is buried] in: *Magyarság* [Hungarianness] 21/30 (1940), 8.

⁶ G. Lederer, *A magyarországi, II*, 65.

⁷ Abdul Latif (1886-1946) was a Turkish lector, imam, hodja, leader of the Turkish Muslim community in Budapest.

⁸ G. Lederer, *A magyarországi, II*, 67.

⁹ Gyula Ortutay (1910-1978), ethnographer, academic, politician, director general of MTI [Hungarian News Agency] (1945-1947), Minister of Religion and Public Education (1947-1950).

¹⁰ *Hansard of the Hungarian Parliament 1947-51*. 24-25. II. 31. 4 December 1947, Athenaeum, Budapest 1948.

Resulović's son, *András Reszulovics* recalled seeing groups of 150-200 people gathering at that time there, but most of the children were no longer following the faith of their fathers, or at least were not fervent Muslims, and so human mortality slowly ended the continuity of Islam in Hungary."¹¹

In another interview, historian Zoltán Bolek, the current president of the Hungarian Islamic Community, stated that the Durić-led Islamic community was dissolved by the authorities in 1948, and it was only re-established in 1988 under the name Hungarian Islamic Community.¹²

In fact, Bosniaks and their families who remained in Hungary practised their faith illegally from 1947-1948 onward. The Bosnian, Turkish and Albanian Muslims living in Hungary, most of whom were born at the end of the 19th century or around the turn of the century, mostly chose Hungarian wives who either converted to Islam or remained with their own religion, and so the widows were often not buried in the Muslim plot next to their husbands. „Some of the Bosnian-Hungarian Muslims emigrated before 1948, others went abroad after the 1956 revolution, such as Mehmed Resulović who worked as a fencing coach in Vienna and the FRG until his death in 1983. The last of those who stayed in Hungary, Abid Ćatić closed his eyes for ever in a social home in Újpest in April 1977. There was no one to recite the Fatiha over his grave, as he had paid his last respects to his brothers in faith who had passed away a few years earlier, Hajdar Hajdić, Muharem Slatinović, Zuko Suleiman and others.”¹³ For more than thirty-five years, Hungarian historians, sociologists, Muslim believers, imams, or journalists who have been dealing with the history of Islam in Hungary after 1945 have almost exclusively shared this - undoubtedly important and relevant - information in their own writings, and have not - to my knowledge - undertaken any deeper research. Therefore, in this paper I will attempt to enrich the history of domestic Islam between 1945 and 1988 with new facts and data. The scope of this paper does not allow me to cover the fate of all Bosniaks after 1945, so I will focus on the most important and, in my opinion, the most interesting life stories. I would like to express also that in another paper I would like to show how the Bosniaks came into the view of state security, based on sources found in the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (*ÁBTL*), but this part did not fit into the scope of the current study.

¹¹ G. Lederer, *'A magyarországi, II, 68.*

¹² József Botlik, 'Kis egyházak Magyarországon. Magyar Iszlám Közösség' [Small Religious Communities in Hungary: The Hungarian Islamic Community]. in: *Magyar Nemzet [Hungarian Nation]* 60/157 (1997), 7.

¹³ G. Lederer, *'A magyarországi, II, 68.*

In the pull of the Gül Baba Tomb

Based on my research so far, it is reasonable to assume that from 1947 there was no functioning Islamic church or association legally registered in the country or tacitly acknowledged by the authorities, no public place of worship or functioning mosque. Although it is interesting to note that the Article XVII of 1916 on the recognition of the Islamic religion¹⁴ remained formally in force, it was not abolished, and later it provided the legal basis for the organisation and registration of the Hungarian Islamic Community in 1988. According to historian Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics, “the Muslim community of Budapest did not formally dissolve even after 1945. This is the reason why the Hungarian state accepted the status of the Hungarian Islamic Community in 1988, on the basis of the 1916 Reception Act, which was confirmed in 1990 and 2012, and the fact that this church is the successor of the Gül Baba Islamic Community, which was active between 1931 and 1945.”¹⁵ Furthermore, after 1946, there were no imams working in Hungary, it was no longer possible to collect the Zakat, to teach Islamic religious instruction to Muslim students in schools, to translate the Quran, and finally, since diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia were established only in April 1995, it became almost impossible for the handful of Hungarian citizen Muslims who remained in Hungary to make pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. It should be mentioned that an exception to all this was Professor Gyula Germanus (1884-1979), aka Hajji Abdul-Karim Germanus, an Arabist, writer, literary historian, traveller, university professor and briefly member of parliament (1958-1966). He and his second wife, Kató Kajári (Ayse), also a convert to Islam, went to Mecca in 1965 at the invitation of the Saudi king and made an attempted pilgrimage, which was interrupted for health reasons. He was considered the so-called “official Muslim” of the country, and I have explored his life in several other studies.¹⁶

The “Iron Curtain” between the eastern and western sides of Europe was closed, and travel in and out of Hungary became extremely difficult, if not impossible. Muslims in Hungary who had left for the West had no chance to visit relatives left in the motherland, to come home for a funeral or wedding, or to

¹⁴ 1916. évi XVII. törvénycikk az iszlám-vallás elismeréséről. [Article XVII of 1916 on the recognition of the Islamic religion], <https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=91600017.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-torvenyei/%3Fpagenum%3D38>, accessed November 25, 2024.

¹⁵ Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics, ‘Több, mint száz éve lett törvényesen elismert vallás az iszlám Magyarországon’ [Islam became a legally recognised religion in Hungary more than a hundred years ago.], in: transtex.ro October 27, 2024. 08:17. <https://transtex.ro/kultura/2024/10/27/magyarország-islam-vallas>, accessed November 25, 2024.

¹⁶ For more on the life of Germanus, see: Zsolt András Udvarvölgyi, ‘A journey with experiences of a lifetime. The adventures of Gyula Germanus in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1902.’ *Historijski pogledi*, Vol. 6, No. 10, Tuzla 2023, 52-71. (<https://doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2023.6.10.52>).

bring religious literature to Hungarian believers. The authorities have similarly censored mail and parcels. For the Muslims in Hungary, the land of their ancestors became inaccessible too: The entry to Tito¹⁷ Yugoslavia, especially during the “chain dog” period (Tito was labelled “the chain dog of imperialism” by the Hungarian communist dictator Mátyás Rákosi¹⁸), also became more difficult, and it is also worth noting that the communist state leadership in Yugoslavia preferred not Bosnian Muslims but rather Serbs and Croats in its “cadre policy”. Nor have I yet found any source that Bosniaks from Bosnia and Herzegovina settled in Hungary during this period, or that anyone from Hungary moved to their ancestral land. Relations with Enver Hoxha¹⁹’s atheist Albania, suffering from a terrible communist reign of terror, also became impossible, although in the 1930s, especially after the marriage of Count Apponyi Geraldine²⁰ to King Zogu I of Albania²¹ (27 April 1938), Hungarian-Albanian relations were very fruitful, from which the Hungarian Islamic community also benefited. As the Republic of Turkey joined the Western power bloc, it entered NATO in 1952 and thus became an “enemy”, which had a negative impact on Hungarian-Turkish relations.

Unfortunately, we do not have official statistics on exactly how many Muslims, and within that how many Bosniaks, lived in Hungary after 1945. During the relevant period, too, there may have been more men among Muslims in Hungary, because the wives of Bosniaks, Albanians and Turks did not always convert to Islam. Estimates, recollections and biographical data from the gravestones in the “Muslim” plot 124 of the New Public Cemetery indicate that even after 1945 there was a Muslim colony in Hungary of between 100 and 300, mostly in Budapest. They are only mentioned in sporadic press articles, which are mainly about the Gül Baba Türbe.

The World Youth and Students’ Meeting, or World Youth Meeting (“VIT”), was held in Budapest in August 1949. This was the second VIT and there were around 20,000 participants from 82 countries. The Roman Catholic weekly, *Új Ember* article on the event is an interesting addition to the history of the Türbe: “The fact that one of the most famous “saints” of the Muslim world is buried in the Hungarian capital is almost forgotten. Gül Baba, the “Father of Roses”, founded a dervish monastery in Buda during the Turkish occupation and introduced rose gardening, the memory of which is now only preserved in the

¹⁷ Tito, Josip Broz (1892-1980) was a Yugoslav communist revolutionary, marshall, politician, Prime Minister (1945-1963) and President of Yugoslavia (1953-1980).

¹⁸ Rákosi, Mátyás (1892-1971) communist politician, General Secretary (later: First Secretary) of the Hungarian Communist Party (1945-1958) and Hungarian Working People’s Party (1948-1956). Prime Minister of Hungary (1952-1953).

¹⁹ Hoxha, Enver (1908-1985) was an Albanian communist revolutionary, politician and First Secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania.

²⁰ Countess Geraldine Apponyi (1915-2002) was a Hungarian aristocrat and a Queen of the Albania.

²¹ Zogu I of Albania (1895-1961) was an Albanian politician, prime minister, president of the republic, King of Albania (1928-1939).

name of the Rose Hill (“*Rózsadomb*”). Buried here, on the eastern slope of the Rose Hill, is the octagonal tomb chapel of the Muslim saint, one of the few Turkish architectural monuments in Buda. It is currently cared for by the caretaker of the villa built around it, and can be visited with his guidance. We learnt from him that the siege of Gül Baba’s tomb was not spared, it was shot, but the damage has been repaired. Immediately after the siege, Abdul Latif, the “high priest” of some 3,000 Muslim believers in Hungary, died, and since then this small tomb chapel, once the centre of Muslim religious life in Budapest, has been quite overrun. Today it is more of a tourist attraction than a religious shrine. It has been visited by a large number of visitors during the Student Youth Meeting and most recently by members of the Egyptian Embassy.”²²

In 1950, one of the darkest years of communist repression, a small article entitled “The Disappearing Turkish World in Buda” was published. According to the journalist, “the true believers still climb the Mosque Street during the fast of Kurban bayram and Ramazan, take off their shoes and face east, but they no longer roast sheep under the rose trees, the green flag of the Prophet does not fly on the crescent tower, Abdul Latif, the last Imam of Pest, passed away three years ago and his widow has also died.”²³ But who were these “true believers” during the harshest period of the Hungarian Stalinist regime? This question will also be answered later: “In the east window, the Quran rests in a dusty white silk sack, last opened in the spring by four visitors from the Egyptian colony who sat here, kneeling in stockings on the floor. The last Muslim visitors wrote their names in the visitors’ book, for the Gül Baba, Father of Roses had a reputation as a polite, gentle man and still keeps a record of his visitors. With fountain pens, the *effendis* wrote their names in the guest book in classical Arabic characters, then they took up their shoes in the garden, got into their Packard (note: it was an American luxury car) and drove off. Since then, only a few “*giaours*” like me have disturbed Gül Baba’s dream of deep peace and tranquility.”²⁴ And finally, there is also some Bosniak relevance in the writing: “The columnist finds a small picture leaning against the coffin, picks it up, and under three lines of Arabic letters, in fading ink, it reads: in memory of Esef Garmić, 3rd K. u. K. Bosnian Infantry Regiment, 12 March 1916. He then asks the rhetorical question with some emotion: “Who brought here this prayer in ink in memory of the Bosnian warrior Esef Garmić and where did he cross the seventh heaven in defence of the Austrian Emperor?”²⁵ Unfortunately, I have not come across the name of the Bosnian fighter in any other source yet.

²² K. Gy, ‘Mohamedán zarándokok katolikus pártfogói’ [Catholic patrons of Muslim pilgrims]. in: *Új Ember* [New Man] 6/36 (1949), 3.

²³ [N. A], ‘Tűnő törökvilág Budán’ [The Disappearing Turkish World in Buda]. in: *Kis Újság* [Small Newspaper] 4/253 (1950), 8.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

From time to time, the glorious history and sad present of the Türbe comes up in articles. The famous Hungarian journalist and reporter Péter Ruffy²⁶ lamented in a 1957 article: “Gül Baba Street is a symbol of something that is gone forever. It is over. It is not. (...) And what is left? His green post turban »around his happy head«. The turban is still there. It is no longer green. It is grey. His red prayer mat is still there. No longer red. Rusty, torn. And in 1946 Abdul Latif, the last imam of Buda, who guarded the ashes of Gül Baba, died. He was also recently succeeded by his true-believing widow, Aunt Nezike, once a Hungarian girl from Bars County. Before she died, she could not even heat a stove. She had nothing. Yet Baba Gül was still warming himself by the flames of Buda. Thus, quite unnoticed, the Turkish world in Buda came to an end after four hundred and sixteen years.”²⁷

Also in 1957, an article was published, which paints a sad and depressing picture of Türbe and its surroundings: “The Türbe stands in the courtyard of a building declared a ruin. Since 1946, when Abdul Latif, the last imam of Buda, died, no one has cared for the building or the tomb. The path to the tomb is lined with weeds the size of children’s weeds, the mosque’s windows are missing, and the courtyard is littered with brick and stone rubble from 1944. The Türbe’s memorial book is crumpled and dirty. The shrine is visited by every Muslim who visits Budapest. And thinks something to himself.”²⁸

In the course of my research I found the last Bosnian Muslim of Buda, Jusuf Esen, who was the subject of a charming little portrait article in left-wing daily *Népszava* in 1959. So at this time, a Bosnian still practice his faith and visited the Türbe regularly. Unfortunately, I have not heard of his potential fellow believers yet. I anticipate that the life of Jusuf Esen will disappoint many readers. I think it is appropriate to quote the article in almost full because of its style and content:

“In Buda, there is a street with a Muslim “hell” at one end and a Muslim »heaven« at the other. The gates of Muslim hell open from the old wine bar that has been serving thirsty people for so long that legend has it that under its shady strawberry trees, the true-believing janissaries of the last Buda pasha used to tap their cups of “*Sashegyi*” (Eagle Mountain) wine, violating the Prophet Muhammad’s most stringent laws and opening the gates of hell. Above the wine pub is the gateway to Muslim heaven, namely the Türbe of the Muslim saint Gül Baba, in which the holy rose gardener is said to rest in person. (...) Though there are few true-believing Turkish “*Effendi*” in the *Viziváros* (Water City) since Abdul Latif, the last imam of Buda, died, and the green silk turban of the holy rose gardener used to be dusted off by a *giaour* woman before Muslim holidays.

²⁶ Ruffy, Péter (1914-1993) was a Hungarian journalist and writer.

²⁷ Péter Ruffy, ‘Pest Buda felfedezése. Gül Baba utca’ [Discovering Pest Buda. Gül Baba street]. in: *Érdekes Újság* [Interesting Newspaper] 2/7 (1957), 17.

²⁸ (bajor): ‘Egy járókelő jámbor észrevételei a modern Pest-Buda néhány különlegességéről’ [A passerby’s pious observations on some of the peculiarities of modern Pest-Buda]. in: *Hétfői Hírek* [Monday News] 1/14 (1957), 2.

The only true-believing janissary scion who still picks up the Quran and utters a *sura* about Allah's infinite power and wisdom is "*Gül Papa*" (Daddy Gül), whose existence was once reported by the bartender of the pub, shouting this: "A big spritzer for *Gül Papa*!" And he slammed the slender glass in front of a round-faced, gentle and pious-looking man, who raised his hand to his forehead and lips to thank him for the spritzer, but first removed his hat. We were in the middle of a crowded wine-tasting room and we came to a table with the *Effendi* who was clutching his glass of spritzer. I asked him: - Are you a Muslim? He replied: - By the grace of *Allah*... - And the wine? I understand that Muhammad has forbidden it? He smiled gently and took a big sip: - The wine is excellent, and *Allah* is far away... We were in complete agreement on that.

Gül Papa, so named because of the bartender's jocularly, was indeed born in the Muslim faith. His father was a Bosnian Muslim warrior - his name was Jusuf Esen - who was seriously wounded in the First World War. He was treated in Pest, but died after bringing his wife and son from Sarajevo to say goodbye. This Bosnian lad was today's Gül Papa, who learned to garden before his mother passed away. Jusuf, who had no intention of returning home, learned mainly about flower gardening. He married in Buda, but they had no children, and his Hungarian wife died later. Gül Papa grafted roses. He was the rose expert in the rose gardens in *Rózsadomb* (Rose Hill), and the skinny counts and fat bankers kept him busy until the rose-loving lords left *Rózsadomb*²⁹, but Gül Papa kept on tending the gardens. But, he planted more and more vineyards instead of aged rose bushes, and in some places he planted such a good vineyard that a single vineyard could produce a hectare of wine if the year is good. Even now, he was clutching a kind of rooted grapevine his arm as he drank the spritzer, and when I pointed out the certain damnation of the Muslim faith, he smiled and showed me the clutch of grapevine: "This, sir, is a "true believer" grapevine... Look at the name. Its name is Afuz Ali... For Allah is great and his humble servant is not to be feared."³⁰ Of course, after all these years, we cannot judge how much Jusuf Esen was a wine lover and how much of the story is just an exaggeration by the journalist.

After 1959 I did not come across any Bosniaks around *Türbe* in the sources I researched, but I did find several references to other Bosniaks, about whom I will write in the next chapter.

²⁹ Here, the journalist refers to the fact that wealthy garden owners fled Buda during and after the Second World War.

³⁰ Géza Baróti, 'Gül Papa mestersége' [Papa Gül's craft]. in: *Népszava* [The Word of the People] 87/80 (1959), 2.

What the Muslim plot and contemporary press sources tell us

First of all, in the following I will write about the Bosniaks resting in the 124th Muslim plot of the Rákoskeresztúr New Public Cemetery of Budapest. Mustafa (according to some sources Mujaga) Topčagić (1883- September 11, 1953), or as he was known to almost everyone in Budapest at the time, “Csocsó bácsi” (Uncle Csocsó) was a notorious figure not only in the Bosnian Muslim community, but also in the nightlife of Budapest and the national, “awakening” far-right in the 1920-30s. In the 1920s, he ran a thriving pub in downtown Budapest, which became a favourite haunt of the “awakening” Hungarians. According to the author of the article, the owner of the pub was also a nationalist and a fan of Kemal Atatürk, which is a bit unusual for a Bosniak. The “awakening” nationalist and anti-Semitic youths gathered in Uncle Csocsó’s pub, from where they started to insult Jews, beat them up and cause other scandals. In 1923, they even organised an attempted coup in the pub, although it could not be considered serious. Later, with the economic consolidation, the awakening Hungarian’s star faded, the pub went bust and the compromised Uncle Csocsó went bankrupt.³¹ He later worked as a garden guard in the capital.

Mustafa Topčagić’s son, Assir, has been in the press since he was a boy: “On Easter morning in 1934, a hundred Hungarian Muslims gathered in a room of the Esplanade Hotel, which had been decorated for the occasion as a Muslim mosque. The chief imam, Hussein Hilmi Durić, in a white turban and green caftan, led the service. After that, the youngest member of the Community, 10-year-old Topčagić Assir, gave a poetic welcome speech, then a blessing followed, and then the congregation marched to the grave of Gül Baba. Here they present a lamb sacrifice.”³² In 1936, during the Seker Bayram celebration, Assir, a young Muslim boy born in Hungary, recited a poem written for the occasion by Daniel Gegus, a retired deputy chief of police. Although not without some hiccups, the performance was nonetheless a great success.³³ Later he was a talented teenager who excelled in sports, for example, in 1942 he came second in the junior “*levente*” runners’ competition, the field race.³⁴ Unfortunately, he drifted to the far right, and is also on the list of Arrow Cross party members in Budapest’s 5th district. At that time he lived on the *Újpest* quay and was listed by profession as a dance master.³⁵

Zuko Suleiman’s name is linked to a very adventurous incident that took place in 1942. Born in Cetinje, Zuko Suleiman, a resident of the Bosnian

³¹ Jenő Széll, ‘Belváros, kisváros’ [Downtown, small town]. in: *Budapest* 14/3 (1976), 19.

³² [N. A.], ‘A budapesti mohamedánok húsvétja’ [The Easter of Budapest’s Muslims]. in: *Az Est* [The Evening] 25/69 (1934), 8.

³³ [N. A.], ‘Seker Bajram, a szeretet ünnepe egy budapesti szállodában’ [Seker Bajram, the Festival of Love at a Budapest Hotel]. in: *Esti Kurír* [Evening Courier] 14/290 (1936), 2.

³⁴ [N. A.], ‘Testedzés’ [Physical Exercise]. in: *Szebb jövőt!* [A better future!] 2/18 (1942), 15.

³⁵ [N. A.], ‘Az V. kerületi nyilas párttagok listája’ [List of Arrow Cross party members in District V]. in: *Világ* [World] 1/19 (1945), 2.

municipality of Visegrád, a Muslim Croatian citizen (I assume he was Bosniak), tried to escape to Hungary on 19 January 1942 near *Gyékényes*. However, he was apprehended and detained by police at the border. During his interrogation, he said that after his house was set on fire by the Chetniks, his wife, Mária Szabó, came to Hungary and he wanted to follow her. However, he did not receive a passport at the embassy in Zagreb and decided to try to enter the country illegally. Zuko Suleiman was prosecuted for illegal border crossing and sentenced to 14 days imprisonment at the Kaposvár Royal Court. The sentence was final.³⁶ I think this little inconvenience was worth it, as he then lived out his life peacefully in Hungary and is buried in Muslim plot 124. He passed away at the age of 80.

It is also important to mention the name of Ismail Mehmedagić (1882–1962), who is buried in the Muslim section as well. He served as the Community’s imam and muezzin, and was also the deputy to Grand Mufti Durić. In fact, he was the second most prominent and respected leader of the Bosniak Muslims from the very beginning. In February 1940, he also conducted Duric’s farewell according to Islamic rites at the New Public Cemetery in *Rákospesztúr*.³⁷ Subsequently, he assumed de facto leadership of the community until its eventual dissolution.

Salko Mulić (1893–1956) and his wife, “Mrs. *Juliska*” (1895–1968), rest in a shared grave. Mulić was likely a comradely, restless, and courageous man; he actively participated in the so-called “Vannay-Schill coup attempt” of 1931 and was even arrested during the investigation. Mulić, who was in his forties at the time and worked as a driver, was interrogated. It emerged that he acted as an intermediary who handed over the list of his Bosniak comrades to the organizers of the coup. The trial turned out to be more fuss than substance; many details of the confused coup attempt remained unclear, and Mulić was not convicted. He did not appear at the trial despite being summoned. According to the records, at that time he was an unemployed driver who declared that he felt no guilt in the matter. In 1927, he joined the “*Turáni Vadászok*” (Turan Hunters Society), where the organizer repeatedly urged him to encourage his Bosniak comrades to join the hunting association. Mulić handed over the list of his comrades. He also attended one meeting but was not active afterward.³⁸ The interrogation had no further consequences for him.

Perhaps the most remarkable case after World War II is that of Hassan Jamaković, a tire repairman, who also rests in the Muslim plot together with his wife. There is a separate file in the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (*ÁBT*L) regarding the trial of “Hassan Jamakovics and his associates”,

³⁶ [N. A.], ‘Egy mohamedán vallású horvát állampolgár útlevél nélkül akart Magyarországra szökni, elítélte a bíróság’ [A Muslim Croatian citizen tried to flee to Hungary without a passport, convicted by court]. in: *Új-Somogy* [New Somogy] 24/147 (1942), 2.

³⁷ [N. A.], ‘Eltemették a budai nagymuftit’ [The Grand Mufti of Buda was buried]. in: *Magyarság* [Hungarianness] 21/30 (1940), 8.

³⁸ [N. A.], ‘Vallomások a puccsisták szervezkedéséről’ [Confessions about the Coup Plotters’ Organization]. in: *8 Órai Újság* [8 O’Clock Newspaper] 18/52 (1932), 2.

which I plan to examine in detail in a separate study. In summary, the available sources suggest that Jamaković, a hardworking and diligent master craftsman who ran a successful tire repair shop, had a reputation for being outspoken, quarrelsome, and hot-tempered. In July 1945, several people reported him for allegedly denouncing Jews during the Arrow Cross regime and for making antisemitic remarks. The case was brought before the National Council of People's Courts (*NOT*), which heard numerous witnesses who testified both for and against him. After a chaotic, tangled trial marked by personal attacks, Jamaković was cleared of all charges and acquitted by the court on July 26, 1945.³⁹ Based on the documents, I personally believe that the Bosniak veteran - who spoke Hungarian with difficulty and often expressed himself clumsily - was likely innocent. Jamaković passed away in 1958, followed by his wife in 1971.

I could find almost nothing about the life of Jusuf Emin, except for the memoirs of one of his grandchildren. In the spring of 2018, photographer Endre Kovács⁴⁰ traveled to Bosnia with his poet friend Ottó Fenyvesi⁴¹. The poet later wrote about the trip, the memories of which were published in a photo-illustrated travelogue titled "*Mély vizek, magas hegyek*" (Deep Waters, High Mountains). In this work, the author summarizes the experiences of their Balkan journey, which they undertook as a group of five. Although they set out for Bosnia, their route eventually included Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia as well, covering several thousand kilometers in five days. In this book, Kovács - who unfortunately did not live to see its publication - also mentions his grandfather, Jusuf Emin (1896-1960). His grandfather relocated from Ipeg (Peć) in Kosovo to Budapest at the end of the 19th century. During that period, conflicts and strife were frequent in the region, and Emin migrated to Hungary hoping for a more peaceful life.⁴² Based on his name and his origins in Kosovo, Jusuf Emin is presumed to have been Albanian.

Hajdar Hajdić (1881–1973), a Bosniak Islamic community's influential, respected, and active member, was a male tailor who lived a long life of 92 years. Interestingly, a joint photo of him and his wife is also found on their grave. His wife's name is inscribed there as well, but only with her birth year: Hajdić Hajdarné (1903–). Moreover, the inscription on the tombstone includes a touching note from her: "She happily lived with her dear husband for 54 years and will be buried here as well when she passes." However, her date of death is missing. A brief biography of Hajdić is also included in the Almanac of Hungarian Industry: Hajdar Henrik Hajdić is a male tailor, lives in *Bulcsú* Street 19. Budapest. He was born in 1892 in Bosnia and completed his tailoring apprenticeship there in 1909. He spent his apprenticeship period working in

³⁹ HU- ÁBTL-3.1.9. – I. s. – V-92748 Jamakovics Hassán és társai ["Hassan Jamakovic and his associates"].

⁴⁰ Kovács, Endre (1947-2020) was a Hungarian photographer and director.

⁴¹ Fenyvesi, Ottó (1954-) is a Hungarian poet, writer and editor.

⁴² Ottó Fenyvesi, 'Mély vizek, magas hegyek' [Deep Waters, High Mountains]. in: *Kortárs [Contemporary]* 66/7-8. (2022), 107, 109.

workshops in Zagreb and Budapest. In 1928, he established his own workshop, producing first-rate work. He employs one assistant. During the First World War, after a short period of frontline service on the Russian front, he was taken prisoner of war; he returned home after three and a half years. His wife's name is Mária Árba.⁴³ The Hajdić family was still living in their apartment building on *Bulcsú* Street during the 1944–1945 siege of Budapest. Writer Rudolf Ungváry⁴⁴ remembered them as follows:

“The street-level façade was lined with shops, including the gentlemen's tailor shop of Hajdár Hajdić, who had remained here after coming from Bosnia. The family spent their lives in the cramped space above the shop.”⁴⁵ Unfortunately, I have not yet found any sources regarding how Hajdić's life unfolded after the World War II. I presume he may have been part of the community that visited the *Türbe* illegally during that period.

The most famous of those who died abroad was Mehmed Resulović (Reszulovics Mehmed or Rachulovich Mechmed) (1902–1983), a veteran soldier, fencing master and later sports instructor, was also a pillar member and one of the leaders of the Independent Hungarian Autonomous Islamic Religious Community of Buda, named after Gül Baba. Resulović was born on 31 January 1902. After the First World War, he graduated from the Royal Hungarian *Miklós Toldi* Honvéd Sports Teacher and Fencing Master Training Institute. From 1935 to 1936 he was a fencing coach at the Ludovica Academy, and between the two world wars he was one of the best left-handed fencers in the country. In 1939 he took part in the invasion of the Highlands (“*Felvidék*”). After 1945 he taught fencing at the Red Flag Sports Club (“*Vörös Lobogó SE*”). He left Hungary after the suppression of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence and worked as a fencing coach in Vienna and later in the FRG until his death in 1983.⁴⁶ After emigration, Resulović became a well-known and respected coach in German fencing circles. Italian fencing master and coach Stefano Gardenti also remembered his former master fondly in his writing: “Because of my job, I worked in Düsseldorf from April to October 1963 and took lessons from Master Resulović at RFKD⁴⁷. He had a rounder build and his neck was already wrinkled. He shook his head when he corrected a wrong move. Even at sixty, he was lightning quick with the blade and mercilessly stabbed me back when he was

⁴³ Miksa Ladányi, (ed), *A magyar ipar almanachja. II-II. rész. Az iparos társadalom (Névjegyzék) [The Almanac of Hungarian Industry, Vol. II, Part II: The Artisan Society (Directory)]*. Magyar Ipar Almanachja Kiadóhivatala, Budapest 1930, 170.

⁴⁴ Ungváry, Rudolf (1936 -) is a Hungarian mechanical engineer, writer, journalist and critic.

⁴⁵ Rudolf Ungváry, Egy bérház élménye 1944/1945 fordulóján [The Experience of a Tenement House at the Turn of 1944/1945]. in: *Jelenkor [Present Day]* 57/78 (2014), 771.

⁴⁶ Rachulovics Mechmed (Reszulovics Mehmed) vívómester, sportoktató [fencing master, sport instructor]. in: Magyar Szablyavívó Iskola [Hungarian Sabre Fencing School], Pécs honlapja [website].http://magyarszablyapecs.hu/galeria/album/mesterek_eletrajza/slides/rachulovics_mehmed.pdf, accessed May 8, 2024.

⁴⁷ Rheinischen Fechtclub Düsseldorf

defending my amateur attack.”⁴⁸ Resulović chose a Hungarian wife too; the marriage register attests that in Kőszeg, on 22 December 1944, Mehmed Reszulovics, a fencing master of the Muslim religion, a resident of Kőszeg, born on 31 January 1902 in Trebinje, Bosnia and Herzegovina (parents: the late Ahmed and Dérka Reszulovics), married Erzsébet Toporci of the Reformed faith, a teacher at a civil school in the capital, resident of Kőszeg, born on 6 May 1919 in Brasov (parents: the late János Toporci and Erzsébet Bokor). Under the heading of the marriage declarations, possible remarks before signing, the parties stipulated that “by agreement, all children of both sexes from this marriage will follow the religion of the mother, i.e. the Reformed religion, according to the decision of the official notary of Kőszeg, No. 67/944. Thus, in this case, the requirement of Islamic family law, the Sharia, that the children should inherit the religion of the Muslim father, did not apply. There is also a subsequent entry No. 40/1947, which I assume refers to the divorce of the couple. Based on information received from Tiborné Tóth Marianna Márkus, whose primary school teacher at the Elementary School in *Köztársaság* square, Budapest, between 1960 and 1964 was Mehmedné Reszulovics Erzsébet Toporci, and to whom she also attended private German lessons at their apartment in *József* bld. 69, it can be stated that she was already divorced from Reszulovics at that time and that she was raising her son, András. According to the death certificate of Mrs. Reszulovics, she died on 8 October 1970 in Budapest, in the *Péterfy Sándor* Street Hospital, and her marital status was already divorced. It is therefore clear that neither she nor his son András converted to Islam.⁴⁹

The “last Mohican” of the Bosnian community between the two world wars, as I mentioned earlier, was Abid Čatić (Csátics), who passed away on April 13, 1977, at the Elderly Home on *Baross* Street in Budapest’s 4th district. Čatić was born in Travnik, Bosnia, on January 2, 1895. He served in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I, and after the Treaty of Trianon, he remained permanently in our country along with several hundred fellow “reservists.”⁵⁰ The young, hot-tempered, and passionate Čatić committed a terrible crime in 1921 and became a murderer. The contemporary press reported the incident as follows: “Abid Čatić, a resident of Budapest who had been married for 13 years but was planning to divorce his wife, intended to marry Jozefin Láng, with whom he had been involved for some time. On the night of April 22, he came home drunk. In the early morning, while he was asleep, Jozefin Láng appeared at his apartment. Čatić sent his wife to the market, and while

⁴⁸ Gardenti, Stefano: Meine Fechtmeister- und trainer. in: <https://www.passionescherma.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/meine-fechtmeister-und-trainer-biographie.pdf>, accessed September 18, 2024.

⁴⁹ On 26 January 2025 I received the two birth certificates in an e-mail message from Tiborné Tóth Marianna Márkus. I thank her for her help and information.

⁵⁰ Zsolt Udvarvölgyi, ‘Csátics Abid, az utolsó bosnyák muszlim, aki a Baross utcai otthon lakója volt’ [Abid Čatić, the last Bosnian Muslim resident of the Elderly Home of Baross Street]. in: *Baross Híradó* [Baross Gazette]. 25/1 (2017), 12.

staying with Jozefin, during a conversation, he asked her if she would love others besides him. The woman replied yes, and repeated her answer when he asked a second time. In a fit of rage, the man drew his revolver and shot her, killing her instantly. Čatić was brought before a summary court.”⁵¹ A later report titled “The Bosniak in love” presented the tragedy in a more detailed and sensational, tabloid style, and also informed about the verdict: After hearing several witnesses, the court sentenced Abid Čatić to one and a half years in prison.⁵²

However, the real adventures for him began only then: The Bosniaks, together with their leader, Hussein Hilmi Durić, who had previously served as a military chief imam, took part in the battles in Western Hungary. They actively participated in the proclamation of the “*Lajtabánság*”, proved to be loyal comrades of Pál Prónay⁵³, and thanks to them, a referendum was held in Sopron and its surroundings, through which the city remained part of Hungary. Čatić was present throughout these events, and later, proud of his religion and nationality as a Bosnian Muslim, he also took part in the founding of the first Hungarian Islamic community in 1931. Durić was the head of the community, but he was also part of its leadership. In the autumn of 1931, the restless Čatić and other Bosniak associates actively participated in a far-right armed coup attempt organized by retired and active soldiers, police officers, and gendarmes, known as the so-called “*Vannay-Schill*” coup, which ultimately failed. Čatić was also accused of conspiracy, but the charges against him were dropped during the trial. In the court documents, his occupation is listed as “agent”. It is assumed that he might have been involved in trade, possibly as a peddler, but no clear sources confirm this. He may have been among those who, even in the 1950s, secretly visited the tomb of Gül Baba to pray. Since Čatić married a Hungarian woman, his children were no longer Muslim. In 1926, he had a daughter named Alija, but sadly, she passed away on January 20, 1927, at the age of seven months. He moved into the Elderly Home at 100 *Baross* Street on February 4, 1977. According to the inventory of his estate, he died practically penniless, leaving behind only one month’s pension, some cash, and clothing. Due to his daughter Zsófia’s illness, his grandchild arranged his burial in the Muslim section of the New Public Cemetery in *Rákoskeresztúr*. There was no one to give him a proper Muslim farewell according to tradition, by reciting the Fatiha (the first chapter of the Quran).⁵⁴

⁵¹ [N. A.], ‘Féltékenységből lelőtte a szeretőjét. (A rögtönítélő bíróság mai tárgyalása)’ [He shot his lover out of jealousy. (Today’s trial at the summary court)]. in: *Kis Újság* [Small Newspaper] 34/110 (1921), 4.

⁵² [N. A.], ‘A szerelmes bosnyák’ [A Bosniak in love]. in: *8 Órai Újság* [8 O’Clock Newspaper] 7/257 (1921), 4.

⁵³ Prónay, Pál (1874-1946?), military officer, Lieutenant Colonel, leader of ‘Lajtabánság’, politician, party leader.

⁵⁴ Z. Udvarvölgyi, *Ibidem*.

Summary

Based on my research so far, I conclude that in the 1950s and 1960s, Bosniaks who remained in Hungary practiced their faith around the Gül Baba Türbe, came here on Fridays to pray, and celebrated major Islamic holidays here - together with other nationalities of the Islamic colony in Budapest, such as Arabs, Turks, Albanians, Afghans. Muslim tourists visiting Budapest, businessmen, students studying here or diplomats working here were also familiar with the Türbe and occasionally visited the building, which was then still in a state of disrepair and neglect.

As I mentioned earlier, the descendants of Bosnian Muslims in Hungary have mostly stopped following the faith of their fathers. This fact is also confirmed by the fact that in 1988, when a handful of Hungarian Muslims, led by Balázs Mihálffy⁵⁵, an agricultural engineer who became the Community's sheikh, started to organise the Hungarian Islamic Community, they were not primarily based on the descendants of Bosniaks. Mihálffy, who became the founding president of the Community, said that he read the names from the headstones of Muslim plot 124 and used them to contact the families. Unfortunately, few took up their faith, so the Community was formed from the Hungarian wives of Arabs living here and from returnees who had converted to Islam as Hungarians on postings to Arab countries.⁵⁶ But it should be noted that there were Bosniaks among them. In her study, Szilvia Köbel quotes the September 1988 Information of the State Office for Church Affairs (*ÁEH*), according to which "in 1931, an autonomous Hungarian Muslim congregation named after Gül Baba was founded, which was forgotten due to changes caused by the Second World War and the extinction of its members. In the last decade, however, Islam has been revived in Hungary. Muslims are basically divided into three groups: Bosniaks and their descendants still living today, those born of mixed marriages, and converts from other religions." According to the *ÁEH*, in September 1988, the number of Muslims holding Hungarian citizenship in Hungary was about 200, including family members, and about 500.⁵⁷ It is also worth noting that Mihálffy had previously painted a more favourable picture of the Bosniaks, stating in 1988 that "after their Community became a legal entity, their membership now numbers several hundred believers. The nucleus is made

⁵⁵ Mihálffy, Balázs (Abdurrahman) (1955-) is a Hungarian agricultural engineer, the first president and sheikh of the Hungarian Islamic Community in 1988, one of the Hungarian translator of the Quran and public writer.

⁵⁶ [N. A], 'Magyar muszlimok. A föld gömbölyű' [Hungarian Muslims. The earth is round]. in: *Reszpublika [Republic]* 1/31 (1994), 68-69.

⁵⁷ Szilvia Köbel, „Nem elsősorban egyházpolitikai kérdésről van szó...” Az iszlám és a pártállam – állambiztonsági iratok tükrében' ["It is not primarily a question of church politics..." Islam and the single-party state - in the light of state security documents]. in: *Betekintő [Insight]* 11/2 (2017), 3.

up of descendants of former Bosnian-Herzegovinian families.”⁵⁸ Unfortunately, since I was born in 1973 and have only been researching the history of Islam in Hungary since 1997, I have not had the opportunity to meet any Bosnian Muslims in Budapest. Therefore, I kindly ask that if anyone - whether in Bosnia and Herzegovina or elsewhere - reads my writing and has information about members of the Bosnian Muslim community who lived in Hungary between the two World Wars, please contact me.

Zaključak

Na osnovu mog dosadašnjeg istraživanja, zaključujem da su Bošnjaci koji su ostali u Mađarskoj tokom 1950-ih i 1960-ih godina praktikovali svoju vjeru oko turbeta Đul Babe, dolazili ovdje petkom na molitvu i tu slavili velike islamske praznike – zajedno s drugim nacionalnostima islamske kolonije u Budimpešti, poput Arapa, Turaka, Albanaca i Afganistanaca. Muslimanski turisti koji su posjećivali Budimpeštu, biznismeni, studenti koji su ovdje studirali ili diplomate koji su tu radili također su bili upoznati s turbetom i povremeno su posjećivali objekat, koji je u to vrijeme još uvijek bio u trošnom i zapuštenom stanju.

Kao što sam ranije spomenuo, potomci bosanskih muslimana u Mađarskoj većinom su prestali praktikovati vjeru svojih očeva. Ovu činjenicu potvrđuje i to što se 1988. godine, kada je nekolicina mađarskih muslimana, predvođena poljoprivrednim inženjerom Balázsom Mihálffyjem (koji je postao šejh zajednice), počela organizovati Islamsku zajednicu Mađarske, oni nisu prvenstveno oslanjali na potomke Bošnjaka. Mihálffy, koji je postao osnivač i predsjednik Zajednice, izjavio je da je imena pročitao sa nadgrobnih spomenika (nišana) na muslimanskoj parceli 124 te ih iskoristio kako bi stupio u kontakt s porodicama. Nažalost, malo ko se vratio vjeri, pa su Zajednicu zapravo formirale mađarske supruge Arapa koji su ovdje živjeli, te povratnici koji su kao Mađari prešli na islam tokom službovanja u arapskim zemljama. Ipak, treba napomenuti da je među njima bilo i Bošnjaka.

U svojoj studiji Szilvia Köbel citira Informaciju Državnog ureda za crkvena pitanja (ÁEH) iz septembra 1988. godine, prema kojoj je „1931. godine osnovana autonomna mađarska muslimanska zajednica nazvana po Đul Babi, koja je pala u zaborav uslijed promjena uzrokovanih Drugim svjetskim ratom i izumiranjem njenih članova. U posljednjoj deceniji, međutim, islam je u Mađarskoj doživio oživljavanje. Muslimani su u osnovi podijeljeni u tri grupe: Bošnjaci i njihovi potomci koji i danas žive ovdje, osobe iz mješovitih brakova te konvertiti iz drugih religija.“ Prema ÁEH-u, u septembru 1988. godine broj

⁵⁸ [szia-]: 'A magyar sejk a hazai iszlám közösségről. Zarándokút Mekkában' [The Hungarian sheikh on the domestic Islamic Community. Pilgrimage in Mecca]. in: *Magyar Hírlap* [Hungarian Newspaper] 21/252 (1988), 6.

muslimana s mađarskim državljanstvom u Mađarskoj bio je oko 200, odnosno oko 500 uključujući članove porodica. Također je vrijedno napomenuti da je Mihálffy prethodno oslikao povoljniju sliku o Bošnjacima, izjavivši 1988. godine da, „nakon što je njihova zajednica postala pravni subjekt, njeno članstvo sada broji nekoliko stotina vjernika. Jezgro čine potomci nekadašnjih bosanskohercegovačkih porodica.“

Nažalost, budući da sam rođen 1973. godine i da historiju islama u Mađarskoj istražujem tek od 1997. godine, nisam imao priliku upoznati nijednog bosanskog muslimana u Budimpešti. Stoga vas ljubazno molim da me, ukoliko iko – bilo u Bosni i Hercegovini ili drugdje – ko pročita ovaj rad, ima informacije o članovima zajednice bosanskih muslimana koji su živjeli u Mađarskoj između dva svjetska rata, kontaktira.

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IN THE FACE OF THE COLD WAR: UNKNOWN POLISH ALBANIAN RELATIONS 1949-1952 IN THE LIGHT OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

Abstract: *The article analyzes the diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Poland and Albania during the years 1949–1952 in the context of the Cold War and the integration of both states within the Eastern Bloc. Starting with the most significant diplomatic events, it discusses the nomination of Mihal Prifti as Albania's Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary to Poland, as well as the appointment of Bolesław Jeleń as the head of the Polish diplomatic mission in Tirana. The personnel of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Albania in Poland included Mihal Prifti, his wife, Llambi Dishnica, Drita Dishnica, and Abdyl Ulqinaku. On the Polish side, the staff consisted of Anna Wróblewska-Jacobson, Antoni Duchnowski, and Stefania Stępnjak. Bolesław Jeleń, head of the Polish diplomatic mission in Tirana, held meetings and talks with Enver Hoxha, Bedri Spahiu, Omer Nishani, Kahreman Ylli, Gogo Nushi, and Tuk Jakova, which are detailed in the article. These discussions focused on key political and economic issues and aimed to strengthen cooperation between Poland and Albania during the Cold War period.*

Key diplomatic discussions involving representatives from both countries were presented, including Llambi Dishnica, Nesti Nase, and Abdyl Ulqinaku from Albania, as well as Polish diplomats such as Wiesław Sobierajski, Dora Lassman, and Feliksa Koniecznyńska. A significant aspect of these discussions was the economic issues, including Albania's acquisition of German ships as war reparations, which aimed to facilitate trade cooperation. On this matter, the Albanian government proposed that Poland purchase ships and barges, emphasizing the need for a prompt response. Additionally, the cancellation of orders for Polish railway wagons, resulting from changes in Albania's economic

development plans, was discussed. Other topics included the planned visit of a trade delegation, delays related to the embassy building, difficulties in obtaining assistance from UNICEF, interest in historical documents in Polish libraries, the arrival of Albanian workers in Poland, internships for Albanian students, and technical cooperation in sectors such as mining, railways, and ports. Issues concerning the transportation of goods, the exchange of embassy buildings, challenges in securing specialists, and matters related to the remuneration of Albanian interns were also raised. The matter of an exit visa for Olga Tadicz, the wife of Albanian student Hamdi Kakuli, who wished to join her husband in Albania, was discussed as well. Other discussions addressed education-related topics, including scholarships for Albanian students in Poland and their vocational internships, as well as cooperation in health care, including the treatment of Albanian officers in Poland.

The article also places particular emphasis on the cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania from 1949 to 1952, which was a significant aspect of the diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries within the Eastern Bloc. This collaboration, despite organizational and logistical challenges, aimed to strengthen ideological ties between the socialist states and promote values associated with socialism and communist ideology. One of the key events in this sphere was the Albanian Polish Friendship Week, held in 1950. This event was organized as part of a broader propaganda strategy to strengthen the alliance between Poland and Albania through artistic and cultural exchange. The main elements of the event included art exhibitions, film screenings, concerts, and other initiatives aimed at introducing Albanian audiences to Polish culture and art. The goal was not only to promote shared values but also to showcase the strength of contemporary socialist culture, which sought to create a positive image of both countries in the eyes of other Eastern Bloc states. While the Friendship Week achieved certain positive outcomes, such as increasing the Albanian public's interest in Polish art, numerous organizational difficulties were also highlighted.

Delays in preparations, difficulties in transporting materials, and limited infrastructural resources encountered by both sides meant that the implementation of the program did not always proceed according to the original plans. Alongside organizing cultural events, both parties sought to intensify cultural exchange at the institutional level. In 1950, a cultural cooperation agreement was signed, aiming to strengthen ties between the two nations through the exchange of literature, art, education, and the organization of joint artistic and scientific initiatives. This agreement served as a significant diplomatic tool that enabled Poles and Albanians to collaborate in the fields of art, education, and material culture. An example of its implementation was the organization of exhibitions in Poland showcasing Albanian art and photography, designed to promote Albanian national identity within the context of socialism. In the field of education, a key aspect of the cooperation was the exchange of scholarships and the organization of programs for Albanian students, who came to Poland to study

in various disciplines, from social sciences to engineering. Thus, cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania from 1949 to 1952 was not only a diplomatic process but also an ideological endeavor aimed at promoting socialist values and bringing the two countries closer within the Eastern Bloc. Despite numerous organizational and logistical challenges, it was a crucial element in strengthening interstate relations, with a noticeable impact on the further development of economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties in the following years.

An analysis of documents from 1950–1952 reveals a series of challenges related to the implementation of trade agreements concerning economic cooperation between Poland and Albania. Despite efforts on both sides, agreements from 1949–1950 faced numerous difficulties, such as delays in the delivery of goods, including bitumen, copper, and railway tracks. Due to changing economic conditions, Albania began considering securing loans from other socialist countries, such as Romania and Czechoslovakia, which offered higher financing amounts. Consequently, economic cooperation between Poland and Albania was hindered, and mutual agreements often required renegotiation, particularly regarding the delivery of goods and project financing. Despite these challenges, Poland and Albania sought to develop cooperation in various areas. Joint initiatives included the exchange of specialists, training Albanian workers and students in Poland, and modernization plans aimed at utilizing Polish expertise in post-war reconstruction efforts in Albania. At the same time, logistical challenges, differences in legal regulations, and changing political conditions were significant barriers to achieving full cooperation. From a broader political and ideological perspective, the diplomatic talks between Poland and Albania from 1949 to 1952 serve as an interesting example of the Eastern Bloc's efforts to strengthen cooperation among its member states to counter Western influences. Economic, cultural, and technical cooperation became not only diplomatic tools but also part of a modernization process aimed at building a unified socialist bloc.

Key words: Cold War, Poland, Albania, diplomacy, economy, culture.

U JEKU HLADNOG RATA: NEPOZNATI POLJSKO-ALBANSKI ODNOSI 1949–1952. U SVJETLU POLJSKIH DIPLOMATSKIH DOKUMENATA

Apstrakt: Ovaj članak analizira diplomatske, ekonomske i kulturne odnose između Poljske i Albanije tokom godina 1949–1952. u kontekstu Hladnog rata i integracije obje države unutar Istočnog bloka. Počevši od najvažnijih diplomatskih događaja, razmatra se imenovanje Mihala Priftija za izvanrednog opunomoćenog ambasadora Albanije u Poljskoj, kao i imenovanje Bolesława Jelenia za šefa poljske diplomatske misije u Tirani. Osoblje Ambasade Narodne Republike Albanije u Poljskoj činili su Mihal Prifti, njegova supruga, Llambi

Dishnica, Drita Dishnica i Abdyl Ulqinaku. Sa poljske strane, osoblje su činili Anna Wróblewska-Jacobson, Antoni Duchnowski i Stefania Stępnjak. Bolesław Jeleń, šef poljske diplomatske misije u Tirani, održavao je sastanke i razgovore s Enverom Hoxhom, Bedrijem Spahiujem, Omerom Nishanijem, Kahremanom Yllijem, Gogom Nushijem i Tukom Jakovom, koji su detaljno predstavljani u članku. Ti razgovori su se fokusirali na ključna politička i ekonomska pitanja s ciljem jačanja saradnje između Poljske i Albanije tokom perioda Hladnog rata.

Ključni diplomatski razgovori između predstavnika obje zemlje su predstavljani, uključujući Llambija Dishnicu, Nestija Nasea i Abdyla Ulqinakua s albanske strane, kao i poljske diplomate poput Wiesława Sobierajskog, Dore Lassman i Felikse Konieczynske. Značajan aspekt ovih razgovora bile su ekonomske teme, uključujući sticanje njemačkih brodova od strane Albanije kao ratne reparacije, što je imalo za cilj olakšanje trgovinske saradnje. Po tom pitanju, albanska vlada je predložila da Poljska kupi brodove i teglenice, naglašavajući potrebu za brzom reakcijom. Također je raspravljano o otkazivanju narudžbi za poljske željezničke vagone, što je bilo rezultat promjena u planovima ekonomskog razvoja Albanije. Ostale teme uključivale su planiranu posjetu trgovačke delegacije, kašnjenja vezana za zgradu ambasade, poteškoće u dobijanju pomoći od UNICEF-a, interesovanje za historijske dokumente u poljskim bibliotekama, dolazak albanskih radnika u Poljsku, stručne prakse za albanske studente i tehničku saradnju u sektorima poput rudarstva, željeznice i luka. Također su pokrenuta pitanja koja se odnose na transport robe, razmjenu zgrada ambasada, izazove u osiguravanju stručnjaka, kao i pitanja vezana za naknade albanskih pripravnika. Razmatrano je i izdavanje izlazne vize za Olgu Tadicz, suprugu albanskog studenta Hamdija Kakulija, koja je željela da mu se pridruži u Albaniji. Ostali razgovori bavili su se temama vezanim za obrazovanje, uključujući stipendije za albanske studente u Poljskoj i njihove stručne prakse, kao i saradnjom u oblasti zdravstva, uključujući liječenje albanskih oficira u Poljskoj.

Članak također stavlja poseban naglasak na kulturnu saradnju između Poljske i Albanije u periodu od 1949. do 1952. godine, koja je predstavljala značajan aspekt diplomatskog približavanja dviju zemalja unutar Istočnog bloka. Ova saradnja, uprkos organizacionim i logističkim izazovima, imala je za cilj jačanje ideoloških veza između socijalističkih država i promoviranje vrijednosti povezanih sa socijalizmom i komunističkom ideologijom. Jedan od ključnih događaja u ovoj oblasti bila je Sedmica albansko-poljskog prijateljstva, održana 1950. godine. Ovaj događaj je organizovan kao dio šire propagandne strategije s ciljem jačanja savezništva između Poljske i Albanije kroz umjetničku i kulturnu razmjenu. Glavni elementi događaja uključivali su izložbe umjetnosti, filmske projekcije, koncerte i druge inicijative usmjerene na upoznavanje albanske publike s poljskom kulturom i umjetnošću. Cilj nije bio samo promovisanje zajedničkih vrijednosti, već i predstavljanje snage savremene socijalističke kulture, koja je težila stvaranju pozitivne slike obje zemlje u očima ostalih država Istočnog bloka. Iako je Sedmica prijateljstva donijela određene

pozitivne rezultate, poput povećanog interesa albanske javnosti za poljsku umjetnost, ukazano je i na brojne organizacione poteškoće.

Kašnjenja u pripremama, poteškoće u transportu materijala i ograničeni infrastrukturni resursi s kojima su se suočavale obje strane doveli su do toga da realizacija programa nije uvijek tekla prema prvobitnim planovima. Pored organizovanja kulturnih događaja, obje strane su nastojale intenzivirati kulturnu razmjenu na institucionalnom nivou. Godine 1950. potpisan je sporazum o kulturnoj saradnji s ciljem jačanja veza između dvije nacije kroz razmjenu književnosti, umjetnosti, obrazovanja i organizaciju zajedničkih umjetničkih i naučnih inicijativa. Ovaj sporazum služio je kao značajan diplomatski alat koji je omogućio Poljacima i Albancima saradnju u oblastima umjetnosti, obrazovanja i materijalne kulture. Primjer njegove realizacije bila je organizacija izložbi u Poljskoj koje su prikazivale albansku umjetnost i fotografiju, sa ciljem promoviranja albanskog nacionalnog identiteta u kontekstu socijalizma. U oblasti obrazovanja, ključni aspekt saradnje bila je razmjena stipendija i organizacija programa za albanske studente, koji su dolazili u Poljsku da studiraju u različitim disciplinama, od društvenih nauka do inženjeringa. Tako je kulturna saradnja između Poljske i Albanije od 1949. do 1952. godine bila ne samo diplomatski proces, već i ideološki poduhvat s ciljem promoviranja socijalističkih vrijednosti i približavanja dviju zemalja unutar Istočnog bloka. Uprkos brojnim organizacionim i logističkim izazovima, bila je ključni element u jačanju međudržavnih odnosa, s vidljivim utjecajem na dalji razvoj ekonomskih, diplomatskih i kulturnih veza u narednim godinama.

Analiza dokumenata iz 1950–1952. godine otkriva niz izazova u vezi s implementacijom trgovinskih sporazuma koji se odnose na ekonomsku saradnju između Poljske i Albanije. Uprkos naporima obje strane, sporazumi iz 1949–1950. godine suočavali su se s brojnim poteškoćama, poput kašnjenja u isporuci robe, uključujući bitumen, bakar i željezničke pruge. Zbog promjenjivih ekonomskih uvjeta, Albanija je počela razmatrati osiguranje kredita od drugih socijalističkih zemalja, poput Rumunije i Čehoslovačke, koje su nudile veće iznose finansiranja. Posljedično, ekonomska saradnja između Poljske i Albanije bila je otežana, a međusobni sporazumi često su zahtijevali ponovnu pregovaranje, posebno u vezi s isporukom robe i finansiranjem projekata. Uprkos tim izazovima, Poljska i Albanija su nastojale razvijati saradnju u različitim oblastima. Zajedničke inicijative uključivale su razmjenu stručnjaka, obuku albanskih radnika i studenata u Poljskoj, te planove za modernizaciju s ciljem korištenja poljskog stručnog znanja u poslijeratnoj obnovi Albanije. Istovremeno, logistički izazovi, razlike u zakonskim regulativama i promjenjivi politički uvjeti bili su značajna prepreka za postizanje potpune saradnje. Sa šire političke i ideološke perspektive, diplomatski pregovori između Poljske i Albanije od 1949. do 1952. godine predstavljaju interesantan primjer napora Istočnog bloka da ojača saradnju među svojim članicama kako bi se suprotstavio zapadnim uticajima. Ekonomska, kulturna i tehnička saradnja

postala je ne samo diplomatski alat, već i dio procesa modernizacije s ciljem izgradnje ujedinjenog socijalističkog bloka.

Ključne riječi: *Hladni rat, Poljska, Albanija, diplomatija, ekonomija, kultura.*

Between Warsaw and Tirana: Establishing Diplomatic Relations and Challenges in the Years 1949-1952

On January 13, 1949, the Legation of People's Albania, acting on the authorization of its government, officially informed the Government of the Republic of Poland of the decision to strengthen diplomatic relations between the two countries. As part of this initiative, Albania planned personnel changes within its diplomatic mission in Poland.¹

The Albanian government approached the Polish authorities with a request to approve the candidacy of Mr. Mihal Prifti for the position of Albania's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Poland. A detailed biography was attached to the official letter. Mihal Prifti, born in 1918 in Gjirokastrë, Albania, received his education in Athens and Rome. From a young age, he was involved in the Albanian liberation movement, and from 1943, he fought in partisan ranks. In 1945, he took on the role of Secretary-General in the Presidium of the Albanian Council of Ministers. Since April 1947, he had served as Albania's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Moscow.²

In connection with the above, the Albanian legation formally requested the Government of the Republic of Poland to approve the appointment of Mr. Prifti as Albania's diplomatic representative in Poland. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after thoroughly reviewing the request, decided to forward it to the Citizen President for his approval,³ without raising any objections to this

¹ Protokół Dyplomatyczny – Poseł Albanii w Moskwie Mihal Prifti proponowany równocześnie na Posła Albanii w Warszawie: Listy uwierzytelniające, korespondencja, notatki, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMSZ), Departament: Protokół Dyplomatyczny z lat 1945 – 1963, Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-16 W-3 T-50, Daty Skrajne: 1949 – 1951, Państwo: Albania – Ludowa Republika Albanii, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Europa Południowa, Europa Wschodnia, 1.

² *Ibidem*, 3-4.

³ *Ibidem*, 6; In the diplomatic context, when the People's Albanian Legation approached the Government of the Republic of Poland with a request to approve Mr. Mihal Prifti's nomination as Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, it is customary for such nominations to be ultimately approved by the head of state, in this case, the President. The request to send the document to the Citizen President aimed at formally obtaining his approval for this nomination, which is a standard procedure in many countries. Approval by the President is important because it emphasizes the rank and significance of the nomination, as well as confirms that the diplomatic representative will act on behalf of the state at the highest level. This process is designed to ensure that all changes in the composition of diplomatic missions are properly coordinated and accepted by the highest authorities.

candidacy. The document was signed by the Secretary General of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Stefan Wierbłowski, underscoring the significance and official nature of this initiative.⁴ On February 3, 1949, following the instructions of the Prime Minister, Ambassador Stefan Wierbłowski was informed that there were no objections to the candidacy of Mr. Mihal Prifti, proposed for the position of Albania's Envoy to Warsaw. The document confirmed the positive stance of the Polish government toward this nomination, reflecting goodwill in the diplomatic relations between Poland and Albania. On February 12, 1949, in Tirana, the Presidium of the People's Assembly of Albania addressed President Bolesław Bierut with a request to approve the nomination of Mihal Prifti. The letter expressed a desire to maintain and strengthen the friendship between the two countries, reflecting an intention to develop bilateral cooperation. The letter also conveyed wishes for Poland's prosperity, indicating a willingness for mutual support.⁵

In response to the nomination, the Polish Minister accepted Mihal Prifti's letters of credence with satisfaction, emphasizing that Poland views the heroic struggles of the Albanian people during the war with great respect. He highlighted that cooperation between the two countries is based on shared aspirations for peace and prosperity. The document also expressed the intention to strengthen the friendship, which held particular significance in the context of post-war stabilization in Europe. During discussions, the importance of the friendship between the nations, reinforced by their shared struggle against foreign occupiers, was underscored. Attention was drawn to the gratitude of both nations toward the Soviet Union, which played a key role in their struggle for freedom and independence. Ultimately, the documents highlighted that both sides were ready for further cooperation, indicating the ambitions of both governments to strengthen international relations and their shared pursuit of development and peace in the region.⁶

Analyzing the appointment of Mihal Prifti as the Extraordinary Envoy to Poland reveals several key reasons and contexts that reflect the complex political situation in post-war Europe. Prifti was a figure with considerable experience, both in the struggle for independence and in government administration. His involvement in the Albanian resistance movement and the roles he held in government administration, such as Secretary General in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of Albania and his work in Moscow, made him a suitable candidate to represent Albania in Poland. Both countries, situated within the sphere of influence of the USSR, sought to stabilize their diplomatic relations. However, these relations were rooted in the context of ideological dominance. Communism, as the system of governance in both states, introduced elements that restricted their autonomy and independence in decision-making. Despite

⁴ Protokół Dyplomatyczny – Posel Albanii w Moskwie Mihal Prifti..., op.cit, 6.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 7-8.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 9-12.

efforts to achieve stability, the cooperation was burdened with expectations from Moscow, which could lead to conflicts of interest in the future. Consequently, it is difficult to speak of full trust between Albania and Poland; their relations were a complex web of interactions where pragmatism often had to give way to ideological dictates.

In April 1949, Albanian envoy Mihal Prifti arrived in Warsaw from Moscow, accompanied by his wife and secretary. They were welcomed at the Warsaw airport by Llambi Dishnica, Secretary of the Albanian Legation, along with Angoni Murati, an official from the Albanian Ministry of Trade, as well as a group of Albanian students studying in Poland. Prifti was taken to the Bristol Hotel, where two rooms had been reserved for him. The following day, his visit to the Director of the Diplomatic Protocol was scheduled for 12:00. Prifti had previously been in Poland, participating in the Wrocław Congress and the Unification Congress. He had direct contacts with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Polish diplomats. The Albanian Legation in Warsaw also included Llambi Dishnica, who had previously been chargé d'affaires in Bucharest and participated in the Albanian partisan movement during World War II. Additionally, the legation was supported by Angoni Murat, a commercial attaché from the Ministry of Trade in Tirana.⁷

During his stay in Warsaw, Prifti signaled difficulties related to finding a suitable premises for the legation and housing for its representatives. Temporary accommodation at the Polonia Hotel was only a temporary solution to this problem. The ideal solution for the Albanian diplomatic mission was to rent a space that would house both the legation's offices and the residence for the chargé d'affaires. During his stay, Prifti was also looking for a way to settle his dollar-based financial resources, expressing uncertainty about potential agreements between Poland and Albania regarding financial settlements. Until a response was received, he requested the possibility of obtaining credit for his expenses at the hotel. Prifti planned to present his letters of credence in the coming days, and his return to Moscow was scheduled for early May 1949.⁸

In August 1949, the Government of the Republic of Poland decided to appoint Bolesław Jeleń as the Legation Counselor in Tirana. This important event aimed to strengthen the friendly relations between Poland and Albania. As Charge d'Affaires, Jeleń was tasked with leading the Polish legation and representing the interests of the Republic of Poland in the Albanian capital.⁹ In

⁷ Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi w Warszawie, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-17 T-148, Daty Skrajne: 1949-1958, Państwo: Albania, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Środkowa, 2-4.

⁸ *Ibidem*, 4-5.

⁹ Protokół Dyplomatyczny – Utworzenie Poselstwa Polski w Tiranie. Bolesław Jeleń, Chargé D'Affaires en pied, Listy wprowadzające, korespondencja, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMSZ), Departament: Protokół Dyplomatyczny z lat 1945 – 1963, Sygnatura

the context of post-war Europe, this nomination was significant not only diplomatically but also symbolically, demonstrating Poland's desire to build positive ties with other countries. The new challenges and opportunities for cooperation became crucial for the stabilization and development of international relations during this period. Jeleń's appointment also reflected the broader policy of the government, which sought to increase its presence in the region and strengthen Poland's position as an active participant in international affairs.

On August 31, 1949, Bolesław Jeleń, chargé d'affaires of the People's Republic of Poland in Tirana, sent a confidential report to Ambassador Stefan Wierbłowski, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, detailing the discussions held in Albania from August 11 to 29, 1949. The document contains a detailed account of the initial diplomatic contacts with representatives of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰

Jeleń reports that upon his arrival in Tirana, he was kindly welcomed by the head of protocol at the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Evangjeli. On August 13, he held a meeting with Manush Myfti, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was managing the ministry in place of Enver Hoxha, who simultaneously held the positions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The conversation, which lasted 45 minutes, was conducted in French. During the meeting, Myfti expressed his satisfaction with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Albania, emphasizing that cooperation between socialist countries would contribute to strengthening the camp of democracy and peace. Jeleń shared these views, also expressing the sympathy of the Polish people towards Albania and recognition of its political and economic achievements. Myfti broadly outlined the internal situation in Albania, highlighting the assistance the country receives from the USSR and other socialist states. The conversation was friendly in nature, although the need to use an interpreter somewhat limited its fluency. In the end, Myfti assured that the ministry was making efforts for the Polish diplomatic mission to begin its operations as soon as possible, asking for understanding regarding the local difficulties.¹¹

In the report of the Polish representative's visit to the Albanian Prime Minister, Enver Hoxha, on August 17, several key elements can be seen that illustrate the relations between Poland and Albania at the time, as well as the political and economic situation in Albania. Hoxha expressed particular appreciation for the support Albania had received from Poland, emphasizing the importance of trade credits that helped stabilize the country's economy after the

Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-16 W-3 T-46, Daty Skrajne: 1949, Państwo: Albania – Ludowa Republika Albanii, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Europa Południowa, Europa Wschodnia, 1-3.

¹⁰ Notatki z rozmów polskich dyplomatów w Tiranie, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-17 T-147, Daty Skrajne: 1949-1960, Państwo: Albania, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Środkowa, 2.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 3-4.

end of World War II. His remarks primarily focused on Albania's role in the bloc of socialist states and the alliance with the USSR, which Hoxha regarded as a crucial element for the survival and development of the Albanian state. During the conversation, Prime Minister Hoxha addressed the internal situation in Albania, highlighting the country's economic and social backwardness, as well as the challenges faced by the young working class. He also added that Albania constantly had to fend off provocations from Yugoslavia and Greece, particularly attacks by monarcho-fascist Greek forces on the country's borders. Hoxha emphasized the determination of the Albanian people in defending their sovereignty and the bonds of friendship with the USSR, which ensure stability in the region. The entire visit took place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and confirmed the close diplomatic relations between Albania and Poland.¹²

On August 20, Bolesław Jeleń met with Dr. Omer Nishani, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, accompanied by Deputy Minister Vasil Nathanaili. The conversation was conducted in French, which Nishani spoke fluently. Nishani, described as an old Albanian democrat, had studied in several European countries and had been in political exile for over 20 years. During the meeting, he emphasized Albania's gratitude to the USSR.¹³

On August 22, 1949, an important meeting took place between Bolesław Jeleń and Bedri Spahiu, the Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of Albania, at the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Party. Spahiu, then 41 years old, was a key figure in Albania's new political order, holding several high-ranking positions, including Minister of Reconstruction and Prosecutor General. The conversation lasted approximately an hour and occurred in a cordial atmosphere, despite Albania's challenging circumstances at the time. Spahiu, proficient in French but struggling with Italian, addressed current political and economic issues during the discussion. It is worth noting that his position aligned closely with the political line represented by Enver Hoxha, suggesting strong ideological and organizational ties within the Communist Party. Spahiu addressed issues related to external threats, particularly in the context of British military landing attempts and Albania's increasing isolation due to Yugoslavia's aggressive policies. His assessment of the situation demonstrated determination to maintain party unity and stability in the face of challenges the country was facing. He mentioned technical support from the USSR and other People's Democracies, highlighting the international context of Albania's postwar politics.¹⁴

Analyzing this meeting, it becomes evident that it was crucial for understanding the internal dynamics of power in Albania and the challenges it faced in the immediate post-World War II period. The image of Albania as a country resisting imperialist influences while striving to maintain independence

¹² Notatki z rozmów polskich dyplomatów w Tiranie, op.cit, 5-6.

¹³ *Ibidem*, 6-7.

¹⁴ Notatki z rozmów polskich dyplomatów w Tiranie..., op.cit, 7-9.

becomes clearer, revealing how the political elites of the time sought to consolidate power in the face of external threats. Analyzing this situation provides deeper insight into how ideology influenced political decisions and the mechanisms employed to maintain power during times of crisis. This meeting also sheds light on the complexity of the relationship between political practice and ideological convictions during the Cold War era.

Kahreman Ylli, the Minister of Education, met with Bolesław Jeleń at the ministry headquarters, and the conversation was conducted in fluent French, which Ylli had mastered. The discussion revealed that he had spent time in France before the war, where he studied in Lyon, possibly indicating his involvement in the communist movement. Between 1946 and 1947, he served as Albania's envoy to Paris, which allowed him to establish connections with Minister Skrzyszewski and Ambassador Putrament.¹⁵ This meeting highlights the complexity of diplomatic relations and the influence of the historical context on cooperation between Poland and Albania during this period.

Gogo Nushi, the Minister of Industry, met with Bolesław Jeleń on August 26 at the Ministry of Industry headquarters. The conversation was conducted in French, without an interpreter. Nushi, approximately 36 years old, came from a working-class background. Since 1943, he had served as the Secretary of the District Committee in Tirana, and in 1949, he joined the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labour. Before the war, he worked in Villeurbanne, where he came into contact with the communist movement.¹⁶ During the discussions, the Albanian representatives expressed interest in Poland's achievements, but no specific proposals regarding future Polish-Albanian relations were presented.¹⁷

The document dated December 23, 1949, issued by the Legation of the People's Republic of Albania, contains significant information regarding the composition of the legation's staff and their roles in the context of Polish-Albanian diplomatic relations.

- Mihal Prifti – Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, played a key role in representing Albania in Poland. His duties included negotiations and maintaining relations with the Polish government. The documents noted his absence, which may indicate challenges related to diplomacy during that period.
- Mrs. Prifti, the wife of Mihal Prifti, was also mentioned; however, her absence may suggest that both had to contend with challenges related to their roles.
- Llambi Dishnica – Charge d'Affaires ad interim, temporarily in charge of the legation's affairs in the absence of the ambassador. His duties included managing daily diplomatic matters and maintaining contact

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 9.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 10

¹⁷ Notatki z rozmów polskich dyplomatów w Tiranie..., op.cit, 10-11.

with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dishnica played an important role in the context of the legation's activities, particularly in crisis situations.

- Drita Dishnica, the wife of Llambi Dishnica, may have played a supporting role in the legation's activities. In the diplomatic context, the wives of diplomats often participated in social life.¹⁸
- Abdyl Ulqinaku – Chancellor¹⁹, who served as the secretary at the legation. He was responsible for the administration and organization of the daily functioning of the diplomatic mission.

In the section regarding the Polish staff, the following were listed:

- Anna Wroblewska-Jacobson – typist and translator, responsible for documentation and translations, which were essential for effective communication with Polish institutions.
- Antoni Duchnowski – driver and bailiff, responsible for transportation and the daily logistical affairs of the legation. His role, although less visible, was crucial for ensuring operational efficiency.
- Stefania Stępnjak – the person responsible for cleaning, highlighting the need to ensure appropriate working conditions at the diplomatic mission.²⁰

This document, in addition to outlining the composition of the staff, illustrates the complexity of diplomatic relations in postwar Europe. The individuals listed had a significant impact on shaping Polish-Albanian relations, and their roles, both formal and informal, were crucial to the functioning of the legation. In a historical context, this staff listing provides valuable information about the organization and operations of legations during the difficult postwar period.²¹

Documents from the Polish Legation in Tirana from September and December 1949 highlight the complexity and difficulties associated with the functioning of the Polish diplomatic mission in Albania after the end of World War II. The correspondence from Chargé d'Affaires Bolesław Jeleń indicates significant delays regarding the legation's premises and communication problems

¹⁸ Protokół Dyplomatyczny – Poseł Albanii w Moskwie Mihal Prifti..., op.cit, 13-14.

¹⁹ The term *chancelier* (in Polish, *kanclerz* or *kancelarz*) in the diplomatic context refers to a person holding an administrative role in a diplomatic mission, such as an embassy or legation. In the Polish diplomatic system, the chancellor often performs a role similar to that of a secretary, with responsibilities including managing administration, organizing daily operations, and providing support to the head of the diplomatic mission. In short, *chancelier* can be considered a term that encompasses the functions of both a chancellor and a secretary in a diplomatic context, with an emphasis on the administrative aspects of the mission's activities. In diplomatic documents, it is often used interchangeably with *secretary* or *administrator*, depending on the specifics of the country and context.

²⁰ Protokół Dyplomatyczny – Poseł Albanii w Moskwie Mihal Prifti..., op.cit: p.14.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 14.

with Warsaw, which is particularly important in the context of the geopolitical tensions of the time. In the first document from September 29, 1949, Jeleń expresses frustration due to the lack of progress on the location of the mission. The promised deadlines for the mission's establishment were repeatedly postponed, which resulted in the legation staff being forced to live in a hotel, affecting their daily functioning and ability to carry out diplomatic tasks. It is worth noting that during this period, communication with Warsaw was crucial, and its absence posed a significant obstacle to the mission's operations. Jeleń, aware of the growing problems, decided to demand a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which reflects his determination to obtain concrete information and resolve the situation. His account reveals not only personal discouragement but also a broader political context in which Poland sought to strengthen its presence in Albania in the face of the changing international situation.²²

In the second document from December 3, 1949, Jeleń informs about the commencement of renovations on the building that was to house the legation. He highlights the urgency of establishing radio and cipher communication, which was crucial for the functioning of the mission during this period. He also mentions the legation's financial situation, which was largely resolved by opening an account at the Bank of Albania.²³

Both the first and second parts of the correspondence reveal the turbulence and challenges faced by Polish diplomats. The issues with financing the renovation of the legation's premises and the financial obligations incurred due to the building's rental illustrate the difficulties diplomatic missions encountered amid the political and economic instability of the region. In the analyzed documents, it is evident how local conditions influenced Polish foreign policy and how diplomats had to deal with daily challenges, often of an administrative and financial nature. This correspondence serves as a valuable source material, shedding light not only on the personal struggles of diplomats but also on the broader political contexts in which Polish missions operated in Albania.

On May 19, 1950, Bolesław Jeleń held a conversation with Tuk Jakova, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Ministry of Industry of Albania. During the conversation, Jakova requested the arrival of a group of officials to Poland, indicating a desire to strengthen international cooperation and develop contacts between Poland and Albania. Jakova explained how the Albanian government views its foreign connections, highlighting difficulties in maritime communication through Trieste. He emphasized that such a route could not be

²² Ułatwienia dotyczące budynku-siedziby placówki dyplomatycznej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w Tiranie, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-17 T-149, Daty Skrajne: 1949-1953, Państwo: Albania, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Środkowa, 1.

²³ *Ibidem*, 2.

considered due to concerns about American intervention. He mentioned an incident involving an Albanian sailor who sustained a minor injury on the way to Trieste. After being taken to the hospital, he was denied immediate assistance, and after returning the following day, he did not reappear. The Albanian government suspected that the sailor might have been abducted by the American police or at their behest. Jakova pointed out that maritime communication should be conducted through the Black Sea to avoid potential threats related to American presence in the region. In the context of the discussed situation, Jakova showed Jeleń the number of the newspaper *Zëri i Popullit*. Referring to the international situation, Jakova expressed the view that *we have healthy nerves and there is no chance that we will allow them to be disturbed*.²⁴ The analysis of this statement reveals the determination of the Albanian government in the face of international tensions and its efforts to defend the country's sovereignty. Jakov's words suggest the belief that Albania, despite the difficult geopolitical situation, is capable of maintaining internal stability. These events illustrate the complexity of Albanian-Polish relations and reflect the broader context of the Cold War, in which Albania sought to preserve its independence amid the growing dominance of Western powers.

The discussions held by Aleksander Skrzynia, the Polish chargé d'affaires in Albania from 1952 to 1954, with representatives of the Albanian government, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Mihal Prifti and Minister of Trade Wasil Kati, reveal the practical difficulties and expectations associated with developing cooperation within the Eastern Bloc. Deputy Minister Prifti emphasized the Albanian side's hopes for intensifying diplomatic relations and expressed the expectation that Poland would send a delegation to the Second Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour.²⁵ The desire for the presence of a Polish envoy in Albania underscores the Albanian diplomacy's drive to strengthen its international position and maintain prestige within the socialist bloc. The Albanians were clearly determined to achieve an appropriate level of representation in their relations with Poland that would reflect their importance. On the other hand, the conversation with Minister of Trade Wasil Kati reveals how economic challenges impacted bilateral relations. Albania was reliant on imports of raw materials and equipment from Poland, which was associated with significant logistical and administrative issues. Minister Kati expressed dissatisfaction with the delayed delivery of explosives, carbide, and compressors, which were crucial for the implementation of Albanian infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Mati River. He emphasized the need for a quicker response from the Polish government to avoid delaying construction and mining work in Albania. It is also worth noting that the dialogue addressed the form of communication and the level of diplomatic intervention. The Albanian side preferred that economic matters be discussed at

²⁴ Notatki z rozmów polskich dyplomatów w Tiranie..., op.cit, 13-14.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 28.

the ambassadorial level rather than through a trade representative.²⁶ This suggests some tensions related to the effectiveness of this cooperation, which from a historian's perspective shows that Albania – largely dependent on the support of its allies – was trying to secure as broad an engagement from Poland as possible.

In conclusion, these documents portray Polish-Albanian relations as constructive yet full of challenges. The cooperation between Poland and Albania stemmed not only from ideological solidarity within the socialist bloc but also from the practical needs of both countries, with Albania requiring economic and technical support, while Poland viewed these relations as an opportunity to consolidate its influence in the region.

Poland and Albania's Post-War Cooperation: An Analysis of Selected Diplomatic Conversations from 1949-1952

Between 1949 and 1952, relations between Poland and Albania developed in the context of post-war challenges and economic changes. During diplomatic conversations, both sides took actions aimed at strengthening cooperation in trade, education, and culture, adapting to current needs and opportunities. The following analysis of selected meetings demonstrates how both countries navigated the new reality, striving to achieve common interests and build long-term relations.

On May 25, 1949, a conversation took place between Llambi Dishenica²⁷ a representative of Albania, and Wiesław Sobierajski,²⁸ representing Poland. The conversation focused on trade agreements and the issue of canceling orders for wagons. Dishenica informed that in January 1949, contracts were signed under the trade agreement regarding the supply of Polish wagons, which highlights activity in the trade sector. However, due to changes in Albania's economy, there arose a need to cancel orders for tanker wagons. This indicates a dynamic economic situation and the difficulties faced by Albania. The approval to cancel the orders for coal wagons and freight wagons may indicate the pragmatism of the Albanian side, which was forced to adjust its orders to the economic reality. Additionally, Dishenica informed about the rental of part of the premises for the embassy's

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 30.

²⁷ Llambi Dishenica was a member of the Albanian legation in Warsaw, formerly the First Secretary, and chargé d'affaires in Bucharest.

²⁸ After the war, Wiesław Sobierajski joined the service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland. He was a member of the Party Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1949. He was also a member of the Slavic Committee established in Poland in 1945. In 1947, he served as the head of the Southeast Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later, he was arrested and became a political prisoner from 1950 to 1955. From April 26, 1963, to February 13, 1968, he served as the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Poland in Romania.

office, which shows the development of the diplomatic mission and the desire to maintain effective communication.²⁹

On July 12, 1949, a conversation took place in which Dishnica and Sobierajski, representing Poland, participated. The topics of this conversation concerned several important issues related to the trade relations and economies of both countries. The first point of discussion was the issue of Albania's acquisition of German ships as part of war reparations. The Albanian government agreed to sell ships and barges (remorque) to Poland in foreign currency, suggesting that Albania was seeking ways to secure funds during the difficult post-war period. The request for a specific response from the Polish government emphasizes the urgency and significance of this matter for Albania. Additionally, Albania wanted to sell Poland another small ship, indicating further trade opportunities and a willingness to cooperate.³⁰

Another important point of the conversation was the request to cancel the contract regarding the orders for wagons. Changes in Albania's economy and the new development plan no longer anticipated the expansion of the railway system on the scale originally planned. The cancellation of the last order for tanker wagons may reflect the adjustment to the changing economic realities and challenges that Albania faced at the time. Finally, the conversation addressed the issue of the lack of accommodation for Josel Stura, which may indicate organizational problems within the Albanian embassy. Dishnica informs that the Hungarian envoy had already vacated his previous residence, suggesting that a rotation in the diplomatic staff was taking place.³¹

On August 6, 1949, another conversation took place, this time between Llambi Dishnica and Dora Lassman,³² also representing Poland. The main topics included the delivery of radio equipment and the issue of scholarships for Albanian students. The first point was the announcement of the delivery of a radio set, which may indicate the growing importance of communication in the diplomatic relations between Albania and Poland. Cooperation in the field of communication technology can be interpreted as an element of strengthening relations and seeking common interests. Another important point was the Ministry of Education's decision to increase the number of scholarships for Albanian students by an additional five places. Such decisions are crucial for the cultural and educational development of relations between countries. The increase in the number of scholarships may indicate Poland's willingness to support Albanian youth and build long-term relations. The final part of the

²⁹ Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi..., op.cit, 8.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, 6

³¹ *Ibidem*, 6.

³² Dora Lassman was a counselor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and head of the Main Chancellery, as well as the head of the Danube Department in Department I, starting on February 1, 1949. Dziennik Urzędowy: Ministerstwa spraw zagranicznych, Warszawa 31 marca 1949 r, Nr. 2, 2.

conversation concerned the organization of a new headquarters for the Albanian mission in Warsaw, reflecting further development of the diplomatic infrastructure. The address of the building was discussed in detail, emphasizing the importance of the embassy's smooth operation for relations between the countries.³³

On April 26, 1950, a conversation took place between Dishnica and Dora Lassman. The topics of the conversation included an invitation to a ceremony and cultural matters related to the presentation of Albanian culture. Lassman informed about the invitation extended to a representative of the Steelworkers' Union to attend the ceremony, which shows a desire to engage in international events. Assigning this role to a union representative suggests that Poland was trying to build relations not only at the government level but also on a social one.³⁴ Additionally, in the context of the Albanians' request for permission to set up a display case, Lassman suggested that Albanian photographs could be featured in exhibitions dedicated to countries of people's democracy.³⁵ This shows Poland's openness to promoting Albanian culture, which could contribute to strengthening relations between the countries.

In conclusion, all the conversations illustrate the complexity and dynamics of the relations between Poland and Albania in 1949-1950, as well as demonstrate the pragmat.

Analyzing the conversations between Dishni, who represented the People's Republic of Albania, and Sobierajski, the representative of the Republic of Poland, in May and June 1950, one can observe that they were complex and covered many important political, cultural, and educational issues. These conversations required a detailed discussion of the context, facts, and personal aspects, which highlights the complexity of the relations between these two countries.

Here is a detailed analysis of each of the topics discussed:

1. Request for the provision of the statutes of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Poland

Dishnica, as a representative of the Albanian government, made a request for the statutes of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Poland to be provided.³⁶ In the context of Albania, which in the 1950s was under the strong influence of a communist regime and pursued a policy of atheization, such information might have been essential for understanding how Poland, a country with strong Catholic traditions, managed church influences within a socialist system. Gathering

³³ Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi..., op.cit, 7.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, 9.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, 9.

³⁶ Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi..., op.cit, 10.

information on legal regulations concerning religious activities could have been useful for the Albanian government in formulating its policy toward religion.

2. *Scholarships for Albanian students*

Dishnica raised the issue of scholarship payments for Albanian students in Poland, pointing out that in the previous year (1949), scholarships were not yet handled by the Ministry of Education but by various institutions, which led to a lack of uniform practices in payments. The amount of the scholarship was 15,000 zł, and the Albanian government provided an additional 1,000 zł to the scholarship holders. The internships that students undertook during the summer holidays were paid and amounted to 9,000–10,000 zł per month.³⁷ The opportunity to undertake internships in Poland and access scholarships was an important element of educational cooperation between Albania and Poland, highlighting the significance of education in the professional development of young people from Albania.

3. *Invitation of a journalist to the Albanian Parliamentary elections*

Dishnica made a request for journalists to be invited to cover the Albanian Parliamentary elections, which took place on May 28, 1950. He noted that the government of the People's Republic of Albania wanted a journalist affiliated with the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) to be among those invited.³⁸ This indicates an attempt to strengthen relations between the two countries and the need to promote the image of Albania.

4. *Request for materials on the fight against illiteracy*

In the context of the fight against illiteracy, Dishnica requested materials that could serve as a model for the Albanian authorities.³⁹ Poland, which in the 1950s was conducting intensive efforts in this field, could have served as a model for Albania, whose government also wanted to reduce the illiteracy rate. Cooperation on this issue indicates a desire to exchange experiences and methods, which could have contributed to improving the educational situation in Albania.

5. *Intervention regarding summer internships for students*

Dishnica requested the intervention of the Ministry of Education so that four Albanian students from the Mining Academy in Kraków could undertake internships at the „*Nowy Orzeł Biały*“ metal mines, which were not included on the ministry's list.⁴⁰ This shows how important professional internships were for technical and vocational education in Albania. Approval for internships at Polish

³⁷ Ibidem, 10.

³⁸ Ibidem, 11.

³⁹ Ibidem, 11.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, 11.

mines could have contributed to improving the students' qualifications and their future career prospects.

6. *Health issues of sick officers and soldiers*

Dishnica also addressed issues related to accommodation and healthcare for 60 sick officers and soldiers, highlighting concern for the military personnel and the desire for their rehabilitation. He requested information on the locations where the sick would be placed and sought doctors' opinions on their health condition. The reported health issues, such as tuberculosis (20 sick), wounds (20 injured), and convalescence (20 convalescents), were an important topic, especially in the context of post-war difficulties in treatment and rehabilitation.⁴¹

7. *Film cooperation*

Dishnica addressed the issue of signing an agreement on film cooperation between Poland and Albania. He emphasized the need to establish the terms of the agreement, which could have been important for cultural exchange between the two countries.⁴² Film as a medium could have been used to promote socialist ideas and strengthen cultural ties.

8. *Trips of Albanian students to Albania*

Dishnica also addressed the issue of 46 Albanian students residing in Poland, 22 of whom were to travel to Albania. As a result, two key issues arose: summer scholarships for the remaining 24 students and matters related to their stay. Scholarships were determined based on practical needs and were to be paid for 10 months. Dishnica assured that efforts were being made to organize appropriate conditions for those who would not be participating in paid internships. However, issues related to visa and administrative regulations remained a significant challenge for the mobility of Albanian students.⁴³

The discussions between Dishnica and Sobierajski in May and June of 1950 reveal the complex relations between Poland and Albania during the Cold War. The topics raised by Dishnica, including education, the fight against illiteracy, health, and cultural cooperation, highlight the Albanian government's efforts to modernize and strengthen ties with Poland. Additionally, the political and social context of the 1950s emphasized the difficulties and challenges both countries faced, which influenced the further development of their international relations.

⁴¹ Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi..., op.cit, 12.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 12.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, 12.

The conversation between Nasti Nase⁴⁴ and Feliksa Koniecznyńska⁴⁵ on December 27, 1950, reveals that a trade delegation with Deputy Prime Minister Spiro Koleka could arrive in Warsaw on December 29. Nase also discussed the issue of sending Polish specialists to Albania and the delay related to the building he intended to move into on January 1, 1951. Nasti Nase informed that Albania had been receiving aid from UNICEF until 1950, and the head of the delegation was the American Waling. Relations with Waling encountered difficulties, resulting in the suspension of aid. Nase pointed out the possibility of resuming support and that Albania was considering nominating a Pole, Szewlewski, as the new head of the delegation. However, UNICEF informed that Szewlewski was no longer available for cooperation. In light of this situation, Albania faces a difficult position, as neither Czechoslovakia nor the USSR currently have representatives in UNICEF, which may force the country to abandon further assistance. Nase is seeking an answer regarding Szewlewski's availability.⁴⁶

On March 22, 1951, Feliksa Koniecznyńska had a conversation with Abdyl Ulqinaku, the Albanian representative, who pointed out the Albanian side's interest in historical documents stored in Polish libraries and museums. Ulqinaku also inquired whether Poland had come across any traces of two Albanians who went missing during World War II in Germany, which suggests a desire to obtain information about those who died or went missing during the war. Additionally, Ulqinaku informed about the planned arrival of 47 Albanian workers to Poland for training, reflecting the growing cooperation between Poland and Albania in the areas of labor exchange and vocational training aimed at the reconstruction and modernization of both countries after the war.⁴⁷

In a conversation on March 30, 1951, Dora Lassman informed Nasti Nase that the Polish authorities had agreed to accept 47 Albanian trainees. Referring to the Albanian request for assistance in appointing a UNICEF delegate in Albania, she conveyed that the citizen Szawleski was not being considered. She also added that the issue of the Albanian legation building would be resolved.⁴⁸ In August 1951, an important conversation took place between Eufrozyna Paduchowa and Nasti Nase. Nase, addressing the issue of the technical cooperation protocol, expressed the need to expand cooperation not only to specialists from the mining sector but also to railways and ports. Paduchowa informed about the departure of engineer Lasok, the director of the Stalin Mine, and Nase added that at the beginning of the school year, another group of 12

⁴⁴ Nasti Nase (born April 14, 1922, in Korça, died February 11, 1995, in Tirana) was an Albanian diplomat and intelligence officer, serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1966 to 1982. From 1950 to 1952, he worked at the Albanian Embassy in Poland.

⁴⁵ Feliksa Koniecznyńska, junior clerk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed a clerk on February 1, 1949.

⁴⁶ Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi..., op.cit., 23-24.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, 25-26.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 29.

students from Albania would arrive in Poland. Nase also requested regulations regarding official passports and information about Polish regulations concerning prostitution. He also mentioned plans for Nani Salata, the Albanian trade attaché, to visit Poland.⁴⁹ On September 27, 1951, Nesti Nase informed Eufrozyna Paduchowa about the difficulties in trade exchange between Poland and Albania. Albania had ordered 60 wagons from Poland, worth 1 million rubles. However, due to a lack of transport capacity, it was decided to ship them on the Polish ship *Kościuszko* for a cost of 500,000 rubles. The next day, Nase received information from Metalexport that the transport cost had risen to 1.8 million rubles, and failure to accept this amount by September 29 would result in the cancellation of the transaction. Albania was unable to cover this sum, but MHZ claimed that the 1.8 million rubles had been stated from the beginning, with the 500,000 rubles intended as a deposit.⁵⁰ In a conversation on October 8, 1951, Stanisław Południak⁵¹ informed the Secretary of the Albanian Legation, Abdyl Ulqinaku, that the Albanian students Theodos Karlineri and Edibe Olvi, who were completing their summer internships in the 4th year of the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Poznań, would not receive additional remuneration. This decision was justified by the fact that they were receiving a scholarship during the internship period.⁵²

Based on a conversation on April 26, 1952, between Romaniecki and Ulqinaku, an interesting situation regarding Hamdi Kakuli, an Albanian student, is revealed. Kakuli married Olga Tadicz, a Yugoslav citizen registered in Kraków at Raymonta Street, Academic House 17. Olga Tadicz studied in Kraków and, after the Cominform revolution in 1948, submitted a declaration of her intention to stay in Poland. After completing his studies, Hamdi Kakuli decided to return to Albania, while his wife, along with their one-year-old child, wished to join him. Ulqinaku pointed out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) was considering the possibility of issuing an exit visa for Tadicz. An important aspect of this situation was also that the ship to Albania was set to depart in ten days, which presented the family with the urgent task of securing the necessary documents within a short timeframe. Additionally, two students were scheduled to travel on the same ship, and they offered to assist Tadicz with her journey and

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, 36.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, 36-37.

⁵¹ Stanisław Południak started working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw on February 1, 1949, and by April of that year, he was sent to the Polish Military Mission (PMW) in Berlin. In August 1949, he was transferred to the Polish Consulate in Baden-Baden as a junior clerk, from where he returned to the PMW in Berlin in November 1950. From 1951, he worked in the Department IV of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in 1954, he became the Second Secretary of the Military Mission in Berlin. In 1958, he was appointed head of the department. In October 1960, he was appointed head of the Central European Department. From August 1961 to June 1963, he served as the Consul General of the People's Republic of Poland in Brussels.

⁵² Notatki z rozmów prowadzonych przez polskich dyplomatów z dyplomatami albańskimi akredytowanymi..., op.cit, 40.

her child.⁵³ This situation not only illustrates the personal dilemmas of individuals in the context of migration but also reflects the complex political and social reality of that period. Migrations, regulated by the authorities of the time, were crucial to the relations between Poland and Albania, as well as to the functioning of the Albanian student community in Poland.

In a conversation on May 13, 1952, Ulqinaku discussed with Romaniecki the arrival of an Albanian artistic troupe in Poland from July 18 to August 2, as well as the invitation for Polish artists to visit Albania. He also addressed the issue of exchanging buildings, suggesting a swap for the vacant building at Al. Róż 3. Romaniecki promised to forward the request to the Ministry. Finally, they mentioned the upcoming congresses in Albania and the delay in the arrival of Ambassador Paapi to Poland due to his participation in the Congress of the Albanian Labour Party.⁵⁴

In a conversation on September 19, 1952, Ambassador Petro Papi addressed Minister Stanisław Skrzyszewski with several issues regarding Polish-Albanian cooperation. Papi first inquired about the response to the letter concerning the trade agreement for 1953-55. Skrzyszewski informed him that the letter was under consideration. Papi then raised the issue of sending specialists to Albania, pointing out that of the 30 specialists needed, Poland could provide only 18. The Minister promised to take action on this matter, despite staffing difficulties. Later in the conversation, Papi discussed the situation of Albanian interns in Poland, who were employed in various establishments, including the railway and the „Baildon” factory. He pointed out the differences in wages and work experience, asking for the issue of salaries to be resolved so that all interns would have the same status and pay. Skrzyszewski committed to intervening on this matter. Papi also raised the issue of the embassy building, proposing its exchange for a larger one due to the needs of the mission. Skrzyszewski highlighted the general housing difficulties in Warsaw and the lack of available buildings that met the embassy's requirements. He suggested that the easiest solution might be to build a new facility with the help of Polish authorities. In response to the urgency of the matter, Papi requested permission for an internal renovation of the current building, which was approved, provided a specific project was submitted. Finally, Papi asked for assistance in obtaining materials for windows, which was also to be considered.⁵⁵ The entire conversation reflects the complex relations between Poland and Albania and the challenges both countries faced in the post-war period.

Diplomatic conversations between Poland and Albania from 1949 to 1952 are historically significant as they reveal the dynamics of relations between two countries that, despite geographical and cultural differences, found common interests in the context of the Cold War. Analyzing these interactions, it is evident

⁵³ *Ibidem*, 42.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, 43.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, 44.

that Poland, as a country with a strong industrial and political background, played the role of a mentor to Albania, supporting its economic and political development. In turn, Albania, being one of the less developed countries in the Eastern Bloc, sought to strengthen its international position through alliances with more developed partners. This cooperation not only contributed to strengthening bilateral ties but also had an impact on the broader regional context, highlighting the strategy of communist countries in building unity against Western influences. Thus, these conversations are not only an example of diplomacy but also an illustration of the historical processes that shaped Europe in the 20th century.

Friendship Week: Between Ideology and Reality in Polish-Albanian Cultural Cooperation

The report of the Polish Embassy in Tirana, dated December 31, 1949, addresses the issue of cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania, emphasizing the need to revive cultural exchange. Although Albania already had active cooperation with countries of the people's democracies, including the USSR, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, relations with Poland in this area remained less developed. The author of the report points to the possibility of organizing exchanges of artistic ensembles, including inviting an Albanian folk ensemble to Poland, which could attractively present Albanian culture.⁵⁶

The report from January 30, 1950, regarding cultural relations between Poland and Albania highlights the challenges of attempting to establish closer cultural cooperation in the post-war period. From a historical perspective, this document fits into the broader context of diplomatic relations among Eastern Bloc countries, where culture played a significant role in building ideological ties and strengthening alliances. Despite the failure of the initiative to bring the Albanian Army Choir to Poland due to delays, the report reflects the importance of mutual cultural activities in deepening interstate relations. The mentioned Mickiewicz commemorations and the participation of Kol Jakowy, a key figure in the Albanian cultural world, highlight the potential such events had for strengthening cultural ties. By expressing interest in Poland's cultural life, Jakowy became a symbol of Albania's willingness to cooperate in this area. The possibility of continuing and deepening these contacts was seen as crucial for developing a more systematic artistic exchange, which in turn was expected to contribute to mutual understanding and the promotion of socialist ideas.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (dalej: AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-18 T-158, Daty Skrajne: 1949-1951, Państwo: Albania, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Środkowa, 4.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, 15.

The Albanian-Polish Friendship Week in 1950 was one of many examples of the intensive cultural and political cooperation among Eastern Bloc countries, particularly as part of the broader strategy of building diplomatic and propaganda relations by the Soviet Union and its satellites. A key role in this event was played by cultural exchange, aimed at strengthening ties between Albania and Poland, solidifying the political alliance, and promoting shared ideological values.

One of the main highlights of the event was the screening of Polish films, such as *The „Last Stage”*, *„The Broad Road”*, and *„May 1st”*, with commentary provided in French.⁵⁸ These screenings aimed to showcase both the artistic and ideological achievements of the Polish People's Republic. The use of French, which at the time was the language of international cultural communication, facilitated the reception of the films by the Albanian audience, symbolizing openness to the international dimension of socialist propaganda.

The event organized on July 13 for representatives of the press, diplomacy, and the cultural world in the garden of the Albania-USSR Cultural Relations Society marked the beginning of a series of events.⁵⁹ Polish films, despite the lack of translation into Albanian, attracted numerous viewers in cinemas both in the capital and in the provinces..⁶⁰ It is worth noting that the selection of films such as *„The Last Stage”*, which depicted Nazi crimes, was deliberate and aimed to emphasize the martyrdom of the Polish nation as well as the triumph of socialist values in the struggle for liberation.

The Albanian-Polish Friendship Week began on July 21, 1950. During the event, Mihal Prifti, Albania's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered a speech in which he emphasized the historical ties of the struggle for independence, Albanian-Polish friendship, and the crucial role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of both nations.⁶¹ The emphasis on the importance of the USSR was typical of propaganda during this period, and chanting the names of Stalin, Bierut, and Enver Hoxha was an expression of political loyalty to communist leaders. Anna Milska, speaking on behalf of the Polish delegation, expressed feelings of friendship and solidarity with the Albanian people, highlighting the shared path of both nations toward socialism.⁶² Such statements aimed to reinforce the idea of socialist unity and served as a propaganda tool emphasizing the close relations between Eastern Bloc countries. They were not only a diplomatic declaration but also an attempt to construct an image of mutual

⁵⁸ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 59.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, 59.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, 59.

⁶¹ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit: 59-60; Trybuna Ludu, Organ KC Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, Warszawa – Środa, 26 lipca 1950 r. Nr. 203 (575) Rok III, 1; Trybuna Ludu, Organ KC Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, Warszawa – Środa, 26 lipca 1950 roku, Nr. 202 (574) Rok III, 1.

⁶² Dziennik Zachodni, Katowice dnia 26 lipca 1950 roku, Nr.169 (1722) AB, 1.

support and shared aspirations, intended to consolidate the socialist alliance in the eyes of the public.

The analysis of the organization of the Albanian-Polish Friendship Week, however, reveals certain shortcomings. The decoration in Tirana was modest, and attempts to promote Polish achievements through photographic exhibitions did not meet expectations, which could have been due to insufficient time for preparation. During the Albanian-Polish Friendship Week, only two Polish flags were seen in Tirana, surrounding a portrait of President Bierut, placed on the city administration building.⁶³ On the other hand, the Albanian press and radio did a good job, regularly informing the public about the events and promoting a positive image of Poland.⁶⁴ During the Albanian-Polish Friendship Week, informational articles, analyses, and event reports were published. Many publications featured both articles by Albanian authors and reprints from Soviet press and „*Parallèle 50*”, covering Poland's economic, social, and cultural life.

The „*Friendship Week*,” organized in Albania with the participation of Polish representatives, presented an interesting contrast between planned and actual actions. From a historical perspective, this event highlights the specifics of cultural and political relations between Poland and Albania in the post-war period, as well as the role attributed to socialist propaganda and the promotion of mutual solidarity. Although Poland's involvement aimed to show solidarity and support the construction of a positive image among Albania's working class, the diverse results of these actions were influenced by both organizational issues and the attitudes of the participants.⁶⁵ The main activities during the Friendship Week included concerts, academies, meetings, and lectures, which were intended to introduce the Albanian community to the culture and achievements of the Polish People's Republic. Artistic groups performed not only in Tirana but also in smaller cities such as Durrës, Korça, and Shkodra. An interesting case was the outdoor concert in Durrës, which attracted as many as 8,000 listeners—unlike the events in the capital, which were limited to a 800-person theater audience. Local Committees showed more initiative and resourcefulness than the central organizers, which can be interpreted as a reflection of local aspirations and efforts to improve their own social organization.⁶⁶

Unfortunately, in the context of cooperation, logistical difficulties arose, such as the failure to deliver important promotional materials from Vienna and the cancellation of a football match involving the Polish team, which Albanians

⁶³ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 60.

⁶⁴ Trybuna Ludu, Organ KC Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, Warszawa – Czwartek, 27 lipca 1950 r. Nr. 204 (576) Rok III, 1.

⁶⁵ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 61; The „*Friendship Week*,” organized in Albania, illustrates the difficulties and successes involved in attempts to build relations between socialist countries through culture and art. On the one hand, we see a lack of organization from the central committees in Tirana, while on the other, the grassroots, more creative actions of local committees demonstrated initiative and engagement.

⁶⁶ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 61.

were eagerly anticipating. The match, in addition to its sporting significance, could have had economic importance, as the Albanian authorities planned to allocate the proceeds to cover the costs of the entire Week.⁶⁷ The lack of full understanding of the Albanian side's expectations in this regard may have limited the ultimate impact of the event, which was intended to promote integration and strengthen friendship. The reception of Polish artists by Albanians was generally positive, but it is important to note the lack of uniformity in the attitudes of the artists themselves. Soloists such as Barbara Hesse-Bukowska,⁶⁸ Halina Słonicka, and Jerzy Adamczewski, on the one hand, delivered high-quality performances that were met with enthusiasm from the local audience. On the other hand, some of the artists displayed attitudes that were perceived by Albanians as reluctance or a lack of interest in Albanian culture and issues. The lack of openness to local realities and a different perspective on political matters highlights the difficulties faced by Polish representatives in adapting to the specific context of the People's Republic of Albania, where a full understanding and ideological engagement were expected.⁶⁹

On the other hand, the interactions of delegation members such as Anna Milska and Krzysztof Gruszczyński, who actively engaged in dialogue with Albanian partners and writers, were positively received. There are clear differences in the reception of individual attitudes, which had a significant impact on the further development of Polish-Albanian relations. Albanian society, which places great importance on loyalty and ideological commitment, expected delegates from socialist countries to be fully aware of the political realities and demonstrate the appropriate attitude. Ultimately, the events related to the „*Week of Friendship*“ concluded with the sending of a telegram to Prime Minister Enver Hoxha, expressing gratitude for the hospitality and recognition of Albania's achievements. This telegram, although symbolic, played an important role in shaping the image of Poland as a reliable partner in the socialist world and left a positive impression in Albanian political circles.⁷⁰

From a historian's perspective, the „*Week of Friendship*“ thus represents a microcosm of the relations between Poland and Albania at the time: on one hand, we see the official desire to strengthen ties through culture, while on the other, we witness the clash of organizational and mental differences.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, 61.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, 61-63; The cultural mission faced organizational difficulties, such as the lack of a suitable piano for Barbara Hesse-Bukowska's recital and temperatures reaching 50 degrees Celsius.

⁶⁹ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 62.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, 62-64.

Exchange as Key: Cultural Alliances between Poland and Albania

The document concerning cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania, dated to the Cold War period, is an important testament to the formalization of bilateral relations within the Eastern Bloc. It highlights the significance attributed to cultural cooperation as a tool for strengthening ties between socialist countries. According to the document, in December of the previous year, Albania ratified the cultural cooperation agreement, and Poland planned to complete its ratification in March. The exchange of ratification documents was to take place in Warsaw, reflecting a desire to quickly implement the agreement. Particular emphasis was placed on establishing the Polish-Albanian Joint Commission, which was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the agreement's provisions. The Press and Information Department, in forwarding the draft work plan to the relevant ministries, emphasized the need for consultations and gathering opinions, reflecting the bureaucratic structure of power within the Eastern Bloc.⁷¹

The conference planned for March 15 aimed to agree on a detailed plan, which was then to be submitted to the Albanian side for approval. The proposal to hold the first meeting of the Joint Commission in mid-April demonstrated the determination of both countries to intensify cultural cooperation, regarded as a tool for fostering mutual understanding and ideological unity.⁷²

In a historical context, documents of this kind illustrate how the authorities of the Eastern Bloc sought to develop cultural relations that were not only aimed at supporting ideological unity but also at minimizing internal tensions. Cultural cooperation was seen as a key element of diplomatic strategy, intended to strengthen alliances and deepen ties between socialist states.

Gustav Gottesman⁷³, as the Director of the Press and Information Department, was responsible for coordinating these activities, which may

⁷¹ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne plany współpracy kulturalnej, materiały do negocjacji, interwencje, uwagi do projektów planów, ocena ich realizacji, protokoły z posiedzeń Komisji Mieszanej, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (dalej: AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-19 T-167, Daty Skrajne: 1949-1951, Państwo: Albania, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Środkowa, 6.

⁷² *Ibidem*, 6.

⁷³ Gustaw Gottesman, born on September 15, 1918, in Lviv, symbolizes the complexity of the fate of Polish Jews in the 20th century. His biography illustrates the impact of World War II on individuals: the loss of his parents in the Holocaust, service in the Polish Armed Forces in the West, and subsequent work in the Polish government in London, including his role as secretary to Minister Ludwik Grosfeld at the Bretton Woods Conference (konferencja w Bretton Woods). After the war, he returned to Poland, where, between 1949 and 1951, he served as Director of the Press and Information Department (Departament Prasy i Informacji) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighting his influence on the information policy of the new government. He joined the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) but left it in 1968. As a journalist and editor of „Przegląd Kulturalny” and „Literatura”, Gottesman significantly influenced Polish culture. His work as a

indicate his role in promoting cultural and political relations between Poland and Albania.⁷⁴ His name, in the context of the document, represents an important element in analyzing the administration's influence on the development of international cooperation within the Eastern Bloc.

The Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of Albania was signed on December 2, 1950, in Tirana. It contains 11 articles regulating the principles of cultural cooperation between the two countries, aimed at strengthening bonds of friendship and promoting cultural exchange.⁷⁵

Among the signatories of the agreement were:

- Eugenia Krassowska⁷⁶, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Training, representing the Government of the Republic of Poland.⁷⁷
- Kahreman Ylli⁷⁸, Minister of Education, representing the Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

translator, particularly his adaptation of the libretto for „*Les Misérables*”, reflects his contribution to the development of theater in Poland. He passed away on October 5, 1998, in Warsaw.

⁷⁴ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 6.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, k. 7; Dziennik Zachodni, Czytelnik, Środa 6 grudnia 1950 r, Nr. 336 (2085) - Rok VI, 1.

⁷⁶ Eugenia Krassowska, educated in a teaching family, graduated from Stefan Batory University in Vilnius in 1935 and then worked as an assistant in the Department of Polish Literature History. During World War II, she was involved in secret teaching and worked as a teacher and journalist in Vilnius. After the war, she held key positions in the Polish education system, including as director of a high school in Białystok and supervisor of the Białystok School District. Since 1945, she actively participated in the activities of the Democratic Party, holding important positions in its board, including membership in the Central Committee. From 1946 to 1950, she was Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Education, and later in the Ministry of Higher Education from 1951 to 1965, contributing to academic development in Poland, including the establishment of the Medical Academy in Białystok. In later years, Krassowska served as the editor-in-chief of „*Tygodnik Demokratyczny*” and chairwoman of the Polish Committee for UNESCO. As a Member of Parliament, she participated in the work of the Sejm, including in the Education and Culture Committees. She passed away on September 15, 1986, in Warsaw, leaving a significant mark on Polish cultural and political life.

⁷⁷ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, k. 7; Życie Częstochowy, Czytelnik, Czwartek 7 grudnia 1950 roku, Nr. 337 (1238), 1.

⁷⁸ Kahreman Ylli (1917–1975) was an important figure in the political and educational life of communist Albania, and his actions remain a subject of controversy and reflection on the era. As a pedagogue and diplomat, he was actively involved in the communist partisan movement from the early 1940s, influencing the transformation of Albania's educational system. His role as Minister of Education (1948–1952) in Enver Hoxha's government and later as Rector of the University of Tirana (1961–1970) allowed him to participate in the ideological transformation of education, closely integrated with the interests of the communist party. From a historian's perspective, Ylli embodies the archetype of the communist elite: his influence extended across politics, education, and diplomacy. He was a member of the most important bodies, serving as a deputy and belonging to the Presidium of the People's Assembly, which indicates his position within the inner circle of Albania's power elite. His international diplomatic missions, including participation in the Paris

Articles of the agreement:

Article 1:

The parties commit to cooperation between institutions and scientific societies, cultural and educational organizations, as well as sports organizations. The cooperation will include mutual invitations of representatives of these institutions and the organization of professional internships and courses.

Article 2:

The parties agree:

a) To introduce lectures on the history, literature, geography, and economic sciences of the other party into the curricula.

b) To ensure researchers from both countries have the freedom to conduct scientific research and access archival and library materials.

c) To support mutual studies, grant scholarships, and organize teacher exchanges.

d) To promote the study of the Polish language in Albania and the Albanian language in Poland, as well as strive to include materials about the other party in textbooks.⁷⁹

Article 3:

Both parties agree to exchange literature and scientific publications in the form of translations from Polish to Albanian and from Albanian to Polish, as well as to exchange periodicals and other publications.

Article 4:

The parties will organize exhibitions of art, music, and film in both countries.

Article 5:

Both parties aim to establish cooperation between radio stations.

Article 6:

The parties will facilitate the work of journalists and correspondents in both countries.

Article 7:

To implement the provisions of the agreement, a Polish-Albanian Joint Commission will be established, consisting of two subcommittees: one in

Peace Conference and representing Albania in The Hague, highlight Albania's role as an active participant in the postwar international arena, seeking to legitimize and secure the interests of its government. However, from the perspective of research on the communist regime, Ylli becomes a symbol of controversy. Reports from the Institute for the Study of the Crimes and Consequences of Communism in Albania point to his involvement in the structures responsible for persecution, which prompts a discussion about the responsibility of elites for repression and political violence. Embedded in a system that promoted repression against the opposition, Ylli embodies the moral and social dilemmas of that era. His death in 1975, surrounded by mystery, intensifies the aura of controversy. Drowning while swimming, despite his poor health and inability to swim, fuels speculation and remains a puzzle that is difficult to resolve, particularly in the context of the political atmosphere and practices of the regime.

⁷⁹ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 7.

Warsaw and the other in Tirana. Each subcommittee will have a chairman appointed by the government of the country in which it is located.

Article 8:

The meetings of the Joint Commission will alternate between Warsaw and Tirana, with the first meeting to be held in Warsaw no later than one month after the exchange of ratification documents. The expenses related to the Commission's activities will be covered by both parties, in accordance with the agreed arrangements.⁸⁰

Article 9:

The Joint Commission is tasked with developing a detailed implementation plan for this Agreement. This plan will cover all issues not addressed in other parts of the document, ensuring a comprehensive approach to the agreement's implementation. The plan requires approval by both governments in order to take effect. Furthermore, each party has the right to propose changes or additions to the plan. However, such modifications can only be implemented with the mutual consent of both parties. The Joint Commission will regularly present reports to the governments of Poland and Albania on the progress of the agreement's implementation. Additionally, it may submit proposals and recommendations on other matters that both governments decide to assign to it.

Article 10:

Existing agreements between scientific and cultural institutions shall remain in effect, unless they are in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement.⁸¹

Article 11:

The Agreement will be ratified as soon as possible and will enter into force on the day of the exchange of ratification documents. It is concluded for a period of five years, with the possibility of extension.

The agreement was signed in two identical copies, in Polish and Albanian, both texts having equal legal force.⁸²

The cultural cooperation agreement between Poland and Albania, signed on December 2, 1950, in Tirana, was a symbolic yet strategic move in strengthening socialist alliances in Central and Eastern Europe. The signing of this document was part of the broader context of post-war integration of the Eastern Bloc and close cooperation among socialist countries within the framework of mutual solidarity. The aim of the agreement was to deepen cultural exchange between the nations through cooperation in the fields of art, literature, education, science, and sports. This cooperation not only contributed to mutual understanding of each country's culture but also supported the socialist ideology, which was crucial for legitimizing both regimes. Through the exchange of artists,

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, 8.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 9.

⁸² *Ibidem*, 9.

joint cultural initiatives, and scholarship programs for Albanian students in Poland, the agreement became a propaganda tool aimed at tightening bonds and strengthening the ideological unity of both nations. It is important to emphasize that this agreement was created in an atmosphere of enthusiasm that characterized the development of international relations within the Eastern Bloc - relations based on shared social and economic goals and the idea of proletarian internationalism. The propaganda of that period emphasized that the agreement was a manifestation of genuine friendship, not the result of *diplomatic maneuvering*.⁸³ In reality, like other agreements of this kind in the Eastern Bloc, it was a political expression of submission to Moscow. The Soviet Union played a key role as a mediator and guarantor of these relations, symbolically demonstrating international solidarity, although it left no room for individual, sovereign decisions in foreign policy.

This cultural agreement also aimed to counter Western influences, which were seen as an ideological and political threat. In the rhetoric of official media, such as the Albanian *Zëri i Popullit*,⁸⁴ it was emphasized that Poland and Albania were walking together *the same path of building a new life* in contrast to Anglo-American imperialism, which was portrayed as a destabilizing and aggressive force.⁸⁵

Analyzing this agreement as a historian, it can be observed that Polish-Albanian relations, despite their dependence on the USSR, were characterized by local cultural initiatives that fostered greater understanding and the exchange of experiences between the nations. Through such agreements, the societies of socialist countries had better access to the culture of other bloc countries, which contributed to the exchange of ideas and, paradoxically, could support national identity and pride, even in a context dominated by the international aspirations of the Soviet Union.

The telegram sent to the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Albania on December 7, 1950, is an interesting document that reflects the relations between Poland and Albania at the time, as well as the ideological dynamics of that period.⁸⁶ In the content of the telegram, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Hilary Chelchowski,⁸⁷ expresses gratitude

⁸³ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 111-112.

⁸⁴ „Zëri i Popullit” (Voice of the People) is an Albanian newspaper founded in 1944 as the official organ of the Communist Party of Albania. From 1948 to 1991, it served the Albanian Party of Labor, and after the political changes in Albania in 1991-1992, it became the press organ of the Socialist Party of Albania, retaining its original name. In 2011, its circulation was 25,000 copies. The newspaper's editorial office was located on Stalin Boulevard, now Zogu I Boulevard.

⁸⁵ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 112.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 114.

⁸⁷ Hilary Chelchowski was a Polish politician and communist activist, born into a minor noble family of Feliks and Marianna Milewski. At the age of two, he lost his father and soon received basic education. In the 1930s, he worked as a laborer in Warsaw and became a member of the Communist Party of Poland in 1932. During World War II, he was active in the People's Guard and the People's Army, adopting the pseudonym Długi Janek. After the war, he joined the Polish

for the *brotherly reception* from the Albanian government and people.⁸⁸ Such formulations are typical of communication within communist states, where emphasizing solidarity and brotherhood between nations played a key role in propaganda. This document evokes the concepts of mutual assistance and cooperation in building socialism, which was the ideological foundation of both countries at that time.

Particularly important is the reference to the *building of the foundations of socialism* and the *struggle for the consolidation of peace*, which indicate common political and ideological goals.⁸⁹ In the context of the Cold War and tensions with Western countries, such formulations aimed at legitimizing the actions of communist governments and mobilizing society around these ideas. In a statement made to a representative of the Albanian Telegraphic Agency, the Deputy Prime Minister also emphasizes solidarity with the Albanian people in the face of threats from *fascist neighbors*, reflecting concerns about the surrounding political environment.⁹⁰ This reference reflects the geopolitical context in which Albania, like Poland, sought allies in the face of potential threats from Western countries.

Another important element is the emphasis on Albania's successes in the economic and social fields, which was intended to serve as an example to follow. By describing the *great results in the economic field*, H. Chelchowski contributes to promoting the image of Albania as a country rapidly developing under communist rule. The conclusion of the statement refers to the signing of the Cultural Cooperation Agreement, signaling the intentions of both countries to strengthen relations in the cultural and educational fields. Such agreements were not only aimed at supporting cooperation but also at strengthening the ideological ties between the nations.⁹¹

The telegram and the statement as a whole illustrate the complexity of the relations between Poland and Albania in the context of the Cold War, combining elements of propaganda, politics, and culture. This document is a valuable source for historians studying not only international relations but also the ideological mechanisms that influenced the attitudes and actions of communist governments in Eastern Europe.

Workers' Party, where he held several key positions, including secretary of the Lublin and Radom districts and a member of the Central Committee of the PPR. In 1948, after the unification with the Polish Socialist Party, he became a member of the Polish United Workers' Party, continuing his work in the party leadership. From 1950 to 1952, he served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Agricultural Enterprises. His political career ended after controversial speeches in 1956, when he was removed from important positions. After retiring in 1960, he remained active in politics, including in the illegal Communist Party of Poland. Chelchowski died in Warsaw and was buried at the North Communal Cemetery in Wólka Węglowa.

⁸⁸ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 114.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, 114.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, 115.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, 115.

The 1951 document refers to the framework plan for the implementation of the cultural cooperation agreement between Poland and Albania. The proposals presented aim to strengthen the ties between the two countries through a series of cultural, educational, and artistic activities.

The key elements of the agreement include:

1. Publication of works: The plan includes joint literary and scientific publications, as well as translations of works from Polish to Albanian and vice versa. In particular, it emphasizes the need to promote the Polish language in Albania and to include translations into other languages, such as Russian and French.

2. Exchange of artists and scholars: The document provides for inviting artists, journalists, and scholars from both countries, aiming to foster mutual cultural understanding and collaboration on artistic and research projects.

3. Education and scholarships: The agreement also includes the exchange of students and support for Albanian students in Poland. Scholarship programs and initiatives to promote the Polish language in Albania are planned, aimed at enhancing language and cultural competencies.

4. Promotion of cinematography: The document includes a proposal for joint film productions and the translation of documentary films into Albanian. The goal is to increase the availability of Polish film productions in Albania, which have been popular in the past.

5. Music and art: Initiatives are planned to promote classical and folk music, as well as organize concerts. In particular, there is an emphasis on the need to support Albanian artists in their creative work and presentations.

6. Adult education: The agreement also includes educational programs for adults aimed at combating illiteracy and improving the quality of education in Albania.⁹²

The document on cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania from 1951 presents a complex structure of activities aimed at strengthening the relations between the two countries. It highlights significant aspects related to education, culture, and the media, as well as artistic cooperation, with the goal of not only tightening the bonds between the nations but also reinforcing the position of both states in the face of the Cold War reality.⁹³

In the field of education, the agreement provides for a broad exchange of textbooks and curricula, aimed at facilitating mutual understanding of achievements in the field of education. The introduction of the history and literature of the other country into the curricula indicates a desire to understand and accept foreign cultures.⁹⁴ Moreover, the organization of language courses is

⁹² Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 14.

⁹³ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 1-2.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, 2.

another step towards facilitating communication and building lasting relationships.

In the field of culture, the agreement emphasizes the exchange of publications and artists, highlighting the importance of collaboration in literature, music, and art. Joint exhibitions, translations of literary works, and inviting artists for performances aimed at promoting the cultural richness of both countries and enhancing their prestige on the international stage.⁹⁵ In the context of the Cold War, culture became a tool of propaganda, enabling the presentation of a positive image of both nations.

The agreement also provides for cooperation in the field of media, highlighting the importance of exchanging information and experiences between journalists. Enabling journalists to meet and exchange views on issues of interest could contribute to a better understanding of the situation in both countries and strengthen the bonds between their societies.⁹⁶ In the context of censorship and information control during the Cold War, such actions aimed not only at increasing the availability of information but also at creating a positive image of both states.

It is also worth noting that the document emphasizes the importance of cooperation in the field of amateur artistic movements, highlighting the effort to unite societies through art. The organization of exhibitions on cultural or political themes aimed to strengthen social bonds and increase citizens' engagement in cultural life.⁹⁷

In summary, the document on cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania from 1951 is an important testament to the international relations of that time. In the face of the Cold War, these efforts aimed not only to strengthen the ties between the two countries but also to shape their image within a broader ideological context. Cultural, educational, and media cooperation played a key role in building positive relations and promoting communal values amidst global tensions.

On April 18, 1951, at 2:00 PM, the exchange of ratification documents for the Polish-Albanian cultural agreement took place in the Reception Hall of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The event was attended by Polish Minister Stanisław Skrzyszewski and Albania's chargé d'affaires, Nesti Nase, along with diplomats Jeleń, Lassman, Mencil, Lachs, and Bartol. The ceremony included the signing of protocols and the exchange of ratification documents, followed by congratulations and a brief social gathering with wine and pastries. The entire event concluded at 2:30 PM.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, 3-4.

⁹⁶ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, k. 4.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, 4-5.

⁹⁸ Protokół Dyplomatyczny – umowa kulturalna polsko – albańska: wymiana dokumentów ratyfikacyjnych: program ceremoni, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (dalej: AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-16 W-4 T-54, Daty Skrajne: 1951-1951, Państwo: Albania –

The document dated April 24, 1951, originates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and concerns the organization of a meeting of the Joint Commission in Tirana, scheduled to take place from May 10 to 15 of the same year. The document outlines the proposed composition of the Polish delegation that was to participate in the conference. The delegation included:

1. Director Barbag from the Ministry of Education,
2. Citizen Milska from the Committee for Cultural Education (K.W.K.Z).
3. Citizen Matysiak from the Second Secretariat of the Legation in Tirana.

An intervention was requested regarding Director Barbag, which suggests that his presence at the conference was crucial for the delegation. In the event of his absence, it was recommended to send a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demonstrating the Polish delegation's flexibility and readiness to adapt to circumstances. The document also highlights the need to obtain approval from the minister, emphasizing the formal nature of the actions and the administrative structure in Polish foreign policy.⁹⁹

The report from the meeting of the subcommittee of the Polish-Albanian Joint Commission, held on January 19, 1952, is a significant document concerning cultural cooperation between Poland and Albania. The purpose of the meeting was to review and summarize the progress made under the Polish-Albanian Cultural Agreement. The presence of representatives from both countries underscores the importance of mutual relations and efforts to strengthen cooperation in the fields of education, culture, and science. On the Albanian side, participants included Jawer Malo, Secretary General of the Committee for Cultural Cooperation, as well as representatives from ministries and cultural organizations such as Kustag Misha, Reis Malile, Spiro Xhai, and Foto Stramo. The Polish delegation was represented by Aleksander Skrzynia and Julian Forýs, highlighting the commitment of both sides to the process of cooperation.¹⁰⁰ During the meeting, Jawer Malo noted that despite technical difficulties, both sides were trying to fulfill the provisions of the agreement. The difficulties mentioned included delays in the publication of books, which affected the delivery of educational materials. From a historian's perspective, these issues can be interpreted in the context of the overall political and economic situation in Eastern Europe, where many countries faced shortages of materials and infrastructure, which often impacted international agreements.

Ludowa Republika Albani, Polska – PRL, Region Świata: Europa Południowa, Europa Wschodnia, 1.

⁹⁹ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 15.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, 18.

The implementation of specific points of the agreement

The analysis of the cultural agreement points shows that only some of the planned actions were partially implemented:

1. Education: Only 16 textbooks were sent, which indicates limitations in book publishing. Additionally, the monthly magazine „*Oświata dla ludu*“ was regularly sent, suggesting that the Albanians made efforts to maintain contact and exchange educational information.
2. Scientific cooperation: The point regarding the exchange of scholars and students highlights difficulties in implementation due to a lack of adequate resources and political uncertainty. The number of Albanian students at Polish universities in the 1951/52 academic year was 87.
3. Culture: The regular exchange of literary publications, such as *Nasza Literatura*“ and „*Młody Pisarz*“, demonstrates the desire to promote Albanian culture in Poland. The sent posters and photographs from artistic courses also indicate a dynamic approach to artistic collaboration.
4. Sports: The lack of any sports cooperation since 1949 may suggest that political tensions and isolation between the countries hindered the development of such initiatives, which typically require greater openness and collaboration.
5. Mass organizations: The report indicates active exchange between professional and women's organizations, which may reflect their importance in building civil society and strengthening relations between the countries.¹⁰¹

The next document presents a report on the activities of the Polish-Albanian Joint Commission, aimed at implementing the Cultural Agreement between Poland and Albania. Dated January 20, 1952, it is addressed to the Director of the Press and Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document discusses key points regarding cultural cooperation between the two countries. It includes plans for the arrival of Polish scholars in Albania, which was scheduled to take place around April 15, 1952, after the conclusion of the Second Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor.¹⁰² In the context of teaching the Polish language in Albania, the report highlighted the lack of available educational texts and competent teachers, which posed an obstacle to achieving this goal. It was suggested that Albanian students in Poland, with the support of Polish institutions, take on the task of preparing materials for learning both Polish and Albanian. The report also mentioned issues related to publishing literature, including the need to translate books, such as „*Węgiele*“ by

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, 18-21.

¹⁰² Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 26.

Scibor-Rylski, into other languages.¹⁰³ The document also refers to the organization of the exhibition *Warsaw-Peace-Reconstruction*, which was to be set up by May 1952 at the latest. It pointed out the difficulties related to the lack of appropriate exhibition materials, which could have affected its success. In the context of media cooperation, it was noted that Radio Poland had only been transmitting musical materials and had not provided content on other topics. A request was made for additional information on various social, political, and cultural aspects. It was recommended to organize a *Polish Culture Week* in Albania from April 11 to 18, 1952, which would coincide with the 60th anniversary of President Bolesław Bierut's birth.¹⁰⁴

The document regarding Polish-Albanian cultural cooperation in the 1950s emphasizes the importance of cultural relations as a key element of overall relations between the two countries. It notes that the visit of the Polish journalist, Karłowicz, to Albania was aimed at better acquainting the public in Poland with the Albanian reality, which could help strengthen these relations. The document points out that a significant amount of materials related to education, literature, and art were sent to Albania, but there were difficulties in their effective use by the Albanian side. Despite plans for the visit of an Albanian delegation to Poland and the organization of artistic performances, many initiatives were not realized. It highlights the growing difficulties in further developing cultural cooperation. The analysis pointed out the need for thoughtful and tailored assistance for Albania to support it in its fight against isolation and propaganda. It also emphasized that cooperation should include various forms of support, including in education, as well as the use of Polish experiences in shaping a new socialist culture. In conclusion, it noted the organizational and financial difficulties that may affect the future of cooperation, as well as the need for further strengthening of international relations.¹⁰⁵

From Trade Agreements to Actual Deliveries: Poland and Albania in the Context of Cold War Economic Relations in 1949-1952

The analysis of economic relations between Albania and Poland in 1949-1950 reveals significant changes and challenges in bilateral trade relations. Documents from this period highlight a shortage of data and materials concerning the specifics of agreements, making it difficult to fully assess the situation. The trade agreement of 1949 and that of 1950 differ in several respects. Notably, there

¹⁰³ Polsko – albańska umowa kulturalna, dokumenty ratyfikacyjne, roczne..., op cit, 26.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, 26-27.

¹⁰⁵ Raporty polityczne Poselstwa Rzeczypospolitej Polski w Tiranie, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (dalej: AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-18 T-159, Daty Skrajne: 1952-1952, Państwo: Albania, Polska, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Południowa, Europa Środkowa, 217-219.

is a visible decline in overall trade turnover compared to 1949. Albania's imports in 1949 amounted to \$1.1 million, whereas for 1950, they were projected at 5.83 million rubles. This difference in currencies and the variation in values may cause difficulties in interpreting the data. Exports from Poland to Albania in 1950 were also lower than those anticipated in the 1949 agreement. The credits granted to Albania for 1950 were smaller than those of the previous year, which limited trade opportunities. It is worth noting that in 1949, the credits amounted to \$2 million, while in 1950, under the agreement, credits were projected at 7.95 million rubles. A significant issue was that Albania did not fulfill all the deliveries stipulated in the 1949 agreement, which may indicate difficulties in meeting market demands.¹⁰⁶

During discussions between Albanian and Polish representatives, signals emerged indicating Albania's intention to improve the fulfillment of its obligations to Poland in the current year. The Albanians were better able to define their needs and capabilities when signing the 1950 agreement, which could have led to a more realistic approach to cooperation. It is also worth noting that Albania was considering obtaining credits from Poland and Hungary for 1950 and projected credits for the years 1951-1952. This reflects an effort to improve financial planning and cooperation with other socialist countries. Analyzing agreements with other nations, such as Romania and Czechoslovakia, reveals that these countries offered significantly higher credits than Poland. Romania granted Albania a \$3 million credit for 1950, while Czechoslovakia provided \$3.5 million. In light of these figures, the credits extended by Poland were lower, which may have negatively affected the appeal of Polish proposals.¹⁰⁷

A document dated June 30, 1950, preserved in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, testifies to the dynamic trade and economic relations between Poland and Albania within the context of the postwar socialist bloc. The exchange between the two countries included Poland's attempt to procure 5,000 tons of bitumen, while Albania awaited the delivery of diesel engines, crucial for its oil industry, as agreed upon in the 1949 trade agreement.¹⁰⁸

In the document, the Albanian Minister of Trade, Kico Ngjela, emphasizes that the delivery of bitumen will only be possible if Poland fulfills its earlier commitments regarding engines. The text also reveals that the challenges faced by Albania's oil sector – production shortages and outdated infrastructure – posed significant difficulties for the country, making it reliant on technical and energy support from allies such as Poland and the USSR. This document highlights the economic interdependence within the socialist bloc, as

¹⁰⁶ Raporty polityczne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Tiranie..., op.cit, 14.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, 14.

¹⁰⁸ Umowa handlowa polsko- albańska, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (dalej: AMSZ), Departament: Departament I za lata 1949-1960 (państwa socjalistyczne bez NRD), Sygnatura Jednostki Archiwalnej: Z-7 W-19 T-166, Daty Skrajne: 1950-1956, Państwo: Albania, Polska PRL, Region Świata: Bałkany, Europa Południowa, Europa Środkowa, 2.

well as the mutual expectations and limitations in achieving economic plans at the beginning of the Cold War.¹⁰⁹

In a letter dated July 26, 1950, addressed to the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Trade, issues regarding the delivery of goods under trade agreements were discussed. It was stated that in April, the delivery of 264 tons of goods for the second and third quarters of the current year began. The commitment to deliver 280 tons during the same quarters was partially fulfilled, as only 26 tons were delivered, along with an additional shipment sent on July 17 aboard the ship Olsztyn. Regarding black sheet metal, 500 tons were to be delivered in the first quarter and 605 tons in the second quarter, with an additional 500 tons planned for the third quarter's quota. So far, 466 tons have been shipped.¹¹⁰

In a letter dated July 28, 1950, addressed to the Albanian Minister of Foreign Trade, the delivery of railway track accessories was reported. In the second quarter, 138 tons of accessories were delivered. Based on information provided by Ahmet Jegeni, Director of the Export Department, it was noted that 500 tons of rails were shipped from Poland on July 24, with another 900 tons planned for shipment by August 5. According to the agreement, 462 tons remain to be delivered out of the agreed 2,000 tons. A commitment was made to deliver the remaining items by the end of August.¹¹¹

The trade agreement between the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of Albania from 1951 serves as an example of Cold War economic cooperation between socialist states. It was signed on January 25, 1951, in Warsaw by representatives of the governments of both countries: the Polish side was represented by Eugeniusz Szyr, and the Albanian side by Spiro Koleka. The agreement aimed to develop trade exchange and establish a system of mutual deliveries and payments.¹¹²

1. Article 1: The exchange of goods was established based on lists „A/51“ and „B/51,“ which specified the goods exported by both countries.
2. Article 2: The contracts were concluded by authorized institutions and enterprises of both sides.
3. Article 3: The prices of goods were set in rubles according to world prices, which were based on the main international markets.
4. Article 4: The terms of delivery were established as c.i.f. for goods from Poland and f.o.b. for goods from Albania at Adriatic ports.
5. Article 5: Payments were made through letters of credit and bank accounts in rubles, via the national banks of both countries.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, 2-3.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 36.

¹¹¹ Umowa handlowa polsko- albańska..., op.cit, 34.

¹¹² *Ibidem*, 62-63.

6. Article 6: Additional charges, such as insurance, transportation, and other exchange costs, were handled by both national banks through special clearing accounts.
7. Article 7: The same payment mechanism was applied to other transactions arising from the credit agreement and remaining diplomatic obligations.¹¹³
8. Article 8: The National Bank of Poland and the State Bank of Albania established the technical terms of settlement.¹¹⁴
9. Article 9: Both parties committed to ensuring that the transactions complied with national foreign exchange regulations.
10. Article 10: Albania could cover the obligations arising from the agreement with a credit of up to 6 million rubles, divided into investment and non-investment goods.
11. Article 11: The establishment of a Joint Commission was agreed upon, with the aim of analyzing the state of exchange and resolving difficulties.
12. Article 12: The agreement was valid until the end of 1951, but its provisions were to remain in effect for contracts not completed by the expiration date.¹¹⁵

This agreement, in addition to providing economic benefits, strengthened political ties between Poland and Albania, aligning with the strategy of mutual support between the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

Below is the list of goods exported from Albania to Poland according to list A/51.¹¹⁶

S.n.	Name of the goods	Quantity	Value in rubles
1.	Chromium ore	12.750 t	
2.	Wool	350 t	
3.	Blister copper	200 t	
4.	Natural bitumen	4.000 t	
5.	Tobacco	200 t	
6.	Bay leaves	100 t	
7.	Medicinal herbs		90.000
8.	Different	---	200.000

¹¹³ *Ibidem*, 62.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*, 62.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 63.

¹¹⁶ Umowa handlowa polsko- albańska..., op.cit, 64.

Below is a list of goods exported from Poland to Albania according to List B/51, Section I:¹¹⁷

S.n.	Name of the goods	Quantity	Value in rubles
1.	Compressors with internal combustion engines	10 szt.	
2.	Concrete mixers	3 szt.	
3.	Machine tools	2 szt.	
4.	Sheet metal bending machines	2 szt.	
5.	Locomotive jacks	1 szt.	
6.	Construction lifts	10 szt.	
7.	Iron and steel wire	200 ton	
8.	Iron rivets	16 ton	
9.	Galvanized wire mesh	10 ton	
10.	Steel ropes	10 ton	
11.	Agricultural chains	12 ton	
12.	Steel cylinders	113 szt.	
13.	Sanitary fittings		15.000
14.	Electric wires and cords		36.000
15.	Cast iron pipes, water supply fittings, and manual valves	650 ton	
16.	Cast-wrought connectors	12 ton	
17.	Various machines, devices, and metal products		250.000
18.	Railway trolley	1 szt.	
19.	Narrow-gauge locomotive	1 szt.	
20.	Diesel locomotives	4 szt.	
21.	Blast furnace iron	500 ton	
22.	Profiled iron	162 ton	
23.	Steel strip	135 ton	
24.	Black sheet metal	800 ton	
25.	Galvanized sheet metal	140 ton	
26.	White sheet metal	15 ton	
27.	Galvanized pipes	335 ton	
28.	Steel pipes	200 ton	
29.	Narrow-gauge rails and accessories	400 ton	
30.	Rebar iron (for concrete)	725 ton	
31.	Special steel	10 ton	
32.	Textile products		5.400.000
33.	Coke	4.000 ton	
34.	Cement	1.000 ton	
35.	Chemicals		1.000.000
36.	Different		250.000

¹¹⁷ Umowa handlowa polsko- albańska..., op.cit, 64-65.

Below is a list of goods exported from Poland to Albania according to the B/51 list, section II:¹¹⁸

S.n.	Name of the goods	Quantity	Value in rubles
1.	Railway locomotives/multi-gauge	2 szt.	
2.	Open wagons, multi-gauge	40 szt.	
3.	Covered freight wagons	20 szt.	
4.	Tank wagons	2 szt.	

On December 11, 1951, in Tirana, a document was drafted that serves as an official letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania, addressed to the Legation of the Republic of Poland. This document represents an example of post-war diplomatic correspondence, reflecting the economic and logistical difficulties faced by socialist states in fulfilling their mutual trade obligations. In the note, the Albanian government expresses regret over its inability to fully comply with the trade agreement concluded between Poland and Albania on January 25, 1951, concerning the export of goods and mutual payments. Albania informs Poland of the current export restrictions, submitting an updated list of goods for the current year, while also apologizing for the impact of this situation on the Polish economy. The document also includes Albania's commitment to cover the resulting deficit and pay 2% interest to compensate Poland for part of the losses incurred due to the failure to fully meet its obligations.¹¹⁹

Graph of goods exported from Albania to Poland in 1951:¹²⁰

S.n.	Name of the goods	Un	Agreement of 1951	Delivered by October 31, 1951	Total deliveries under the 1951 agreement
1.	Chromium ore	ton	12.750	7.999	12.750
2.	Wool	--	350	---	350
3.	Blister copper	---	200	---	75
4.	Natural bitumen	---	4.000	2.000	4.000
5.	Tobacco	---	200	---	30
6.	Bay leaves	---	100	12	100

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 65.

¹¹⁹ Umowa handlowa polsko- albańska..., op.cit, 67.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem*, 68.

7.	Medicinal plants	Rbl.	90.000	---	42.000
8.	Different	---	200.000	---	---

The document of February 2, 1952, is the response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to the diplomatic note from Albania dated December 11, 1951, regarding the fulfillment of obligations arising from the trade agreement of January 25, 1951. The Polish side, citing the significant importance for the national economy and import plans, rejects the possibility of postponing the overdue deliveries of copper and tobacco, which Albania was supposed to deliver in 1951, to 1952. Poland explicitly demands the prompt fulfillment of these contingents in accordance with the original agreement, arguing that it has either fulfilled its obligations or is in the process of doing so.¹²¹

A conversation between Aleksander Skrzynia, a representative of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Albania, Spiro Koleka, took place on March 17, 1952, in the presence of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Prifti. The topic of discussion was the difficulties in the negotiations concerning the Polish-Albanian trade agreement for the year 1952. A. Skrzynia, acting on the orders of Stefan Wierbłowski, presented to Koleka the issues related to the trade negotiations in Warsaw. He emphasized that the terms proposed by Minister Abdyl Kellezi, the head of the Albanian delegation, were unacceptable. He also noted that despite Poland's efforts to increase credits for Albania, the amount of goods supplied by the country was decreasing. Skrzynia pointed out that Poland aimed to expand trade cooperation and expected the Albanian side to also strive for the development of these relations.¹²²

Deputy Prime Minister Koleka acknowledged that he was aware of the difficulties that had been presented and agreed with Skrzynia's assessment. He explained that the Albanian delegation had intended to offer a specific amount of copper and bitumen, but this could not be realized due to the lack of materials necessary for the Albanian industry. As a result, the Albanians decided to withdraw the previously promised 50 tons of copper in favor of the Czechs, who had committed to supplying materials that they could not obtain from Poland. During the conversation, Skrzynia pointed out that both sides had difficulties fulfilling their commitments, which put the Albanian government in a difficult position, especially in the context of the new ambassador. Koleka promised that he would make every effort to ensure that the matters were resolved in a way that would satisfy both sides. Skrzynia also raised issues related to the transportation of oil and delays in unloading ships, which were generating additional costs. Koleka expressed hope for the prompt signing of the trade agreement for 1952, despite the complicated situation with supplies and misunderstandings. Skrzynia

¹²¹ *Ibidem*, 71-72.

¹²² Umowa handlowa polsko- albańska..., op.cit, 76.

pointed out that the lack of responsibility on the part of the Polish commercial attaché might have contributed to the difficulties, and the information about copper and chrome extraction in Albania suggested potential issues with fulfilling commitments.¹²³ This conversation illustrates the tense trade relations between Poland and Albania during the Cold War, while also highlighting the complexity of negotiations and the mutual expectations of both sides.

Summary

The relations between Poland and Albania from 1949 to 1952 reveal the complexity of Cold War diplomacy, where official socialist ideology intertwined with the pragmatic needs of both countries. The Albanian-Polish Friendship Week in 1950 and speeches by leaders such as Mihal Prifti highlighted the symbolic importance of propaganda in maintaining the image of socialist unity and loyalty to the USSR. The propaganda influence was crucial: emphasizing the common path to socialism and chanting the names of Eastern Bloc leaders aimed to consolidate internal support through the image of an external alliance. At the same time, the dynamics of economic relations between Poland and Albania revealed more practical, yet problematic, aspects of their cooperation. Despite the signed trade agreements in 1949 and 1950, the actual economic exchange was lower than anticipated. Shortages of credits and delays in deliveries pointed to differences between expectations and the capabilities of both sides. Albania struggled to fully meet its commitments, and Polish credits were less competitive than the support offered by Romania or Czechoslovakia. Such imbalances not only posed a challenge to bilateral relations but also suggested internal tensions and limitations in fulfilling the goals of the Eastern Bloc.

The 1950 cultural cooperation agreement aimed not only to strengthen relations but also to serve as a tool of propaganda. The establishment of the Polish-Albanian Mixed Commission expressed the need for controlled development of contacts and mutual exchange, while also symbolizing the desire to tighten the alliance through formal channels of cooperation. In practice, this meant incorporating culture into the broader strategy of maintaining the political cohesion of the socialist bloc, which was of significant importance both for external relations and for the internal ideological order. Diplomatic appointments, such as that of Bolesław Jeleń as the Envoy Counsellor in Tirana, were important elements of the post-war strategy to stabilize international relations. As a historian, one can observe that the process of building Polish-Albanian relations was multifaceted: official alliance declarations and symbolic events served propaganda purposes, while real cooperation struggled with numerous difficulties. It was an era in which political ambitions did not always align with economic and logistical needs, highlighting the contradictions

¹²³ *Ibidem*, 76-78.

characteristic of the socialist bloc and demonstrating how, under ideological pressure, states sought their own paths to pursue their interests.

Zaključak

Odnosi između Poljske i Albanije od 1949. do 1952. godine otkrivaju složenost diplomatije Hladnog rata, gdje su se zvanična socijalistička ideologija i pragmatične potrebe obje zemlje isprepletale. Sedmica albansko-poljskog prijateljstva 1950. godine i govori lidera poput Mihala Priftija istaknuli su simboličan značaj propagande u očuvanju slike socijalističkog jedinstva i lojalnosti prema SSSR-u. Uticaj propagande bio je presudan: naglašavanje zajedničkog puta ka socijalizmu i skandiranje imena lidera istočnog bloka imalo je za cilj učvršćivanje unutrašnje podrške kroz sliku spoljnog saveza. Istovremeno, dinamika ekonomskih odnosa između Poljske i Albanije otkrila je praktičnije, ali i problematične aspekte njihove saradnje. Uprkos potpisanim trgovinskim sporazumima 1949. i 1950. godine, stvarna ekonomska razmjena bila je manja od očekivane. Nedostatak kredita i kašnjenja u isporukama ukazivali su na razlike između očekivanja i mogućnosti obje strane. Albanija se borila da u potpunosti ispuni svoje obaveze, a poljski krediti bili su manje konkurentni u poređenju s podrškom koju su nudile Rumunija ili Čehoslovačka. Takve neravnoteže nisu samo predstavljale izazov za bilateralne odnose, već su ukazivale i na unutrašnje tenzije i ograničenja u ispunjavanju ciljeva Istočnog bloka.

Sporazum o kulturnoj saradnji iz 1950. godine imao je za cilj ne samo jačanje odnosa, već i služenje kao alat propagande. Osnivanje Mješovite poljsko-albanske komisije izrazilo je potrebu za kontrolisanim razvojem kontakata i međusobne razmjene, dok je istovremeno simboliziralo želju za učvršćivanjem saveza putem formalnih kanala saradnje. U praksi, to je značilo uključivanje kulture u širu strategiju očuvanja političke kohezije socijalističkog bloka, što je bilo od velikog značaja kako za spoljne odnose, tako i za unutrašnji ideološki poredak. Diplomatska imenovanja, poput onog Bolesława Jelenia za savjetnika izaslanstva u Tirani, predstavljala su važne elemente poslijeratne strategije stabilizacije međunarodnih odnosa. Kao historičar može se uočiti da je proces izgradnje poljsko-albanskih odnosa bio višeslojan: zvanične deklaracije savezništva i simbolični događaji služili su propagandnim ciljevima, dok se stvarna saradnja suočavala s brojnim poteškoćama. To je bilo doba u kojem se političke ambicije nisu uvijek poklapale s ekonomskim i logističkim potrebama, što je isticalo kontradikcije karakteristične za socijalistički blok i pokazivalo kako su države, pod ideološkim pritiskom, tražile vlastite puteve za ostvarivanje svojih interesa.

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EMANCIPACIJA ŽENA U INTELEKTUALNOJ MISLI MARE MATOČEC*

Apstrakt: *Rad po prvi puta analizira poimanje ideje emancipacije hrvatskih žena u intelektualnoj misli Mare Matočec (1886-1967), prve hrvatske političarke u modernome smislu i jedne od najistaknutijih osoba u međuratnome razdoblju hrvatske povijesti. Iako je Matočec u dosadašnjoj historiografiji učestalo bila predmetom istraživanja biografskoga sadržaja, ovaj rad nudi novi interpretativni okvir kroz perspektivu rodne povijesti kako bi se analiziralo njezino djelovanje u patrijarhalnoj okolini. Kroz sagledavanje i analizu njezinih tekstova, književnih djela i političkih nastupa, ovaj rad istražuje kako je Matočec naglasila potrebe za promjenom položaja žena u hrvatskome društvu, ali i kako je istovremeno pronalazila balans između progresivnih ideja i tradicionalističkog društvenog pristupa. U radu su korišteni analiza diskursa i interpretacija političkog jezika, a autor se oslanja i na teorijsku postavku roda kao društvene organizacije spolne razlike (prema Joan Wallach Scott) te na potrebu vraćanja vidljivosti „nevidljivih“ žena (prema Gerdi Lerner).*

U tom kontekstu, rad tematski obuhvaća međuodnos Matočecinih ideja i ideologije Hrvatske (pučke/republikanske) seljačke stranke. Prikazano je kako je njezino političko djelovanje omogućio Stjepan Radić, kao političar čiji su stavovi sadržavali i liberalne elemente, a takvi su liberalni elementi vidljivi u Ustavu Neutralne Seljačke Republike Hrvatske iz 1921. godine, koji je predviđao ravnopravnost muškaraca i žena. Istovremeno, u radu je vidljiva suprotnost između ovakvog liberalnog Radićevog pristupa i kasnijeg (navodno) konzervativnijeg pristupa Vladka Mačeka, koji je razdvajao politiku kao

* Rad je nastao kao dio istraživanja u okviru institucionalnoga znanstveno-istraživačkoga projekta Fakulteta hrvatskih studija Sveučilišta u Zagrebu br. 260068 „ZAPAMTI - Zavičaj kao prostor kulturna pamćenja: mikrohistorijska, kroatološka i komunikološka istraživanja lokalnih identiteta i kultura“ (CroRiS ID 13340).

primarno muški prostor i ženski prostor doma. Time se jasno ocrtava heterogenost pristupa, tj. heterogenost stavova u Hrvatskoj (pučkoj/republikanskoj) seljačkoj stranci.

Rad sažeto analizira Matočecino zalaganje za žensko pravo glasa i važnost obrazovanja kao početnog procesa emancipacije žena. Njezina se aktivnost pritom interpretira kao pokušaj svojevrsnog buđenja političke i društvene samosvijesti kod žena. Posebno mjesto kroz rad zauzima definiranje njezine emancipacijske misli (ideje), koja se uvelike razlikovala od feminističkih ideja. Precizno definiranje ideja Mare Matočec upravo je poseban doprinos ovoga rada. Pritom kod Matočec ne vidimo odbacivanje patrijarhalnih uloga, već redefiniranje istih. Kao argument za ulazak žena u javnu sferu, ona koristi majčinstvo i važnost žena u svakodnevnom životu. Njezina je ideja bila da žene upravo zbog svojih „dužnosti“ i brige za djecu, dakle buduće naraštaje, moraju biti obrazovane i svjesne političkih događanja. Politički diskurs u njezinom radu obuhvaća pacifističku ideju i agrarističku ideologiju, gdje se žena promatra kao čuvarica narodne kulture i kao ravnopravna muškarcu u „narodnoj borbi“.

Rad obuhvaća preispitivanje „sukoba“ između Tome Jalžabetića i Mare Matočec 1921. godine prilikom održavanja stranačke skupštine u Koprivnici. Analizom izvora i literature, rad sugerira da je incident možda historiografski preuveličan s obzirom na okolnosti izvođenja spomenute skupštine. Bez obzira na potencijalno preuveličavanje, u radu je potvrđena Radićeva predanost obrani ravnopravnosti žena i muškaraca.

Zaključno, ovaj rad sagledava ulogu Mare Matočec u stvaranju svojevrsnog „ruralnog“ oblika prosvjetiteljstva. Aktivnosti Mare Matočec na kulturnom i političkom planu, a u okviru stranačkih ciljeva, bile su projekt osmišljen kako bi se dokinulo marginaliziranje seljanki. Tako nam ostavština Mare Matočec može ponuditi uvid u spajanje morala proizašlog iz tradicije s „naprednim“ (progresivnim) idejama ravnopravnosti muškaraca i žena.

Ovim istraživanjem, potvrđeno je da je Mara Matočec bila glas nevidljivih žena hrvatskih sela, koji je zasigurno sudjelovao u postavljanju temelja za emancipaciju hrvatskih žena.

Ključne riječi: *Mara Matočec, Stjepan Radić, HSS, feminizam, žene, Podravina, međuratno razdoblje.*

WOMEN'S EMANCIPATION IN THE INTELLECTUAL THOUGHT OF MARA MATOČEC

Abstract: *This paper analyzes, for the first time, the conception of the idea of the emancipation of Croatian women in the intellectual thought of Mara Matočec (1886–1967), the first Croatian female politician in the modern sense and one of the most prominent figures in the interwar period of Croatian history. Although Matočec has frequently been the subject of biographical research in*

existing historiography, this paper offers a new interpretive framework through the perspective of gender history to analyze her activities within a patriarchal environment. Through an examination and analysis of her texts, literary works, and political speeches, this study explores how Matočec emphasized the need for changing the status of women in Croatian society, while simultaneously finding a balance between progressive ideas and a traditionalist social approach. The paper utilizes discourse analysis and the interpretation of political language, while the author also relies on the theoretical framework of gender as a social organization of sexual difference (according to Joan Wallach Scott) and the need to restore visibility to „invisible“ women (according to Gerda Lerner).

In this context, the paper thematically covers the interrelationship between Matočec's ideas and the ideology of the Croatian (Peasant/Republican) Peasant Party (HSS). It demonstrates how her political activity was enabled by Stjepan Radić, a politician whose views contained liberal elements, as evidenced in the 1921 Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia, which envisioned equality between men and women. At the same time, the paper highlights the contrast between Radić's liberal approach and the later (allegedly) more conservative approach of Vladko Maček, who separated politics as a primarily male sphere from the female sphere of the home. This clearly illustrates the heterogeneity of approaches and attitudes within the Croatian (Peasant/Republican) Peasant Party.

The paper provides a concise analysis of Matočec's advocacy for women's suffrage and the importance of education as the initial process of women's emancipation. Her activity is interpreted as an attempt to awaken political and social self-awareness among women. A significant portion of the work is dedicated to defining her emancipatory thought (ideas), which differed greatly from feminist ideas. Precisely defining the ideas of Mara Matočec represents a specific contribution of this paper. In Matočec's work, we do not see a rejection of patriarchal roles, but rather their redefinition. She uses motherhood and the importance of women in everyday life as arguments for women's entry into the public sphere. Her idea was that women, precisely because of their „duties“ and care for children—the future generations—must be educated and aware of political events. The political discourse in her work encompasses pacifist ideas and agrarian ideology, where the woman is viewed as the guardian of national culture and as an equal to men in the „national struggle.“

The paper also includes a re-examination of the „conflict“ between Toma Jalžabetić and Mara Matočec in 1921 during a party assembly in Koprivnica. Through the analysis of sources and literature, the paper suggests that the incident may have been historiographically exaggerated given the circumstances of the assembly. Regardless of potential exaggeration, the study confirms Radić's commitment to defending the equality of women and men.

In conclusion, this paper views the role of Mara Matočec in the creation of a kind of „rural“ form of enlightenment. Her cultural and political activities,

within the framework of party goals, were a project designed to end the marginalization of peasant women. Thus, the legacy of Mara Matočec offers insight into the merging of tradition-based morality with „advanced“ (progressive) ideas of equality between men and women. This research confirms that Mara Matočec was the voice of the invisible women of Croatian villages, a voice that undoubtedly played a role in laying the foundations for the emancipation of Croatian women.

Key words: *Mara Matočec, Stjepan Radić, HSS, feminism, women, Podravina, interwar period.*

Uvod

Mara Matočec (1886-1967) bila je prva hrvatska političarka u modernome smislu.¹ Uz to, bila je i književnica te javna djelatnica. Kao takva, predstavlja jednu od najznačajnijih ženskih osoba u hrvatskoj povijesti. Da je tijekom života bila popularna svjedoče, između ostalog, sljedeće riječi Josipa Galekovića iz Mraclina: „Među književnicima sa sela nalazi se i jedna seljakinja. Svakako se može reći da je ta seljakinja najpopularnija žena u Hrvatskoj.“²

O Mari Matočec do sada su pisali povjesničarka Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević te povjesničar i kroatolog Vlatko Smiljanić, u biografskim knjigama o ovoj političarki. Vlatko Smiljanić priredio je i knjigu sabranih djela Mare Matočec. Osim toga, Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević autorica je nekoliko znanstvenih radova o njoj, ali se sadržajni naglasak uvelike stavlja na biografske podatke. Marom Matočec znanstveno se bavio i Vladimir Miholek prikazavši odnos ove podravske političarke s političarem Tomom Jalžabetićem. Žene je općenito u kontekstu Hrvatske (pučke/republikanske) seljačke stranke³ najviše proučavala povjesničarka Suzana Leček, čija se znanstvena djelatnost pretežito usmjerava na stranačke organizacije HSS-a kao što je Seljačka sloga. Dakako, u historiografiji uistinu nedostaju radovi koji bi Maru Matočec sagledali kroz prizmu intelektualne povijesti. Umjesto klasične biografske rekonstrukcije kakva je u historiografiji o Mari Matočec česta, ovaj rad teži razumijevanju kako je rod bio ključan element koji je oblikovao njezino stvaralaštvo i javno djelovanje u patrijarhalnoj sredini. Pritom u analizi posebno mjesto zauzima knjiga povijesnih izvora o njoj, pod naslovom *Sabrana djela Mare Matočec*.

Rodna povijest, koja je kao historijska subdisciplina razvijana primarno od 1970-ih, omogućila je da povjesničari detaljnije analiziraju rodne razlike u

¹ Za biografiju Mare Matočec vidi knjige: Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja i njen rad na socijalno-političkom i kulturno-prosvjetnom polju u okviru seljačkog pokreta braće Radić*, Koprivnica, Zagreb 1993; Vlatko Smiljanić, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska spisateljica, prosvjetno-kulturna aktivistica i političarka. Biografija*, Virovitica 2015.

² M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 7.

³ U radu se dalje spominje kao Hrvatska seljačka stranka (HSS).

oblikovanju različitih životnih iskustava. Kao što je svojim radom o ženskim organizacijama Hrvatske seljačke stranke (HSS) prikazala hrvatska povjesničarka Suzana Leček,⁴ čak i one organizacije koje su djelovale unutar konzervativnih (patrijarhalnih) okvira pridonijele su društvenim promjenama.

Definicija roda, prema teoretičarki Joan Wallach Scott, kao svojevrsne društvene organizacije spolne razlike⁵ omogućuje nam da Maru Matočec promotrimo kao osobu čije su mogućnosti bile uvjetovane određenim društvenim normama i očekivanjima. Time se fokus iz teorijskog kuta prebacuje s biološki određenog spola na konstruirane rodne uloge što nam u kontekstu Mare Matočec može omogućiti jednostavnije razumijevanje njezinih odluka i ponašanja. U tom smislu, moglo bi se reći da se ovaj rad u korektivnom smislu naslanja i na spoznaje Gerde Lerner, koja je istaknula važnost vraćanja „nevidljivih“ ženskih likova.⁶ Time ćemo pokušati ispraviti činjenicu da Mara Matočec još uvijek do sada nije analizirana u smislu praćenja njezine emancipacijske misli⁷.

Ovim radom, opisat će se emancipacijska misao Mare Matočec. Osim toga, bit će odgovoreno na pitanje u kojem je odnosu uloga Mare Matočec bila s rodnim očekivanjima njezinog vremena, koja su ženi nametala ulogu majke i domaćice te kako Matočec argumentira ulazak žene u javnu sferu i gdje su granice njezine emancipacijske ideje u odnosu na patrijarhalni poredak. Samim time, objasniti će se međuodnos emancipacijske ideje Mare Matočec i HSS-a te feminističke ideje. Također, istražiti će se u kojoj je mjeri Matočecino umjetničko (književno) stvaralaštvo bilo način za izražavanje ženskog iskustva ili kritiku patrijarhata. Uzevši sve to u obzir, ovim će se radom pokušati ponuditi novu perspektivu na djelovanje Mare Matočec smještajući je u kontekst borbe za rodnu ravnopravnost tijekom međuratnog razdoblja⁸. Metodološki, rad je pisan analizom argumentacije, tj. diskursa te interpretacijom političkoga jezika koji je korišten u povijesnim izvorima. Povijesni izvori korišteni u analizama sačuvani su u knjizi *Sabrana djela Mare Matočec*, koju je priredio Vlatko Smiljanić te u biografiji Mare Matočec, koju je napisala Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević. Izvori su književno-kulturni tekstovi Mare Matočec u kojima ona tematizira život žena i

⁴ Vidi radove: Suzana Leček, „Dosada se samo polovica hrvatskog naroda borila”. Hrvatska seljačka stranka i žene (1918-1941), *Historijski zbornik*, Vol. 59, Zagreb 2006, 93-130; Suzana Leček, Seljačka sloga i uključivanje žena u seljački pokret (1925-1929), *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu*, Vol. 32-33, br. 1, Zagreb 2000, 293-298.

⁵ Vidi rad: Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, br. 5, Washington D. C. 1986, 1053-1075.

⁶ Vidi knjigu: Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy*, New York, Oxford 1986.

⁷ Emancipacija žena označava proces, tj. procese oslobađanja žena od ograničenja koja su ih stavljala u podređen položaj u odnosu na položaj kakav su imali muškarci. U ovome se radu pod emancipacijskom idejom Mare Matočec označava kako je ona razmišljala o političkim pravima žena, obrazovanju žena, javnoj ulozi žena i ekonomskoj samostalnosti žena, kako bi se dobio jasan uvid u to kakav je razvoj situacije željela za žene u Hrvatskoj.

⁸ Razdoblje između Prvog svjetskog rata i Drugog svjetskog rata.

publicistički tekstovi u kojima piše o svojem javnom djelovanju vezanom uz žene. Uz to, korišteni su novinski izvori i literatura koja je uglavnom biografska.

Hrvatska (pučka/republikanska) seljačka stranka i žene

HSS i njezina ideologija, bile su usko vezane uz političko pozicioniranje njezinih osnivača, Antuna Radića i Stjepana Radića. Ako promatramo položaj žena u ideologiji ove političke stranke, možemo zaključiti da je prostor ideji emancipacije otvoren prvenstveno zahvaljujući zalaganju Stjepana Radića čije su misli o jednakosti ljudi imale određena obilježja liberalizma.⁹ Uz to, bilo mu je poznato da se žene u inozemstvu bore za svoja prava, a njegova je supruga Marija Radić još 1904. godine pisala o položaju žena.¹⁰ U kontekstu toga ponajviše vrijedi istaknuti dokument iz 1921. godine koji je napisao Stjepan Radić, pod naslovom *Državno uređenje ili Ustav Neutralne Seljačke Republike Hrvatske*, čiji članak 7. glasi: „Muškarci i žene imaju u svemu posvema jednaka prava.“¹¹ *Ustav* je bio usvojen i od strane Radićeve političke stranke, a sadržajno je predstavljao način uređenja za hrvatsku seljačku republiku. Veliku važnost za Stjepana Radića imala je i njegova supruga Marija Radić, koja je ujedno bila njegova glavna suradnica u političkom djelovanju. Osim supruge, velik je trag na Radića ostavila njegova majka, koja je u rodnom selu bila itekako poznata po zastupanju seljaka pred različitim činovnicima, tj. pred vlastima.¹²

Unatoč javno prisutnoj konzervativnoj retorici i ograničenim uvjetima za žensko djelovanje, HSS je u javni život i politiku uveo brojne žene. Promjene u odnosu prema HSS-ovkama od strane muškoga dijela stranke nisu bile ubrzane, već su se žene postupno „nametale“ i aktivno doprinosile promjeni konzervativnog mentaliteta. Stranačka ideologija bila je prilagođena tradicionalnom patrijarhalnom mentalitetu većine ondašnjeg seoskog stanovništva, a ženino dostojanstvo i prava branila su se pozivanjem na ulogu majke, domaćice i čuvarice kulture, što je ženama omogućavalo da se u politički život uključe unutar patrijarhalnog okvira. Takvo gledanje na ženu logično je s obzirom da su pozivanje na dom i obitelj neki od najčešćih izraza u govorima HSS-ovih političara.¹³ Također, na primjeru sjednice Glavnoga odbora Hrvatske pučke seljačke stranke (HPSS) u rujnu 1917. godine, vidimo da stav o ovoj temi nije bio ujednačen među članstvom. Primjerice, Vladko Maček nije bio sklon

⁹ Bruno Šagi, H(P/R)SS i Venstre: Hrvatska politika po danskom uzoru?, *Liberalizam: teorija i povijest jedne ideje. Zbornik radova povodom 300 godina od rođenja Adama Smitha 1723-2023*, Zbornik radova, Zagreb 2024, 121-134.

¹⁰ Mira Kolar, Podravka Mara Matočec, prva seljačka književnica i političarka u hrvatskom seljačkom pokretu (1918-1940), *Podravina: časopis za multidisciplinarna istraživanja*, Vol. 6, br. 12, Samobor 2007, 6.

¹¹ Dragutin Žanić (ur), *Tako je govorio Stjepan Radić*, Vinkovci 1991, 26.

¹² Vidi knjigu: Stjepan Radić, *Praški zapisi. Autobiografska proza*, Zagreb 1985.

¹³ Vidi rad: S. Leček, „*Dosada se samo polovica hrvatskog naroda borila*“, 93-130.

davanju prava glasa ženama, a neki su članovi bili protiv jer nisu željeli da žene budu u „političkom blatu i kalu“. S druge strane, Stjepan Radić je u svojem nastupu naglasio da su muška i ženska duša jednake te da se stranku i narod slabi ako se žene isključuju kao kod Turaka i Azijata. Od Radića je još radikalniji bio Josip Gjuračić koji je bio za sveopće žensko izborno pravo, dok je svoj govor završio izjavom da bi on, s obzirom na odgojnu ulogu žene, ženama dao i pravo na dva glasa. Većinom glasova ipak je prihvaćen sljedeći stav HPSS-ovaca: „Sve udate žene imaju aktivno pravo glasa kao i mužkarci s navršenom 20. godinom, isto tako sve udovice. Za udate žene može glasovati i njihov muž; isto tako žena može glasovati za muža. Neudate žene (djevojke) imaju pravo glasa, ako su svršile koju srednju školu, ili ako samostalno vode svoje gospodarstvo.“¹⁴ Na taj način, jasno je da stranka ovdje politički nije obuhvatila ideju općeg prava glasa. Za međuratno razdoblje, povjesničarka Suzana Leček piše da su žene, neovisno o tome što nisu imale pravo glasa, mogle utjecati na svoje muževe: „Iako žene nisu imale jednaku ulogu u javnom životu, imale su i te kako važnu u obiteljskom, pa je protivljenje žene većem muževom angažiranju u nekoj od djelatnosti koje je pokretala HSS, često značilo i njegovo odustajanje.“¹⁵ Sličnu tvrdnju je u kontekstu djelovanja Mare Matočec i njezinog utjecaja na žene napisala povjesničarka Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević: „Iako žene nisu imale pravo glasa, stihove Mare Matočec su žene čitale, jer u Podravini gotovo da i nije bilo nepismenih žena, pa su one iako formalno nisu bile glasači na izborima imale itekako velik utjecaj na muške učesnike na izborima.“¹⁶

HSS je tijekom vremena sve više otvarao vrata ženama pa je općepoznato da je stranka imala i ženske organizacije (djelovale su 1927-1929. godine, a kasnije su obnovljene) od kojih je najaktivnija bila Hrvatsko srce, osnovana 1936. godine. O djelovanju ženskih organizacija saznajemo iz stranačkih glasila pa je tako ostalo sačuvano da je namjena bila organiziranje analfabetskih tečajeva za žene, buđenje svijesti o ravnopravnosti žena i muškaraca i zalaganje za žensko pravo glasa.¹⁷ U pozivu za učlanjenje u Sveučilišnu organizaciju HRSS-a iz 1922. godine, vidimo da je prostor za učlanjenje bio moguć i ženama, dakle „akademičarkama“, a ne samo „akademičarima“.¹⁸ Ova je organizacija tijekom 1930-ih čak i otvorila posebnu sekciju za studentice koja je okupila velik broj zainteresiranih.¹⁹ Uz to, velik je broj žena bio uključen u aktivnosti preko organizacije Seljačka sloga (djelovala je 1925-1929. godine i 1935-1941. godine) u kojoj su se mnoge od njih dodatno obrazovale i u kojoj je istaknutu ulogu imala

¹⁴ Hrvatski seljački narod i osnova zakona o sveobćem izbornom pravu, *Dom: Glavne novine Hrvatske pučke seljačke stranke*, God. XI, br. 36, Zagreb, 18. 9. 1917, 1-2.

¹⁵ S. Leček, *Seljačka sloga i uključivanje žena*, 295.

¹⁶ Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević, Mara Matočec i žene, *Podravina: časopis za multidisciplinarna istraživanja*, Vol. 17, br. 34, Samobor 2018, 69.

¹⁷ Marija Radić, Zagrebačka ženska organizacija HSS, *Dom: Glavno glasilo hrvatske seljačke politike*, God. XXI, br. 11, Zagreb, 16. 3. 1927, 4.

¹⁸ Proglas Omladinske organizacije HRSS na Sveučilištu, *Obzor*, God. LXIII, br. 270, Zagreb, 4. 10. 1922, 3.

¹⁹ *Seljačka mladica. List sveučilišne omladine H. S. S.*, God. IV, br. 2, Zagreb, 16. 12. 1939, 6.

Mara Matočec. Ipak, prema aktivnostima je jasno vidljivo da su žene bile zadržane u okviru prosvjetnih, kulturnih i humanitarnih djelatnosti.²⁰ Takvo stanje potvrđuje Scottino razmišljanje o rodu kao načinu označavanja odnosa moći, točnije, dok su se muškarci mogli baviti praktičnom politikom, žene su bile ograničavane na određeni produžetak njihove uloge iz privatne sfere što je odraz patrijarhalne dominacije. Sve većem aktiviranju žena u okviru HSS-a kroz vrijeme svjedoči upravo Mara Matočec koja je 1941. godine napisala da je dugo vremena radila sama s muškarcima, ali da se situacija promijenila jer su se žene iz različitih hrvatskih krajeva aktivirale.²¹ Osim žena, u okviru HSS-ovog djelovanja aktivirale su se djevojčice što vidimo u pjesmama koje su već ranih 1920-ih objavljivale u novinama *Slobodni dom. Glavne novine Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke* gdje su svoje pjesničke radove, primjerice, objavile učenice Emilija Lovrenčević i Marica Kovačić.²² Edukaciju žena vrlo je važnom smatrao i Stjepan Radić koji je upravo s tim ciljem na hrvatski jezik preveo knjigu *Djevojački svijet. Izabrane pripoviesti čeških spisateljica* još i prije osnivanja HPSS-a.²³ Stoga je jasno da se stranka ovoj temi vrlo ozbiljno posvetila.

Žene su pravo glasa na izborima ostvarile tek 1945. godine. Naravno, to ne znači da žensko pravo glasa nije bilo aktualnim političkim pitanjem u nekom trenutku prije. U Kraljevini SHS zakonski uređeno pravo glasa bilo je sljedeće: „Pravo biranja poslanika za Ustavotvornu Skupštinu ima svaki muškarac, koji je do početka sastavljanja biračkih spiskova navršio 21. godinu i koji je u tom času bio državljanin kraljevstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca...“²⁴ Kada je u parlament dospjela rasprava o ovoj temi (12. i 14. lipnja 1920), a posljedično i glasanje, rezultat je bio takav da je 253 poslanika glasalo protiv ženskog prava glasa na izborima, dok je 36 poslanika podržalo žensko pravo glasa. Pravo glasa podržali su socijalisti, republikanci i „Jugoslavenski klub“. Kritike su uglavnom bile upućene na to da žene aktivno ne traže pravo glasa kao što je bila situacija u nekim drugim mjestima u Europi.²⁵ HSS u ovome nije sudjelovala jer je stranka bojkotirala parlamentarno djelovanje. Iako je jasno da je HSS podržala ideju ženskog prava glasa preko ranije spomenutog *Ustava Neutralne Seljačke*

²⁰ Suzana Leček, Priča o uspjehu – strategija i metode političke borbe HSS-a (1918-1941), 110 godina Hrvatske seljačke stranke, Zbornik radova, Zagreb 2015, 39-40. Za primjere aktivnosti žena u okviru Seljačke sloge vidi knjigu: Suzana Leček, *Seljačka sloga u Slavoniji, Srijemu i Baranji (1925-1941)*, Slavonski Brod 2005.

²¹ Vlatko Smiljanić (ur), Najveća zadovoljština. Pred Glavnu skupštinu Seljačke sloge 30. III. 1941, *Sabrana djela Mare Matočec*, Zagreb 2017, 104-105.

²² Emilija Lovrenčević, Naša nada i sreća, *Slobodni dom. Glavne novine Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke*, God. XV, br. 38, Zagreb, 19. 9. 1921, 1; Marica Kovačić, Republikanstvo, *Slobodni dom. Glavne novine Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke*, God XVI, br. 25, Zagreb, 18. 6. 1922, 1.

²³ Vidi knjigu: Stjepan Radić, *Djevojački svijet. Izabrane pripoviesti čeških spisateljica*, Zagreb 1902.

²⁴ Žensko biračko pravo i naše Narodno Predstavništvo, *Ženska misao. List za prosvjetu, socijalni rad i organizaciju*, br. 5-6, Zagreb, 15. 7. 1920, 65.

²⁵ Isto, 65-72.

Republike Hrvatske, u stranačkom glasilu *Slobodni dom* vidimo da se u raspravama radila razlika između „gospodskih“ i gradskih žena te žena radnika i seljaka. Na taj način slika žene nije uvjetovana samo rodom, već i svojevrsnom pripadnosti nekom društvenom sloju. To posebice možemo primijetiti u članku Stjepana Kranjčevića iz 1921. godine. S jedne strane, Kranjčević idealizira ženu radnika i seljaka kao vjernu partnericu u svakom poslu, dok istovremeno kritizira žene iz grada kao one koje manje rade i u koje se muškarci ne mogu pouzdati jer gradske gospođe ustvari ne poštuju muškarce. Ovo je, naravno, bila pretjerana ocjena. Pritom autor radi i usporedbu Zapadne Europe kao mjesta gdje žene nemaju politička prava i Rusije u kojoj žene imaju „dužnost sudjelovati u upravi državom“. U ovoj usporedbi ustvari možemo vidjeti da je autor pokušao kritizirati Zapad kao „gospodski“ i pohvaliti Rusiju kao seljačku i radničku državu. Uređenjem seljačke države, žene bi prema tome dobile prava i na hrvatskom prostoru. Kao rezultat usporedbe, Kranjčević daje jasan zaključak: „Politička se prava u obće ne daju, ona se moraju – izvojštititi.“²⁶ Dakle, prava prema Kranjčeviću ne bi trebala biti dana na temelju ženskih prosvjeda kakvi su se organizirali u Zapadnoj Europi, već marljivim radom i pomaganjem muškarcu. Primjećuje se da je Kranjčević u potpunosti ignorirao povijesni razvoj sela i gradova, a samim time i količinu, opseg ili vrstu poslova kakvi su dostupni na selu ili u gradu.

Usporedbe žena iz različitih društvenih slojeva primjetne su i u radu Mare Matočec. U njezinoj su pjesmi *Tri majke*, socijalni položaj radničke majke i seljačke majke suprotstavljeni socijalnom položaju građanske majke.²⁷ Na Prvom ženskom seljačkom kongresu (1937) pozvala se također na razliku između žena sa sela i žena iz grada: „Nek nemaju samo gospodske gradske žene svoje sastanke, zborove, nego i mi seljačke žene, čija je inteligencija starija od svojih grofovskih i plemićkih titula.“²⁸ Osim toga, u Matočecinom proznom tekstu *Meni ne treba tvoja vura*, primjećuje se žaljenje protagonista za neravnopravnim tretiranjem žena sa sela jer u knjizi o znamenitim ženama koja se spominje u djelu, nije navedena nijedna seljakinja.²⁹

Ideološke postavke unutar kojih se žena naglašavala kao ona koja je vezana uz dom i obitelj, nisu bile karakteristične samo za HSS, već i za mnoge druge seljačke/agrarne stranke u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi. Razlog za to leži u činjenici što su agraristi gledali na obitelj kao na temeljnu jedinicu društva za razliku od liberalnih ideologa koji su naglasak stavljali na slobodnoga

²⁶ Stjepan Kranjčević, Zašto gospodske žene u zapadnoj Evropi još uvijek nemaju pravo glasa, *Slobodni dom: Glavne novine Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke*, God. XV, br. 20, Zagreb, 18. 5. 1921, 3.

²⁷ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Tri majke*, *Sabrana djela*, 76-77.

²⁸ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Prvi ženski seljački kongres*, *Sabrana djela*, 114.

²⁹ M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Meni ne treba tvoja vura*, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 104-106.

pojedinka.³⁰ Na tragu toga bio je i vjerojatni stav predsjednika HSS-a, Vladka Mačeka, u intervjuu iz 1938. godine kojega su s njim napravile suradnice antifašističkih novina *Žena danas*, a koji prema onome što piše nije objavljen te godine zbog cenzure, ali ga 1944. godine prenosi *Žena u borbi: glasilo Antifašističke fronte žena Hrvatske*. Naravno, ovaj je članak objavljen kako bi se Mačeka u vremenu Drugoga svjetskog rata prikazalo u negativnom svjetlu i pohvalilo komuniste, što je vidljivo zbog antimačkovskog narativa. Uzevši u obzir sve ove podatke, izvoru je potrebno pristupiti s oprezom. Može se reći da je Maček ženu (navodno) strogo gledao u okviru doma i obitelji što vidimo iz njegove (navodne) rečenice: „Za ženu je kuća, a za muškarca politika.“ Osim toga, Maček je (navodno) bio mnogo direktniji u rečenici: „Tko bi se na primjer brinuo za moju kuću i djecu kako bi se moja gospođa počela baviti politikom. Kuća i djeca to je nešto najljepše za ženu, jer žena izvan kućnog ognjišta izgubila bi sve ono što je resi kao ženu.“³¹

Mara Matočec i emancipacija žena

Obrazovanje kao preduvjet emancipacije

U uvodu ovoga rada spomenuto je da je Mara Matočec bila značajna žena u hrvatskoj povijesti. Da je u vrijeme kada je djelovala bila vrlo poznata među hrvatskim ženama svjedoči nam činjenica da je o njoj napisan članak u *Ženskom listu*, čija je autorica bila poznata hrvatska književnica Marija Jurić Zagorka. Popularnost Mare Matočec izvan lokalnog okvira, u članku izvrsno opisuje rečenica: „Znade ju čitava okolica – znade ju sva Slavonija – a znadu je i svi krajevi duž čitave Hrvatske – svuda gdje seljaci imaju svoja pjevačka i prosvjetna društva.“³² Iako je bila vrlo poznata u hrvatskim krajevima, svoju čvrstu duhovnu vezanost za selo nikada nije otpisala što je Zagorka objasnila na sljedeći način: „Ona je živi dokumenat seljačke duhovne snage, dokaz njegovog pjesničkog i duhovnog stvaralačkog talenta.“³³ Otkrivanjem spomenika posvećenog Mari Matočec u Koriji 2009. godine, njezino je djelovanje honorirano u javnome prostoru Republike Hrvatske.³⁴ Ovaj spomenik bio je rađen po uzoru na spomenik Đuri Basaričeku u Okrugljači, čije je podizanje 1928. godine inicirala upravo Mara Matočec.³⁵

³⁰ Johan Eellend, *Agrarianism and Modernization in Inter-War Eastern Europe, Societal change and ideological formation among the rural population of the Baltic area 1880-1939*, Zbornik radova, Huddinge 2008, 47-48.

³¹ Bosiljka Krajačić, *Od obmane do izdaje, Žena u borbi: glasilo Antifašističke fronte žena Hrvatske*, God. II, br. 7, ožujak 1944, 5.

³² Marija Jurić Zagorka, *Kad spremi motiku – uzima pero, Ženski list*, God. XI, br. 5, Zagreb, svibanj 1935, 9.

³³ *Isto*, 9.

³⁴ V. Smiljanić, *Mara Matočec*, 127-139.

³⁵ *Isto*, 63-67.

Tijekom djelovanja, Mara Matočec uspjela se profilirati kao javnosti poznata političarka koja se zalagala za poboljšanje položaja žena. Prvi poznati javni politički govor Mare Matočec nije bio u Koprivnici 1921. godine kako to tvrdi povjesničarka Suzana Leček,³⁶ već je bio na skupštini HSS-a u veljači 1919. godine o čemu piše Rudolf Horvat: „Ona govori o bijednom položaju žene, u koji je zapala zbog današnjeg nasljednog prava. Po tome pravu dobiva žena iza muževe smrti jednu četvrtinu zemlje, i to samo u tom slučaju, ako imade svoje djece. Traži sva prava za žene, koja uživaju i muškarci, a u prvom redu pravo glasa.“³⁷ Pravo glasa za žene Mara Matočec je tražila javno i kroz svoje kasnije djelovanje. Recimo, krajem 1937. godine je u intervjuu s engleskom novinarkom *miss* Boem poslala poruku muškarcima: „Vi, muži, ne bute ništa postigli, dok žena ne dobije pravo glasa.“³⁸ U listu *Naša žena* iste je godine objavljen jedan od najpoznatijih članaka Mare Matočec, pod naslovom *Žena i politika*. U njemu piše da je ženska politička aktivnost potrebna i da se ženi aktivnost i izricanje mišljenja ne smije braniti, već se nju u djelovanju treba ohrabriti: „Dužnost je dakle svakoga pristaše seljačke stranke, svakog Hrvata i svakog pametnog čovjeka, da ženu u njenom nastojanju, da se politički uputi i prosvijetli, osokoli, a ne da joj baca klipove pod noge!“³⁹ Osim toga, Mara Matočec u svojem je djelovanju govorila i o potrebama za jednakost prosvjete muškaraca i žena iz praktičnih razloga što vidimo u njezinoj rečenici: „Ženi isto treba prosvjeta kao i muškarcu. Jer dogodi se, da ostaje udova, ili je muž bolestan – i svašta se može dogoditi – pa kuku lele ženi, koja se ne zna snaći. I uz znanje zlo, a bez znanja stoput gore.“⁴⁰

Sukob s Tomom Jalžabetićem?

Velika skupština u Koprivnici 1921. godine zanimljiv je historiografski problem koji Maru Matočec stavlja u središte zbivanja. S jedne strane, povjesničarke Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević i Suzana Leček te povjesničar i kroatolog Vlatko Smiljanić, ovaj događaj opisuju kao dokaz gdje se Maru Matočec uvrijedilo na temelju roda. Prema njihovim interpretacijama, Tomo Jalžabetić se usprotivio kada je za govornicu trebala stupiti Mara Matočec (razlog je prema njima bio to što je Matočec žena) pa je Stjepan Radić stao u njezinu obranu.⁴¹ No ako analiziramo izvore, vidimo da je Vladimir Miholek vjerojatno ispravno primijetio da se radilo o preuveličavanju situacije.⁴² Glavni dokaz za to

³⁶ S. Leček, „*Dosada se samo polovica hrvatskog naroda borila*“, 104.

³⁷ Rudolf Horvat, *Hrvatska na mučilištu*, Zagreb 1942, 67.

³⁸ M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 41.

³⁹ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Žena i politika, Sabrana djela*, 103.

⁴⁰ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Prvi ženski seljački kongres, Sabrana djela*, 113.

⁴¹ M. Kolar, *Podravka Mara Matočec*, 10; S. Leček, „*Dosada se samo polovica hrvatskog naroda borila*“, 104; V. Smiljanić, *Mara Matočec*, 37.

⁴² Vidi rad: Vladimir Miholek, *Odnos Mare Matočec i Tome Jalžabetića, Podravina: časopis za multidisciplinarna istraživanja*, Vol. 17, br. 34, Samobor 2018, 75-81.

pronalazimo u jednome od tekstova Mare Matočec, u kojem je napisala da se Tomo Jalžabetić bunio da na skupu govore i žene zato što je prema njemu bilo kasno da govore još i žene, dakle skupština je prema njemu očito dugo trajala. Ipak, ostalo je zabilježeno da je Stjepan Radić odgovorio: „Tko je protiv ženama, ne spada k nama, nije dionik našeg programa, jer da nije žena, ni današnje slave nebi bilo. Tu su puno radile žene naše, sestre i majke naše.“⁴³ Tu Radićevu rečenicu citira većina autora koja piše o ovoj temi. Vlatko Smiljanić napisao je da je Matočec poslije ove Radićeve „intervencije“ govorila o želji žena da sudjeluju u političkim aktivnostima te o socijalnim temama vezanim uz obitelj.⁴⁴ No potrebno je spomenuti da govoru Mare Matočec stranački tisak (*Slobodni dom*) nije posvetio pažnju. U novinama *Slobodni dom*, Juraj Krnjević objavio je izvještaj o ovoj skupštini koja se održala u Koprivnici, na trgu ispred vijećnice, 8. svibnja 1921. godine. Izvještaj nam donosi vijesti o sudionicima, broju ljudi i trajanju skupštine, ali je zanimljivo da se Mara Matočec u ovome tekstu uopće ne spominje. U Koprivnicu su toga dana stigli: Stjepan Radić, Marija Radić, gospođa Barić (američka Hrvatica čije ime ne saznavamo) i nekoliko narodnih zastupnika (Kovačević, Crnčić, Crlenjak, Adžija, Hajzler, Robić i Kraljević). Njih su dočekali gradonačelnik Ivan Kraljić, izaslanstva nekih organizacija i neki od narodnih zastupnika (Jalžabetić, Vrtar, Lovreković, Šalamun, Pancer, Škrinjar, Čižmenović i Lakuš). Moguće je da je Mara Matočec bila dio jednoga od izaslanstava organizacija, no za to nemamo jasnu potvrdu u ovome tekstu. Nadalje, Krnjević je napisao da je skupština trajala dva sata i trideset minuta, da se skupilo preko 30.000 ljudi i da su govornici bili brojni: „Za Radićem govorio je zastupnik Pancer, Medjimurac a za njim gdja Barić i prisutni narodni zastupnici, svaki par minuta.“⁴⁵ Moguće je da Mara Matočec nije spomenuta u ovom Krnjevićevom izvještaju zbog Jalžabetićevog „incidenta“ koji je prethodio njezinom nastupu. Uzevši sve argumente u obzir, ovaj slučaj ne možemo definirati kao obrazac stranačkoga odnosa prema ženama, već kao historiografski prijemor koji je nastao zbog manjka analize svih potrebnih povijesnih izvora. Uz to, iz izvora je jasno da su žene imale pristup govoriti na tom događanju što nam daje dodatan uvid u političku kulturu stranke Stjepana Radića. Međutim, Jalžabetićev se otpor može interpretirati kroz prizmu Joan Wallach Scott, kao pokušaj stavljanja rodni granica u javni prostor gdje se u ovom slučaju muškarce naglašava kao one za koje bi slušateljstvo trebalo imati vremena u usporedbi sa ženama za koje, prema njemu, vremena nije bilo.

⁴³ V. Smiljanić (ur), Radićeve izreke, *Sabrana djela*, 97-99.

⁴⁴ V. Smiljanić, *Mara Matočec*, 37.

⁴⁵ Juraj Krnjević, Veličanstvena manifestacija seljačke republikanske misli u Koprivnici, *Slobodni dom: Glavno glasilo Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke*, God. XV, br. 20, Zagreb, 18. 5. 1921, 3.

Majčinstvo kao legitimacijski argument

Mara Matočec svoju je početnu prepoznatljivost stekla temeljem pjesme *Sibiriji* koja je objavljena u novinama *Dom*, u siječnju 1915. godine, tijekom Prvoga svjetskog rata u kojem je izgubila supruga. Ova pjesma bila je posvećena suprugu koji se nije vratio s bojišta.⁴⁶ Razlog slanja ove pjesme u novine ležao je u činjenici da je Stjepan Radić pozvao žene da svoje pjesme šalju u stranački list. Tako osim Mare Matočec mnoge žene dobivaju prostor za umjetničko izražavanje što postaje kontinuitet u djelovanju HSS-a. Prema tadašnjem zakonom o nasljeđivanju, u slučaju Mare Matočec, tri četvrtine zemlje bilo bi vraćeno obitelji preminulog muškarca čime je ona kao udovica financijski bila znatno ugrožena. Mnogo ljudi pomagalo je Mari Matočec da preživi siromaštvo, a ona je u konačnici iz Đurđevca preselila u Koriju uz pomoć HSS-ovca Đure Basaričeka i njegove akcije za kolonizacijom.⁴⁷ S obzirom da je bila žena čije su životne uvjete uvelike obilježile ratne strahote, među izvorima pronalazimo njezin rukopis pod naslovom *Nećemo rata* u kojem, između ostalog, piše: „A mi žene cijeloga svijeta tražimo, da se i nas pita, pa da se u svijetu ne dogovaraju takvi slučajevi bez kojih bi čovječanstvo moglo biti i živjeti životom dostojnoga života. Jer žene i majke neće rata. Hoće sveti mir i u njemu rad i sretan život.“⁴⁸ Ovime vidimo da je rad prve hrvatske političarke zaokružen i u ideji pacifizma, ali i da je svoje političke stavove i političke poruke uvelike plasirala kroz pisana djela, neovisno o tome je li riječ o pjesmi ili rukopisu.

Majčinstvo je kao tema u njezinom djelovanju zauimalo jedno od ključnih mjesta kod promišljanja o ženama. Mara Matočec se, kao što ćemo pokazati, često pozivala na tradicionalnu rodnu ulogu majke koja „uzgaja djecu i buduće političke borce“⁴⁹. Takvu tematiku uklopila je u svoje tekstove, ali i predavanja. Kao primjer predavanja ističe se ono organizirano u prosincu 1936. godine na Pučkom sveučilištu gdje je gostovala sa svojim prijateljem, HSS-ovcem i seljačkim književnikom, Mihovilom Pavlekom Miškinom. Na tome je predavanju Mara Matočec slušateljima prikazala život seljakinja od djetinjstva do starosti, a slušatelje je upoznala i s brojnim narodnim poslovicama, razlikama između običaja u hrvatskim krajevima te ulogom majke.⁵⁰ Neke je od svojih tekstova posvetila upravo ženama iz pojedinih hrvatskih krajeva. Tako se ističu pjesma *Sestri iz Dalmatinske Zagore za Uskrs*⁵¹, posvećena siromašnim ženama Dalmatinske zagore, te rukopis *Istrijanka*⁵², posvećen ženi koja se vraća u svoju

⁴⁶ Podatke o pjesmi i pjesmu vidi u: V. Smiljanić (ur), *Sabrana djela*.

⁴⁷ M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 9-10.

⁴⁸ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Nećemo rata, Sabrana djela*, 34.

⁴⁹ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Žena i politika, Sabrana djela*, 103.

⁵⁰ M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 36-37.

⁵¹ M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Sestri iz Dalmatinske Zagore za Uskrs, Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 85.

⁵² V. Smiljanić (ur), *Istrijanka, Sabrana djela*, 47-48.

slobodnu Istru. Situaciju u pojedinim krajevima Matočec je saznala i putovanjima, koja nisu bila samo po Hrvatskoj.

Seljačka sloga je krajem 1930-ih poslala Maru Matočec u Bosnu, gdje je seljacima i seljakinjama u svrhu prosvjete držala govore i razgovarala s njima.⁵³ U jednom od tekstova o Bosni, primijetila je da se žene u Bosni „po turskom običaju (...) drži za nešto niže“, ali je iznenađujuća njezina rečenica u kojoj piše da je tamošnjim ženama rekla da žene nisu za politiku: „Nismo mi žene za politiku, ali kao žene i majke moramo biti prosviećene, da budemo pomoć muževima i sinovima u narodnom poslu.“⁵⁴ Ne može se dokazati što je ovdje Matočec željela poručiti i zašto je ovo rekla s obzirom da je općenito zagovarala politički angažman žena. Ipak, može se pretpostaviti da je ova rečenica bila potaknuta još tradicionalnijom sredinom nego što je bila ona podravska, točnije hrvatska pa da je u svojoj rečenici prosvjetu žena u takvoj sredini stavila ispred političke aktivnosti. Žene iz Bosne koje su bile muslimanke, Matočec je smatrala sestrama, a kroz pjesmu *Sestri muslimanki* poslala je snažnu političku poruku jedinstva gdje je muslimanku prikazala kao kćer majke koja se zove Hrvatska.⁵⁵

Teške socijalne prilike hrvatskih sela možda su najbolje opisane u rukopisu *Sladoled*⁵⁶ koji tematizira situaciju kada majka djetetu zbog siromaštva ne može dati novac za sladoled. Tekstovi ove podravske književnice i političarke izazivali su snažne emocije i oslikavali tešku seljačku svakodnevicu međuratnog razdoblja. Isticanje majčinstva kao snažnog i emotivnog elementa za emancipaciju često se pojavljuje u djelovanju Mare Matočec. Ona to nije smatrala samo političkim izrazom, već i svojom ženskom dužnošću, što je razlikuje od mnogih pripadnica drugih ženskih (npr. feminističkih) pokreta i stavlja je u okvir ranije spomenutih agrarističkih ideja: „Nekoji kažu, da je za nas kuhača, kuća i djeca. Pa mi ne bježimo od svojih ženskih dužnosti. Ali baš zato, što smo žene i majke, treba da zavirimo i dalje malo – u selo, u pokrajinu, domovinu i u svijet...“⁵⁷ Ovdje vidimo jasnu suprotnost između (građanskog) feminizma, koji ženu vidi kao slobodnu pojedinku neovisnu od obiteljskog statusa. Uz to, ako pogledamo fotografije, vidimo da je Mara Matočec bila obučena u tradicionalnu žensku seljačku odjeću. Na glavi je nosila rubac po čemu je bila upečatljiva „predstavica“ seljakinja. U kasnijim vremenima rubac su počele nositi i pripadnice jugoslavenskog antifašističkog (komunističkog) pokreta, primjerice političarka Kata Pejnović, što predstavlja svojevrsni kontinuitet želje za što autentičnijim predstavljanjem seljakinja i njihovim okupljanjem u političkom pokretu.

Vrijednost tekstova Mare Matočec leži i u činjenici da su u njima ostale sačuvane rečenice o tome kako je Stjepan Radić gledao na žene. U jednom od tekstova iz 1939. godine naglašava se da još uvijek ima puno onih koji se

⁵³ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Moj put po Bosni, Sabrana djela*, 123-126.

⁵⁴ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Nema straha – prestaje mrak...dojmovi s puta po Bosni, Sabrana djela*, 111.

⁵⁵ M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Sestri muslimanki, Mara Matočec. Hrvatska književnica-seljakinja*, 108.

⁵⁶ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Sladoled, Sabrana djela*, 75.

⁵⁷ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Prvi ženski seljački kongres, Sabrana djela*, 113.

nazivaju Radićevim sljedbenicima, a ne tretiraju žene onako kako je Radić govorio: „Jednu poštivaj kao sveticu – to ti je majka – drugu nemoj ni cvijetom da udariš, to ti je žena, družica tvojih boli i jada, patnja i nada. A što je najglavnije, majka dječice tvoje. A svaku treću poštivaj kao vitez, kavalir, poštivaj ju kao sestru – čuvaj čast i poštenje njezino.“⁵⁸ Prema tome, vidimo da je emancipacija žena na selu krajem 1930-ih još uvijek bila daleko od idealnog. Pri tome je potrebno naglasiti i da je Vladko Maček kao predsjednik HSS-a (od 1928. godine) znatno manje stavljao fokus na emancipaciju žena ako bismo ga usporedili s njegovim prethodnikom Stjepanom Radićem što je zasigurno ostavilo tragova u društvu.

Zaključak

Mara Matočec nije bila samo pasivni sudionik političkih događanja, već prva hrvatska političarka u modernom smislu čije je djelovanje uvelike nadilazilo tradicionalne rodne uloge toga vremena. Njezin put pokazuje da je emancipacija žena u međuratnom razdoblju velikim dijelom bila vezana uz ideologiju i rad HSS-a, ali i da je Matočec takvu ideologiju koristila za svoje djelovanje. Kroz analiziranje njezinih nastupa i književnih radova, primjećuje se da je ona uspješno iskoristila unutarstranački prostor koji joj je otvorio Stjepan Radić, čiji su stavovi o ravnopravnosti muškaraca i žena sadržavali elemente liberalizma „formalizirane“ u njegovom *Ustavu* iz 1921. godine.

Emancipacijska misao Mare Matočec specifična je po tome što se nije temeljila na potpunom raskidu s patrijarhalnim uređenjem, tj. patrijarhalnim poretkom, već na njegovom svojevrsnom redefiniranju. Ona je koristila tradicionalnu rodnu ulogu žene kao majke, domaćice i čuvarice kulture kako bi opravdala ulazak žene u javnu sferu. Majčinstvo u njezinom djelovanju nije predstavljalo prepreku, već moralni argument za političku aktivnost. Ona je tvrdila da upravo zbog svojih „ženskih dužnosti“ i brige za djecu, žene trebaju moći imati uvid u događanja na lokalnoj, nacionalnoj i globalnoj razini. Takav pristup bio je različit od feminizma, jer je njezino djelovanje bilo ukorijenjeno u „klasnu“ seljačku svijest, pacifističku i agrarističku ideologiju koja je obitelj promatrala kao osnovnu jedinicu društva.

Ovaj rad potvrđuje i da je Matočec djelovala u ideološki heterogenom okruženju kada je u pitanju položaj žena. Dok je uživala potporu Stjepana Radića, u kasnijim vremenima sama ističe da ima onih koji se nazivaju Radićevim sljedbenicima, a ne poštuju žene. Unatoč tim „ograničenjima“, njezina borba za pravo glasa i jednaku prosvjetu bila je prisutna, a njezina popularnost u narodu, o kojoj je svjedočila i Marija Jurić Zagorka, potvrđuje da je dopirala izvan lokalnog virovitičkog ili regionalnog podravskog okvira.

⁵⁸ V. Smiljanić (ur), *Ne dajmo se smesti, Sabrana djela*, 137-138.

Doprinos Podravke Mare Matočec u razvoju emancipacijske misli u Hrvatskoj od velike je važnosti jer je upravo ona bila glas žena koje su u historiografiji često ostajale nevidljivima. Njezino umjetničko stvaralaštvo i javni nastupi (govori ili predavanja) služili su kao sredstvo za prijenos znanja i iskustva ili kritiku društvenog stanja. Time je Mara Matočec neizostavna osoba među onima koji su postavljali temelje za ravnopravnost muškaraca i žena na hrvatskom prostoru. Rad Mare Matočec predstavlja dokaz da se borba za prava žena na hrvatskom selu događala sa specifičnim elementima koji su poštovali tradiciju, ali istovremeno transformirali društvo.

Summary

Mara Matočec was not merely a passive participant in political events, but the first Croatian female politician in the modern sense, whose activities largely transcended the traditional gender roles of that time. Her path demonstrates that the emancipation of women in the interwar period was largely linked to the ideology and work of the HSS (Croatian Peasant Party), but also that Matočec utilized this ideology for her own actions. Through the analysis of her appearances and literary works, it is evident that she successfully utilized the internal party space opened to her by Stjepan Radić, whose views on the equality of men and women contained elements of liberalism „formalized“ in his 1921 Constitution.

Mara Matočec's emancipatory thought is specific in that it was not based on a complete break with the patriarchal system, but rather on its peculiar redefinition. She employed the traditional gender roles of a woman as a mother, housewife, and guardian of culture to justify women's entry into the public sphere. In her work, motherhood did not represent an obstacle, but rather a moral argument for political activity. She argued that precisely because of their „female duties“ and care for children, women must be able to have insight into events at the local, national, and global levels. This approach differed from feminism, as her activity was rooted in a „class-based“ peasant consciousness, as well as a pacifist and agrarian ideology that viewed the family as the basic unit of society.

This paper also confirms that Matočec operated within an ideologically heterogeneous environment regarding the status of women. While she enjoyed the support of Stjepan Radić, in later times she herself pointed out that there were those who called themselves Radić's followers but did not respect women. Despite these „limitations,“ her struggle for suffrage and equal education was persistent, and her popularity among the people, as witnessed by Marija Jurić Zagorka, confirms that her influence reached beyond the local Virovitica or regional Podravina frameworks.

The contribution of Mara Matočec from Podravina to the development of emancipatory thought in Croatia is of great importance, as she was the voice of women who often remained invisible in historiography. Her artistic creative

work and public appearances (speeches or lectures) served as a means for the transfer of knowledge and experience or as a critique of social conditions. Thus, Mara Matočec is an indispensable figure among those who laid the foundations for the equality of men and women in Croatia. The work of Mara Matočec provides evidence that the struggle for women's rights in the Croatian countryside occurred through specific elements that respected tradition while simultaneously transforming society.

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THE DEMONSTRATIONS OF 1981 IN KOSOVO: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Abstract: *Through this work will be presented an analysis of the political and historical developments in the early 80s century. XX in Kosovo, with a special focus on the political process that forced demonstrations that arose in 1981. It is true that initially the 1981 demonstrations erupted as social protest, at the same time they expressed the constitutional, political, economic and cultural discontent. But by looking in retrospect voice of the student and the people of Kosovo, expressing his demands through protests to achieve basic rights and freedoms of political, legal, economic to continue to the educational and cultural ones. It makes you find the motivation to investigate, why Kosovar students was forced to do such things?*

Although historiography has so far struggled it belongs as professional treatment and research of this event and events like this, by assigning diverse connotations time fulfilling the desires of daily politics, the times are fulfilling the desires of the different social groups, presenting an opinion not meaningful of historiography.

In this paper will be presented with arguments, a conclusion scientific and logical, Albanians demonstrations of 1981, must be set as publishers see democracy and freedom of peoples within the former Yugoslavia, comparing along with „Solidarnost“ in Poland, by the socialist camp of that time. Also, this year constitutes breaking the silence and eliminate dark curtain of „Brotherhood and Unity“, this is the year of the revival of the Albanian national movement for independence.

Key words: *Demonstration, developments, political, historical, Kosovo.*

DEMONSTRACIJE 1981. NA KOSOVU: IZ PERSPEKTIVE POLITIČKIH, DRUŠTVENIH I HISTORIJSKIH KRETANJA

Apstarkt: *U ovom radu bit će predstavljena analiza političkih i historijskih kretanja s početka 80-ih godina XX vijeka na Kosovu, s posebnim fokusom na političke procese koji su doveli do izbijanja demonstracija 1981. godine. Istina je da su demonstracije iz 1981. u početku izbile kao socijalni bunt, ali su istovremeno izražavale ustavno, političko, ekonomsko i kulturno nezadovoljstvo. No, sagledavajući retrospektivno glas studenata i naroda Kosova, koji su kroz proteste izražavali svoje zahtjeve za ostvarivanje osnovnih prava i sloboda – od političkih, pravnih i ekonomskih, do onih u sferi obrazovanja i kulture – javlja se motivacija za istraživanjem: zašto su kosovski studenti bili primorani na takve korake?*

Iako se historiografija do sada suočavala s izazovima u pogledu profesionalne obrade i istraživanja ovog i sličnih događaja, često im pridajući različite konotacije kako bi zadovoljila potrebe dnevne politike ili interese različitih društvenih grupa, time je nerijetko prezentovala stavove koji nemaju istinsko historiografsko značenje.

U ovom radu će, uz pomoć argumenata te naučnih i logičkih zaključaka, biti iznesena teza da se albanske demonstracije iz 1981. godine moraju posmatrati kao vjesnici demokratije i slobode naroda unutar bivše Jugoslavije, upoređujući ih s pokretom „Solidarnost“ u Poljskoj u okviru tadašnjeg socijalističkog bloka. Također, ova godina označava prekid šutnje i uklanjanje tamnog vela „bratstva i jedinstva“; to je godina oživljavanja albanskog nacionalnog pokreta za nezavisnost.

Ključne riječi: *Demonstracije, kretanja, politički, historijski, Kosovo.*

Political and constitutional position of Kosovo Albanians in the former Yugoslavia

Looking in retrospect the voice of student youth and the people of Kosovo, expressing their demands through protests to realize their rights and fundamental freedoms, such as political, legal, economic to continue to those educational and cultural, makes you think what forced the Kosovar student youth to make such actions?

Then, we should stop, ask and pose a lot of questions, Were indeed Kosovo Albanians constituent part of the Yugoslav federation? Why Kosovo did not become a republic within Yugoslavia, and why was it like that? What was the economic situation of Albanians and Kosovo in relation to other republics? What political, legal, educational and cultural rights had Albanians in Kosovo? Were Kosovo Albanians discriminated in comparison with other nations of Yugoslavia?

To give concrete answers will have to go in order, presenting a concise arguments for each issue.

Albanians even in the 70s were treated in the legal and political order as nationality and not a nation within the former Yugoslavia. Albanians were imprisoned and punished by the courts for allegedly politically mounted illegal and hostile activities against the then government. The economic situation of Kosovo Albanians on those years was weak and had begun to deteriorate more and more every day. The only shining light in Kosovo in the 70s was the University of Prishtina¹ student and youth education in the Albanian language.² If we refer to the 1974 Constitution, it can be said that Kosovo by criteria of constitutional law was fully a federal unit.³ In this case one can naturally ask, Why Kosovo in the end did not declare a republic? The answer to that we can seek out and find the theoretical core of the Yugoslav federal system, because according to the decisions of Jajce (1943)⁴, republics were organizing nations, not nationalities.⁵ So, constitutional policy of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, which was introduced by the Constitution of 1974, 80% did not improve the political, legal, economic and social situation of the people of Kosovo. As we can see, this was a failure of political leadership of Kosovo communist regime. So, the Kosovo Constitution of 1974 failed to sublimate the political will of the students' demonstrations of 1968, nor meet the requirements expressed in public hearings that were held in all towns of Kosovo, where openly was requested by Albanian people of Kosovo to activate the status of republic.⁶ At the same time the economy of Kosovo precisely this constitution, had begun to degrade, because through it was given the right of Serbia to take Kosovo's economic potential. Thus, Kosovo's leaders especially Mahmut Bakalli and Fadil Hoxha and all political, legal compromises and constitutional questions about Kosovo accepted from the Yugoslav Federation, only to govern Kosovo and to maintain good neighborly relations with the political leadership and the Yugoslav state.⁷

The only thing that can be said with much competence is the end of the 70's of the last century marked increase in the number of high school Albanians

¹ University of Pristina was established by the Law on the Establishment of the University, which was approved by the Assembly of the Socialist Province of Kosovo on 18 November 1969. The establishment of the University was a historic event for the people of Kosovo and especially for the Albanian nation. Founding Assembly of the University of Prishtina was held on February 13, 1970, and two days later, on February 15, 1970 was held the solemn meeting of the Assembly and the date of 15 February was declared Day of the University.

² Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian-A history of Kosovo*, Columbia University Press, New York 1998, 289.

³ Esat Stavileci, *Kosovo under international administration*, Forum for Democratic Initiative, Gjakova 2000, 25-26; Arsim Bajrami, *The right of Kosovo in transition*, University of Pristina, Pristina 2001, 48; Kurtesh Salihu, *Constitutional right*, University of Pristina, Pristina 1998, 312.

⁴ Second meeting of AVNOJ held on 29 and 30 November in Jajce of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

⁵ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo a short history*, Koha, Pristina 2001, 341.

⁶ Ethem Çeku, *Kosovo in the background of Yugoslavia and Albania diplomacy 1945-1981*, Brezi '81, Pristina 2009, 269.

⁷ *Ibidem*, 269.

and the ethnic imbalance in socio-political life of Kosovo gradually started to change. But yet Albanians continued to be discriminated, oppressed and marginalized in all spheres of life.⁸

Social life and political relations in the early '80s in Kosovo

Yugoslavia was then aimed at a large civil community, within each, different groups of ethno-cultural will have the opportunity to freely develop their identity. People thought to be loyal to both of these goals, according to a hierarchical rank, which were free to choose themselves. Measure how they can identify with the former Yugoslavia depended on the credibility of the state. In case the majority of Kosovo Albanians do not believe in this political formation because it was created artificially.⁹ Also because the former Yugoslavia based on the principles of „socialism“ and since this so-called Yugoslav socialism was involved in corruption and the discrimination prevalent in the social differences of ethnicity, then Yugoslavia and the Kosovo by the end of the '70s -to the last century witnessed a severe crisis. At the same time, the death of Tito in May 1980-the man who symbolized the Yugoslav socialism that created and imposed by all means loyalty to Yugoslavia, gave an additional impetus to these developments.¹⁰

Thus, the economic crisis of the 80s led to a dramatic deterioration of the political and social climate. Unemployment and inflation captured the incredible numbers and standard of living went deteriorating until the maximum.¹¹ Also, the economic crisis of the '80s also brought growing contradictions. As Kosovo created a tense situation within society with spiritual different political, economic and ethno-cultural views. This situation had to do, because Kosovo failed to pass the backwardness of its historical, not from lack of desire, but the inability of the government of then Yugoslav federal governments of the republics to its constituent and political elite to erase the difference between north and south.¹² Therefore, there is no doubt that more serious economic and social situations, feed nationalism and make it act to create freedom. Thus, the early '80s marks a very dynamic and effective action of the Kosovo Albanian nationalism.¹³ So, precisely from this period has also originated the movement for independence. Because it was thought right and so very real that a permanent solution and only numerous problems Kosovo had, was that it acquired the status of an independent

⁸ Stefan Karastojanov, *Kosovo- a geopolitics analyse*, Serembe, Skopje 2007, 175.

⁹ Ramë Buja, *The issue of Kosovo and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, University AAB, Pristina 2007, 35.

¹⁰ Raymond Detrez, *Kosovo-the war postponed*, Skanderbeg books, Tirana 2004, 62.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 64.

¹² Julie Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley 1999, 46-47.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

republic, although at the time it was requested within the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴ Occasionally it has been argued that ethnic authoritarian nationalism, takes root only where civic nationalism has never existed.¹⁵

Despite national inequality it was evident in the economic field, as we see it manifested in all social and political development of Kosovo. It should be emphasized that there was no important moment in the political and social affirmation of Kosovo that was not hampered by Serb nationalism. All these phenomena stemming from the constitutional dependent political status of Kosovo.¹⁶

Consequently, Kosovo Albanian aspirations for independent living became more and more compelling. Serb nationalist discontent over government included all layers of the population of Kosovo, from the workers and peasants and intellectuals up to students.¹⁷ This dissatisfaction was expressed with the requirements of the government and with open criticisms towards government, especially with organizing illegal activity, which emerged as a model for national activities.¹⁸ Kosovo had the highest number of political prisoners in the former Yugoslavia due to the activities of illegal organizations.¹⁹

So the demonstrations that erupted in the spring of 1981 were as a result of these processes and factors that dominated political and social life of the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, with special emphasis on the autonomous province of Kosovo, as always conflicting ethnic relations, trends and continuous radical and unitary greater Serbian nationalism, economic stagnation, degeneration of the communist system, structural factors such as demographics and Albanian birthrate, federal nonfunctional system and the failure of the national unity of concepts such as history, language and other cultural elements.²⁰

However, it should finally be given some additional arguments and messages, theoretical and methodological modifications of Albanian historiography.

Students' demonstrations of 1981 in Kosovo are an important link in the struggle for freedom of Albanian people of Kosovo and other Albanian regions in Yugoslavia. These demonstrations began in Pristina on March 11, 1981. On March 15 demonstrated in Prizren, then on March 26 in Pristina students staged a new demonstration. One of the most massive demonstrations is what took place in Pristina on April 1, attended by several thousands of people from all strata of Albanian population. According to official data, during this demonstration 9 citizens were killed and 15 wounded, while the Serbian police forces killed 2

¹⁴ M. Vickers, *Between*, 217.

¹⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging-trips to the new nationalism*, Dituria, Tirana 2000, 9.

¹⁶ Xhelal Gjeçovi et. al, *The history of Albanian people, vol. IV*, Toena, Tirana 2008, 367.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 367.

¹⁸ See: Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations in Kosovo 1981-1990*, Institute of History, Pristina 2005.

¹⁹ See: Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, *Albanian political prisoners 1945-1990*, Logos-A, Skopje 2009.

²⁰ J. Mertus, *Kosovo*, 46.

people and injured 17. On April 2, 1981 Belgrade declared a state of emergency in Kosovo and stopped traffic on the two together in public places. Executive Council interrupted elementary schools, secondary schools and faculties and closed dormitories and students in Pristina. Similar measures were taken in other municipalities as well. However, on April 2 in Pristina Albanian mass demonstrations continued all day. The same day the demonstrations were held in Podujevo, Gjiilan, Vushtrri, Lipjan, Glogoc, Gjakova etc., but on April 3 in Ferizaj, Viti, Vushtrri, and Mitrovica on April 30 in Decani and Istog. In this track on May 18, 1981 about 1,000 students demonstrated in Pristina for a half hour in the Student Center. Thereafter, the government bodies ended the academic year at the university ten days before the deadline.²¹

The demonstrations of 1981 were a national testing for Albanians. Even those indicated clear that their primary goal was the national and ideologies are second hand ones, which was clearly noticed that there could be an obstacle for the advancement of the national political situation within the former Yugoslavia.²²

But these demonstrations we can say that they have had these special specifications: geopolitical orientation had suffered change, redefine ideals to a large part of the Albanians, the shock that became world and entry into the agenda of international politics, created models to seeking self-determination, leading to the destruction of the constitution of 1974 and the end of an important factor that has contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, etc.²³

The main demands and slogans that were presented were: We want Republic! Long live the Republic of Kosovo! Albanians are not Yugoslav! Kosovo belongs to Kosovars! Trepca works for others! Hooray Adem Demaçi! Kosovo belongs to Kosovars! Fusion-union! etc.²⁴

Demonstrations' Banners of '81, "Kosovo republic ,, according to some analysts, historians and politicians of the time it is said that it reached critical case when it surpassed slogan, calling for unity. Logically thinking and looking at the whole, students did not ask to be changed as the name of Kosovo or ideological orientation, what is important for the fact that they wanted, that Kosovo Albanians to have a state (Republic) in the federation where they were.²⁵

Demonstrations of 1981 were discovered in a definite way: the critical situation of the Albanian people who lived at that time in Yugoslavia, hatred and conflict which stood covered in the feelings and national soul, dissatisfaction with the current government and the plight of living, universal demand for freedom and independence etc.²⁶

²¹ X. Gjeçovi et. Al, *The history*, 368.

²² Shaban Sinani, *Kosovo in geopolitics*, Dritero, Tirana 1998, 111.

²³ S. Sinani, *Kosovo*, 111-112.

²⁴ Bujar Dugolli, *The turning point of October the 1st Student movement 1997- 1999*, University of Pristina, Pristina 2013, 43.

²⁵ S. Sinani, *Kosovo*, 15.

²⁶ S. Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations*, 62.

Against peaceful demonstrators numerous forces and military police used: tear gas bombs, rubber sticks and clubs, toxic gases chemicals, firearms, armored vehicles, tanks and even aerospace machinery. Most of these forms of intervention in Kosovo since that time settled the Serbian military and paramilitary task forces continuing their Chetnik plans.²⁷

Relations between Kosovo and Albania in the early '80s already started to survive, but how can Albania have a hand in case of demonstrations, then to be as objective as possible, by my side for now I can not have a decisive opinion, except that based on historiography. While the official position of the Albanian government towards demonstrations, former President Ramiz Alia the Albanian leadership said that they „were in surprise” and stood silently without any special declaration. But Albanian press reflects the public demonstrations a week after the events and with a very small space.²⁸

However, after a while the Albanians ideological leader, Enver Hoxha, supported one of the slogans of the demonstration, „Kosovo Republic“, and it was a politics prognosis, which meant that automatically rule out the option of national unity, but with this recognizes Kosovo as a new Albanian state.²⁹

The problem whether the 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo, are influenced by the Albanian reality is usually seen in a close manner. Maybe the problem was at ideological trends.³⁰ But the truth is that the ideological barriers fell and Albania remained divided, it continued until the creation of two spirit identities, it was established a cooled opinion about each other, it was confirmed even that *an Albanian socialist is worse than a Democrat Serbian* etc. These facts show that ideological difference was not the first factor of division of Albanians, even if such an effect existed in the events of 1981 in Kosovo, there was no such character.³¹

After 1981, Kosovo Albanians were denied everything from government, everything that was related to the individual and collective rights, made isolation and sanction of free movement of citizens of Kosovo, then a part of the population of Kosovo passed through the hands of the police being tortured, abused, accused of serving sentences without the deserved and cruel murders.³² However, the most damaging effect of political reaction in 1981 was a way of starting a new wave of lawsuits and recriminations against Albanian and Serbian nationalism.³³

²⁷ Shaban Braha, *Serbian Genocide and Greater Albanian resistance (1844-1990)*, Lumi-T, Gjakova 1992, 518.

²⁸ S. Sinani, *Kosovo*, 5-6.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 8-9.

³⁰ Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Kosovo: Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft*, Böhlau, Wien 2008, 258.

³¹ S. Sinani, *Kosovo*, 16.

³² S. Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations*, 29.

³³ N. Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 351.

Demonstrations of 1981 as an important event in the Balkans will have great resonance throughout Europe. In charge was student youth that were eager for knowledge and freedom. They had set itself the task of contributing to a major issue. As argued by many domestic and international scholars, these demonstrations have been of great importance, and through them the Kosovo Albanian people affirmed their demands as a people and as a region in the middle of Europe seeking freedom and equal footing with people in that other common federation called Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - SFRJ.³⁴

These demonstrations further affirmed Kosovo and Albanians as a people and as a region of Europe that require resolution of the national question. They constitute a fundamental turning point in the struggle for freedom and independence for Albanians.

The outbreak of the economic crisis was a tragedy for Yugoslavia. Although the symptoms of the crisis were noted earlier, the political leader of the country, due to the enormous increase in inflation, finally admitted publicly that the country had fallen into crisis. To derive the country from the economic crisis, the federal scale formed a committee headed by Sergey Krajger, where from the composition of that committee were appointed political cadres and economic experts from all the republics and provinces of SFRY.³⁵

Krajger' Commission drafted 4 documents to withstand the crisis: *antiinflater Program (June 1982)*, *Analysis of the problem of unemployment (July 1982)*, *Analysis of the housing and communal economy, the Agriculture Program (November 1982)*. Through these four areas, it was thought to be found the reasons for the crisis in which the country had fallen and will open the way to economic recovery.³⁶

Dismemberment of Albanian-populated territories between several Yugoslav republics violated their unique and normal development, it influenced them to remain in the position of suppliers of raw materials for the development of Yugoslavia.

Kosovo was conducted only in the extractive industry and little in processing. Kosovo products sold at very low and below the average price of Yugoslavia, and the prices of commodities, especially industrial ones, which other republics sold in Kosovo, were too high. Therefore, although Kosovo and other Albanian regions are regions very rich in natural resources, they remained the most backward regions of Yugoslavia and Europe. Raw materials, such as lead, zinc, gold, silver, magnesite, chromite, iron-nickel and the potential energy were used with standard of a region's colonial, while hundreds of thousands of Albanians left the country because of unemployment, the state of severe economic and social situation.³⁷

³⁴ Ukshin Hoti, *The political philosophy of the Albanian issue*, Unikomb, Pristina 1996, 36.

³⁵ X. Gjeçovi et. al, *The history*, 369.

³⁶ Nikë Gjeloši, *Kosovo at crossroad '89*, Editrice velar, Gorle 1997, 31-33.

³⁷ N. Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 258.

Strengthening of Serb repression, ideo-political arrests and convictions of the Albanian movement

Soon after demonstrations, broke out a wave of chasing, differentiations, political arrests, imprisonments and punishments.

Ideo-political retaliation-policy began to be implemented immediately after the events of '81 by the state party starting from pupils, students, teachers, professors up to the of outstanding scientific staff, which means the University, which in the view of the Government of Serbia it was the home where it was fed the „bastion of nationalism and Albanian irridentism „, „castle of nationalism and seperatism“ etc., so as a target of their policy, this was the most appropriate which should be emptied of all the rage and all forces to destroy the knowledge, and when this is achieved, then destroy an entire nation.³⁸

All the meanness of this wrong political strategy was developed based on the plan approved by the Provincial Committee of the Communist League of Kosovo (PCCLK), on May 23, 1981 in Pristina, which was called „Action Program of CK of Kosovo fighting against hostile and counterrevolutionary forces and to stabilize the political situation in the province.“ Immediately after the adoption of this document the ideopolitical differences campaign began in the University, Institute, Academy and other places of education, science and culture. From 1981-1983 this process underwent scientific intellectuals of whom 3 were academics (Acad. Ali Hadri, Acad. Gazmend Zajmi and Acad. Fehmi Agani), who were forced to leave all positions kept at that time.

While another group of intellectuals- professors at the University of Pristina being laid open in the supported student demonstrations and their demands of Ukshin Hoti, Halil Alidema, Ekrem Kryeziu, etc. Reçica Shemsi. They were imprisoned and sentenced to many years in prison which suffered in different prisons of the former Yugoslavia. They were imprisoned and sentenced to many years in prison and thousands of Albanian students including all the organizers of the demonstrations of 1981, as Hydajet Hyseni, Selatin Novosella, Meriman Braha, Bajram Kosumi, Ali Lajçi and many others. As for these leaders are others as well sentences ranged from 10 to 15 years in prison, which they suffered in different Yugoslav and Serbian jails.³⁹

The document entitled „Appeal 215“ with which the Kosovo intelligence came to the higher socio-political and state power about injustices that were done by both Albanians and in particular against the University was not considered by the Yugoslav authorities. But even this appeal as well as everything remained silent on its signatories and persecution measures were taken, starting with the dismissal from the party until the isolation.⁴⁰

³⁸ S. Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations*, 79.

³⁹ Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, *Albanian political prisoners in Kosovo: 1945-1990*, Logos-A, Pristina 2009, 169-170.

⁴⁰ See more: Zekeria Cana, *Appeal 215*, Rilindja, Pristina 2001.

And another document was approved from the Provincial Committee of KPK in 1985, called „The criteria for determining moral-political eligibility of students“ which contained rules for students who wish to enroll in higher education and the University, where by these rules seriously violated basic human rights to education. This document contained the following general rules: 1). These candidates do not meet moral and political qualities for registration of students; - Who have been dealing with various forms of hostile, - whose close family members were taken to subversion, etc., these and other rules also applied for placement in dormitories and for the benefit of scholarship. 2). Reliability of moral and political suitability of pupils and students should always be under the care of social and political organizations (the Communist League, trade unions, the Socialist Alliance, the League of Socialist Youth and the Committee for General folk Protection and self defense).⁴¹

Also in the '80s, came the rebirth of the Underground, illegal movements or illegal groups called the authorities at the time Albanian organizations for the Rights and freedom that were in conflict with discriminatory laws antiAlbanian that Serbia and Yugoslavia used at that time, in Kosovo but it did not remain aside diaspora movements in various countries across Europe and the World.⁴² The activity of illegal organizations after the outbreak of student demonstrations characterized the company's stock, organization and sensitized to the issue of Kosovo and the implementation of application Kosovo-Republic. Main carriers of illegal activity were mainly students and education patriots etc. While forms of illegal activity among others were writing and distribution of the patriotic slogans, posters and various leaflets etc.⁴³

It is noteworthy that in the struggle for national liberation and unification occupies a prominent place underground movement, which was multidimensional. It began shortly after the end of World War I, where dissatisfaction of the Albanians were, the fact that it was not respected the principle of self-determination of people, who had participated in the anti-fascist war. Kosovo Albanians had thought that based on the principles proclaimed by the National Liberation Army and the Communist Party of the people of Yugoslavia will you enable you to realize the decisions of the Conference of Bujan on December 31, 1943, that after the war, the national liberation Kosovo will joining Albania. Once this happened the Albanian opposition began immediately after the liberation from fascism and Kosovo remnant under Serbia respectively Yugoslavia.⁴⁴

In the '80s the number of illegal groups and organizations operating in Kosovo and in emigration was quite large. Among them were: Movement for

⁴¹ X. Gjeçovi et. al, *The history*, 375.

⁴² Sami Repishti, Human Rights and the Albanian Nationality in Yusoglavla, in *Human Rights in Yugoslavia*, Irvington Pulishers, New York 1986, 262-263.

⁴³ S. Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations*, 32-33.

⁴⁴ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: what everyones needs to know*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, 21-22.

Socialist Republic of Albania in Yugoslavia (MSRAY) was formed sometime in mid-1982 and its leader was appointed Xhafer Shatri, Organization „National Liberation Front of Kosovo“ („NLFK“), Marxist-Leninist organization of Kosovo (MLOK) which was formed by Hydajet Hyseni, Mehmet Hajrizi, Gani Sylja, etc., it was one of the most massive after 1981 and was distinguished with a good and quick organization, „Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia“ („MLCPAY“) was the only political force in this period operating in an organized way to lay claim to the Republic of Kosovo, Red National Front led by Ibrahim Kelmendi and Jusuf Gërvalla, The National Liberation Movement of Kosovo in the framework of which also operated two committees Decani and Glogovci committee etc. These movements and their activists were hunted down, arrested and liquidated by the Yugoslav UDB both inside and outside the country. Then we have groups of individuals in illegal activities such as: *Albanikosi* - illegally group in the district of Kamenica that was formed in January 1981, „Patriotic Organization - Ideal“ - illegally group in Peja, „Eagles of Liberty“ - was an illegal organization that was formed by a group of high school students in Pristina, illegal group „Golden Eagles“ - and „Young Heroes“ - developing activities in and around Pristina etc.⁴⁵

In the period after 1981 in Kosovo against members of various illegal and illegal organizations were conducted numerous wild judicial processes and it can be considered as the reign of harsh punitive policy of the former Yugoslavia. We can say that every third Albanian experienced wild coping with police, starting from investigations, detentions, fines up to the killings with different motifs which were Albanians, where all forms of punishment were by Yugoslav laws and local affiliates.⁴⁶

Various members of illegal groups in Kosovo often were punished with imprisonment of many years, or liquidated all. One of the worst cases was that of 17 January 1982, when the Yugoslav UDB killed in Stuttgart, Germany, 3 of the main leaders of the Movement for Albanians, brothers Yusuf Gërvalla, Bardhosh Gërvalla and Kadri Zeka.⁴⁷ Two years later, on January 22, 1984, in Pristina were killed by the Serb police Nuhi Berisha and Rexhep Mala. In 1986, died from inhumane Yugoslav UDB torture Metush Krasniqi, the symbol of resistance and Albanian relentless, and in 1989, were killed by the Serb police in Pristina Afrim Zhitia and Fahri Fazliu.⁴⁸

The killings of these martyrs of freedom and liquidation of many others was the power of time to certain political goals, not only quenches the liberation war, but became the inspiration and example of Albanian resistance against national oppression and inequality was doing Serbian murderous machine of a people seeking freedom and fundamental rights of life.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ S. Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations*, 91.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, 38-40.

⁴⁷ „Das ganze sieht nach Hinrichtung aus“, *Der Spiegel*, Germany, no. 4/1982, 25.01.1982, 50-54.

⁴⁸ Selatin Novosella, *Spring Albanian martyrs '81*, SHBPK, Pristina 2011, 145-157.

⁴⁹ S. Repishti, *Human*, 255.

And then the government of that time against intellectual Albanians in Kosovo preferred the measure „isolation“, through which they experienced the most brutal forms of punishment and discrimination, which aim was labeling, staining and degradation of personality and professional staff. Another factor with political background that emerged in the '80s and that consequently had the criminal acts of UDB against political prisoners, their transfer from prisons in Kosovo in those famous bad on the territory of the SFRY, treating closed in a room with criminals, psychopaths and patients with infectious diseases until the negation of professional development, ventilation and cleaning the cell, prohibition of visits by family members and their relatives, all verified by direct use of physical violence, favorable conditions for „suicide“, torture and deliberate killings, etc., favorable to end the life of an Albanian prisoner.⁵⁰

Hatred for Albanians had gripped the Yugoslav Army (YNA). World history knows no cases that an army kills its soldiers, but this unfortunately happened with Albanian soldiers in Yugoslavia. All these killings intensified after the events of '81 where soldiers killed came back in closed coffins „armed „with reasoning (diagnosis)“ suicide „as Nesim Dana from Gjakova which sank by superiors YNA, Ismet Bojku (a soldier in Bitol), Hyzer Sadiku (soldier in Belgrade), Selami Isufi (soldier in Sibenik), Mustafa Pantina (soldiers in Derventa BH), Enver Elezi (soldier Divule-Croatia), Agron Ademi (soldier in Backa Topola), Afrim Ragushi (soldier in Belgrade), Agron Ferizaj (soldier) and Fadil Talla (was killed by members of YNA), Abedin Balaj from Glogovac (soldier in Slovenia) etc.⁵¹

According to some data only during the 1981-1990 were convicted 3,348 Kosovo Albanians, by police and army gunfire were killed 183 people, of whom 16 were children, there were also wounded by gunfire 616 people of whom 49 children and women.⁵²

In 1986 the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Serbia approves its infamous Memorandum. With this memorandum eventually is prepared the ground for genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and was aimed at creating a Great Serbia, where in the most outrageous and offensive way is heard about Albanians. According to it, the issue of Kosovo Albanians had to be settled with the destruction of Kosovo's autonomy that was guaranteed under the Constitution of 1974 and the establishment of Serbian hegemony. In 1988 began the discussion on amending the Constitution of Serbia, which also gave signals that change the SAP of Kosovo. This memorandum, which became the national

⁵⁰ Ismet Salihu, *Criminal and political processes as a form of systematic violation of freedoms and individual and collective rights of the Albanian people in Kosovo*, in "Kosovo Issue – an actual and historic problem", SHBLU, Tirana 1996, 317-319. S. Keçmezi-Basha, *Illegal Organizations*, 47-57.

⁵¹ Fetnete Ramosaj, *Serbian crimes in Kosova: without apology: facts against defamations*, Fokusi, Pristina 2005-2008, 25-46.

⁵² Pajazit Nushi, *Phenomenology of military and police violence in Kosovo in 1981-1992*, SHBLU, Tirana 1996, 283-285.

program of the Serbs and implemented by policies and machinery of Slobodan Milosevic, that on June 28, 1989, precisely in Kosovo Polje, with his populist speech unveiled the program titled „All Serbs in a single place“.⁵³ In this program, Milosevic based in Serbian myths and so-called *Serbian historic right* began fighting for a Great Serbia, a war that was spread early in Slovenia, then to continue in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and to finish in Kosovo. Sadly it brought only suffering war, ethnic hatred, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and all this *drama* ended with the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Summary

It is obvious that the first demonstrations of 1981 erupted seemingly as social protests, but according to the time and witnesses, this movement at the same time manifested constitutional-political, economic, cultural dissatisfaction of Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, not as tends to calls in most cases of Albanian historiography, pretended demonstrations began after a student „ran a fly on his plate“ because of „poor food quality „, to continue so to the most crude metaphorical expression „inversion of a plate of beans“. We note that all these estimates are not random, so they are an attempt to put a black mark on the national historic events that took place in Kosovo in the second half of the twentieth century. To issue an doubting opinion that Albanians have always operated allegedly without plans and programs, without imagining that things make top itself etc. Thus, our historiography influenced greatly by that of Communist and even today attempts to introduce such offensive and derogatory jargon, even worse trying to rehabilitate communist political Yugoslav figures at that time as Fadil Hoxha, Mahmut Bakalli, Sinan Hasani Ali Shukriu, etc., that their activity have allegedly been in service of the country and Tito's Yugoslavia and not at the service of the Republic of Serbia, and allegedly pro blaming student demonstrations were not against them. But the facts speak otherwise, can we forget the famous saying that the students't demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981 were „counterrevolutionaries“ of ostensibly organized „Albanian terrorists“, were aimed at the destruction of Yugoslavia and „Development of Kosovo“, organized by „Albanian separatists“, „internal enemies of the state“ driven by a „foreign enemies“, alluding to „Enver Hoxha's Albania“ etc.

At the conclusion of this paper I want to draw more concrete ways of arguing, a logical conclusion, that Albanian students' movement of 1981 that broke out at the University of Pristina, Kosovo, must be set as the first messenger of democracy and freedom of people within the former Yugoslavia.

The demonstrations of 1981 Kosovo broke the famous unmasked communist slogan for national equality in the system. It was seen by all as within the socialist Communist Yugoslavia and abroad that Albanians were

⁵³ „Memorandum of Serbia Science Academy“, *Duga*, Beograd, June 1986, 39.

discriminated and were denied basic human and national rights and that there was no national equality in the Socialist Yugoslavia which pretended to be a „Paradise“ of the standard of living and coexistence of nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia.

Kosovo movement of 1981 is comparable with „Solidarity“ in Poland, by the then socialist bloc. Even the student movement „Solidarity“ in Poland unmask the alleged communist slogan of social equality. Social discontent as a result of poverty and increasing social differences and class of the Polish people, the democratic world and not only that, understood that the slogans of social communism for social equality in the system were a trick not only for Polish people but also for all social Communist bloc nations.

In Kosovo in 1981 is the year of the revival of the Albanian national movement for the Republic and Independence. Albanians' resistance who were captured in Yugoslavia and Serbia, from this year began to grow, expand, get massive, structured and formed, to come to culminate perfection with the activation of resistance Liberation of Kosovo and the liberation war that made the KLA and assisted later by NATO later in 1998/1999 which brought freedom on 12 June 1999 and Kosovo independence on February 17, 2008.

Zaključak

Očigledno je da su prve demonstracije 1981. godine izbile prividno kao socijalni protesti, ali prema svjedočenjima i kontekstu tog vremena, ovaj pokret je istovremeno manifestovao ustavno-političko, ekonomsko i kulturno nezadovoljstvo Albanaca u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. To je suprotno onome kako se u većini slučajeva u albanskoj historiografiji nastoji prikazati – tvrdeći da su demonstracije počele jer je studentu „muha upala u tanjir“ zbog „lošeg kvaliteta hrane“, pa sve do najgrubljeg metaforičkog izraza o „prevrtanju tanjira graha“. Napominjemo da ovakve procjene nisu slučajne; one su pokušaj bacanja mrlje na nacionalne historijske događaje koji su se na Kosovu odigrali u drugoj polovini dvadesetog vijeka. Cilj je nametanje sumnjičavog mišljenja da su Albanci navodno uvijek djelovali bez planova i programa, bez svijesti o tome kako se stvari pokreću same od sebe itd.

Stoga, naša historiografija, pod snažnim uticajem one komunističke, čak i danas pokušava uvesti takav uvredljiv i pogrđan žargon, te što je još gore, nastoji rehabilitovati tadašnje jugoslovenske komunističke političke ličnosti poput Fadila Hoxhe, Mahmuta Bakallija, Sinana Hasanija, Alija Shukriua i drugih. Tvrdi se da je njihovo djelovanje navodno bilo u službi zemlje i Titove Jugoslavije, a ne u službi Republike Srbije, te da studentske demonstracije navodno nisu bile usmjerene protiv njih. No, činjenice govore drugačije. Možemo li zaboraviti čuvene kvalifikacije da su studentske demonstracije na Kosovu 1981. bile „kontrarevolucionarne“, djelo tobože organizovanih „albanskih terorista“, usmjerene na uništenje Jugoslavije i „razvoja Kosova“, u

režiji „albanskih separatista“, „unutrašnjih neprijatelja države“ potaknutih od strane „stranih neprijatelja“, pri čemu se aludiralo na „Albaniju Envera Hoxhe“ itd.

U zaključku ovog rada želim iznijeti konkretnije argumente i logičan zaključak: pokret albanskih studenata iz 1981. godine, koji je izbio na Univerzitetu u Prištini, mora se definisati kao prvi vjesnik demokratije i slobode naroda unutar bivše Jugoslavije. Demonstracije 1981. na Kosovu razbile su i razotkrile čuvenu komunističku krilaticu o nacionalnoj ravnopravnosti u sistemu. Kako unutar socijalističke komunističke Jugoslavije, tako i u inostranstvu, svima je postalo jasno da su Albanci diskriminisani i da su im uskraćena osnovna ljudska i nacionalna prava, te da nije bilo nacionalne ravnopravnosti u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji koja se pretvarala da je „raj“ životnog standarda i suživota naroda i narodnosti.

Kosovski pokret iz 1981. godine uporediv je s pokretom „Solidarnost“ u Poljskoj unutar tadašnjeg socijalističkog bloka. Čak je i studentski pokret „Solidarnost“ razotkrio navodnu komunističku krilaticu o socijalnoj pravdi. Zbog socijalnog nezadovoljstva uslijed siromaštva i rastućih društvenih i klasnih razlika među Poljacima, demokratski svijet, i ne samo on, shvatio je da su slogani socijal-komunizma o društvenoj jednakosti u sistemu bili varka – ne samo za poljski narod, već i za sve nacije socijalističkog bloka.

Na Kosovu je 1981. godina bila godina oživljavanja albanskog nacionalnog pokreta za republiku i nezavisnost. Otpor Albanaca, koji su bili zarobljeni u Jugoslaviji i Srbiji, od ove godine počeo je rasti, širiti se, postajati masovan, strukturiran i uobličen, da bi kulminirao aktivacijom oslobodilačkog otpora i oslobodilačkim ratom koji je vodila OVK (UÇK), uz kasniju pomoć NATO-a 1998/1999. godine. To je u konačnici donijelo slobodu 12. juna 1999. i nezavisnost Kosova 17. februara 2008. godine.

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RATNI ZLOČINI U KOTOR-VAROŠI 1992. GODINE: SUDSKI UTVRĐENE ČINJENICE I SAVREMENI REVIZIONIZAM

Apstrakt: *U radu analiziramo ratne zločine počinjene nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom na području općine Kotor-Varoš tokom 1992. godine kroz prizmu sudske prakse međunarodnih i domaćih sudova. U prvom dijelu rada daje se pregled političkog i vojnog konteksta nasilnog preuzimanja vlasti od strane srpskih političkih, vojnih i policijskih struktura, te obrasca zločina koji je uključivao ubistva civila, nezakonita zatočenja, mučenja, seksualno nasilje, prisilne deportacije i uništavanje imovine i vjerskih objekata. Posebna pažnja posvećena je masovnom ubistvu zarobljenih muškaraca u školi u Grabovici u novembru 1992. godine. U početnom dijelu rada razmatra se savremeni politički i društveni kontekst u kojem se pojavljuju pokušaji negiranja ili relativizacije tih zločina, uključujući zabranu obilježavanja mjesta zločina u Grabovici. Rad pokazuje da tvrdnje o "nepostojanju presuda" nisu u skladu sa postojećom sudskom praksom i predstavljaju oblik historijskog revizionizma koji osporava sudski utvrđene činjenice i pravo žrtava na sjećanje i memorijalizaciju.*

Kako bi smo navedeno potvrdili u centralom dijelu rada analiziramo sudske predmete i presude koje se odnose na događaje u Kotor-Varoši. Razmatraju se presude Međunarodnog krivičnog tribunala za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) i Međunarodnog rezidualnog mehanizma za krivične sudove (IRMCT) u više predmeta, u kojima su utvrđeni brojni zločini protiv bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva u Bosanskoj krajini, uključujući i one u Kotor-Varoši. U radu također analiziramo presude njemačkih sudova za genocid izrečene na osnovu principa univerzalne jurisdikcije, naročito predmet protiv Đurađa Kušljica, kao i postupke vođene pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine i Okružnim sudom u Banja

Luci protiv neposrednih izvršilaca i odgovornih lica za ratne zločine u Kotor-Varoši.

Na osnovu komparativne analize pomenute sudske prakse radom pokazujemo da presude pomenutih sudova zajedno formiraju relativno koherentnu činjeničnu i pravnu osnovu o zločinima počinjenim u Kotor-Varoši 1992. godine.

Ključne riječi: *Kotor-Varoš; 1992, ratni zločini; zločini protiv čovječnosti, genocid, sudska praksa; memorijalizacija; historijski revizionizam.*

WAR CRIMES IN KOTOR-VAROŠ IN 1992: JUDICIALLY ESTABLISHED FACTS AND CONTEMPORARY REVISIONISM

Abstract: *This paper analyses war crimes committed against the Bosniak and Croat population in the municipality of Kotor-Varoš during 1992 through the lens of international and domestic judicial practice. The first part provides an overview of the political and military context of the violent takeover of power by Serb political, military, and police structures, as well as the pattern of crimes, including killings of civilians, unlawful detention, torture, sexual violence, forced deportations, and the destruction of property and religious sites. Particular attention is devoted to the mass killing of detained men at the school in Grabovica in November 1992.*

The introductory section also examines the contemporary political and social context in which attempts to deny or relativize these crimes have emerged, including bans on commemorating the site of the crimes in Grabovica. The paper demonstrates that claims regarding the “absence of judicial rulings” are not consistent with existing case law and represent a form of historical revisionism that challenges judicially established facts and the right of victims to remembrance and memorialization.

In order to substantiate these arguments, the central part of the paper analyses judicial cases and judgements related to events in Kotor-Varoš. It examines rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in several cases in which numerous crimes against the Bosniak and Croat population in the Bosanska Krajina region, including Kotor-Varoš, were established. The paper also analyses judgements of German courts for genocide rendered under the principle of universal jurisdiction, particularly the case against Đurađ Kušljčić, as well as proceedings conducted before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the District Court in Banja Luka against direct perpetrators and other responsible individuals for war crimes in Kotor-Varoš. Based on a comparative analysis of the aforementioned judicial practice, the paper shows that the judgements of these courts together form a relatively

coherent factual and legal basis regarding the crimes committed in Kotor-Varoš in 1992.

Key words: *Kotor-Varoš; 1992; war crimes; crimes against humanity; genocide; judicial practice; memorialization; historical revisionism.*

Uvod

Tokom agresije na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu (1992–1995) na području općine Kotor-Varoš počinjeni su teški zločini protiv civilnog bošnjačkog, ali i hrvatskog stanovništva, uključujući ubistva, nezakonita zatočenja, mučenja, silovanja, prisilne deportacije, uništavanje imovine i vjerskih objekata, kao i sistematsko prikrivanje zločina izmještanjem masovnih grobnica. Ovi zločini izvršeni su u kontekstu nasilnog preuzimanja vlasti od strane srpskih političkih, vojnih i policijskih struktura tokom 1992. godine, te su predstavljali dio šire kampanje usmjerene na trajnu promjenu etničke strukture stanovništva, što je bilo u skladu sa “strateškim ciljevima srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini”.¹

Općina Kotor-Varoš je prema popisu stanovništva iz 1991. godine imala izrazito mješovit nacionalni sastav.² Uprkos tome, već u prvoj fazi rata došlo je do sistemskog isključivanja Bošnjaka i Hrvata iz političkog, institucionalnog i bezbjednosnog sistema.

U općini Kotor-Varoš Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) je preuzela vlast u junu 1992. godine, nakon napada policijskih i vojnih struktura Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (SrRBiH), odnosno Republike Srpske (RS).³

¹ Na 16. sjednici samoproglasahe Skupštine srpskog naroda, kojom je predsjedavao Momčilo Krajišnik, Radovan Karadžić, predsjednik samoproglasahe Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, pročitao je i obrazložio “Strateške ciljeve srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini”, koji su potom usvojeni. Strateški ciljevi glase: “Prvi strateški cilj razdvajanje od druge dvije nacionalne zajednice, državno razdvajanje... Drugi strateški cilj je koridor između Semberije i Krajine... Treći strateški cilj je uspostavljanje koridora u dolini rijeke Drine, odnosno eliminisanje Drine kao granice između dva svijeta... Četvrti strateški cilj je uspostavljanje granica na rijeci Uni i rijeci Neretvi... Peti strateški cilj je podjela grada Sarajeva na srpski i muslimanski dio i uspostavljanje svakog od ova dva dijela efektivne državne vlasti te konstitutivne države... Šesti strateški cilj je izlaz Srpske Republike BiH na more.” ICTY, “Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 22, str. 866, Skupština SrRBiH, *Odluka o strateškim ciljevima srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, broj: 02-130/92, Banja Luka, 12. maj 1992; ICTY, *Izvorni zapisnik sa 16. sjednice Skupštine srpskog naroda u BiH, održane 12.05.1992. godine u Banjaluci u prostorijama Doma JNA*, govor Radovana Karadžića, 7-8.

² Prema rezultatima popisa stanovništva iz 1991. godine na području Kotor-Varoši živjelo je ukupno 36.853 stanovnika, od čega 14.056 Srba (38,14%), 11.090 Muslimana (odnosno Bošnjaka) (30,09%), 10.695 Hrvata (29,02%), 745 Jugoslavena (2,02%) te 267 osoba druge ili nepoznate nacionalnosti (0,72%). Jakov Gelo, Marinko Grizelj, Anđelko Akrap (priredili), *Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine: Narodni sastav po naseljima*, Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb 1995, 162-164.

³ Naziv SrRBiH tokom 1992. godine je promijenjen. U augustu 1992. godine naziv je skraćen u

Nakon uspostave paralelnih struktura vlasti i oružanih formacija, u junu 1992. godine započela je otvorena faza nasilja, obilježena napadima na naselja u kojima su živjeli Bošnjaci i Hrvati. Među tim naseljima se izdvajaju Kotor-Varoš, Vrbanjci, Hrvacani, Hanifići, Dabovci, Ravne i Večići. Tokom napada ubijani su civili i izvršavani su drugi zločini. Većina stanovnika tih sela na kraju je izbjegla na okolna područja. U selu Večići snage Vojske Republike srpske (VRS) naišle su na znatan oružani otpor Bošnjaka i borbe su trajale mjesecima. Jedinice VRS-a redovno su granatirale Večiće, sve do oktobra 1992. godine, a selo su napale i iz zraka, koristeći kasetne bombe i napalm. Do kraja prve sedmice novembra 1992. godine Večići su ispražnjeni, a 161 zarobljeni pripadnik Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine je ubijen u školi u Grabovici.⁴

Tokom vojnih i policijskih operacija ubijani su civili, uključujući žene, djecu i starije osobe, dok su preživjeli muškarci masovno hapšeni i odvođeni u improvizirane i formalne logore, poput policijskih stanica, zatvora, školskih objekata i industrijskih hala. U tim objektima zatočenici su bili izloženi fizičkom i psihičkom zlostavljanju, mučenju, seksualnom nasilju i ubistvima. Posebno su dokumentirana silovanja žena i djevojčica, kako u logorima tako i u privatnim objektima, što potvrđuje da seksualno nasilje nije bilo sporadično, već sastavni dio obrasca zločina. Istovremeno, provedene su prisilne deportacije i progoni cjelokupnih zajednica. Stanovništvo je primoravano na napuštanje svojih domova, često uz potpisivanje izjava o “dobrovoljnom

“Srpska Republika”, da bi već u septembru iste godine bio usvojen konačni naziv “Republika Srpska” (RS). Detaljnije vidi: Muamer Džananić, Jasmin Medić, Hikmet Karčić, *Nastanak Republike srpske: Od regionalizacije do strateških ciljeva (1991-1992)*, Univerzitet u Sarajevu – Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava i Univerzitet u Sarajevu – Institut za historiju, Sarajevo 2023. Na 16. sjednici samoproglašene Skupštine srpskog naroda pored usvajanja “Strateških ciljeva srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini”, donesena je i odluka o formiranju Vojske SrBiH, odnosno o preimenovanju 2. VO JNA u Vojsku SrBiH. Također je odlučeno da se Ratko Mladić imenuje za komandanta Glavnog štaba Vojske SrBiH. ICTY, *Zapisnik sa 16. sjednice Skupštine srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Banja Luka, 12. maj 1992; ICTY, Skupština SrBiH, broj: 03-234/92, *Odluka o formiranju vojske Srpske republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, Banja Luka, 12. maj 1992.

⁴ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-99-36, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Radoslava Brđanina, *Presuda*, 1. septembar 2004, Tom 1, par.111; Amir Kliko, Stradanje i odbrana kotorvaroških Bošnjaka i Hrvata 1992. godine, *Historijski pogledi*, god. V, br. 7, Tuzla 2022, 379–422 (<https://doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2022.5.7.379>); Senad Zec, *Večići-92 Kotor-Varoš (4. izdanje)*, Baton, Zenica 2024. Amir Kliko navodi da su nakon masakra nad 161 Bošnjakom 4. novembra 1992, jedinice VRS-a nastavile potragu za preživjelima, dok su zarobljeni civili i borci ubijeni u osnovnoj školi u Grabovici. Istovremeno su vojne i civilne vlasti pristupile uklanjanju tragova zločina, uključujući “asanaciju terena” i čišćenje školskog objekta, što potvrđuju i navodi o dolasku predsjednika Ratnog predsjedništva “Srpske opštine Kotor-Varoš” Nedeljka Đekanovića 5. novembra 1992. godine, kao i najava Župljanina da će narednog dana obići područje Večića.” A. Kliko, *Stradanje i odbrana kotorvaroških Bošnjaka i Hrvata 1992. godine*, 411.

iseljenju“ i odricanju od imovine, dok su kuće, vjerski objekti i infrastruktura sistematski uništavani kako bi se onemogućio povratak.⁵

Jedna od specifičnosti zločina koje su srpske snage počinile u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-1995. godine, a što uključuje i zločine u Kotor-Varoši, jeste i izražen obrazac prikrivanja zločina kroz sistem masovnih grobnica za ubijene žrtve. Jasmin Odošić 2015. godine iznosi podatke da je na području Kotor-Varoši ekshumirano deset grobnica i 140 tijela. Najstarija žrtva bila je rođena 1902. godine, a najmlađa 1983. godine.⁶

Zločini počinjeni na području općine Kotor-Varoš bili su predmet krivičnog gonjenja pred različitim sudskim instancama. Pred ICTY-em i IRMCT-om procesuiran je veći broj političkih, vojnih i policijskih funkcionera RS-a, pri čemu su presude u predmetima čiji se dijelovi odnose na Bosansku krajinu utvrdile postojanje sistematskih progona, nezakonitih zatočenja, ubistava i deportacija kao dijela širokog i koordiniranog napada na civilno stanovništvo. Pored međunarodnih presuda, određeni izvršioци su procesuirani i pred nacionalnim, regionalnim i domaćim sudovima Bosne i Hercegovine. Posebno mjesto u pravosudnoj praksi zauzimaju presude njemačkih sudova, donesene na osnovu principa univerzalne jurisdikcije. Te presude su od izuzetnog značaja jer su, već tokom devedesetih godina, utvrdile postojanje genocida nad Bošnjacima u više lokalnih sredina u Bosni i Hercegovini.⁷ U radu se posebno analiziraju presuda koje se odnose na individualnu krivičnu odgovornost počinitelja za zločine u Kotor-Varoši, koji predstavljaju ključni dokaz za razumijevanje pravne kvalifikacije zločina, pitanja genocidne namjere i uloge struktura vlasti u provođenju šire politike progona i uništenja Bošnjaka, ali i Hrvata u Kotor-Varoši.

Javno osporavanje zločina u Kotor-Varoši i argument “nepostojanja presuda“

U savremenom društveno-političkom kontekstu Bosne i Hercegovine, sjećanja na ratne zločine sve češće postaju predmet institucionalnih zabrana i javnih osporavanja, naročito u sredinama u kojima su zločini počinjeni nad bošnjačkim civilnim stanovništvom. Institucionalno negiranje genocida i počinjenih ratnih zločina u Bosni i Hercegovini je dio kontinuirane prakse još

⁵ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Radoslava Brđanina, *Presuda*; ICTY, Predmet br. IT-08-91-T, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina, *Presuda*, 27. mart 2013; ICTY, Predmet br. IT-09-92-T, Pred pretresnim vijećem I, Tužilac protiv Ratka Mladića, *Presuda*, 22. novembar 2017; ICTY, Predmet br. IT-00-39-T, Pred pretresnim vijećem I, Tužilac protiv Momčila Krajišnika, *Presuda*, 27. septembar 2006.

⁶ Detaljnije o masovnim grobnicama u općini Kotor-Varoš vidi: Jasmin Odošić, *Hiljadu grobnica u Bosanskoj krajini 1992-1995*, BZK Preporod, Sarajevo 2015, 215-229.

⁷ Detaljnije vidi: Almir Grabovica, *Tragovi genocida: Grapska 1992-1995*, Univerzitet u Sarajevu – Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo 2025.

od vremena izvršenja zločina, koja se nije zaustavila sve do danas. I dalje su vodeći negatori politički lideri bosanskohercegovačkog entiteta RS, te Republike Srbije.⁸ Kako se zločini negiraju na najvišim političkim nivoima, takvu praksu slijede brojne lokalne zajednice. Takav slučaj zabilježen je i u općini Kotor-Varoš. Najnoviji primjer jeste povodom namjere Organizacije porodica šehida, poginulih i nestalih osoba “Vrbanja“ da 3. novembra 2025. godine obilježi 33. godišnjicu zločina nad Bošnjacima u selu Grabovici.⁹ “Posjeta će biti dostojanstvena, komemorativnog karaktera gdje će se na navedenoj lokaciji položiti cvijeće i odati počast ubijenim Bošnjacima bez političkog govora ili bilo kakvih provokacija uz poštivanje svih propisa o javnom okupljanju”, naglasili su iz Udruženja i dodali da će u koloni biti svega 50 učesnika.¹⁰ Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova RS zabranilo je održavanje ovog skupa, navodeći kao razlog procjenu da bi obilježavanje moglo ugroziti bezbjednost ljudi i imovine te dovesti do narušavanja javnog reda i mira. Organizatori su ovu odluku ocijenili kao neosnovanu i diskriminatornu, ističući da se radi o mirnom i dostojanstvenom obilježavanju mjesta ovog masovnog zločina. Odluka o zabrani obilježavanja zločina u Grabovici bila je praćena i nizom javnih reakcija lokalnih političkih i društvenih aktera koje ilustriraju širi diskurs osporavanja takvih komemoracija. Načelnik općine Kotor-Varoš Zdenko Sakan izjavio je da u ovoj općini nema međunacionalnih incidenata te da zbog toga nije potreban skup koji grupa Bošnjaka planira održati 3. novembra, upozoravajući da bi takva okupljanja mogla proizvesti nove tenzije i da “to Kotor-Varošu ne treba”.¹¹ Zabrani obilježavanja zločina u Grabovici prethodile su javne izjave predstavnika srpskih boračkih udruženja iz RS. Predsjednik Boračke organizacije RS Kotor-Varoš Miladin Savanović izjavio je za Radio-televiziju RS da se protivi obilježavanju “navodnog zločina nad Bošnjacima“, navodeći da “za ovaj navodni zločin ne postoji nijedan dokaz, niti sudska presuda“, te da takvo obilježavanje predstavlja provokaciju i podizanje međunacionalnih tenzija.¹² Slične stavove iznio je i Općinski odbor političke partije DEMOS, koji je također zatražio zabranu skupa tvrdeći da se radi o

⁸ Detaljnije o tome: Jasmin Medić, Hikmet Karčić, Muamer Džananović i Elvedin Mulagić, *Politika revizionizma: Negiranje zločina i genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-1995*, Univerzitet u Sarajevu – Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo 2025.

⁹ “Sramotno: Policija u RS-u zabranila obilježavanje 33. godišnjice zločina nad Bošnjacima u Grabovici”, 30. oktobar 2025. Dostupno na: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/sramotno-policija-u-rs-u-zabranila-obiljezavanje-33-godisnjice-zlocina-nad-bosnjacima-u-grabovici/251030210>, (Pristup: 12. januar 2026).

¹⁰ *Isto*.

¹¹ “Tihim hodom za veliku bol' porodice iz Kotor-Varoši obilježavaju 33. godišnjicu zločina u Grabovici”, *Detektor*, 1. novembar 2025. Dostupno na: <https://detektor.ba/2025/11/01/tihim-hodom-za-veliku-bol-porodice-iz-kotor-varosi-obiljezavaju-33-godisnjicu-zlocina-u-grabovici/>, (Pristup: 12. januar 2026).

¹² “Savanović: Protivimo se obilježavanju navodnog zločina nad Bošnjacima u Grabovici kod Kotor Varoša”, *RTRS*, 28. oktobar 2025. Dostupno na: <https://lat.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=620162>, (Pristup: 12. januar 2026).

pokušaju destabilizacije Kotor-Varoši, dok je Udruženje veterana “Garda Panteri” iz Bijeljine u javnim saopćenjima osudilo ono što su nazvali “pokušajima provokacije srpskog naroda od pojedinih muslimanskih udruženja”.¹³

Slične zabrane i ograničenja prava na obilježavanje ratnih zločina zabilježene su i ranije u drugim lokalnim sredinama u RS-u što potvrđuje da se radi o široko rasprostranjenoj praksi. Naprimjer, u Prijedoru su policijske vlasti u više navrata onemogućavale ili ograničavale javna okupljanja posvećena sjećanju na žrtve logora i masovnih ubistava iz 1992. godine, pozivajući se na bezbjednosne procjene.¹⁴ Ovakve prakse ukazuju da zabrane obilježavanja nisu izolirani incidenti, već dio šire institucionalne dinamike koja utiče na način javne memorijalizacije ratnih zločina u Bosni i Hercegovini. U tom kontekstu, osporavanje prava na obilježavanje mjesta zločina ne odnosi se samo na pojedinačne lokalne inicijative, već predstavlja segment šireg obrasca u kojem se žrtvama genocida u Srebrenici i drugim mjestima zločina nad Bošnjacima često osporava pravo na javno sjećanje, dok se granice dopuštene memorijalizacije kontinuirano pomjeraju. Primjeri takve prakse vidljivi su i u slučajevima kada nadležna tijela u RS-u ograničavaju ili onemogućavaju aktivnosti koje imaju za cilj dokumentiranje i obilježavanje mjesta masovnih zločina.¹⁵

Zločini u općini Kotor-Varoš u presudama ICTY-a i IRMCT-a

Predmeti protiv Radovana Karadžića i Ratka Mladića

Iako postupak protiv političkog lidera SDS-a i RS-a Radovana Karadžića pred ICTY-em i IRMCT predstavlja jedan od ključnih sudskih izvora za razumijevanje ukupnog konteksta zločina u Bosni i Hercegovini, općina Kotor-Varoš nije bila pojedinačno predmetom detaljne činjenične analize u presudi. Međutim, činjenični nalazi iz ove presude relevantni su za širi kontekst

¹³ “Tihim hodom za veliku bol” porodice iz Kotor-Varoši obilježavaju 33. godišnjicu zločina u Grabovici”, *Detektor*.

¹⁴ “Zabrana šetnje u Prijedoru: Kršenje ljudskih prava ili bezbjednosna procjena”, 1. juni 2022. Dostupno na: <https://detektor.ba/2022/06/01/zabrana-setnje-u-prijedoru-kršenje-ljudskih-prava-ili-bezbjednosna-procjena/>, (Pristup: 12. januar 2026).

¹⁵ Tako naprimjer, Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova RS-a nedavno nije odobrilo uposlenicima Memorijalnog centra Srebrenica planirano snimanje objekta Doma kulture u Pilici, jednog od ključnih mjesta genocida u bosanskom Podrinju. “MUP RS zabranio snimanje Doma kulture u Pilici, Memorijalni centar upozorava na opasnost za istraživanje genocida”, *Euronews*, 18. 01. 2025, <https://euronews.ba/bosna-i-hercegovina/aktuelno/10266/mup-rs-zabranio-snimanje-doma-kulture-u-pilici-memorijalni-centar-upozorava-na-opasnost-za-istrazivanje-genocida>, (Pristup: 13. novembar 2025). O zločinima počinjenim u ovom logoru 1992. nad zborničkim Bošnjacima, kao i nad Bošnjacima tokom genocida u Srebrenici i oko nje jula 1995. godine vidi: Muamer Džananović, Elvedin Mulagić, *Zvornik 1992-1995: Genocid na kapiji Bosne*, Univerzitet u Sarajevu – Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo 2025, 599-607, 928-936.

djelovanja srpskih političkih, vojnih i policijskih struktura na području Autonomne Regije Krajina (ARK), u okviru koje se nalazila i općina Kotor-Varoš.¹⁶ Također, Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da je zona odgovornosti 1. krajiškog korpusa VRS obuhvatala, između ostalog, i Kotor-Varoš, zajedno sa općinama poput Prijedora, Ključa, Sanskog Mosta i Banja Luke, čime se ova općina jasno smješta u operativni okvir vojnih struktura koje su bile predmet optužnice i sudske analize.¹⁷ Nadalje, u drugom tomu presude detaljno su razmatrani događaji u općinama ARK-a, uključujući sistem zatočeničkih objekata i premještanja zatočenika, pri čemu se eksplicitno navodi da su zatočenici u logor Manjača dovođeni i iz objekata u Kotor-Varoši, zajedno s drugim općinama sjeverozapadne Bosne, što dodatno potvrđuje uključenost ove općine u širi obrazac progona i nezakonitog zatočenja bošnjačkog, ali i hrvatskog stanovništva.¹⁸

U konačnici, Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da je Radovan Karadžić, kao predsjednik RS-a i vrhovni komandant njenih oružanih snaga, snosio individualnu krivičnu odgovornost kroz učešće u više udruženih zločinačkih poduhvata, uključujući i tzv. sveobuhvatni udruženi zločinački poduhvat čiji je cilj bio trajno uklanjanje Bošnjaka i Hrvata s teritorija samoproglašene RS. Ove nalaze je u značajnoj mjeri potvrdilo i Žalbeno vijeće IRMCT-a, koje je pravosnažno potvrdilo većinu osuđujućih nalaza, te njegovu odgovornost za genocid nad Bošnjacima i preinačilo kaznu na doživotni zatvor.¹⁹

Zločini počinjeni na području općine Kotor-Varoš bili su predmet razmatranja i u postupku pred ICTY-em i IRMCT-om u predmetu protiv Ratka Mladića. U optužnici protiv Mladića navedeno je da je, kao komandant Glavnog štaba VRS od 12. maja 1992. do najmanje novembra 1996. godine, odgovoran za genocid, zločine protiv čovječnosti i kršenja zakona i običaja ratovanja počinjene na teritoriji Bosne i Hercegovine. Među općinama obuhvaćenim optužnicom bila je i općina Kotor-Varoš.²⁰

U okviru poglavlja presude koja se odnose na ovu općinu, Pretresno vijeće je analiziralo niz ubistava, progona, protivpravnog zatočenja, uništavanja

¹⁶ Samoproglašena Skupština srpskog naroda donijela je 21. novembra 1991. godine odluku kojom je potvrđeno prethodno proglašenje srpskih autonomnih oblasti u Bosni i Hercegovini, te je istovremeno usvojena Odluka o verificiranju proglašenih srpskih autonomnih oblasti. Ovom odlukom definisan je teritorijalni obuhvat ARK, koju su činile općine Banja Luka, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, Bosansko Grahovo, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Čelinac, Glamoč, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Kupres, Laktaši, Mrkonjić-Grad, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Skender-Vakuf, Srbac, Šipovo i Titov Drvar, kao i dijelovi drugih općina na ovom prostoru u kojima je srpsko stanovništvo činilo većinu. Kao administrativno sjedište ove regije određena je Banja Luka. ICTY, Skupština srpskog naroda u BiH, *Odluka o verifikaciji proglašenih srpskih autonomnih oblasti u Bosni i Hercegovini*, 21. novembar 1991.

¹⁷ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-95-5/18-T, Pred pretresnim vijećem, Tužilac protiv Radovana Karadžića, *Presuda*, 24. mart 2016, Tom 1, par. 179-180.

¹⁸ *Isto*, Tom 2, par. 1366-2061.

¹⁹ IRMCT, Case No. MICT-13-55-ES, In the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovana Karadžića, *Judgement*, 20 March 2019.

²⁰ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem I, Tužilac protiv Ratka Mladića, *Presuda*, Tom 1, par. 2.

imovine i deportacija počinjenih nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom tokom 1992. godine. Jedan od ključnih zločina koji je razmatran u presudi odnosi se na ubistvo zarobljenih muškaraca u školi u Grabovici početkom novembra 1992. godine. Prema nalazima Pretresnog vijeća, nakon zarobljavanja grupe muškaraca iz sela Večići, oni su dovedeni u školu u Grabovici gdje su tokom noći držani u zatočeništvu. Dana 4. novembra 1992. pripadnici 1. kotorvaroške brigade i 2. bataljona 22. brigade VRS ubili su oko 150 nenaoružanih muškaraca, bosanskih Muslimana, odnosno Bošnjaka, koji su bili zatočeni u školi.²¹ Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da je dio zarobljenika odveden kamionima na lokacije Duboka i Maljava, gdje su ubijeni, dok je manji broj zatočenika ubijen u sportskoj dvorani škole u Grabovici. Također je utvrđeno da je jedan ranjeni zatočenik, koji je preživio masakr, ubijen sljedećeg dana vatrenim oružjem dok je tražio vodu.²²

Pored masovnog ubistva u Grabovici, Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo i druga ubistva počinjena na području općine Kotor-Varoš tokom 1992. godine. Između ostalog, zaključeno je da su srpske vojne snage sredinom juna 1992. napale selo Hrvacani i ubile najmanje pet starijih mještana, Bošnjaka, koji nisu mogli napustiti selo prije napada. Oni su ubijeni iz vatrenog oružja ili spaljeni.²³ Također je utvrđeno da su 2. jula 1992. vojne snage pod komandom Slobodana Župljanina i Saše Petrovića ili pripadnici Specijalnog odreda policije Centra službi bezbjednosti (CSB) Banja Luka ubili najmanje 30 Bošnjaka tokom napada na selo Vrbanjci.²⁴

Pretresno vijeće je razmatralo i dodatne dokaze o velikom broju ubistava u općini tokom 1992. godine. Prema iskazima svjedoka i dokazima iznesenim tokom postupka, sanitetske jedinice su između juna i decembra 1992. učestvovala u sahranjivanju približno 250 do 300 ubijenih osoba na području općine Kotor-Varoš.²⁵ Pretresno vijeće je također utvrdilo da su snage RS-a tokom 1992. godine sistematski uništavale imovinu bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Kuće su granatirane, spaljivane i pljačkane, dok je prema iskazima svjedoka približno 80% nesrpskih kuća u gradu Kotor-Varošu bilo uništeno. Nije spaljena niti jedna srpska kuća.²⁶ U presudi se također navodi da je tokom 1992. godine uništen ili teško oštećen veliki broj islamskih i katoličkih sakralnih objekata, uključujući džamije u Hanifićima, Hrvacanima, Večićima i Vrbanjcima, kao i katoličke crkve u Kotor-Varoši i Vrbanjcima.²⁷

Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da su tokom 1992. godine iz općine Kotor-Varoš organizovane deportacije i prisilna premještanja bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Ratno predsjedništvo općine je formiralo posebnu službu za

²¹ *Isto*, par. 892.

²² *Isto*.

²³ *Isto*, par. 901, 921, 927.

²⁴ *Isto*, par. 902.

²⁵ *Isto*, par. 896.

²⁶ *Isto*, par. 921.

²⁷ *Isto*, par. 928

preseljenje stanovništva i organizovalo konvoje autobusa kojima su civili deportirani prema teritoriji pod kontrolom Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, posebno prema Travniku.²⁸ Zaključno, Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da su od juna do novembra 1992. snage RS-a, vojska, policija i specijalne jedinice sistematski prisiljavale značajan dio bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva da napusti općinu Kotor-Varoš, pri čemu su deportacije bile praćene ubistvima, pljačkom, uništavanjem imovine i drugim oblicima nasilja.²⁹

Nalazi Žalbenog vijeća IRMCT-a dodatno potvrđuju činjenične zaključke Pretresnog vijeća u vezi sa događajima u školi u Grabovici i u općini Kotor-Varoš. Žalbena vijeća je razmatralo tvrdnje odbrane Ratka Mladića da su izvještaji VRS o događajima od 4. novembra 1992. godine pokazivali da su zarobljeni muškarci poginuli tokom borbenih dejstava. Međutim, potvrđeno je da su jedinice Prvog krajiškog korpusa VRS pokušale prikriti ubistvo približno 150 nenaoružanih Bošnjaka koji su bili zatočeni u i oko škole u Grabovici, slanjem netačnih izvještaja Glavnom štabu VRS-a 4. i 5. novembra 1992. godine.³⁰ Uprkos takvom izvještavanju, jedan od upućenih izvještaja sadržavao je navod o “brutalnom masakru zarobljenih pripadnika Zelenih beretki”, čime je Glavni štab VRS-a bio upozoren na mogućnost počinjenja teškog zločina i imao obavezu da pokrene istragu.³¹

Žalbena vijeća je ujedno odbacilo tvrdnje Mladićeve odbrane prema kojima su civili i zarobljenici dobrovoljno napuštali područje općine ili da su događaji predstavljali posljedicu legitimnih borbenih operacija. Podsjećajući na nalaze Pretresnog vijeća o sistematskim ograničenjima slobode kretanja, ubistvima, protivpravnom zatočenju i drugim oblicima nasilja nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom, Žalbena vijeća je potvrdilo zaključak da bošnjačko i hrvatsko civilno stanovništvo koji su napustili općinu Kotor-Varoš “nisu imali stvarni izbor osim da odu”.³²

Na taj način, žalbeni postupak nije doveo u pitanje činjenične nalaze o zločinima počinjenim u općini Kotor-Varoš, uključujući i masovno ubistvo zarobljenih Bošnjaka u školi u Grabovici. Naprotiv, većina argumenata Mladićeve odbrane kojima se pokušavalo relativizirati ili osporiti ove događaje odbačena je kao neutemeljena. Konačnom presudom Žalbenog vijeća potvrđena je prvostepena presuda kojom je Ratko Mladić proglašen krivim za genocid u i oko Srebrenice, kao i za niz zločina protiv čovječnosti i kršenja zakona i običaja ratovanja, uključujući progon, istrebljivanje, ubistvo, deportaciju i druga nehumana djela, te mu je potvrđena kazna doživotnog zatvora.³³

²⁸ *Isto*, par. 953-954.

²⁹ *Isto*, par. 960.

³⁰ IRMCT, Case No. MICT-13-56-A, In the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, *Judgement*, 8 June 2021, par. 212.

³¹ *Isto*.

³² *Isto*, par. 158-160.

³³ IRMCT, In the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, *Judgement*.

Predmet protiv Biljane Plavšić i Momčila Krajišnika

U okviru predmeta protiv Biljane Plavšić pred ICTY-em zločini počinjeni na području općine Kotor-Varoš bili su obuhvaćeni optužnicom kao dio šire kampanje progona bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini. Plavšićeva, kao jedna od vodećih političkih ličnosti SDS-a i RS-a i članica najviših organa vlasti, bila je optužena, između ostalog, za učešće u udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu čiji je cilj bio trajno uklanjanje Bošnjaka i Hrvata sa teritorija pod srpskom kontrolom, pri čemu je Kotor-Varoš izričito naveden među općinama obuhvaćenim tom politikom progona. Nakon zaključenja sporazuma o priznanju krivice, Plavšić je osuđena na 11 godina zatvora. Izjasnila se krivom za progon kao zločin protiv čovječnosti, čime je prihvatila postojanje organizirane i sistematske kampanje nasilja koja je uključivala ubistva, deportacije, nezakonita zatočenja i druge oblike teškog kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog prava nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom u nizu općina, uključujući i Kotor-Varoš.³⁴

U analizi odgovornosti političkog vrha RS-a posebno mjesto zauzima presuda protiv Momčila Krajišnik. Ona je od velikog značaja jer se odnosi na jednog od najviših političkih dužnosnika u strukturi vlasti RS-a tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Krajišnik je bio predsjednik Skupštine RS-a i blizak politički saradnik Radovana Karadžića, predsjednika SDS-a i RS-a, te je učestvovao u političkom i institucionalnom oblikovanju sistema vlasti koji je upravljao teritorijama pod kontrolom samoproglašene RS.

U prvostepenoj presudi ICTY-a Krajišnik je proglašen krivim za više zločina protiv čovječnosti, uključujući progon, istrebljenje, ubistvo, deportaciju i prisilno premještanje, počinjene u okviru šire kampanje usmjerene protiv bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da je Krajišnik učestvovao u udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu (UZP) čiji je cilj bio trajna promjena etničke strukture stanovništva na teritorijama pod kontrolom RS-a putem progona i drugih zločina protiv čovječnosti. U presudi je konstatovano da je političko rukovodstvo na Palama, odnosno lideri SDS-a i RS-a, predstavljalo centralnu komponentu tog poduhvata, dok su lokalne strukture vlasti u općinama provodile njegove ciljeve na terenu.³⁵

Žalbeno vijeće je 2009. godine djelimično preinačilo prvostepenu presudu. Iako su neke osuđujuće presude za pojedine zločine ukinute zbog nedostatka dovoljno preciznih nalaza o njihovom uključivanju u zajednički cilj UZP-a, ključni zaključci o Krajišnikovoj odgovornosti za progon, deportaciju i prisilno premještanje kao zločine protiv čovječnosti ostali su na snazi. Žalbeno vijeće je potvrdilo da su ti zločini bili dio šire strategije etničkog preoblikovanja teritorija pod kontrolom RS-a, te da je Krajišnik svojim političkim djelovanjem

³⁴ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Pred pretresnim Vijeće, Tužilac protiv Biljane Plavšić, *Presuda*, 27. februar 2003; Vidi i: ICTY, Podaci o predmetu – Biljana Plavšić, dostupno na: https://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/cis/bcs/cis_plavsic_BCS.pdf, (Pristup: 12. februar 2026).

³⁵ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem I, Tužilac protiv Momčila Krajišnika, *Presuda*.

dao značajan doprinos ostvarivanju tog cilja. Nakon žalbenog postupka kazna mu je smanjena sa 27 na 20 godina zatvora.³⁶

Činjenični nalazi Pretresnog vijeća u predmetu protiv Momčilo Krajišnik pružaju detaljan uvid u obrasce nasilja i institucionalnog djelovanja nelegalnih srpskih vlasti u općini Kotor-Varoš tokom 1992. godine. Administrativne, finansijske i druge javne službe primale su instrukcije iz regionalnih centara pod kontrolom vlasti RS-a, dok je lokalna policija djelovala po naredbama CSB u Banjoj Luci.³⁷ Time je stvoren institucionalni okvir koji je omogućio kasnije provođenje politike progona bošnjačkog, ali i hrvatskog stanovništva.

Vojna eskalacija započela je 11. i 12. juna 1992. godine, kada su srpske vojne snage napale grad Kotor-Varoš, nakon čega je dio bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva bio prisiljen napustiti grad i potražiti zaklon u okolnim šumama.³⁸ U narednim danima došlo je do nasilja nad civilima, uključujući odvođenje i ubistva civila, zlostavljanje, ponižavanje i pljačku imovine. Jedna grupa Bošnjaka je odvedena, brutalno pretučena i zlostavljana, nakon čega je šest osoba ubijeno, dok je još jedan civil ubijen u blizini bolnice od strane policajca.³⁹

Tokom ljeta 1992. srpske snage su izvršile napade na niz bošnjačkih i hrvatskih sela u općini. Svjedočenja u postupku ukazuju da su u pojedinim selima muškarci odvođeni iz svojih kuća i ubijani, dok su preživjeli civili bili izloženi zlostavljanju i prisilnom raseljavanju.⁴⁰

Pretresno vijeće je također utvrdilo postojanje sistema zatočeničkih objekata u kojima su civili bošnjačke i hrvatske nacionalnosti bili nezakonito zatočeni. Tokom juna i jula 1992. civili su držani u policijskoj stanici u Kotor-Varoši, gdje su bili izloženi fizičkom i seksualnom zlostavljanju.⁴¹ Kasnije su zatočenici držani u općinskom zatvoru, u osnovnim školama u Kotor-Varoši i Grabovici, te u brojnim drugim objektima širom općine, uključujući fabrike, ostale škole i privatne objekte. U tim objektima zatočenici su redovno premlaćivani, držani u prenapučenim prostorijama bez osnovnih higijenskih uslova i često bez informacija o razlozima zatočenja.⁴² Posebno težak slučaj zabilježen je u augustu 1992. u objektu Pilana, gdje je bilo zatočeno približno hiljadu žena, djece i starijih osoba. Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da su srpski vojnici silovali brojne žene i djevojčice prije nego što su zatočenici autobusima deportovani prema Travniku.⁴³

³⁶ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-00-39-T, Pred žalbenim vijećem, Tužilac protiv Momčila Krajišnika, *Presuda*, 17. mart 2009.

³⁷ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem I, Tužilac protiv Momčila Krajišnika, *Presuda*, par. 458.

³⁸ *Isto*, par. 459.

³⁹ *Isto*.

⁴⁰ *Isto*, par. 460.

⁴¹ *Isto*, par. 461.

⁴² *Isto*, par. 462-464.

⁴³ *Isto*, par. 463.

Jedan od najtežih zločina u općini počinjen je početkom novembra 1992. u vezi sa događajima u selu Večići. Nakon pregovora o predaji stanovništva, dio muškaraca pokušao je napustiti područje i probiti se prema teritoriji pod kontrolom Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine. Srpske snage su ih zarobile i dio njih odvele u školu u Grabovici. Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da je 4. novembra 1992. izvršen masakr nad približno 150 zarobljenih muškaraca.⁴⁴

I ova presuda također dokumentuje organizovanu politiku prisilnog raseljavanja bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Srpski Krizni štab Kotor-Varoši je već u junu 1992. uspostavio mehanizme za nadzor preseljenja stanovništva. Osobe koje su željele napustiti općinu morale su predati izjave da dobrovoljno napuštaju svoje domove i pritom ostaviti svoju imovinu lokalnim vlastima. Uz to im je bilo dozvoljeno da sa sobom ponesu samo ograničene novčane iznose, dok je ostatak imovine često oduziman ili konfiskovan.⁴⁵ Pretresno vijeće i u ovom predmetu je utvrdilo i sistematsko uništavanje kulturnih i vjerskih objekata. Tokom 1992. godine teško je oštećeno ili potpuno uništeno četrnaest muslimanskih i katoličkih vjerskih objekata, uključujući više džamija u Kotor-Varoši i okolnim selima.⁴⁶

Na osnovu ukupne analize dokaza Pretresno vijeće je zaključilo da su srpske snage u periodu od sredine juna do početka novembra 1992. u općini Kotor-Varoš ubile više od 157 civila bošnjačke i hrvatske nacionalnosti. Istovremeno je veliki broj civila bio zatočen u najmanje četrnaest različitih zatočeničkih objekata, dok je značajan dio bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva bio prisiljen napustiti općinu usljed nasilja, prijetnji i neizdrživih životnih uslova.⁴⁷

Predmet protiv Radoslava Brđanina

Presuda ICTY-a u predmetu protiv Radoslava Brđanina predstavlja jedan od ključnih izvora za razumijevanje političkog i institucionalnog okvira u kojem su počinjeni zločini na području ARK-a,⁴⁸ uključujući i općinu Kotor-

⁴⁴ Isto, par. 465.

⁴⁵ Isto, par. 466.

⁴⁶ Isto, par. 467.

⁴⁷ Isto, par. 468.

⁴⁸ Na osnovu odluka SDS-a Bosne i Hercegovine, u Banjoj Luci je 16. septembra 1991. godine proglašena Autonomna regija Krajina (ARK) kao formalno-pravni nasljednik Zajednice opština Bosanske krajine (ZOBK), koja je proglašena 25. aprila 1991. godine. Ovom jednostranom odlukom ARK je definisana kao sastavni dio federativne Jugoslavije, uz primjenu saveznih jugoslovenskih zakona, te je predviđeno da, u zavisnosti od budućeg statusa Bosne i Hercegovine, samostalno ili u zajednici s drugim oblastima odluči o formiranju posebne republike u okviru Jugoslavije. Detaljnije vidi: Jasmin Medić, Demografska slika i političke koncepcije etno-teritorijalne organizacije Bosanske krajine, *Godišnjak 2018*, BZK Preporod, Sarajevo 2018, 261; "Ne može se rasturati Jugoslavija, a da Bosna i Hercegovina ostane netaknuta", *Javnost*, br. 50, 28. septembar 1991, 4; M. Džananović, et al, *Nastanak Republike srpske*.

Varoš.⁴⁹ Tužilaštvo je tvrdilo da je optuženi, kao prvi potpredsjednik Skupštine Zajednice opština Bosanske Krajine, predsjednik Kriznog štaba ARK-a i istaknuti član SDS-a, imao vodeću ulogu u kampanji čiji je cilj bio trajno uklanjanje bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva s područja ARK-a putem nasilja, zastrašivanja i drugih oblika prisile.⁵⁰ Pretresno vijeće je u tom kontekstu analiziralo brojne događaje i zločine počinjene u općini Kotor-Varoš, pri čemu su mnoge od tih činjenica kasnije bile predmet razmatranja i u drugim predmetima.

Pretresno vijeće je utvrdilo da su snage RS-a u junu 1992. godine preuzele vlast u općini Kotor-Varoš nakon napada na grad i okolna sela u kojima su živjeli Bošnjaci i Hrvati, uključujući Večiće, Hrvaćane, Ravne, Hanifiće i druga naselja. Tokom tih operacija ubijen je određeni broj civila, dok je većina stanovništva bila prisiljena napustiti svoja sela. Ovaj niz zločina nad Bošnjacima kulminirao je masovnim ubijanjem u školi u Grabovici u novembru 1992. godine.⁵¹ Posebno mjesto u presudi zauzimaju događaji u školi u Grabovici. Pretresno vijeće i u ovom predmetu je utvrdilo da je u novembru 1992. grupa civila iz Večića i okolnih sela pokušala napustiti područje općine Kotor-Varoš i doći do teritorije pod kontrolom Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine. Nakon što su upali u zasjedu snaga RS-a, zarobljeni su i odvedeni u školu u Grabovici gdje su zatvoreni u učionicama. Sljedećeg dana žene i djeca su deportovani autobusima, dok su muškarci ostali zatočeni u školi, a zatim ubijeni.⁵²

Pretresno vijeće također je utvrdilo niz pojedinačnih ubistava civila. Među njima je ubistvo zatočenika ispred Medicinskog centra u Kotor-Varoši 25. juna 1992. godine, kada su pripadnici policije i vojske RS-a strijeljali najmanje dva civila nakon što su ih postrojili ispred bolnice. Također je utvrđeno da su sredinom augusta 1992. pripadnici vojske RS-a ubili najmanje tri civila u selu Dabovci. U selu Hanifići ubijeno je najmanje osam civila u

⁴⁹ Tokom procesa nelegalne regionalizacije Bosne i Hercegovine 1991–1992. godine, općina Kotor-Varoš bila je obuhvaćena i srpskim i hrvatskim konceptima etno-teritorijalne reorganizacije. Dok je u okviru srpskog projekta bila faktički integrisana u strukture ARK i kasnije RS, u okviru političkih odluka Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ) Bosne i Hercegovine bila je uključena u normativno definisani teritorijalni obuhvat Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne (HZHB). Dakle, slično politici etno-teritorijalnog zaokruživanja koju je provodio SDS, i dio političkog rukovodstva HDZ-a nastojao je obuhvatiti određene općine u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni unutar nelegalnog projekta HZHB, proglašene 18. novembra 1991. godine. Prema Odluci o uspostavi HZHB-a, u njen sastav je, između ostalih, uključena i općina Kotor-Varoš, što potvrđuju i nalazi iz presude ICTY-a u predmetu Prlić i drugi. ICTY, Predmet: Br. IT-04-74, Pred pretresnim vijećem III, Tužilac protiv Jadranka Prlića, Brune Stojića, Slobodana Praljka, Milivoja Petkovića, Valentina Čorića i Berislava Pušića, *Presuda*, 29. maj 2013, Tom 1, par. 420–425.

⁵⁰ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Radoslava Brđanina, *Presuda*.

⁵¹ *Isto*, par. 275–278

⁵² *Isto*, par. 432–433.

mjesnoj džamiji, koja je potom zapaljena, dok je u selu Čirkići ubijeno sedam civila, uključujući šest žena, nakon što su snage RS-a zapalile selo.⁵³

Civili su masovno hapšeni i zatvarani u različitim objektima, uključujući pomenutu školu u Grabovici, policijsku stanicu, zatvor i pilanu u Kotor-Varoši. U tim objektima zatočenici su bili izloženi fizičkom zlostavljanju, ponižavanju i drugim oblicima mučenja. U zatvoru u Kotor-Varoši zatočenici su držani u izuzetno teškim uslovima, uz nedostatak hrane, medicinske pomoći i osnovnih higijenskih uslova.⁵⁴ Pretresno vijeće u ovom predmetu također je utvrdilo da su snage RS-a granatirale grad Kotor-Varoš i okolna sela, pljačkale i spaljivale kuće te uništavale imovinu bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Tokom tih operacija uništeni su i vjerski objekti, uključujući džamije u Vrbanjcima i Hanifićima te rimokatoličku crkvu u Kotor-Varoši. Paralelno s tim nasiljem provođene su deportacije civilnog stanovništva, pri čemu su žene i djeca iz više sela transportovani autobusima prema teritoriji pod kontrolom Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, posebno prema Travniku.⁵⁵

U prvostepenoj presudi iz 2004. godine Brđanin je proglašen krivim za progone kao zločin protiv čovječnosti, uključujući deportaciju i prisilno premještanje, za hotimično lišavanje života kao teško kršenje Ženevskih konvencija, za mučenje kao teško kršenje Ženevskih konvencija, te za bezobzirno razaranje gradova i sela i uništavanje vjerskih objekata kao kršenje zakona i običaja ratovanja. Za ta krivična djela izrečena mu je jedinstvena kazna od 32 godine zatvora.⁵⁶

U žalbenom postupku pred ICTY-em 2007. godine vijeće je djelimično usvojilo određene žalbene osnove i ukinulo dio osuda koje su se odnosile na pomaganje i podržavanje mučenja u logorima i zatočeničkim objektima, kao i dio osude za razaranje koji se odnosio na općinu Bosanska Krupa. Međutim, većina ključnih osuđujućih nalaza je potvrđena, uključujući odgovornost za progone, deportacije i druga djela počinjena u okviru kampanje nasilnog uklanjanja bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva s područja ARK-a. Nakon žalbenog postupka kazna mu je smanjena sa 32 na 30 godina zatvora.⁵⁷

Predmet protiv Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina

U predmetu protiv Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina ICTY je razmatrao njihovu ulogu i odgovornost za događaje koji su se odvijali u Bosni i Hercegovini nakon uspostavljanja RS-a. Optužnicom su obojica terećena za zločine protiv čovječnosti i kršenja zakona i običaja ratovanja počinjene tokom

⁵³ Isto, par. 428-431.

⁵⁴ Isto, par. 501-502; 816-835; 924-928.

⁵⁵ Isto, par. 622-623; 564-565; 651.

⁵⁶ Isto.

⁵⁷ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-99-36-T, Pred žalbenim vijećem, Tužilac protiv Radoslava Brđanina, Presuda, 3. april 2007.

1992. godine u više općina u Bosni i Hercegovini.⁵⁸ Mićo Stanišić je od decembra 1991. godine bio ministar bez portfelja u Ministarskom savjetu i član Savjeta za nacionalnu bezbjednost, koji je predstavljao prvi *de facto* izvršni organ samoproglašene RS. Od 1. aprila 1992. godine obavljao je funkciju ministra unutrašnjih poslova RS-a, a samim tim bio je i član Vlade RS-a.⁵⁹ Stojan Župljanin je od 1991. godine bio načelnik regionalnog CSB-a u Banjoj Luci, a najkasnije od maja 1992. godine postao je i član Kriznog štaba ARK-a.⁶⁰

Sa stanovišta krivičnopravne odgovornosti, ove funkcije su bile od velikog značaja jer su Stanišić i Župljanin imali institucionalnu kontrolu nad policijskim strukturama koje su učestvovala u operacijama preuzimanja vlasti i represiji nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom u brojnim općinama Bosne i Hercegovine. U tom kontekstu posebno je relevantna i činjenica da je Župljanin, kao načelnik CSB-a Banja Luka i član Kriznog štaba ARK-a, imao operativnu nadležnost nad policijskim strukturama u većem dijelu sjeverozapadne Bosne, uključujući i područje općine Kotor-Varoš.

Optužnica ih je teretila za zločine protiv čovječnosti i kršenja zakona i običaja ratovanja, uključujući progone, ubistva, mučenje, deportaciju, prisilno premještanje i istrebljenje. Tužilaštvo je tvrdilo da su optuženi djelovali u okviru UZP-a čiji je cilj bio trajno uklanjanje Bošnjaka i Hrvata sa teritorije planirane “etnički čiste” srpske države. Pretresno vijeće i u ovom predmetu utvrdilo je da je tokom 1992. godine u brojnim općinama došlo do široko rasprostranjene i sistematske kampanje nasilja protiv bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Ta kampanja uključivala je nasilno preuzimanje vlasti u općinama, masovna hapšenja civila, uspostavljanje logora, zlostavljanje zatočenika, ubistva, uništavanje imovine i prisilno premještanje stanovništva. Vijeće je zaključilo da su policijske snage RS-a, zajedno sa vojskom, teritorijalnom odbranom i “paravojnim” formacijama, imale ključnu ulogu u sprovođenju ovih aktivnosti.

Pretresno vijeće je zaključilo da je Mićo Stanišić, kao ministar unutrašnjih poslova RS-a, imao vrhovnu nadležnost nad policijskim snagama te učestvovao u organizovanju i raspoređivanju policijskih snaga u operacijama koje su dovele do nasilnog preuzimanja vlasti u općinama i progona bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Iako je bio svjestan da policijske i druge srpske snage čine zločine nad civilima, nije preduzeo efikasne mjere da spriječi ta djela niti da kazni njihove počinioc.⁶¹ Stojan Župljanin je imao značajnu ulogu u koordinaciji policijskih operacija, uključujući razoružavanje bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva, nezakonita hapšenja i transport zatočenika u logore poput Manjače. Pretresno vijeće je zaključilo da je bio upoznat sa zločinima

⁵⁸ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-08-91-T, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina, *Presuda*, 27. mart 2013.

⁵⁹ *Isto*, par. 2.

⁶⁰ *Isto*, par. 3.

⁶¹ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina, *Presuda*.

koje su počinile policijske i druge srpske snage, ali nije preduzeo odgovarajuće mjere da ih spriječi ili kazni.

Na osnovu izvedenih dokaza Pretresno vijeće je zaključilo da su Stanišić i Župljanin značajno doprinijeli ostvarivanju cilja UZP-a, odnosno uklanjanju Bošnjaka i Hrvata sa teritorije samoproglašene RS. Vijeće ih je proglasilo krivim za progone kao zločin protiv čovječnosti, kao i za ubistvo i mučenje kao kršenja zakona i običaja ratovanja. Župljanin je dodatno proglašen krivim i za istrebljenje kao zločin protiv čovječnosti. Stanišiću i Župljaninu izrečena je jedinstvena kazna od 22 godine zatvora,⁶² što je potvrđeno i u drugostepenom postupku.⁶³

Nalazi iz drugostepenog postupka u predmetu Stanišić i Župljanin dodatno potvrđuju ulogu policijskih struktura u događajima u općini Kotor-Varoš i njihov odnos prema drugim sigurnosnim i vojnim strukturama vlasti. Žalbeno vijeće podsjetilo je da je Pretresno vijeće utvrdilo kako je Stojan Župljanin tokom ljeta 1992. godine uputio Specijalni odred milicije CSB Banja Luka u Kotor-Varoš.⁶⁴ Prema tim nalazima, Župljanin je već od kraja juna 1992. bio obaviješten o umiješanosti pripadnika tog odreda u teška krivična djela nad civilnim stanovništvom, ali je postojalo malo dokaza o pokušajima da se takvi zločini istraže ili sankcionišu.⁶⁵ U žalbenom postupku Župljanin je pokušao osporiti ove nalaze tvrdeći da je postojanje tzv. komande grada u Kotor-Varoši ograničavalo njegovu kontrolu nad policijskim jedinicama. Međutim, Žalbeno vijeće je zaključilo da dokazi na koje se poziva ne potvrđuju takvu tvrdnju, već samo pokazuju da su vojne strukture imale zadatak da kontrolišu kretanje stanovništva i da ratne zarobljenike upućuju na saslušanje u komandu brigade.⁶⁶ Tribunal je također konstatovao da Župljanin nije dokazao da je Specijalni odred milicije bio potčinjen VRS, niti da je postojanje vojne komande u Kotor-Varošu ograničavalo njegovu sposobnost da provodi disciplinske mjere nad policijskim jedinicama.⁶⁷ Prema tome, Žalbeno vijeće je potvrdilo zaključak Pretresnog vijeća da je Župljanin zadržao dovoljnu *de facto* i *de jure* kontrolu nad policijskim strukturama koje su djelovale u toj općini, te da njegov propust da pokrene istrage i sankcioniše zločine predstavlja relevantan element njegove odgovornosti.⁶⁸

⁶² Isto.

⁶³ ICTY, Predmet br. IT-08-91-A, Pred žalbenim vijećem, Tužilac protiv Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina, *Presuda*, 30 juni 2016.

⁶⁴ Isto, par. 765.

⁶⁵ Isto.

⁶⁶ Isto, par. 778.

⁶⁷ Isto, par. 779.

⁶⁸ Isto, par. 778-779.

Zločini u općini Kotor-Varoš u presudama njemačkih sudova

Jedna od najznačajnijih presuda nacionalnih sudova koja se odnosi na zločine počinjene u općini Kotor-Varoš donesena je pred bavarskim Vrhovnim pokrajinskim sudom (Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht) u postupku protiv Đurađa Kušljića, rođenog u Kotor-Varoši. Presuda je izrečena 15. decembra 1999. godine, nakon višemjesečnog suđenja u kojem je Sud razmatrao događaje iz 1992. godine na području Kotor-Varoši, posebno u mjesnoj zajednici Vrbanjci.⁶⁹

Sud je utvrdio da je Kušljić učestvovao u progonu i ubistvima tokom sistematske kampanje nasilja nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim civilima koja je provedena nakon preuzimanja vlasti od strane srpskih političkih i vojnih struktura u općini. U dispozitivu presude Sud je zaključio da je optuženi kriv za genocid, te ga je osudio na doživotnu kaznu zatvora.⁷⁰

U obrazloženju presude detaljno je rekonstruisana situacija u općini Kotor-Varoš tokom 1992. godine. Posebno su analizirani događaji iz juna 1992. godine u Vrbanjcima, kada su pripadnici lokalnih policijskih i vojnih struktura, zajedno sa naoružanim formacijama, organizovali hapšenje i odvođenje bošnjačkih civila, nakon čega je dio njih ubijen. Sud je također zaključio da su te radnje bile dio šire politike “etničkog čišćenja” usmjerene protiv bošnjačkog stanovništva u općini Kotor-Varoš. U presudi se navodi da su sela sa većinskim bošnjačkim stanovništvom sistematski napadana, spaljivana i pljačkana, dok je civilno stanovništvo izlagano nasilju, zatvaranju i protjerivanju, što je rezultiralo gotovo potpunim uklanjanjem bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva sa tog područja tokom 1992. i 1993. godine.⁷¹

Ova presuda ima poseban značaj jer predstavlja jednu od prvih presuda u Evropi u kojoj je nacionalni sud utvrdio postojanje genocida u vezi sa zločinima počinjenim nad Bošnjacima u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992. godine, i to na osnovu univerzalne jurisdikcije. Istovremeno, presuda bavarskog suda predstavlja važan pravni izvor za rekonstrukciju događaja u općini Kotor-Varoš, jer potvrđuje da su zločini nad bošnjačkim stanovništvom, masovna hapšenja, ubistva i protjerivanja bili dio sistematske kampanje progona koja je provedena tokom 1992. godine.

Savezni vrhovni sud Njemačke (Bundesgerichtshof) je odlukom od 21. februara 2001. godine djelimično izmijenio presudu Bavarskog vrhovnog pokrajinskog suda u predmetu protiv Đurađa Kušljića.⁷² Sud je potvrdio činjenične nalaze prvostepene presude o događajima u općini Kotor-Varoš 1992. godine, utvrdivši da su srpske političke i vojne strukture provodile sistematsku kampanju nasilja nad bošnjačkim stanovništvom koja je uključivala

⁶⁹ Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, *Urteil gegen Djuradj Kušljić*, 15.12.1999. (Kopija prevoda presude na bosanski jezik u posjedu autora)

⁷⁰ *Isto.*

⁷¹ *Isto.*

⁷² Bundesgerichtshof, Beschluss vom 21. Februar 2001, 3 StR 244/00.

ubistva, mučenja, silovanja, zatvaranja i prisilna protjerivanja civila. Sud je prihvatio zaključak da su takve radnje bile dio šire genocidne politike usmjerene protiv bošnjačkog stanovništva na određenim područjima Bosne i Hercegovine. Međutim, preinačena je pravna kvalifikacija djela te je utvrđeno da je optuženi počinio ubistvo u šest slučajeva i da je svojim radnjama pomagao genocid koji su provodili srpski politički i vojni lideri, svjestan genocidnog cilja i vlastitog doprinosa njegovom ostvarivanju. Sud je potvrdio da je Kušljčić 25. juna 1992. godine naredio i učestvovao u strijeljanju šestorice bošnjačkih civila u Vrbancima, koji su ubijeni isključivo zbog svoje etničke pripadnosti. Kazna doživotnog zatvora ostala je na snazi.⁷³

Uprkos pravosnažnoj presudi njemačkog suda, Đurađ Kušljčić je 2006. godine pušten iz zatvora nakon približno osam godina provedenih na izdržavanju kazne, nakon čega je deportovan iz Njemačke i dobio trajnu zabranu ulaska u tu državu. Presuda protiv njega nikada nije ukinuta. Razlog puštanja nije bila nova sudska odluka kojom bi presuda bila poništena, nego institut prijevremenog puštanja odnosno pomilovanja, koji u njemačkom pravnom sistemu može biti primijenjen i kod doživotnih kazni nakon određenog vremena izdržavanja kazne.⁷⁴ U javnim nastupima Kušljčić je tvrdio da je njegovo oslobađanje povezano s presudom Haškog tribunala u predmetu Radoslav Brđanin iz 2004. godine, u kojoj genocid nije presuđen za više općina ARK, uključujući i Kotor-Varoš, te je to tumačio kao potvrdu vlastite nevinosti.⁷⁵ Međutim, takva interpretacija nema pravni značaj za njegov predmet, jer konačna presuda njemačkog suda nikada nije poništena niti izmijenjena u tom smislu.

Zločini u općini Kotor-Varoš u presudama Suda Bosne i Hercegovine

U vezi sa zločinima počinjenim u općini Kotor-Varoš pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine vođeni su i postupci protiv pojedinih neposrednih izvršilaca zločina.

U predmetu protiv Ljubiše Vranješa i Mladena Milića Sud Bosne i Hercegovine je utvrdio njihovu krivičnu odgovornost za ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva počinjen 1992. godine u Kotor-Varoši, kada su učestvovali u nezakonitom odvođenju trojice civila, pri čemu su dva civila ubijena, dok je treći teško ranjen uspio pobjeći. Prvostepenom presudom iz 2011. godine Vranješ i Milić su osuđeni na kazne zatvora od po deset godina,

⁷³ Isto.

⁷⁴ Izet Perviz, Potvrđeno i presudom Bavorskog vrhovnog zemaljskog suda u Münchenu: Genocid u Kotor-Varoši, *Stav*, 21. april 2021, <https://stav.ba/vijest/genocid-u-kotor-varosi/1872>, (Pristup: 21. februar 2026).

⁷⁵ "Nateraću nemce da 'poližu' genocide", 6. novembar 2022, <https://www.novosti.rs/republika-srpska/vesti/1170144/nateracu-nemce-polizu-genocid-djuradj-kusljic-bivsi-direktor-skole-kotor-varosu-ratuje-pravosudjem-mocne-zemlje>, (Pristup: 19. februar 2026).

koje su u žalbenom postupku smanjene na osam godina, a nakon ponovnog odlučivanja određene su konačne kazne od po sedam godina zatvora, dok je Vranješ u kasnije izrečena jedinstvena kazna zatvora u trajanju od sedam godina i tri mjeseca.⁷⁶

U sudskoj praksi Suda Bosne i Hercegovine dodatnu potvrdu postojanja zločina nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim civilnim stanovništvom u općini Kotor-Varoš predstavlja i predmet protiv Duška Vujičića i Duška Maksimovića. Sud je utvrdio da su optuženi, kao pripadnici policijskih struktura, odnosno Vujičić kao aktivni milicioner Stanice javne bezbjednosti Kotor-Varoš, a Maksimović kao rezervni milicioner iste stanice, u periodu od juna do novembra 1992. godine postupali protivno pravilima međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, posebno članu 3. Ženevskih konvencija. Oni su nezakonito zatvarali i nečovječno postupali prema civilima na području općine Kotor-Varoš.⁷⁷ U presudi je detaljno opisano više pojedinačnih događaja koji ilustriraju obrasce zločina nad civilima: nezakonita hapšenja i zatvaranja civila, fizičko i psihičko zlostavljanje, prijetnje oružjem, kao i sistematsko premlaćivanje zatvorenika u prostorijama policije, zatvoru iza zgrade Osnovnog suda i drugim objektima u Kotor-Varoši. Posebno je utvrđeno da su 25. juna 1992. godine tokom akcije hapšenja desetine civila nezakonito lišene slobode i pod prijetnjom oružja sprovedene u improvizirane zatočeničke objekte, gdje su bili izloženi fizičkom i psihičkom zlostavljanju, pri čemu su optuženi učestvovali u premlaćivanju zatvorenika, prijetnjama smrću i drugim oblicima nečovječnog postupanja.⁷⁸

Na osnovu utvrđenog činjeničnog stanja Sud Bosne i Hercegovine proglasio je Vujičića i Maksimovića krivim za ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva, te je Vujičića osudio na kaznu zatvora od šest godina, dok je Maksimović osuđen na kaznu zatvora od jedne godine i šest mjeseci.⁷⁹ Apelaciono vijeće Suda Bosne i Hercegovine potvrdilo je prvostepenu presudu i izrečene kazne.⁸⁰

U sudskoj praksi Bosne i Hercegovine dodatnu potvrdu zločina nad civilnim stanovništvom na području općine Kotor-Varoš predstavlja i predmet Bosiljko Marković i Ostoja Marković. Prvostepenom presudom ovog Suda od 24. juna 2015. godine optuženi su proglašeni krivim da su tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini počinili ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva. Sud je utvrdio da

⁷⁶ Sud Bosne i Hercegovine (dalje: Sud BiH), Predmet br. S11K00273511Krl, *Prvostepena presuda protiv Vranješ Ljubiše i Milić Mladena*, 28. oktobar 2011; Sud BiH, Predmet br. S11K00273512Krž3, *Drugostepena presuda protiv Vranješ Ljubiše i Milić Mladena*, 23. april 2012; Sud BiH, Predmet br. S11K00373516Krž5, *Preinačena drugostepena presuda*, 10. mart 2016.

⁷⁷ Sud BiH, Predmet br. S11K01478814Kri, *Prvostepena presuda protiv Save Tepića, Duška Vujičića, Duška Maksimovića i Ilije Kurušića*, 29. septembar 2023.

⁷⁸ Isto.

⁷⁹ Isto.

⁸⁰ Sud BiH, Predmet br. S11K01478824Krž2, *Drugostepena presuda protiv Save Tepića, Duška Vujičića, Duška Maksimovića i Ilije Kurušića*, 8. maj 2024.

su Markovići učestvovali u nezakonitom lišavanju slobode i zlostavljanju civila, čime su prekršili pravila međunarodnog humanitarnog prava koja štite civilno stanovništvo tokom oružanog sukoba. Na osnovu utvrđenog činjeničnog stanja Bosiljko Marković i Ostoja Marković osuđeni su na kazne zatvora od po deset godina. U drugostepenom postupku Apelaciono vijeće Suda Bosne i Hercegovine potvrdilo je prvostepenu presudu. Istom presudom Sud je prihvatio i imovinskopравни zahtjev žrtve te naložio optuženima da solidarno isplate naknadu nematerijalne štete u iznosu od 26.500 konvertibilnih maraka zbog duševne boli uzrokovane povredom ličnih prava i smanjenjem kvaliteta života.⁸¹

Iako izrečene presude Suda Bosne i Hercegovine spadaju u relativno blaže u poređenju s presudama međunarodnih sudova za iste događaje, ova presuda ima značajnu pravnu vrijednost jer potvrđuje sudski utvrđene činjenice o nezakonitim hapšenjima, zatvaranjima i sistematskom zlostavljanju civila u Kotor-Varoši tokom 1992. godine, čime dodatno potvrđuje nalaze međunarodnih presuda koje se odnose na zločine počinjene na području te općine.

Također, pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine i dalje se vode krivični postupci i istrage protiv više lica za zločine počinjene na području općine Kotor-Varoš, što potvrđuje da procesuiranje ovih djela nije okončano.⁸² Naprimjer, jedan od novijih predmeta odnosi se na Danka Kajkuta, protiv kojeg je Sud Bosne i Hercegovine 22. januara 2025. godine djelimično potvrdio optužnicu za zločin protiv čovječnosti. Kajkut se, kao komandir Prvog voda Specijalnog odreda milicije, tereti da je učestvovao u nezakonitom zatvaranju bošnjačkih i hrvatskih civila, njihovom mučenju, zlostavljanju i seksualnom nasilju, te da nije preduzeo mjere da spriječi niti kazni zločine svojih podređenih.⁸³

Među značajnijim predmetima iz novijeg perioda nalazi se i postupak protiv Zdravka Samardžije, protiv kojeg je optužnica potvrđena 2022. godine. Samardžija se tereti da je, kao član komande Specijalnog odreda milicije CSB, u okviru širokog i sistematskog napada na bošnjačko i hrvatsko civilno stanovništvo u općini Kotor-Varoš 1992. i 1993. godine, učestvovao u progonu civila kroz nezakonita zatvaranja, mučenja, silovanja, ubistva, deportacije i

⁸¹ Trial Verdict upheld in the case of Bosiljko Marković et al.; Dostupno na: <https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/20376-potvrdjena-prvostepena-presuda-u-predmetu-bosiljko-markovic-i-dr>, (Pristup: 19. februar 2026).

⁸² Jasmin Begić, “<https://detektor.ba/2026/01/29/tuzilastvo-bez-odgovora-o-pokretanju-istrage-protiv-nenada-stevandica-za-dogadjaje-u-kotor-varosi/>”, (Pristup: 29. januar 2026).

⁸³ “Potvrđena optužnica u predmet Danko Kajkut“, 7. februar 2025, <https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/Potvr%C4%91ena%20optu%C5%BEnica%20u%20predmetu%20Danko%20Kajkut>, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

prisilna premještanja, kao i kroz uništavanje imovine i vjerskih objekata. Prema navodima optužnice, njegove radnje kvalificirane su i kroz učešće u UZP-u.⁸⁴

U toku dokaznog postupka pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine izvedeni su i iskazi svjedoka koji dodatno potvrđuju način funkcionisanja policijskih i bezbjednosnih struktura u Kotor-Varoši u ljeto 1992. godine. Tako je jedan od zaštićenih svjedoka naveo da je nakon hapšenja u junu 1992. bio ispitivan od strane više lica u prostorijama policije, uključujući i optuženog Samardžiju, ali i osobu koju su prisutni oslovljavali nadimkom “Doktor”, a za koju je kasnije saznao da je Nenad Stevandić, trenutni predsjednik Narodne skupštine RS-a.⁸⁵ Svjedok je opisao i širi kontekst zatočenja, uključujući prisustvo nasilja nad pritvorenim licima, premlaćivanja i nehumanih uslova boravka, čime se njegov iskaz uklapa u već utvrđene obrasce postupanja prema civilima u toj općini. Slične indicije proizlaze i iz svjedočenja u predmetu protiv Danka Kajkuta, gdje je svjedok Fikret Skopljak opisao događaje od 11. juna 1992. godine, kada su vojne i policijske snage preuzele ključne objekte u Kotor-Varoši, uključujući policiju, bolnicu i zgradu općine. Svjedok je naveo da su ga iz kuće izveli uniformisani pripadnici snaga, o čemu postoji i video zapis,⁸⁶ te da su ubrzo nakon toga na lice mjesta došli Kajkut, Stevandić i još jedna osoba. Prema njegovom iskazu, nakon odvođenja u garažu bio je izložen fizičkom nasilju, pri čemu je naveo da je, nakon početnog napada od strane Kajkuta, fizičko zlostavljanje nastavljeno od strane Stevandića, usljed čega je zadobio teške tjelesne povrede, uključujući gubitak više zuba. Svjedok je također opisao dovođenje većeg broja civila u bolnicu, nakon čega su se čuli pucnji i odvoženje tijela, što dodatno ukazuje na kontekst široko rasprostranjenog nasilja nad civilnim stanovništvom.⁸⁷

Pored sudskih svjedočenja, u javnom prostoru postoje i medijski navodi koji dodatno tematiziraju ulogu Nenada Stevandića tokom rata, uključujući povezanost sa formacijom Srpskih odbrambenih snaga (SOS) i “kontroverze” vezane za tzv. “crveni kombi” u Banjoj Luci, odnosno “vozilo koje je navodno korišteno za prevoz nesrpskih civila tokom racija i deportacija”.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Lamija Grebo, “Potvrđena optužnica za zločine u Kotor-Varoši”, 25. januar 2022, <https://detektor.ba/2022/01/25/potvrdjena-optuznica-za-zlocine-u-kotor-varosi/>, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

⁸⁵ Marija Taušan, “Zdravko Samardžija: Optuženi i Nenad Stevandić ga ispitivali u policiji”, 12. januar 2026, <https://detektor.ba/2026/01/12/zdravko-samardzija-optuzeni-i-nenad-stevandic-ga-ispitivali-u-policiji/>, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

⁸⁶ “Nenad Stevandic, Kotor Varos '92”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_-T4C3f1HQ&t=78s, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

⁸⁷ Nermina Kuloglija-Zolj, “Danko Kajkut: Svjedoka u garaži tukli optuženi i Nenad Stevandić, 24. April 2025, <https://detektor.ba/2025/04/24/danko-kajkut-svjedoka-u-garazi-tukli-optuzeni-i-nenad-stevandic/>, posjeta 7. mart 2026; “Svjedočenje o ulozi Nenada Stevandića u ratnim zločinima: Hoće li Tužilaštvo reagovati?”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LP7u7-QRBHI>, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

⁸⁸ Danijal Hadzovic, “Nenad Stevandić, čovjek sumnjive prošlosti: 'Crveni kombi', maltretiranje Bošnjaka i nerazjašnjena likvidacija”, <https://avaz.ba/bih/republika-srpska/960908/nenad->

Relevantnost Stevandića za analizu ovih događaja ne proizlazi samo iz savremenih istraga, već i iz njegovog pominjanja u sudski utvrđenim činjenicama pred međunarodnim sudovima. Presude ICTY-a ukazuju na njegovo povezivanje sa formacijom SOS, koja je djelovala u okviru šire strukture političkih i bezbjednosnih organa RS-a. Pretresno vijeće u predmetu protiv Radoslava Brđanina utvrdilo je da je SOS bio usko povezan sa SDS-om i Kriznim štabom ARK-a, te da je korišten kao operativno sredstvo za provođenje strateških ciljeva. U istom kontekstu konstatovano je da je Stevandić bio na čelu ove formacije i da je bio politički povezan s vrhom SDS-a, uključujući direktne veze sa Radovanom Karadžićem.⁸⁹ Dodatno, u presudi u predmetu protiv Ratka Mladića utvrđeno je da je SOS predstavljao “paravojnu” jedinicu sastavljenu, između ostalog, od lokalnih članova SDS-a i kriminalnih elemenata, koja je djelovala u koordinaciji sa policijskim strukturama i bila integrisana u širi sigurnosni aparat. Pretresno vijeće je zaključilo da su ove formacije, uključujući SOS, od ljeta 1992. godine bile formalno stavljene pod komandu i kontrolu VRS, čime su postale dio šireg sistema vojnog i bezbjednosnog djelovanja na teritoriji ARK-a.⁹⁰ Više puta posljednjih godina u bosanskohercegovačkim medijima je izvještavano o tome da Tužilaštvo Bosne i Hercegovine vodi istragu protiv Nenada Stevandića.⁹¹

Među značajnim predmetima pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine koji su u toku nalazi se i onaj protiv Boška Peulića i drugih, koji ima posebnu težinu jer obuhvata odgovornost ključnih vojnih, policijskih i političkih struktura vlasti u Kotor-Varoši. U okviru ovog predmeta, optuženi su Boško Peulić, komandant 22. lake pješadijske brigade VRS, a potom i komandant Taktičke grupe 3 VRS; Slobodan Župljanin, komandant 2. bataljona iste brigade; Aleksandar Petrović, komandir I čete 2. bataljona; Manojlo Tepić, komandant Teritorijalne odbrane Kotor-Varoš; Janko Trivić, komandant 22. lake pješadijske brigade od oktobra 1992. godine; te Nedeljko Đekanović, predsjednik općine i Kriznog štaba Kotor-Varoš.⁹² Riječ je o predmetu u kojem je istraga započeta pred ICTY-em, a prosljeđena na dalje procesuiranje Tužilaštvu Bosne i Hercegovine. Peulić i drugi su osumnjičeni da su učestvovali u progonu oko 5.000 bošnjačkih i hrvatskih civila sa područja Kotor-Varoši, tokom kojeg je ubijeno najmanje 300 osoba, uz počinjenje

stevandic-covjek-sumnjive-proslosti-crveni-kombi-maltretiranje-bosnjaka-i-nerazjasnjena-likvidacija, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

⁸⁹ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem II, Tužilac protiv Radoslava Brđanina, *Presuda*, par. 98-99; 226-229.

⁹⁰ ICTY, Pred pretresnim vijećem I, Tužilac protiv Ratka Mladića, *Presuda*, Tom IV, par. 3912-3913; Vidi i: ICTY, Predmet br. IT-95-5/18-T, Pred pretresnim vijećem, Tužilac protiv Radovana Karadžića, *Presuda*, 24. mart 2016, Tom 1, par. 1373.

⁹¹ “Tužilaštvo BiH vodi istragu protiv Stevandića zbog zločina koji su počinjeni u Kotor Varoši”, *Klix*, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tuzilastvo-bih-vodi-istragu-protiv-stevandica-zbog-zlocina-koji-su-pocinjeni-u-kotor-varosi/250502014>, (Pristup: 8. mart 2026).

⁹² Sud BiH, S1 1 K 020248 15 Kri Peulić Boško i dr, <https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/Court/Case/1002>, (Pristup: 8. mart 2026).

brojnih drugih zločina, uključujući mučenja, silovanja, nezakonita zatočenja i pljačku imovine.⁹³ Optužnica koje je potvrđena 22. decembra 2015. godine tereti ih da su u periodu od juna 1992. do sredine 1994. godine, kao dio širokog i sistematičnog napada, djelovali sa zajedničkim ciljem trajnog uklanjanja bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva sa teritorije općine.

Poseban značaj ovog predmeta ogleda se u svjedočenjima koja se odnose na događaje u novembru 1992. godine u Grabovici, a koji su već prepoznati i u sudskoj praksi međunarodnih sudova. Svjedoci Tužilaštva Bosne i Hercegovine opisali su kako su nakon napuštanja Večića grupe civila presretnute, zarobljene i dovedene u prostor oko osnovne škole u Grabovici, gdje je izvršeno razdvajanje muškaraca od žena i djece. Prema njihovim iskazima, žene i djeca su zatvarani u učionice, dok su muškarci ostavljeni vani ili odvođeni u druge prostorije, nakon čega su se tokom noći čuli pucnji, a zarobljeni muškarci više nisu viđeni. Svjedočenja ukazuju i na prethodno granatiranje sela, prisilno raseljavanje stanovništva, kao i kontinuirano nasilje nad zarobljenim civilima, uključujući premlaćivanja i nestanke.⁹⁴ Ovi iskazi, iako dolaze iz postupka koji je još uvijek u toku, u velikoj mjeri korespondiraju sa činjeničnim nalazima utvrđenim u presudama ICTY-a.

Presude Okružnog suda u Banjoj Luci za zločine u Kotor-Varoši

Određeni zločini počinjeni na području Kotor-Varoši procesuirani su i pred Okružnim sudom u Banja Luci. Riječ je o predmetima koji se odnose na individualnu krivičnu odgovornost za konkretna djela počinjena nad civilnim stanovništvom tokom 1992. i 1993. godine.

U predmetu protiv Radovana Zeca donesena je pravosnažna presuda 13. septembra 2010. godine, kojom je optuženi osuđen na kaznu zatvora u trajanju od tri godine zbog silovanja jedne Bošnjakinje počinjenog 1993. godine.⁹⁵ Miladin Bogdanić je pravosnažnom presudom od 20. decembra 2011. godine osuđen na kaznu zatvora od šest godina zbog ubistva civila Muje

⁹³ Denis Džidić, "Potvrđena optužnica za zločin u Kotor-Varoši", *Detektor*, <https://detektor.ba/2015/12/30/potvrdena-optuznica-za-zlocin-u-kotor-varosi/>, (Pristup: 7. mart 2026).

⁹⁴ Haris Rovčanin, "Peulić i ostali: Odvajanje muškaraca kod škole u Grabovici", *Detektor*, <https://detektor.ba/2019/05/31/peulic-i-ostali-odvajanje-muskaraca-kod-skole-u-grabovici/>, (Pristup: 8. mart 2026). Postupak je i dalje u toku, a 2018. godine obustavljen je postupak protiv Aleksandra Petrovića zbog njegove smrti. Sud BiH, S1 1 K 020248 15 Kri Peulić Boško i dr.

⁹⁵ Podaci Organizacije porodica šhida, poginulih boraca i nestalih osoba "Vrbanja" Kotor-Varoš; Izet Perviz, "Potvrđeno i presudom Bavorskog vrhovnog zemaljskog suda u Münchenu: Genocid u Kotor-Varoši"; Izet Perviz, "U RS-u osuđeno 114 pripadnika VRS-a", *Stav*, <https://stav.ba/vijest/u-rs-u-osudeno-114-pripadnika-vrs-a/19323>, (Pristup: 8. mart 2026).

Kovačevića 1993. godine.⁹⁶ U predmetu protiv Ranka Stojanovića donesena je pravosnažna presuda 23. maja 2013. godine, kojom je osuđen na kaznu zatvora od tri godine zbog ubistva civila hrvatske nacionalnosti Ilije Antunovića počinjenog u augustu 1993. godine. U postupku je utvrđeno da su posmrtni ostaci žrtve pronađeni 2003. godine na lokalitetu Korićanske stijene.⁹⁷ Radomir Ševarika je pravosnažnom presudom od 24. novembra 2016. godine osuđen na kaznu zatvora od dvije i po godine zbog ubistva dvojice Hrvata.⁹⁸

Važno je naglasiti da je određeni broj osumnjičenih i optuženih za zločine na području Kotor-Varoši ostao nedostupan pravosuđu ili je preminuo tokom trajanja krivičnih postupaka, što dodatno otežava potpuno procesuiranje odgovornih. Jedan od takvih slučajeva odnosi se na Nedeljka Đukića, koji je prvostepenom presudom Okružnog suda u Banjoj Luci od 28. septembra 2015. godine osuđen na četiri godine zatvora zbog učešća u ubistvima i nečovječnom postupanju prema civilima bošnjačke i hrvatske nacionalnosti, ali je preminuo tokom žalbenog postupka.⁹⁹

Zaključak

Analiza sudske prakse i izrečenih presuda međunarodnih, njemačkog, te domaćih sudova, uključujući Sud Bosne i Hercegovine i Okružni sud u Banja Luci, pokazuje da su zločini počinjeni nad bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom u općini Kotor-Varoš tokom 1992. godine višestruko dokumentirani i pravno utvrđeni u nizu krivičnih postupaka. Prvostepene i konačne presude ICTY-a, posebno u predmetima protiv Radovana Karadžića, Ratka Mladića, Radoslava Brđanina, Momčila Krajišnika, Biljane Plavšić, te Miće Stanišića i Stojana Župljanina, te konačne IRMCT-a protiv Karadžića i Mladića, nedvosmisleno su utvrdile postojanje širokog i sistematskog napada na bošnjačko i hrvatsko stanovništvo u Bosanskoj krajini, uključujući i područje Kotor-Varoši. Taj napad manifestirao se kroz ubistva civila, nezakonita zatočenja, mučenje, seksualno nasilje, deportacije i sistematsko uništavanje imovine i vjerskih objekata, pri čemu posebno mjesto zauzima masovno ubistvo zarobljenih muškaraca u školi u Grabovici u novembru 1992. godine.

⁹⁶ Isto; Vidi i: "Lokalno pravosuđe – Bogdanić: Šest godina zatvora", *Detektor*, <https://detektor.ba/2011/07/01/lokalno-pravosude-bogdanic-sest-godina-zatvora/>, (Pristup: 8. mart 2026).

⁹⁷ Podaci Organizacije porodica šehida, poginulih boraca i nestalih osoba "Vrbanja" Kotor-Varoš; Izet Perviz, "Potvrđeno i presudom Bavorskog vrhovnog zemaljskog suda u Münchenu: Genocid u Kotor-Varoši"; "Lokalno pravosuđe – Banjaluka: Stojanoviću tri godine", *Detektor*, <https://detektor.ba/2013/01/17/lokalno-pravosude-banjaluka-stojanovicu-tri-godine/>, (Pristup: 8. mart 2026).

⁹⁸ Isto.

⁹⁹ I. Perviz, *U RS-u osuđeno 114 pripadnika VRS-a*.

Nalazi iz ovih presuda, potvrđeni i u žalbenim postupcima, čine dio međunarodno verifikovane činjenične osnove o događajima u Kotor-Varoši. Njihov značaj dodatno proizlazi iz činjenice da se utvrđenja iz različitih predmeta međusobno dopunjuju i konvergiraju, čime se uspostavlja konzistentan obrazac nasilja koji jasno povezuje lokalne zločine sa širim političkim, vojnim i policijskim strukturama vlasti RS-a. U tom smislu, zločini u Kotor-Varoši predstavljaju integralni segment koordinirane politike progona i prisilnog uklanjanja bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva sa teritorija pod srpskom kontrolom.

Ovu sliku dodatno potvrđuju presude nacionalnih sudova izvan Bosne i Hercegovine. Njemački sudovi su, primjenom principa univerzalne jurisdikcije, još krajem devedesetih godina utvrdili da su ubistva i progoni bošnjačkog stanovništva u Kotor-Varoši bili dio šire kampanje nasilja nad civilima. Sud je zaključio da radnje Đurađa Kušljića predstavljaju svjesno pomaganje genocida koji su provodili srpski politički i vojni lideri nad bošnjačkim stanovništvom na području Kotor-Varoši.

Domaće pravosuđe u Bosni i Hercegovini kroz niz presuda protiv neposrednih izvršilaca dodatno potvrđuje obrazac nasilja nad civilnim stanovništvom na području Kotor-Varoši.

Posmatrane zajedno, presude ICTY-a, IRMCT-a, njemačkih i domaćih sudova formiraju međusobno komplementarnu i u velikoj mjeri koherentnu pravnu i činjeničnu osnovu o zločinima počinjenim u Kotor-Varoši. Uprkos razlikama u pravnim kvalifikacijama pojedinačnih djela, sudovi su dosljedno utvrđivali postojanje sistematskog nasilja i progona bošnjačkog i hrvatskog stanovništva. Upravo ta višeslojna i konvergentna sudska praksa predstavlja jedan od najsnažnijih i metodološki najpouzdanijih izvora za pravno i historijsko razumijevanje ovih događaja.

U tom kontekstu, tvrdnje da za zločine počinjene u Grabovici i drugim mjestima u općini Kotor-Varoš 1992. godine ne postoje dokazi ili sudske presude nisu u skladu sa sudskim presudama. Takve tvrdnje predstavljaju oblik pravnog i historijskog revizionizma koji se zasniva na selektivnom ignorisanju sudski utvrđenih i presuđenih činjenica, pri čemu njihova suštinska funkcija nije osporavanje pojedinačnih pravnih kvalifikacija, već delegitimizacija ukupnog sudske utvrđenog činjeničnog stanja i narativa o zločinima.

Pokušaji zabrane ili osporavanja obilježavanja mjesta zločina, poput komemoracije u Grabovici, ne mogu se posmatrati kao neutralne administrativne ili bezbjedonosne mjere. Oni se uklapaju u širi obrazac kontrole javnog prostora sjećanja i osporavanja sudski potvrđenih i presuđenih činjenica. U konačnici, sudski utvrđene činjenice o zločinima u Kotor-Varoši 1992. godine predstavljaju ne samo pravni i historijski standard istine, već i ključni normativni okvir za očuvanje kolektivnog sjećanja, zaštitu dostojanstva žrtava i suprotstavljanje savremenim oblicima historijskog revizionizma.

Summary

Analysis of the case law and sentences handed down by international, German, and domestic courts, including the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the District Court in Banja Luka, shows that the crimes committed against the Bosniak and Croat populations in the municipality of Kotor-Varoš during 1992 have been documented multiple times and legally established in a series of criminal proceedings. The first-instance and final judgments of the ICTY—particularly in the cases against Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Radoslav Brđanin, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, as well as Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin—along with the final judgments of the IRMCT against Karadžić and Mladić, have unequivocally established the existence of a widespread and systematic attack on the Bosniak and Croat population in the Bosnian Krajina, including the area of Kotor-Varoš. This attack manifested through the killing of civilians, unlawful detention, torture, sexual violence, deportations, and the systematic destruction of property and religious sites, with a prominent place held by the mass killing of captured men at the school in Grabovica in November 1992.

The findings from these verdicts, confirmed in appellate proceedings, form part of the internationally verified factual basis regarding the events in Kotor-Varoš. Their significance further stems from the fact that findings from different cases complement and converge with one another, establishing a consistent pattern of violence that clearly links local crimes to the broader political, military, and police structures of the Republika Srpska authorities. In this sense, the crimes in Kotor-Varoš represent an integral segment of a coordinated policy of persecution and the forcible removal of the Bosniak and Croat population from territories under Serbian control.

This picture is further confirmed by the verdicts of national courts outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Applying the principle of universal jurisdiction, German courts established as early as the late 1990s that the killings and persecutions of the Bosniak population in Kotor-Varoš were part of a broader campaign of violence against civilians. The court concluded that the actions of Đurađ Kušljic constituted the conscious aiding and abetting of genocide carried out by Serbian political and military leaders against the Bosniak population in the Kotor-Varoš area.

The domestic judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through a series of verdicts against direct perpetrators, further confirms the pattern of violence against the civilian population in the Kotor-Varoš region.

Viewed together, the verdicts of the ICTY, IRMCT, German, and domestic courts form a mutually complementary and largely coherent legal and factual basis regarding the crimes committed in Kotor-Varoš. Despite differences in the legal qualifications of individual acts, the courts have consistently established the existence of systematic violence and persecution of the Bosniak and Croat populations. It is precisely this multi-layered and

convergent jurisprudence that represents one of the strongest and methodologically most reliable sources for the legal and historical understanding of these events.

In this context, claims that there is no evidence or court verdicts for the crimes committed in Grabovica and other locations in the municipality of Kotor-Varoš in 1992 are not in accordance with judicial rulings. Such claims represent a form of legal and historical revisionism based on the selective ignoring of judicially established and adjudicated facts, where their essential function is not to contest individual legal qualifications, but to delegitimize the overall judicially established factual situation and narrative of the crimes.

Attempts to ban or contest the marking of crime sites, such as the commemoration in Grabovica, cannot be viewed as neutral administrative or security measures. They fit into a broader pattern of controlling the public space of memory and contesting judicially confirmed and adjudicated facts. Ultimately, the judicially established facts about the crimes in Kotor-Varoš in 1992 represent not only a legal and historical standard of truth but also a key normative framework for preserving collective memory, protecting the dignity of victims, and opposing contemporary forms of historical revisionism.

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DEKONSTRUKCIJA JEDNOG NARATIVA: ANALITIČKE GREŠKE I HISTORIJSKA SELEKCIJA U IZVJEŠTAVANJU O BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI¹

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad predstavlja kritičku analizu teza koje je Marie-Janine Calic iznijela u časopisu *ZEIT Geschichte* o savremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, Sarajevu i bošnjačkom stanovništvu. Autori argumentiraju da se u spornom tekstu reproduciraju narativi koji Bosnu i Hercegovinu smještaju u okvir kulturne i civilizacijske sumnje, pri čemu se bošnjačko-muslimanska većina implicitno predstavlja kao faktor destabilizacije u širem evropskom kontekstu.

U uvodnom dijelu rada ukazuje se na dugotrajan obrazac stigmatizacije Sarajeva i Bošnjaka, koji se ogleda u tvrdnjama o navodnoj "arabizaciji" i "islamizaciji" grada. Autori naglašavaju da takve teze nemaju empirijsko utemeljenje, budući da su obim turističkih posjeta i investicija iz zaljevskih zemalja u Bosni i Hercegovini manji nego u nizu drugih evropskih država, gdje slične pojave ne izazivaju moralnu paniku niti civilizacijske rasprave. U tom kontekstu ističe se asimetrija u tretmanu Bosne i Hercegovine u odnosu na susjedne zemlje koje također održavaju intenzivne političke i ekonomske veze s državama Bliskog istoka, ali bez slične simboličke problematizacije.

Središnji dio rada sistematski osporava nekoliko ključnih tvrdnji. Prvo, odbacuje se interpretacija da je Alija Izetbegović u Islamskoj deklaraciji

¹ Ovaj rad je reakcija na članak Marie-Janine Calic *Jugoslawiens gebrochenes Herz* objavljen 28. novembra 2025. godine, u njemačkom stručnom časopisu *ZEIT Geschichte*. Navedeni odgovor na njemačkom jeziku prosljeđen je njemačkim medijima. Marie-Janine Calic, *Jugoslawiens gebrochenes Herz: Durch den Bosnienkrieg werden Muslime und Christen zu Feinden*, *ZEIT Geschichte*, Nr. 6, Hamburg 2025.

zagovarao panislamsko carstvo, naglašavajući da takvo čitanje proizlazi iz selektivnih i politički instrumentaliziranih interpretacija iz 1980-ih, a ne iz samog teksta. Ukazuje se da dokument nije predstavljao operativni politički program, niti je bio osnova zvanične politike nakon 1990. godine. Drugo, osporava se teza o organiziranoj „reislamizaciji” koju su navodno provodile Stranka demokratske akcije (SDA) i Islamska zajednica, uz argument da nije postojao institucionalni pokušaj uvođenja šerijatskog prava niti obaveznog vjerskog odijevanja, te da je političko djelovanje ostalo unutar sekularnog ustavnog okvira. Treće, preispituju se tvrdnje o “hiljadama mudžahedina”, uz isticanje da je broj stranih boraca bio ograničen i da je njihovo dugoročno prisustvo ostalo marginalno, dok su strane dobrovoljce imale i druge zaraćene strane.

Rad također analizira tvrdnju da Sarajevo gubi multikulturalni karakter, argumentirajući da su demografske promjene primarno posljedica rata, opsade i etničkog čišćenja, a ne planske poslijeratne nacionalizacije. Posebno se naglašava da su migracijski obrasci nakon rata oblikovani etničkom teritorijalizacijom cijele zemlje, a ne isključivo politikama u glavnom gradu. Teza o transformaciji Sarajeva u “panislamski grad” zbog investicija iz zemalja Zaljeva odbacuje se kao zamjena ekonomskog prisustva za ideološki utjecaj, pri čemu se podsjeća da su političke institucije, zakonodavstvo i javni prostor ostali sekularni i pluralni.

Posebna pažnja posvećena je tvrdnji o podjednakoj upotrebi “religijske propagande” svih strana uoči rata. Autori ističu da takvo izjednačavanje zanemaruje asimetričnu prirodu političke mobilizacije i presuđene činjenice o odgovornosti za planiranje i provođenje sistematskih zločina. Slično tome, navodi o širokoj i koordiniranoj isporuci oružja iz muslimanskih zemalja ocjenjuju se kao pojednostavljeni i historijski nedovoljno potkrijepljeni, uz naglasak da je međunarodni embargo imao različite i kompleksne implikacije. Autori upozoravaju da interpretacije kakve nude sporni tekstovi mogu biti instrumentalizirane u takvim političkim okvirima, čime se akademski diskurs nehotice uklapa u šire ideološke agende.

Zaključno, rad tvrdi da analizirane teze ne nude uravnoteženu historiografsku interpretaciju, već selektivno čitanje ratnog i postratnog konteksta koje Bosnu i Hercegovinu predstavlja kao trajno “problematičan” evropski prostor. Umjesto empirijski utemeljene analize institucionalnih i političkih procesa, u fokus se stavljaju kulturno-identitetske pretpostavke, čime se reproducira paradigma sumnje prema bošnjačko-muslimanskoj zajednici i njenoj političkoj legitimnosti, uz zanemarivanje kompleksnosti historijskih uzroka i posljedica rata.

Ključne riječi: Bošnjaci, Bosna i Hercegovina, Sarajevo, ZEIT Geschichte, narativ, diskurs, reakcija.

DECONSTRUCTION OF A NARRATIVE: ANALYTICAL ERRORS AND HISTORICAL SELECTIVITY IN REPORTING ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Abstract: *This article presents a critical analysis of the theses advanced by Marie-Janine Calic in ZEIT Geschichte concerning contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and the Bosniak population. The authors argue that the contested text reproduces narratives that place Bosnia and Herzegovina within a framework of cultural and civilizational suspicion, implicitly portraying the Bosniak-Muslim majority as a destabilizing factor within the broader European context.*

In the introductory section, the article identifies a long-standing pattern of stigmatization directed at Sarajevo and the Bosniaks, reflected in claims about the alleged “Arabization” and “Islamization” of the city. The authors emphasize that such assertions lack empirical grounding, noting that the volume of tourism and investment from Gulf countries in Bosnia and Herzegovina is lower than in a number of other European states, where similar developments do not provoke moral panic or civilizational alarm. In this regard, the article highlights an asymmetry in the treatment of Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to neighboring countries that also maintain intensive political and economic ties with Middle Eastern states, yet without comparable symbolic problematization.

The central part of the article systematically challenges several key claims. First, it rejects the interpretation that Alija Izetbegović advocated a pan-Islamic empire in his Islamic Declaration, arguing that such readings stem from selective and politically instrumentalized interpretations from the 1980s rather than from the text itself. The document, it is stressed, did not constitute an operational political program nor did it form the basis of official policy after 1990. Second, the article disputes the claim of an organized “re-Islamization” allegedly pursued by the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Islamic Community, arguing that there was no institutional attempt to introduce sharia law or mandatory religious dress, and that political practice remained within a secular constitutional framework. Third, it reassesses claims about “thousands of mujahideen,” emphasizing that the number of foreign fighters was limited, their long-term presence marginal, and that foreign volunteers were present on other warring sides as well.

The article further examines the assertion that Sarajevo has lost its multicultural character, contending that demographic changes are primarily the result of war, siege, and ethnic cleansing rather than of a deliberate postwar nationalization project. It underscores that postwar migration patterns were shaped by the broader ethnic territorialization of the country, not exclusively by policies in the capital. The thesis that investments from Gulf countries are transforming Sarajevo into a “pan-Islamic city” is rejected as a conflation of economic presence with ideological influence, with the reminder that political institutions, legislation, and public life have remained secular and pluralistic.

Particular attention is devoted to the claim that all sides made equal use of “religious propaganda” prior to the war. The authors argue that such equivalence ignores the asymmetrical nature of political mobilization and the judicially established facts regarding responsibility for the planning and execution of systematic crimes. Similarly, allegations of broad and coordinated arms deliveries from Muslim-majority countries are described as oversimplified and historically insufficiently substantiated, especially given the complex implications of the international arms embargo. The authors caution that interpretations of this kind may be instrumentalized within contemporary political contexts, allowing academic discourse to become inadvertently aligned with broader ideological agendas.

In conclusion, the article maintains that the analyzed theses do not offer a balanced historiographical interpretation but rather a selective reading of the wartime and postwar context that portrays Bosnia and Herzegovina as a permanently “problematic” European space. Instead of an empirically grounded analysis of institutional and political processes, cultural-identitarian assumptions are foregrounded, thereby reproducing a paradigm of suspicion toward the Bosniak-Muslim community and its political legitimacy, while neglecting the complexity of the historical causes and consequences of the war.

Key words: *Bosniaks, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, ZEIT Geschichte, narrative, discourse, reaction.*

Uvod

U protekle tri decenije Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina te bošnjačko stanovništvo više puta su postajali pogodno mjesto za političke projekcije, sumnjičenja i stigmatizacije. Malo je društava koja su preživjela koordiniranu kampanju uništenja, a da su potom iznova bila prisiljena dokazivati kako ne predstavljaju prijetnju upravo onom kontinentu čije su demokratske vrijednosti branili po cijenu vlastitih života. Taj paradoks, u kojem su žrtve prisiljene legitimirati vlastitu nenasilnu poziciju, predstavlja jedno od problematičnijih nasljeđa postjugoslavenskog diskursa.

U tom kontekstu, fokusiranje na navodnu “arabizaciju” ili “islamizaciju” Sarajeva nije samo empirijsko, nego i naučno neutemeljeno. Broj turista iz arapskih zemalja koji posjećuju Bosnu i Hercegovinu znatno je manji nego u Švicarskoj, Poljskoj, Austriji ili Azerbejdžanu. Isto tako, obim investicija iz zemalja Zaljeva u Bosni i Hercegovini osjetno je manji nego u mnogim drugim evropskim državama, uključujući i članice Evropske unije koje aktivno podstiču takve kapitalne tokove. Ipak, ti primjeri ne izazivaju slične rasprave niti “moralne osude”.

Članak Marie-Janine Calic dodatno zanemaruje širi geopolitički kontekst zapadnog Balkana, u kojem više država održava bliske ekonomske i

političke veze kako sa zemljama Zaljeva tako i s Iranom. Hrvatska ostvaruje značajne koristi od investicija iz zaljevskog prostora, dok Srbija otvoreno nabavlja iranske dronove i sarađuje s akterima čiji se ideološki profili u većoj mjeri udaljavaju od evropskih normi nego bilo šta što se dešava u Bosni i Hercegovini. Takvi odnosi tumače se kao pragmatična vanjska politika. Samo u slučaju Bosne i Hercegovine rasprava se oblikuje kroz ton kulturne uzbune i navodnih civilizacijskih sumnji.

Ova asimetrija nije slučajna. Nesrazmjerna pažnja usmjerena prema Bosni i Hercegovini proizlazi iz činjenice da je najbrojniji narod u zemlji, Bošnjaci, većinski muslimanski. Narativ nepovjerenja, pretpostavka latentne prijetnje i stalna nastojanja za discipliniranjem identiteta u značajnoj mjeri podsjećaju ili upućuju na obrasce argumentacije korištene kako uoči i tokom agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, tako i u protekle tri decenije, radi opravdavanja isključivanja, nasilja i, u mnogim slučajevima, genocida. Pojava takvih obrazaca u etabliranim medijima danas otvara i metodološka i etička pitanja.

Za nas kao istraživače rata i njegovih posljedica, ovi argumenti su poznati: tvrdnje da su Bošnjaci inherentno strani, da se Sarajevo udaljava od Evrope ili da sama demografska prisutnost djeluje destabilizirajuće na zapadni Balkan. Takve tvrdnje nemaju sociološko ni političko uporište, ali opstaju jer se nadovezuju na već etablirane ideološke konstrukcije. Upravo zato je sporni članak izazvao snažnu reakciju. Naime, on nudi selektivnu interpretaciju historijskih procesa, ali i reproducira narative koji su nekada služili dehumanizaciji čitave populacije.

Za nas, koji se konfliktom i njegovim posljedicama bavimo naučno, odgovor na takve reprezentacije predstavlja čin intelektualne odgovornosti. To je posebno važno imamo li u vidu bolna historijska iskustva i trajnu sklonost javnog diskursa reprodukciji starih, dobro poznatih iskrivljenja. Stoga ćemo, prije svega iz metodoloških i profesionalnih razloga, u nastavku analizirati najspornije segmente predmetnog teksta.

Tvrdnja: Alija Izetbegović je zagovarao panislamsko carstvo od Maroka do Indonezije

Često ponavljana tvrdnja da je Alija Izetbegović u *Islamskoj deklaraciji*² zagovarao panislamsko carstvo “od Maroka do Indonezije” zasniva se na gruboj pogrešnoj interpretaciji i selektivnim citatima koje su jugoslavenski sudovi 1983. godine instrumentalizirali u političke svrhe.³ Ovu interpretaciju preuzela je i ideološki zaoštrila srpska nacionalistička propaganda uoči i tokom rata, kako bi

² Ivan Ejub Kostić, *Između vere i nacije: Pokret Mladi muslimani 1939–1990*, Akademska knjiga, 2025; Amir Karić, *Panislamizam u Bosni*, Connectum 2006.

³ Rajko Danilović, *Sarajevski proces 1983*, Bosanska riječ, Tuzla 2006.

Bošnjake predstavila odgovornima za izbijanje sukoba pod optužbom da žele uspostaviti “islamsku državu u Bosni i Hercegovini”.

Ni izdanje iz 1970. ni ono iz 1990. godine ne sadrži poziv na jedinstvenu teokratsku supersilu niti na pretvaranje Bosne i Hercegovine u islamsku teokratiju. Izetbegović govori u normativnim okvirima o muslimanskom svijetu uopće, iznoseći opće refleksije o religiji i društvu, a ne konkretne institucionalne ili teritorijalne projekte. Nekritičko ponavljanje tadašnje jugoslavenske interpretacije perpetuira političku propagandu koja je služila delegitimizaciji bošnjačkih političkih aktera.

Iako *Islamska deklaracija* sadrži konzervativne i islamski obojene elemente, iz nje se ne može izvesti projekat panislamskog carstva niti je odražavao stvarnu politiku Izetbegovića kao predsjednika, koja je bila jasno utemeljena u sekularnom ustavnom okviru. Ispravna interpretacija *Islamske deklaracije* zahtijeva čitanje u kontekstu jugoslavenskog represivnog aparata Hladnog rata, a ne kao doslovnog političkog programa za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Važno je napomenuti i da je sama *Islamska deklaracija* prije rata bila uglavnom nepoznata čak i unutar vodećih bošnjačkih intelektualnih i političkih krugova te da njen sadržaj nikada nije bio dio zvaničnih partijskih ili vladinih programa nakon 1990. godine.

Tvrdnja: SDA i Islamska zajednica željele su “reislamizirati” naciju i uvesti obavezu nošenja vela

Tvrdnja da su SDA i Islamska zajednica tokom 1990-ih provodile ciljanu “reislamizaciju” bošnjačke nacije i pokušavale uvesti obavezu nošenja vela nema empirijsko uporište i iskrivljuje političku stvarnost tog vremena. SDA je bila široko profilirana etnonacionalna stranka čije je biračko tijelo obuhvatalo i sekularne i umjereno religiozne građane, te se ni u kojem slučaju ne može karakterizirati kao islamistički pokret.

Ne postoje dokazi o državnom programu kojim bi se nametalo nošenje vela, ograničavali mješoviti brakovi ili uvodio šerijatski pravni sistem. Uvođenje islamskog prava u Bosni i Hercegovini nikada nije bilo moguće, čak ni da je postojala politička volja, budući da je SDA vladala u koaliciji sa srpskim i hrvatskim strankama. Ni u većinski bošnjačkim kantonima nakon rata SDA nije raspolagala ustavnom većinom za takve promjene niti je pokretala inicijative u tom pravcu, čak ni u onim dijelovima Bosne i Hercegovine u kojima je imala apsolutnu vlast.

Iako je u ranim 1990-im došlo do kulturne islamske revitalizacije, političko vodstvo SDA je kontinuirano potvrđivalo odvojenost religije i države i djelovalo unutar sekularnog ustavnog poretka. Narativ o organiziranoj “reislamizaciji” više služi reprodukciji stereotipa nego ozbiljnoj analizi političkog razvoja Bosne i Hercegovine.

Tvrdnja: “Nekoliko hiljada mudžahedina” borilo se u Bosni i Hercegovini i osnovalo trajne selefijske zajednice

Često ponavljana tvrdnja da se u Bosni i Hercegovini borilo “nekoliko hiljada mudžahedina” koji su potom osnovali trajne selefijske zajednice znatno preuveličava historijske činjenice i nije u skladu s naučnim konsenzusom.⁴ Istraživanja pokazuju da se broj stranih islamističkih boraca kretao između 500 i 1.500, pri čemu procjene rijetko prelaze 1.800. Nakon rata u zemlji je ostalo svega nekoliko desetina njih, dok je većina, pod političkim pritiskom, naročito Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, te u skladu s odredbama Dejtonskog sporazuma, napustila Bosnu i Hercegovinu.

Važno je naglasiti da fenomen stranih dobrovoljaca nije bio isključivo muslimanski niti bošnjački. Sve vojske koje su djelovale u Bosni i Hercegovini imale su strane borce. Na strani bosanskih Srba borili su se ruski i grčki dobrovoljci, od kojih su pojedine jedinice učestvovala u teškim ratnim zločinima, uključujući masakre. Najpoznatiji je slučaj učešća grčkih dobrovoljaca (Grčke dobrovoljačke garde koja je bila integrirana u Vojsku Republike Srpske) u ulasku u Srebrenicu u julu 1995. godine.⁵ Istovremeno, zapadni dobrovoljci, među njima desničarski ekstremisti i neonacisti iz više evropskih zemalja, priključili su se snagama bosanskih Hrvata. Procjene govore da je samo u HVO bilo najmanje 1.000 dobrovoljaca iz zapadnih zemalja.⁶ U tom svjetlu, fokusiranje isključivo na muslimanske dobrovoljce predstavlja analitičku pristrasnost i historijsku selektivnost.

Danas postojeće selefijske grupe u Bosni i Hercegovini brojčano su veoma male, geografski ograničene, fragmentirane i društveno marginalne. One nemaju političku relevantnost niti značajan kulturni utjecaj. Pokušaji da se uspostavi bilo kakva veza između tih marginalnih skupina i kasnijih regrutacijskih mreža tzv. Islamske države predstavljaju empirijski neutemeljenu, ali istovremeno i tvrdnju s mogućim političkim implikacijama. Iako su strani borci donijeli određene fundamentalističke ideje, njihov demografski, politički i kulturni značaj ostao je ograničen i ne odgovara preuveličanim prikazima kakvi se sugeriraju u članku.

⁴ Darryl Li, *The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity*, Stanford University Press, 2020.

⁵ “Grčki borci koji se i dalje hvale Srebrenicom uživaju nekažnjivost”, *Balkan Transitional Justice*, 23. 7. 2023; <https://balkaninsight.com/sr/2023/07/10/grcki-borci-koji-se-i-dalje-hvale-srebrenicom-uzivaju-nekaznjivost/> (Pristup: 11. 2. 2026).

⁶ “Ko su bili strani plaćenici u HVO?”, *Al Jazeera Balkans*, 25. 4. 2019; <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/opinions/2019/4/25/ko-su-bili-strani-placenici-u-postrojbama-hvo> (Pristup: 11. 2. 2026).

Tvrdnja: Sarajevo se “nacionalizira u bošnjačko-muslimanskom smislu” i trajno gubi multikulturalni karakter

Tvrdnja da se Sarajevo “nacionalizira u bošnjačko-muslimanskom smislu” i da trajno gubi svoj multikulturalni karakter predstavlja tendencioznu i historijski neodrživu interpretaciju koja zanemaruje ključne uzroke demografskih promjena. Činjenica da je Sarajevo danas većinski bošnjačko nije rezultat poslijeratne ideološke nacionalizacije, nego direktna posljedica srpske agresije, sistematskih etničkih čišćenja, 1.425 dana duge opsade te masovnog progona i raseljavanja stanovništva tokom rata. Uz to, bitno je podsjetiti da je i prije agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Sarajevo bilo većinski bošnjačko.

Institucije, muzeji, obrazovni programi i političke strukture Sarajeva i dalje su ustavno zasnovani na multietničkom principu, što opovrgava tezu o planskom “projektu nacionalizacije”. Mnogi građani napustili su grad ne zbog politike nove bosanske vlasti, već zbog straha za vlastiti život u opkoljenom gradu bez struje, vode i hrane, izloženom svakodnevnom granatiranju i snajperskoj vatri od strane srpskih snaga koje su grad držale pod opsadom.

Istovremeno, dio srpskog stanovništva napustio je Sarajevo iz straha od odmazde, pod utjecajem ratne propagande ili uslijed direktnog pritiska vlasti bosanskih Srba, koje su politički organizirale iseljavanje Srba iz dijelova grada pod kontrolom Federacije.⁷ Ovi ključni faktori u članku se u znatnoj mjeri zanemaruju. Današnja etnička struktura Sarajeva prvenstveno je rezultat rata i nasilja, a ne namjerne “bošnjačko-muslimanske nacionalizacije”.

Jugoslavenski ratovi doveli su i do redefinicije regionalnih centara gravitacije. Dok su prije rata mnogi bosanski Srbi studirali u Zagrebu, a stanovnici istočne Bosne ili zapadne Srbije odlazili u Sarajevo, danas su migracijski obrasci snažno vezani za etničku pripadnost. Za većinu Srba referentni centri su Banja Luka, Novi Sad ili Beograd; za većinu Hrvata zapadni Mostar i Zagreb; za većinu Bošnjaka Sarajevo. Osim nekoliko državnih institucija decentralizirane Bosne i Hercegovine, u Sarajevu se više ne odlučuje o političkom, ekonomskom ili kulturnom životu većine Srba i Hrvata u zemlji.

Također je važno istaći da u općinama s bošnjačkom većinom, demokratskom voljom građana, nerijetko za načelnike ili gradonačelnike bivaju izabrani Srbi ili Hrvati. U proteklih trideset godina gradonačelnici Sarajeva, izabrani na slobodnim izborima, dolazili su iz svih konstitutivnih naroda.

⁷ “Kako je Momo Krajišnik rastjerao sarajevske Srbe”, *Peščanik*, 31. 8. 2013, <https://pescanik.net/kako-je-momo-krajsnik-rastjerao-sarajevske-srbe/> (Pristup: 8. 2. 2026).

Tvrdnja: Sarajevo se zbog investicija iz zemalja Zaljeva pretvara u “panislamski grad”

Tvrdnja da se Sarajevo zbog investicija iz zemalja Zaljeva pretvara u “panislamski grad” također je empirijski neutemeljena i počiva na problematičnoj zamjeni ekonomskog prisustva s ideološkim utjecajem. Investicije iz zaljevskih zemalja dominantno su usmjerene na turizam i nekretnine i ne pokazuju karakteristike sistematske kulturne islamizacije.

Političke institucije, pravni poredak i javni život Sarajeva ostaju strogo sekularni. Zakonodavstvo i administrativna praksa nisu doživjeli religijsku transformaciju. Istraživanja religijske prakse pokazuju relativno nizak nivo redovnog odlaska u džamije, umjerene stope posta tokom ramazana i izraženu sekularnu samoidentifikaciju, znatno niže nego u mnogim većinski muslimanskim društvima.

Teza da investicije iz muslimanskih zemalja automatski proizvode “panislamski karakter” grada predstavlja analitičku pogrešku koja prenaplašava vidljive religijske simbole, a zanemaruje strukturnu realnost sekularnog i pluralnog urbanog prostora. Ekonomska prisutnost nije isto što i ideološka transformacija.

Tvrdnja: Sve strane su prije rata podjednako koristile “religijsku propagandu”

Izjednačavanje svih strana u pogledu upotrebe “religijske propagande” uoči rata predstavlja historijski neutemeljenu i analitički problematičnu interpretaciju. Raspad Jugoslavije obilježen je asimetričnom mobilizacijom, u kojoj su srpski nacionalistički ideolozi i od države kontrolirani mediji igrali centralnu i eskalirajuću ulogu.⁸

Takva propaganda stvorila je ideološki okvir za ekspanzionističke ciljeve i etnička čišćenja, koja su kasnije većinom provodile snage bosanskih Srba uz podršku Beograda, činjenica potvrđena presudama Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju i u presudi Međunarodnog suda pravde. Iako je nacionalistička retorika postojala u svim zajednicama, izjednačavanje briše razlike u obimu, institucionalnoj podršci i posljedicama te propagande, te

⁸ Opširnije o procesu disolucije Jugoslavije i formiranju paralelnih struktura u Bosni i Hercegovini pod vodstvom Srpske demokratske stranke, vidjeti u: Muamer Džananović, Jasmin Medić, Hikmet Karčić, *Nastanak Republike Srpske: od regionalizacije do strateških ciljeva (1991-1992)*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, Univerzitet u Sarajevu – Institut za historiju, Sarajevo 2023; Robert J. Donia, *Porijeklo Republike Srpske 1990–1992. – opšti kontekst*, (Izjava vještaka objelodanjena Međunarodnom krivičnim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju shodno pravilu *bis 94*), Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju, Den Haag 2002.

zanemaruje utvrđeni pravni i historijski konsenzus o nejednakoj odgovornosti za planiranje i provođenje sistematskih zločina.

Tvrdnja: Saudijska Arabija, Iran, UAE i Sudan “slali su oružje”

Takva tvrdnja da su Saudijska Arabija, Iran, Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati ili Sudan, uprkos embargu Ujedinjenih nacija, slali oružje u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, predstavlja nastojanje da se složene činjenice o zbivanjima u Bosni i Hercegovini reduktivno i pojednostavljeno prikažu. Iako su neke većinski muslimanske države pružile prikrivenu podršku bosanskoj vladi, obim i karakter te pomoći znatno su se razlikovali.

Učešće Irana te ograničene isporuke iz Turske dokumentirani su, dok su navodi o direktnim isporukama iz Saudijske Arabije, UAE, Kuvajta, Egipta ili Sudana historijski sporni i nemaju pouzdanu nezavisnu potvrdu.

Vojna pomoć stizala je tek nakon 1992. godine, kada je bošnjačko civilno stanovništvo već bilo izloženo masovnim zločinima, ubistvima, silovanjima, pljačkama i protjerivanjima. Do kraja 1992. godine više od 80% teritorije Bosne i Hercegovine bilo je “očišćeno” od Bošnjaka. Njemačka i Austrija primile su veliki broj izbjeglica, od kojih najveći broj Bošnjaka.

Čak i nakon pristizanja ograničene vojne pomoći, Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine nije raspolagala kapacitetima za oslobađanje većeg dijela teritorije države. Dejtonski sporazum potpisan je upravo u trenutku kada su započele uspješne oslobodilačke operacije.

Neselektivno nabranje država sugerira koordiniranu i široku opskrbu koja u stvarnosti nije postojala. Pritom se zanemaruje činjenica da je najznačajnije probijanje embarga uslijedilo uz prešutnu toleranciju i logističku podršku pojedinih zapadnih država, posebno Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, koje su time presudno ojačale bosansku stranu. Humanitarna pomoć, finansijska podrška i vjerski programi imali su znatno veći značaj od samih isporuka oružja.

Političke i diskurzivne implikacije ovakvih interpretacija

Kako je već ranije istaknuto, argumentacija Marie-Janine Calic nosi rizik potencijalne instrumentalizacije od strane nacionalističkih i desničarskih aktera, kako u Bosni i Hercegovini, tako i šire u evropskom prostoru. Takve interpretacije mogu poslužiti kao politički resurs onima koji nastoje relativizirati opsadu Sarajeva te dodatno produbiti postojeće etničke podjele, pri čemu se retorički nadovezuju na nedavne istupe pojedinih evropskih desničarskih političara koji demografsku strukturu Bosne i Hercegovine problematiziraju kao

destabilizirajuću.⁹ U tom kontekstu valja podsjetiti da desničarske i populističke političke opcije iz pojedinih država članica Evropske unije, poput Alternative za Njemačku (AfD) u Njemačkoj, Slobodarske stranke (FPÖ) u Austriji, Rassemblement National (RN) u Francuskoj, Fidesza u Mađarskoj te stranke Smer u Slovačkoj - otvoreno artikuliraju antimuslimanske i antiislamske političke narative, uz istovremeno održavanje bliskih političkih odnosa s Miloradom Dodikom i rukovodstvom entiteta Republika Srpska. Riječ je o političkim subjektima koji su u pojedinim državama dio vladajućih struktura ili bilježe značajan politički rast, što dodatno naglašava važnost kritičkog razmatranja diskursa koji može biti percipiran kao normativno utemeljen u širem evropskom političkom prostoru.

Takav narativ ne može se svesti isključivo na antiislamski ili antimuslimanski diskurs; on istovremeno poprima i izrazito antibošnjačku dimenziju te, implicitno ili eksplicitno, pokazuje sklonost prema konceptima etničke fragmentacije Bosne i Hercegovine. Upravo zbog toga nužno je analizirati njegovu genezu, funkciju i moguće političke implikacije u savremenom evropskom kontekstu.

Zaključak

Tvrdnje Marie-Janine Calic objavljene u časopisu *ZEIT Geschichte* ukazuju na obrazac interpretacije koji se ne zasniva na uravnoteženoj historiografskoj i empirijskoj analizi, već na selektivnoj i subjektivnoj analizi ratnog i postratnog konteksta Bosne i Hercegovine. Tvrdnje o navodnom panislamskom projektu Alije Izetbegovića, o "reislamizaciji" društva, presudnoj ulozi mudžahedina, transformaciji Sarajeva u "panislamski grad" te o podjednako religijskoj propagandi svih strana relativiziraju složene političke i vojne procese i smještaju Bosnu i Hercegovinu u okvir ideološke i civilizacijske prijetnje. Teze Marie-Janine Calic proizvode narativ prema kojem je bošnjačko-muslimanska većina implicitno faktor destabilizacije, dok se savremene demografske i investicijske veze interpretiraju kao dokaz ideološke transformacije države. Time se fokus s analize konkretnih politika i institucionalnih procesa premješta na kulturno-identitetske pretpostavke, čime se reprodukuje paradigma sumnje prema jednoj zajednici i njenoj političkoj legitimnosti.

Stoga se ključno pitanje ne iscrpljuje u tačnosti pojedinačnih tvrdnji, već obuhvata i poruku koju ovako strukturiran skup interpretacija prenosi. Takva poruka Bosnu i Hercegovinu predstavlja kao strukturno problematiziran evropski

⁹ "Sarajevski historičari reagirali na tekst Marie-Janine Calic: 'Paušalno, netačno i zlonamjerno'", *Radio Sarajevo*, 3. 12. 2025, <https://radiosarajevo.ba/metromahala teme/sarajevski-historicari-reagirali-na-tekst-marie-janine-calic-pausalno-netacno-i-zlonamjerno/616656> (Pristup: 9. 2. 2026).

prostor, pri čemu se njezina demografska struktura implicitno konstruira kao faktor nestabilnosti. Upravo zbog toga nužno je analizirati ne samo sadržaj tih tvrdnji, već i diskurzivne obrasce koji oblikuju percepciju zemlje u savremenom evropskom kontekstu.

Summary

The claims made by Marie-Janine Calic, published in the magazine *ZEIT Geschichte*, point to an interpretative pattern that is not based on a balanced historiographical and empirical analysis, but rather on a selective and subjective analysis of the wartime and postwar context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Claims regarding Alija Izetbegović's alleged pan-Islamic project, the "re-Islamization" of society, the decisive role of the Mujahideen, the transformation of Sarajevo into a "pan-Islamic city," and the supposedly equal religious propaganda of all sides relativize complex political and military processes, placing Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of an ideological and civilizational threat. Marie-Janine Calic's theses produce a narrative in which the Bosniak-Muslim majority is implicitly a destabilizing factor, while contemporary demographic and investment ties are interpreted as proof of the state's ideological transformation. This shifts the focus from the analysis of concrete policies and institutional processes to cultural and identity-based assumptions, thereby reproducing a paradigm of suspicion toward a specific community and its political legitimacy.

Therefore, the key issue is not exhausted by the accuracy of individual claims, but also encompasses the message conveyed by such a structured set of interpretations. Such a message presents Bosnia and Herzegovina as a structurally problematized European space, with its demographic structure implicitly constructed as a factor of instability. Precisely for this reason, it is necessary to analyze not only the content of these claims, but also the discursive patterns that shape the perception of the country in the contemporary European context.

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POLITICIZATION AND SECURITIZATION OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: THE DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY AND THE STATE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Abstract: *The political and societal debates surrounding the Draft Basic Agreement between the Islamic Community (IC) and the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina reveal deeply rooted tensions over religious identity, societal security, and the process of securitization in a post-conflict society. Drawing on the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, particularly the concepts of securitization and societal security, this study analyzes how political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina have framed the agreement as a potential threat to the state's multiethnic equilibrium. The focus is on how the positions of members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as key decision-makers, have been embedded in a broader discourse linking religious practices, identity rights, and interethnic power relations. Placed within its historical context, the research highlights the continuity of the securitization of Bosniak Muslim identity, particularly evident during the 1990s war, when Islamic symbols and practices were portrayed as existential threats to national security. Although the war*

formally ended, such narratives have persisted and been adapted to contemporary political circumstances, where legitimate religious freedoms and rights are framed as potential destabilizing factors for the political and social order. Through a detailed analysis of the discourse of Serb and Croat political representatives, the study shows how certain Islamic practices – such as the right to religious dress, the performance of Friday (Jumu'ah) prayers, or pilgrimage to Mecca – have been instrumentalized and interpreted as privileging one community. In contrast, Bosniak political representatives view the agreement as a necessary step toward achieving equality with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, which have already concluded similar agreements with the state. The study also examines the legal framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina that shapes state-religion relations. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Law on Freedom of Religion, and previously ratified agreements with other religious communities clearly confirm the right to formalize such relationships. Nevertheless, the ratification process of the agreement with the IC remains blocked due to political disagreements, legal objections concerning the Presidency's competence, and fears of undermining the secular nature of the state. By analyzing public discourse and media narratives across both entities, the research shows how the debate has transcended a purely technical or legal discussion and evolved into a symbol of broader national contestation, political rivalry, and deep-seated mistrust. The findings indicate that the failure to ratify the agreement has multiple implications: it reinforces a sense of marginalization among Bosniaks, weakens trust among the constituent peoples, and obstructs efforts to build societal cohesion in a multiethnic and multireligious environment. In this context, the securitization of religious identity functions as both an obstacle to normalizing relations between the state and its citizens and as a persistent reminder of unresolved wartime legacies and the dominance of ethnonationalist politics. The study concludes that overcoming these divisions requires deconstructing securitized narratives and reaffirming the principles of equality, dialogue, and mutual recognition. Only by acknowledging religious rights as integral to societal security, rather than a perceived threat, can Bosnia and Herzegovina foster trust, stability, and long-term social cohesion. Protecting the societal security of one community need not be seen as undermining the security of others but rather as a shared step toward building an inclusive and democratic post-conflict society.

Key words: *Securitization, Politicization, Religious Identity, Islamic Community, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Societal Security, Identity Politics, State-Religion Relations.*

POLITIZACIJA I SEKURITIZACIJA VJERSKOG IDENTITETA: NACRT OSNOVNOG UGOVORA IZMEĐU ISLAMSKJE ZAJEDNICE I DRŽAVE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

Apstrakt: *Političke i društvene rasprave oko Nacrta Osnovnog Ugovora između Islamske zajednice (IZ) i države Bosne i Hercegovine reflektiraju duboko ukorijenjene tenzije oko vjerskog identiteta, društvene sigurnosti i procesa sekuritizacije u postkonfliktnom društvu. Ova studija, oslanjajući se na teorijski okvir Kopenhagenske škole, posebno na koncept sekuritizacije i društvene sigurnosti, analizira kako su političke elite u Bosni i Hercegovini kroz retoriku i političke odluke oblikovale narativ o ovom sporazumu kao potencijalnoj prijetnji multietničkom karakteru države. Fokus istraživanja je na načinu na koji su se argumenti članova Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine, kao ključnih donosilaca odluka, pozicionirali unutar šireg diskursa koji povezuje religijsku praksu, identitetska prava i interetničku ravnotežu. Kroz historijski kontekst, rad ukazuje na kontinuitet sekuritizacije bošnjačkog muslimanskog identiteta, posebno prisutan tokom rata 1990-ih, kada su islamski simboli i praksa prikazivani kao egzistencijalna prijetnja nacionalnoj sigurnosti. Iako je rat formalno završen, ovi narativi nisu nestali, već su transformirani i prilagođeni savremenim političkim odnosima, gdje se legitimne religijske slobode i prava tretiraju kao potencijalna destabilizacija političkog i društvenog poretka. Analizom diskursa srpskih i hrvatskih političkih predstavnika, studija pokazuje kako su pojedini zahtjevi IZ-a – poput prava na vjersko odijevanje, slobodu prakticiranja džuma-namaza ili odlaska na hadž – instrumentalizirani i interpretirani kao korak ka privilegovanju jedne zajednice. Nasuprot tome, bošnjački politički predstavnici ovaj sporazum vide kao nužno sredstvo izjednačavanja prava s katoličkom i pravoslavnom crkvom, čiji su slični ugovori s državom već ratificirani. Studija detaljno istražuje i pravni okvir Bosne i Hercegovine u kojem se pitanje odnosa države i vjerskih zajednica odvija. Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, Zakon o slobodi vjere i prethodno zaključeni sporazumi s drugim vjerskim zajednicama jasno potvrđuju pravo na formalizaciju odnosa. Ipak, proces ratifikacije ovog sporazuma sa Islamskom zajednicom ostaje blokiran usljed političkih nesuglasica, pravnih osporavanja nadležnosti Predsjedništva i straha od narušavanja koncepta sekularnosti države. Kroz analizu javnog diskursa i medijskih narativa u oba entiteta, rad ukazuje kako je tema ugovora izašla iz okvira tehničko-pravne debate i pretvorila se u simbol šireg političkog nadmetanja, nacionalnih animoziteta i nepovjerenja. Rad ističe da nesposobnost ratifikacije ugovora ima višestruke implikacije: od produbljivanja osjećaja marginalizacije među Bošnjacima, preko slabljenja povjerenja između konstitutivnih naroda, do otežavanja procesa društvene kohezije u multietničkom društvu. Sekuritizacija religijskog identiteta u ovom kontekstu djeluje kao prepreka za normalizaciju odnosa između države i njenih građana, ali i kao trajni podsjetnik na nerazriješene ratne traume i naslijeđe etnonacionalne politike. Zaključuje se da je za prevazilaženje ovih podjela potrebno dekonstruisati*

sekuritizirane narative i reafirmisati principe jednakosti i dijaloga, kako bi se omogućilo ostvarenje vjerskih prava bez percepcije prijetnje po interetnički balans. Time bi se otvorio prostor za građenje povjerenja i dugoročne stabilnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini, potvrđujući da društvena sigurnost jedne zajednice ne mora biti viđena kao prijetnja drugoj.

Ključne riječi: *Sekuritizacija, politizacija, vjerski identitet, Islamska zajednica, Bosna i Hercegovina, društvena sigurnost, identitetska politika, odnosi države i religije.*

Introduction

The Copenhagen School's conceptual framework, while commonly associated with securitization, encompasses a broader spectrum that extends beyond securitization alone, proposing a tripartite continuum that situates any public issue as non-politicized, politicized, or securitized. Non-politicized issues remain confined to the technical or private sphere, excluded from public political debate, until they are politicized—defined as the act of or demand to bring an issue into the political sphere¹. Securitization occurs when an issue is framed as a security threat, necessitating extraordinary measures beyond normal political processes, making it an extreme form of politicization². A fine line exists between politicization and securitization, with politicization having the potential to evolve into securitization³. Both processes are often motivated by political elites seeking to advance their interests. In this context, securitization theory, rooted in a social constructivist perspective, emphasizes the pivotal role of political elites' speech acts in shaping how an issue is conceptualized—determined more by its presentation in discourse than by its intrinsic characteristics⁴. Issues such as migration, refugees, minority rights, gender, religious and political identities, and others can be securitized, politicized, or excluded from political discourse depending on their framing by political elites, making politicization and securitization dynamic processes influenced by the salience and polarization of issues in public discourse.

To comprehend the processes through which issues become politicized or depoliticized, one must consider their salience and the polarization they

¹ Burak Baysal, 20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Vol. 17, No. 67, 2020, 6, (<https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.777338>); Michael Zürn, Politicization Compared: At National, European, and Global Levels, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 7, 2019, 977–978, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619188>).

² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder–London 1998, 23–24.

³ Alfred Tarimo, Politicization of Ethnic Identities: The Case of Contemporary Africa, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2010, 304. (<https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909610364775>).

⁴ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework*.

engender. Social problems become political issues when they capture public attention or spark contention, whereby politicized issues possess both contested and salient characteristics⁵. As an issue gains salience, it attracts a broader range of participants and a greater diversity of viewpoints, leading to increased polarization and heightened politicization of the discourse⁶. This dynamic interplay of salience and polarization is integral to understanding how societal security—a key concept within the Copenhagen School's discourse on identity and security—intersects with securitization. First introduced by Barry Buzan in 1991, societal security refers to threats to a community's language, culture, religion, traditions, and political, social, and economic rights, including fundamental aspects such as education, freedom of expression, and belief. These threats can escalate to forcible displacement or extermination, as seen during the 1990s when identity-centric insecurities gained prominence⁷.

Ole Wæver expanded on societal security by framing it as independent from state security, highlighting its focus on communities and their shared identities rather than government-centric concerns⁸. While Buzan considered society an extension of the state, Wæver emphasized societal security as a distinct object of analysis, with threats targeting societal identity through language, culture, religion, and traditions⁹. In this context, threats to societal security arise when communities perceive risks to their identity—paralleling state concerns for sovereignty but grounded in the survival of a society's unique characteristics¹⁰. This perspective underscores the inseparability of societal security and securitization: as political elites frame issues in terms of existential

⁵ Wouter van der Brug, Gianni D'Amato, Didier Ruedin, Joost Berkhout, *The Politicisation of Migration*, Routledge, London–New York 2015, 6–8.

⁶ Hanspeter Kriesi, The Politicization of European Integration, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 54, No. S1, 2016, 33, (<https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12406>); M. Zürn, *Politicization Compared*, 978.

⁷ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 1991, 122–123; Tuncay Ersoy Ceylan, Tuncay Kardaş, Kimlik-Güvenlik İlişisini Anlamak: Toplumsal Kimlik, Sosyal Psikoloji ve Topluluklar-Arası Güvenlik İkilemi, *Bilgi*, No. 94, 2020, 191. (<https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.9409>); Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and Societal Security Dilemma*, Routledge, London–New York 2005, 4.

⁸ Ole Wæver, Societal Security: The Concept, in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre (eds), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter Publishers, London 1993, 24–27.

⁹ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework*, 119; Bill McSweeney, Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1996, 82, (<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500118467>); idem, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, 69; Paul Roe, The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1999, 192–193, (<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343399036002004>); idem, *Ethnic Violence and Societal Security Dilemma*, 42–43; idem, „Toplumsal Güvenlik,” in Alan Collins (ed), Nuri Uslu (trans), *Çağdaş Güvenlik Çalışmaları*, Röle Akademik Yayıncılık, Ankara 2017, 177.

¹⁰ O. Wæver, *Societal Security: The Concept*, 21–25; Ole Wæver, Toplumsal Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Vol. 5, No. 18, 2008, 154; P. Roe, *Toplumsal Güvenlik*, 177.

threats to identity, they invoke securitizing speech acts, making identity preservation a central security concern¹¹.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious and ethnic identities are deeply intertwined, with Bosniak and Muslim, Serb and Orthodox Christian, and Croat and Catholic Christian identities serving as prominent markers of social distinction¹². These overlapping identities are politically significant due to the constitutional design of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which divided the state along ethnic and religious lines. Consequently, restrictions on religious identities also constrain ethnic and national identities. Before and during the Bosnian war in the 1990s, the religious identity of Bosniaks was intensely securitized by ultra-nationalist Serb and Croat elites. This securitization targeted not only Bosniak Muslim political leaders and intellectuals who publicly expressed their Islamic identity but also Bosniaks who embraced Islam symbolically, through their names or community traditions. Through securitizing speech acts, Bosniaks were labeled as threats under the guise of Islamic fundamentalism and radical Islam. This logic reflects a broader regional pattern where political elites in post-Yugoslav states have sacralized the nation by aligning it with a dominant religion, thereby casting religious 'Others' as inherent threats to national integrity¹³. In such a framework, protecting one's own religious tradition becomes synonymous with defending the nation, while rival religious expressions are perceived as destabilizing forces. While the intensity of this securitization has lessened in the post-war period, certain Serb and Croat politicians continue to politicize Bosniak religious identity, framing issues such as the proposed agreement between the Islamic Community (IC) and the Bosnia and Herzegovina state as political threats rather than matters of religious rights and freedoms. For Bosniaks, whose religious identities were securitized and attacked during the war, this ongoing politicization evokes a perception of restricted identity expression, highlighting the intersection of societal security and securitization in the ongoing discourse surrounding this contentious agreement.

This research aims to explore the politicization and securitization of religious identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the lens of the proposed Basic Agreement between the state and the Islamic Community (IC). By examining the legal, political, and societal debates surrounding the agreement,

¹¹ P. Roe, *Ethnic Violence and Societal Security Dilemma*, 43; idem, *Toplumsal Güvenlik*, 179; O. Wæver, *Societal Security: The Concept*, 22–23; idem, *Toplumsal Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi*, 152.

¹² J. F. Deckard, Religion at the Interface of Identity Politics and Political Identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in F. Cheneval, S. Ramel (eds.), *From Peace to Shared Political Identities—Exploring Pathways in Contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels 2011, 134; G. Ognjenović, J. Jozelić, The Human Rights State and Freedom of Religion in South-Eastern Europe: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, vol. 21, no. 3, 2017, 306–307. (<https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1298734>).

¹³ Faruk Hadžić, The Politicization of Religion and the Sacralized Balkan Nations Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 40, No. 7, 2020.

the study provides a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between religious freedoms, identity politics, and societal security. The research delves into the historical and contemporary stances of members of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, contextualizing their arguments within the broader framework of interethnic and interreligious tensions in the country. Through a detailed examination of the agreement's provisions and the contrasting positions of Bosniak, Serb, and Croat representatives, the study highlights how political elites frame religious rights and freedoms, either as a matter of societal inclusion or as a perceived threat to state secularism. The findings contribute to understanding how securitization and societal security intersect with religion and identity, offering valuable insights into the challenges of fostering social cohesion in a multiethnic, multireligious society.

Legal and Institutional Framework of State-Religion Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 1995, lacks a specific clause on the relationship between religion and the state, leading some scholars to categorize Bosnia and Herzegovina's system as a „regime of non-identification“, where the state neither endorses any religion nor declares itself secular. Instead, the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination based on religious affiliation, reflecting the principles of equality and religious freedom¹⁴. The constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects international human rights norms, as the country is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, making religious freedom enforceable in domestic courts.

A cornerstone of the legal framework is the Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (LFR), enacted at the state level in 2004. The LFR introduced a model of separation with cooperation, which respects religious freedom and autonomy while enabling selective collaboration between the state and religious organizations on matters of mutual interest.¹⁵ Therefore, the agreements between the state and religious communities play a crucial role in bridging the abstract principles of constitutional guarantees with their practical application. These agreements establish a formal and legally binding framework that not only protects the autonomy and rights of religious institutions but also fosters collaboration in areas that contribute to societal well-being. By addressing specific issues such as religious education, cultural preservation, and social welfare, these agreements help integrate religious communities into the broader

¹⁴ Jeroen Temperman, *State-Religion Relationships and Human Rights Law: Towards a Right to Religiously Neutral Governance*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden–Boston 2010, 103–104.

¹⁵ Nedim Begović, Emir Kovačević, *Law, State and Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Routledge, London–New York 2022, 38.

socio-political fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensuring that their contributions are recognized and supported within a legal framework.

The state's efforts to formalize relationships with religious communities are evident in agreements signed with the Holy See and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). These agreements affirm constitutional guarantees and provide a framework for cooperation in areas such as education, culture, and charity. Negotiations between the Holy See and Bosnia and Herzegovina culminated in the 2006 Basic Agreement Between the Holy See and Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on April 19, 2006, followed by the Additional Protocol on September 29, 2006¹⁶. The Additional Protocol addressed concerns about a provision in the Basic Agreement requiring Bosnia and Herzegovina to return all immovable properties nationalized or taken without compensation within ten years, replacing it with an obligation to enact a law on restitution without a fixed deadline. Similarly, the Basic Agreement with the SOC, ratified by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008,¹⁷ reflects structural parallels to the agreement with the Holy See, emphasizing the church's cultural and national significance for the Serb people. Both agreements demonstrate the state's recognition of the role of these religious communities in fostering societal development and preserving cultural heritage.

Historical and Political Context of the Draft Basic Agreement Between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Islamic Community

The relationship between the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IC) and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a significant issue in the aftermath of the 1990s peace settlement. This development was a natural consequence of the collapse of the socialist regime, which had previously curtailed religious freedoms under an aggressive socialist-atheist ideology. With the advent of political leaders more inclined toward fostering a freer and more prominent role for religion in society, particularly among Bosniak representatives, the question of the IC's status gained prominence.

However, the growing importance of religion—specifically Islam—in the lives of Bosniaks introduced complexities for political actors tasked with defining its formal status. Critics of the proposed agreement between the IC and the state argued that it conferred a privileged position on the IC at the expense of other religious communities. Proponents, on the other hand, viewed the agreement as an affirmation of fundamental rights that other religious

¹⁶ Decision on the Ratification of the Basic Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Holy See and the Additional Protocol to the Basic Agreement, „Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina – International Agreements”, year X, no. 10, of 2007.

¹⁷ Decision on the Ratification of the Basic Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Orthodox Church, „Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina – International Agreements”, year X, no. 6, of 2008.

communities either already enjoyed or should be entitled to. Consequently, the debate surrounding the agreement was framed by these two opposing perspectives: one emphasizing concerns over privileging a single religious community and the other advocating for equitable rights across all religious traditions.

The process of formalizing the IC's status began in January 2010 with the submission of a draft agreement to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposal, delivered by the two highest leaders of the IC, was handed to the Bosniak member of the Presidency. Explaining the relatively late submission of the proposal, the then Grand Mufti of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Reisul-ulema Mustafa Cerić, attributed the delay to an initially unfulfilled expectation that the LFR would sufficiently ensure the autonomy and free operation of the IC¹⁸. The submitted proposal explicitly referenced this law, which permits churches and religious communities to conclude similar agreements. According to the law, matters of mutual interest between the state and religious communities can be regulated through agreements involving the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council of Ministers, and the entity governments, with the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees designated as the competent authority for managing relations with religious communities¹⁹.

In early 2011, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina took steps to advance the agreement by assigning the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees the task of preparing and submitting a draft framework²⁰. Over the following years, multiple meetings of the Negotiation Team were held, and there were initial expectations that the formal procedures would be finalized by the end of 2013²¹. However, this timeline was not met. In an interview from October 2015, the Grand Mufti of the IC, Reisul-ulema Husein Kavazović, identified the primary reason for the prolonged delay as the failure to acknowledge key particularities of Islam in both its worship practices—such as Jumu'ah prayers, Suhoor and Iftar, Hajj, and Qurbani—and its integral aspects of religious identity, including the wearing of the hijab, male circumcision, and adherence to a halal diet. In addition to these specific concerns, Kavazović emphasized that the agreement would secure the IC's right to religious education in public and private

¹⁸ „Reis Silajdžiću Predao Prijedlog Ugovora između Islamske Zajednice i Države BiH“, <http://radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/reis-silajdzicu-predao-prijedlog-ugovora-iz-i-drzave-bih/18219> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

¹⁹ *Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article 15, <http://www.mpr.gov.ba/biblioteka/zakoni/bs/ZAKON%20o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²⁰ „Press Release from the 141st Session of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, https://www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/saopstenja/sjednice/saopstenja_sa_sjednica/default.aspx?id=11260&langTag=hr-HR (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²¹ „Ugovor između države BiH i Islamske zajednice do kraja godine“, <https://islamskazajednica.ba/vijesti/aktuelno/17842-ugovor-između-drzave-bih-i-islamske-zajednice-do-kraja-godine> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

schools, freedom of the press, the establishment of its own media or participation in public media, and the formation of associations within the community. These rights, he noted, had already been granted to the Catholic and Orthodox Churches through their respective agreements with the state²².

By September 29, 2015, the Council of Ministers finalized the draft basic agreement between the state and the IC, approving the negotiating team's report and outlining the agreed-upon positions. Following this, the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees was instructed to submit the draft agreement to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina for ratification²³. However, to date, the agreement has not been ratified by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ratification requires the consensus of all three members of the Presidency, who represent the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb constituencies.

Nationally Polarized Perspectives on the Draft Basic Agreement in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency

The draft agreement between the IC and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained unratified by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period spanning three electoral mandates (2014–2018, 2018–2022, and 2022–2026). This section will examine and analyze the positions of all Presidency members during these mandates, as the final decision on ratification hinges on their consensus. Understanding their perspectives will shed light on the core issues under investigation and underscore the significant degree of politicization surrounding the signing of the agreement.

Throughout these three mandates, although the Bosniak representatives in the Presidency have changed, their support for the agreement has remained unwavering. Despite representing ideologically diverse positions and coming from the two largest political parties among Bosniaks—Bakir Izetbegović and Šefik Džaferović from the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Denis Bećirović from the Social Democratic Party (SDP)—all three have consistently expressed unequivocal support for the ratification of the agreement with the IC.

Bakir Izetbegović, serving during the first of these mandates, declared in mid-2017 that he would firmly demand the remaining two members of the Presidency to ratify the agreement with the IC, as had been previously done with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. He emphasized the necessity of recognizing specific Islamic practices, such as „the five daily prayers, permission

²² „U Prijedlogu ugovora između BiH i Islamske zajednice ne postoji nikakav oblik diskriminacije”, <https://islamskazajednica.ba/index.php/vijesti/aktuelno/23226-u-prijedlogu-ugovora-između-bih-i-islamske-zajednice-ne-postoji-nikakav-oblik-diskriminacije> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²³ „Conclusions from the 25th Session of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, https://www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/saopštenja/sjednice/zakljucci_sa_sjednica/default.aspx?id=20449&langTag=hr-HR (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

for Jumu'ah prayers, and the covering of women who consider it obligatory," while also expressing willingness to review issues raised by others, expecting reciprocal understanding from the Bosniak side.²⁴ Following a meeting with a high delegation of the IC in April 2018, Izetbegović and the IC issued a joint statement urging the immediate conclusion of the Basic Agreement with the IC „as one of the traditional religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina“.²⁵ Shortly afterward, Izetbegović included the item „Acceptance of the Basic Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the IC“ in the agenda for the 46th regular session of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁶ However, the other two members of the Presidency requested its removal, and since decisions on agenda items require a majority vote, Izetbegović, as Chairman of the Presidency, was outvoted, resulting in the removal of the item from the agenda.

His successor, Šefik Džaferović, continued this advocacy by consistently promoting the adoption of the Agreement with the IC during Presidency meetings. However, according to Džaferović, the Serb member of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, repeatedly obstructed the decision „without clear and reasoned explanation“. Džaferović further emphasized that „the IC has equal rights as other religious communities, and as such, it cannot be a hostage to politics“.²⁷

Denis Bećirović, who followed Džaferović as the Bosniak member of the Presidency, had expressed his support for the Agreement even before assuming office. As a delegate in the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he described the non-signing of the Agreement as discriminatory during a session in May 2022, asserting that „without equality and equal rights in this country, there is no secure future for anyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the rights, including those of religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, must be respected“.²⁸ Bećirović reiterated these views

²⁴ „Bakir Izetbegović najavio da će ultimativno tražiti da BiH konačno potpiše ugovor sa Islamskom zajednicom“, <https://saff.ba/bakir-izetbegovic-najavio-da-ce-ultimativno-traziti-da-bih-konacno-potpise-ugovor-sa-islamskom-zajednicom-video/> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²⁵ „Bakir Izetbegović i delegacija Islamske zajednice u BiH usvojili deset važnih zaključaka“, <https://www.infobrcsko.com/vijesti/item/15053-bakir-izetbegovic-i-delegacija-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-usvojili-deset-vaznih-zakljucaka.html> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²⁶ „Izetbegović preglasan: Čović i Ivanić protiv potpisivanja ugovora sa Islamskom zajednicom“, <https://binfo.ba/izetbegovic-preglasan-covic-i-ivanic-protiv-potpisivanja-ugovora-sa-islamskom-zajednicom/> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²⁷ „Ko 'koči' potpisivanje ugovora Islamske zajednice sa državom BiH?“, <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/687011/ko-koci-potpisivanje-ugovora-islamske-zajednice-sa-drzavom-bih> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

²⁸ „Pitanjem Ugovora Islamske zajednice sa državom poslije 13 godina bavit će se i novi saziv Predsjedništva BiH“, <https://preporod.info/bs/article/35940/pitanjem-ugovora-islamske-zajednice-sa-drzavom-poslije-13-godina-bavit-ce-se-i-novi-saziv-predsjednistva-bih> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

during his tenure in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,²⁹ describing the absence of the Agreement as „a significant form of disrespect towards the largest segment of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina“³⁰.

In contrast, the Serb members of the Presidency have maintained a unified stance in opposition to the Agreement with the IC. Despite belonging to different political parties and representing two competing blocs within the Serb political spectrum—Mladen Ivanić from the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) and Milorad Dodik and Željka Cvijanović from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)—all three have consistently opposed the signing of the Agreement.

Mladen Ivanić, during his tenure, opposed Bakir Izetbegović's 2018 proposal to include the Agreement on the Presidency's agenda, deeming the draft submitted by the Council of Ministers in 2015 unacceptable³¹. Among the provisions Ivanić found problematic were the right of imams to perform male circumcisions, which he argued should be restricted to medical professionals, citing European standards, and the right to attend Jumu'ah prayers, offering the example of a surgeon potentially missing an operation to attend prayers³². Regarding the provisions on Jumu'ah prayers and appropriate clothing, Ivanić suggested revising the text to state that „Bosnia and Herzegovina does not prevent attending Jumu'ah and wearing appropriate clothing,“ rather than explicitly guaranteeing these rights³³. He characterized Izetbegović's insistence on the draft Agreement as an attempt to provoke conflict³⁴.

Milorad Dodik, succeeding Ivanić as the Serb representative, also staunchly opposed signing the Agreement with the IC. One of Dodik's main arguments was that the proposed Agreement would grant the IC a privileged status compared to the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Churches, as it differed in structure from the agreements signed with these two Churches. Dodik claimed that the agreements with the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church were of an international nature due to their headquarters being in the Vatican and Belgrade, respectively, while the IC's headquarters is located domestically in Sarajevo. He argued that this unique designation of the IC as a domestic religious

²⁹ „Bećirović i reis Kavazović: Važno je da BiH potpiše ugovor sa IZ“, <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/808849/becirovic-i-reis-kavazovic-vazno-je-da-bih-potpise-ugovor-sa-iz> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³⁰ Član Predsjedništva BiH Denis Bećirović posjetio Islamsku zajednicu u Hrvatskoj“, <https://www.islamska-zajednica.hr/izdvojeno/clan-predsjednistva-bih-denis-becirovic-posjetio-islamsku-zajednicu-u-hrvatskoj> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³¹ „Ivanić: Neprihvatljiv izvorni Ugovor sa IZ-om“, <https://n1info.ba/vijesti/a256642-ivanic-neprihvatljiv-izvorni-ugovor-sa-iz-om/> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³² „Prijedlog Osnovnog ugovora sa Islamskom zajednicom u BiH demantuje Ivanića“, <https://istinomjer.ba/prijedlog-osnovnog-ugovora-sa-islamskom-zajednicom-u-bih-demantuje-ivanica/> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³³ „Ivanić i Čović odbili ugovor države s Islamskom zajednicom u BiH“, <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/371127/ivanic-izetbegovic-je-znao-da-nece-dobiti-podrsku> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³⁴ „Ivanić i Čović odbili ugovor“, 2018.

community could implicitly treat Serbs and Croats—Orthodox Christians and Catholics—as foreign entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina³⁵.

Furthering his opposition, Dodik asserted that the issue should be addressed in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament rather than the Presidency, emphasizing the limited mandate of the Presidency to ratifying international agreements. He went so far as to label the Serb representatives in the Council of Ministers who adopted the Agreement as „traitors“, describing their actions as a „Sharia dictate“ and a „confirmation of their subservient attitude towards Bosniak parties.“³⁶ Dodik also raised concerns about the economic implications of Jumu'ah prayers on Fridays, suggesting that „lost hours“ during the workday would require compensation, potentially causing disruptions in industrial production³⁷. This economic argument is notable, as such considerations are rarely cited in discussions about the Agreement with the IC.

Željka Cvijanović, Dodik's party colleague who assumed office at the end of 2022, has not publicly commented on the Agreement. However, there have been no indications of any shift in the stance of Serb representatives in the Presidency regarding the Agreement to date.

Unlike the consistent positions of the Bosniak and Serb representatives, the Croat representatives in the Presidency have demonstrated differing views over the last three electoral mandates. During the 2015 Agreement proposal, Dragan Čović, leader of the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), held the position and largely aligned with the views of opponents and critics of the proposed Agreement. In contrast, the subsequent two mandates were held by Željko Komšić, president of the Democratic Front (DF) party, which rejects identification with any of the three constituent peoples and enjoys significant support primarily from the Bosniak electorate. Since assuming office in 2018, Komšić has consistently maintained that the proposed Agreement should be accepted.

Dragan Čović's opposition became particularly notable in 2018 when extensive media discussion emerged following Bakir Izetbegović's proposal to include the Agreement on the Presidency's agenda. Čović opposed the Agreement, citing issues related to the IC's operations, employment practices within its institutions, archives, waqf property, Jumu'ah prayers, Hajj, and the right to a religious dress code. He also expressed concerns about the procedural aspects of the process, asserting that the Agreement could only be concluded

³⁵ „Decenija čekanja za ugovor Islamske zajednice u BiH i države“, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/islamska-zajednica-bih-islam-dodik-komsic/31522776.html> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³⁶ „O navodnom uvođenju šerijata u BiH: Kako su regulisana prava na hadž, džumu i odijevanje“, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/o-navodnom-uvodjenju-serijata-u-bih-kako-su-regulisana-prava-na-hadz-dzumu-i-odijevanje/151009046> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³⁷ „Dodiku sporna džuma, ugovor između države i Islamske zajednice još na čekanju“, <https://www.zenit.ba/dodiku-sporna-dzuma-ugovor-izmedju-drzave-i-islamske-zajednice-jos-na-cekaju/> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

„once all formal legal and constitutional conditions are met.“³⁸ After being accused by the then Minister for Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina of obstructing the Agreement, Čović characterized these accusations as unfair to believers and dismissed them as part of an election campaign.³⁹ He firmly denied the claims reported in the media about his opposition to specific provisions of the Agreement, reiterating his position that all legal and constitutional prerequisites must be fulfilled before ratification could proceed⁴⁰.

Željko Komšić, succeeding Čović, adopted a much clearer and more supportive stance on the Agreement with the IC. Together with Šefik Džaferović, he placed the Agreement proposal on the agenda of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite strong opposition from Milorad Dodik. Komšić argued that it was entirely expected for the Agreement with the IC to differ from those with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, given the unique characteristics of each religion. He highlighted that, unlike the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, whose main headquarters are in the Vatican and Belgrade, respectively, the IC's headquarters is located in Sarajevo. This distinction, along with the nature of the Agreement, rendered it a *sui generis* arrangement, one that is not of an international character⁴¹. While Komšić also acknowledged the potential legal complexities arising from this fact, he emphasized that the primary obstacle to finalizing the Agreement lay in the lack of understanding and opposition from the Serb member of the Presidency. He maintained that there was nothing inherently controversial about the provisions of the Agreement itself⁴².

While the central focus of this research is the arguments and narratives presented by members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to note that the debate extended far beyond their statements, permeating public discourse and media narratives. The national divisions among the Presidency members were mirrored and amplified in the public discourse, reflecting the broader societal polarization on this issue. For example, Milorad Dodik characterized the Agreement as a „Sharia dictate“, a sentiment echoed in analyses by Radio Television of Republika Srpska, which claimed that „Bosnia and Herzegovina is moving away from a democratic and secular state and

³⁸ „Ivanić, Čović i Dodik ugovor Islamske zajednice i BiH gurnuli u ralje politike“, <https://faktor.ba/bosna-i-hercegovina/aktuelno/ivanic-covic-i-dodik-ugovor-islamske-zajednice-i-bih-gurnuli-u-ralje-politike/104320> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

³⁹ „Čović: Sporazum Islamske zajednice i BiH izvan plana rada Predsjedništva BiH“, <https://bljesak.info/vijesti/politika/covic-sporazum-islamske-zajednice-i-bih-izvan-plana-rada-predsjednistva-bih/227805> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁴⁰ „Zašto Izetbegović zloupotrebljava pitanje ugovora države i IZ-a?“, <https://bljesak.info/vijesti/politika/Zasto-Izetbegovic-zloupotrebljava-pitanje-ugovora-drzave-i-IZ/233415> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁴¹ „Decenija čekanja za ugovor Islamske zajednice“, 2021.

⁴² „Ko koči sporazum između Islamske zajednice i države Bosne i Hercegovine“, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ko-koci-sporazum-izmedju-islamske-zajednice-i-drzave-bosne-i-hercegovine/211007138> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

becoming a theocratic community.⁴³ Similar rhetoric was found in media outlets based in neighboring Serbia, including an article titled „Alarm in Srpska: Sarajevo wants Sharia laws at the Bosnia and Herzegovina level“⁴⁴.

Conversely, media aligned with Dragan Čović's Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) framed the issue differently, focusing on accusations of „abuse of the Agreement“ by Bosniak politicians. These outlets argued that the push for the Agreement was an intentional move to provoke political tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴⁵. These contrasting narratives highlight how the debate over the Agreement transcended institutional boundaries, becoming a focal point for broader national and political discourses within and beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Analysis of Arguments and Their Implications for Societal Security

An overview of the positions of the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights a wide range of arguments from both supporters and opponents of the Agreement with the IC. These arguments span religious, political, economic, and legal dimensions, each of which will be analyzed in greater detail in this section of the research. Additionally, this analysis will consider the perspectives and arguments of the IC itself, as it represents the other party in the negotiations, with whom the state representatives in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency are ultimately expected to conclude the Agreement.

The specific provisions of the Agreement are rooted in Islamic practices, which have been central to the arguments of both proponents and opponents. A notable point of contention is the weekly Jumu'ah prayer. Article 11/1 of the draft Basic Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the IC explicitly mentions Jumu'ah prayer alongside the rights to free time for iftar and suhoor during Ramadan, as well as a break for Jumu'ah prayer. This provision has drawn criticism, notably from the Serb member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, Mladen Ivanić, who questioned its practicality by citing an example of a surgeon potentially neglecting their duties to attend prayers instead of „performing surgery.“

However, a closer look at Article 11/4 reveals limitations that address such concerns. This paragraph refers back to Article 11/3, which emphasizes that the rights outlined—such as prayer, dietary choices, dress, and appearance in public and private sectors—are subject to restrictions deemed „necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, order, health, morals, or the

⁴³ „Ugovor sa IZ- BiH se udaljava od sekularne države (VIDEO)“, <https://lat.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=174446> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁴⁴ „UZBUNA U SRPSKOJ: Sarajevo želi šerijatske propise na nivou BiH“, <https://www.kurir.rs/region/bosna-i-hercegovina/1958623/uzbuna-u-srpskoj-sarajevo-zeli-serijatske-propise-na-nivou-bih> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁴⁵ „Zašto Izetbegović zloupotrebljava pitanje ugovora“, 2018.

protection of the rights and freedoms of others.“ This legal framework prioritizes public health and safety, making Ivanić's hypothetical scenario inconsistent with the Agreement's provisions.

Mladen Ivanić proposed a different formulation to address his concerns about Jumu'ah prayer and dress code rights. He suggested replacing the phrase „guaranteeing the right“ with „Bosnia and Herzegovina does not prevent attending Jumu'ah and wearing appropriate clothing.“ However, the draft Agreement already avoids the criticized wording, with Article 11/3 instead stating that these rights will be „enabled“ in the public and private sectors, alongside the right to leave for the Hajj pilgrimage (Article 11/2).

Beyond public health considerations and textual nuances, Jumu'ah prayer was also questioned by Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, who raised concerns about its economic implications, particularly potential workplace disruptions caused by breaks for prayer, an argument rarely discussed in the context of the Agreement. Given Bosnia and Herzegovina's complex governance structure, with differing authorities at multiple levels, addressing breaks and leave for religious practices cannot follow a single modality. Notably, existing labor laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina include a 30-minute daily break that could accommodate prayers, while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Labor Law permits a one-hour rest period during the workweek for religious practices, a provision absent from the Republic of Srpska Labor Law. A state-level agreement could harmonize these rights nationwide.

In terms of non-working days, the Agreement reflects existing accommodations for other religious communities. The Basic Agreements with the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Holy See (Articles 9/1-2) provide Orthodox Christians with seven non-working days and Catholics with six. The proposed Agreement for the IC (Article 10/1) maintains five non-working days for Muslims, including two for Eid and one additional day for either the Prophet Muhammad's birthday or the Islamic New Year. The recognition of Sunday as a non-working day for Christians offers a precedent for accommodating Jumu'ah prayer on Fridays⁴⁶.

As for the right to leave work for the Hajj pilgrimage, this issue has been framed in discussions as an unpaid leave provision, potentially limited to a one-time entitlement during a believer's working lifetime, rather than an annual allowance.⁴⁷ Currently, unpaid leave decisions are at the discretion of employers, creating inconsistencies. A state-level agreement would standardize this right, ensuring equal treatment for believers nationwide with appropriate legal protections.

⁴⁶ Harun Išerić, Prijedlog osnovnog ugovora između Bosne i Hercegovine i Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, *Pravna misao*, vol. 11–12, 2016, 58–93.

⁴⁷ „O navodnom uvođenju šerijata u BiH“, 2015.

Circumcision of male children is another Islamic practice mentioned in the Agreement that drew opposition from Mladen Ivanić. He argued that this practice conflicts with European standards requiring the procedure to be performed by qualified medical personnel. This issue is addressed in Article 22 of the proposed Agreement, which states that „the practice of circumcision of male children is carried out in accordance with Islamic religious practice and guaranteed as part of the right to freedom of religion.“ Notably, the text does not specify imams as the individuals responsible for performing circumcisions but rather refers more broadly to Islamic religious practice. In the tradition of Bosnian Muslims, imams have never conducted this ritual, making Ivanić's critique largely unfounded.

Another debated aspect of the Agreement is the right to appropriate dress, particularly for women. Article 11/3 guarantees Muslim believers the right to express their faith through dress in both public and private sectors. This issue has been prominently discussed in light of the case of professional soldier Emela Mujanović, who, in 2020, sued the Ministry of Defense before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, alleging discrimination and a violation of her right to freedom of religion due to her wearing a hijab (scarf).

Initially suspended for wearing a hijab, Mujanović was subsequently transferred to a mono-ethnic barracks where the hijab remained an issue. According to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina uniform regulations, „military personnel are not allowed to wear parts of the military uniform in combination with civilian clothing and/or equipment, or combinations of parts from different sets of military uniforms,“ and „religious symbols may be worn with the uniform in a way that they are not visible“⁴⁸. After her lawsuit was dismissed, Mujanović appealed to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking a constitutional review of the Armed Forces' uniform regulations. In early 2024, the Court ruled that the prohibition of wearing a hijab with the uniform during military service did not violate the right to freedom of religion⁴⁹. While her lawyer hinted at the possibility of pursuing the case before the European Court of Human Rights or the UN Human Rights Committee, Mujanović decided to leave the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-2024, stating that she had been „forced to choose between her profession and the hijab“⁵⁰. This case has become a touchstone in debates about the right of Muslim believers to express their religious identity through dress, a provision explicitly included in the proposed Basic Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the IC.

⁴⁸ *Rulebook on the Uniforms of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, „Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, no. 44/17, Article 5(1) and (3).

⁴⁹ *Decision on Admissibility and Merits*, Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, case no. U-21/22, „Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, no. 11/24.

⁵⁰ „Emela Mujanović, vojnkinja sa hidžabom, napušta Oružane snage BiH“, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/emela-mujanovic-vojnkinja-sa-hidzabom-napusta-oruzane-snage-bih/240521174> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

The Bosniak political elite and the IC publicly supported Mujanović during this process⁵¹. Through the Military Muftiate of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces, the IC proposed solutions for integrating the hijab into military uniforms without compromising operational duties⁵². Ratifying the Agreement with the IC would establish a stronger legal basis for accommodating religious dress, including the hijab, in the military. This could address issues highlighted by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which relied on European Court of Human Rights precedents asserting that domestic authorities are best positioned to assess the relationship between the state and various religions within their specific democratic context⁵³.

The legal aspect of the debates surrounding the proposed Agreement with the IC has often centered on the authority of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ratify such an Agreement. Statements from the Serb member of the Presidency, and implicitly from the Croat member through procedural objections, suggest that opposition is frequently justified by questioning whether the Presidency has the jurisdiction to certify an Agreement that is not international in nature. Unlike the Agreements with the Orthodox and Catholic Churches—whose headquarters are outside Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade and the Vatican, respectively—the IC’s headquarter is in Sarajevo, raising doubts about the Agreement’s classification as an international treaty.

This legal debate is not new and has historical precedent. During the 2007 vote on the Basic Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the then Bosniak member of the Presidency, Haris Silajdžić, abstained for similar reasons. Silajdžić argued that the Serbian Orthodox Church, unlike the Vatican, is not a sovereign state, cautioning against setting a precedent by treating religious organizations and other NGOs as states. Nebojša Radmanović, the Serb member of the Presidency at the time, responded by referencing Article 5 of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, which

⁵¹ The appeal to the Constitutional Court of BiH was submitted by former Presidency member Bakir Izetbegović (SDA), while the state Minister of Defense, Zukan Helez, from the second strongest party among Bosniak voters (Social Democratic Party – SDP), repeatedly expressed support for Mujanović. Additionally, the broad support for Mujanović in this case is also evident from the fact that she received backing from high-ranking officials of the social-liberal oriented Naša Stranka (Our Party - NS). „Čudić podnijela inicijativu: Naredne sedmice se odlučuje o nošenju hidžaba u Oružanim snagama BiH”, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/cudic-podnijela-inicijativu-naredne-sedmice-se-odlucuje-o-nosenju-hidzaba-u-oruzanim-snagama-bih/240611122> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁵² „Ministarstvo odbrane BiH pred sudom zbog zabrane hidžaba”, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/emela-mujanovic-tuzila-ministarstvo-odbrane-bih/30978562.html> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁵³ „Advokat Emele Mujanović-Kapidžija: Jako smo razočarani Odlukom Ustavnog suda”, <https://stav.ba/vijest/advokat-emele-mujanovic-kapidzija-jako-smo-razocarani-odlukom-ustavnog-suda/23034> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

outlines the powers of the Presidency, but did not specify which provisions justified the ratification⁵⁴.

Representatives of the IC have countered such legal objections by highlighting the IC's organizational structure⁵⁵. To address claims that „the Islamic Community is not, nor can it be treated as, an international body with necessary elements of foreignness,“ IC representatives pointed to their Constitution, through which the IC encompasses entities such as the Islamic Community in Serbia (headquartered in Novi Pazar), the Islamic Community in Croatia, the Islamic Community in Slovenia, and the Islamic Community of Bosniaks in the European Union, North America, and Australia. They argued that this structure includes legal elements akin to those of the Serbian Orthodox Church, providing a basis for treating the IC similarly in terms of agreements⁵⁶.

The proposed Agreement has frequently been cited as evidence that Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina are denied equal treatment for their supreme religious institution compared to other religious communities. The IC has consistently aligned its position with that of the Bosniak members of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, viewing the blockades to the Agreement as exacerbating mistrust and serving the interests of political blackmail and short-term gains. Although former Croat Presidency member Dragan Čović repeatedly stated that he was not fundamentally opposed to signing the Agreement, his characterization of the issue as a „political question“ drew sharp criticism from the IC. The IC argued that such a stance „irreparably damages the trust of Bosniaks and the IC.“

The Serb political representatives' obstruction of the Agreement also faced strong criticism from the IC, which pointed out that „the blockades of the Agreement with the IC should serve as a lesson to Bosniak politicians not to trust the hypocritical politicians from the Croat and Serb nations, as we in the IC have done.“⁵⁷ This consistent alignment between the highest Bosniak political and religious representatives underscores the enduring significance of the Agreement. Over the years, it has increasingly evolved into an issue of national importance for Bosniaks, reflecting broader concerns about equality, trust, and representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina's complex political and social landscape.

⁵⁴ „Prihvaćen osnovni ugovor između BiH i SPC, Silajdžić bio suzdržan“, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/prihvacen-osnovni-ugovor-izmedju-bih-i-spc-silajdzic-bio-suzdrzan/070820086> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

⁵⁵ „Decenija čekanja za ugovor Islamske zajednice“, 2021.

⁵⁶ N. Begović, E. Kovačević, *Law, State and Religion*, 47.

⁵⁷ „Ugovor sa državom nije ekskluzivitet Islamske zajednice nego crkava, jer se osporava Islamskoj zajednici“, <https://preporod.info/bs/article/38047/ugovor-sa-drzavom-nije-ekskluzivitet-islamske-zajednice-nego-crkava-jer-se-osporava-islamskoj-zajednici> (Accessed: 13.05.2025).

Summary

The proposed Basic Agreement between the IC and the Bosnia and Herzegovina state represents more than a legal framework for regulating state-religion relations; it is a reflection of the enduring struggles over religious identity, societal security, and the politicization of religion in a multiethnic and multireligious context. As evidenced throughout the debates in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and broader political discourse, the agreement has become a focal point of contestation, reflecting deeply entrenched insecurities among the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This contestation has effectively transformed the agreement from a technical legal matter into a politicized and, in some instances, securitized issue.

Drawing from the Copenhagen School's framework, the debates over the agreement illustrate how religious identity, particularly that of Bosniaks and Muslims, has been framed as a potential threat to the societal and political equilibrium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before and during the Bosnian war in the 1990s, Bosniak religious identity was intensely securitized by ultra-nationalist Serb and Croat elites, who portrayed Islamic identity as a security threat under the guise of Islamic fundamentalism. Although the war has ended, elements of this securitization persist in the ongoing discourse. Certain Serb and Croat political representatives continue to present Islamic practices and demands—such as the right to Jumu'ah prayers, the hijab, or halal dietary requirements—as issues that challenge the secular or democratic character of the state. These arguments serve to perpetuate a perception that granting such rights could destabilize the delicate interethnic balance in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

From the perspective of societal security, the failure to ratify the agreement is perceived by many Bosniaks as a restriction on their ability to express their religious identity in the public sphere. This is particularly significant given the historical context in which Bosniak religious and national identities were targeted and securitized during the war. For Bosniaks, whose religious identity is inseparable from their ethnic and national identity, the inability to finalize the agreement exacerbates a sense of marginalization and insecurity. The politicization of the agreement thus deepens societal divisions and undermines efforts to achieve mutual trust and cohesion among the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The research demonstrates that the positions of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency members reflect not only their personal or party ideologies but also broader societal insecurities. Bosniak representatives overwhelmingly frame the agreement as a necessary step toward equality and societal inclusion, while Serb and Croat representatives often portray it as a move toward privileging one community at the expense of others. This dynamic reveals how societal security concerns—centered on the preservation of identity—are deeply intertwined with the processes of politicization and securitization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ultimately, the discourse surrounding the agreement underscores the challenges of fostering societal security in a heterogeneous society. The persistent politicization of religious rights risks transforming societal differences into existential threats, perpetuating divisions and undermining efforts to build a more inclusive and cohesive society. For Bosnia and Herzegovina to move forward, it is essential to approach issues of religious freedoms and identity with an emphasis on dialogue, equality, and mutual understanding, recognizing that the protection of one group's societal security need not come at the expense of others.

Zaključak

Predloženi Osnovni ugovor između Islamske zajednice (IZ) i države Bosne i Hercegovine predstavlja više od samog pravnog okvira za regulisanje odnosa između države i religije; on je odraz dugotrajnih borbi oko vjerskog identiteta, društvene sigurnosti i politizacije religije u multietničkom i multireligijskom kontekstu. Kako svjedoče debate u Predsjedništvu Bosne i Hercegovine i širi politički diskurs, ugovor je postao žarište sporenja, odražavajući duboko ukorijenjene nesigurnosti među trima konstitutivnim narodima Bosne i Hercegovine. Ovo sporenje je efektivno transformisalo ugovor iz tehničkog pravnog pitanja u politizovanu i, u određenim slučajevima, sekuritiziranu temu.

Oslanjajući se na okvir Kopenhagenske škole, debate o ugovoru ilustruju kako je vjerski identitet, posebno Bošnjaka i muslimana, uokviren kao potencijalna prijetnja društvenoj i političkoj ravnoteži Bosne i Hercegovine. Prije i tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini 1990-ih, bošnjački vjerski identitet bio je intenzivno sekuritiziran od strane ultranacionalističkih srpskih i hrvatskih elita, koje su islamski identitet prikazivale kao sigurnosnu prijetnju pod krinkom islamskog fundamentalizma. Iako je rat završen, elementi ove sekuritizacije opstaju u tekućem diskursu. Pojedini srpski i hrvatski politički predstavnici nastavljaju prikazivati islamske prakse i zahtjeve – kao što su pravo na džuma-namaz, hidžab ili halal ishranu – kao pitanja koja izazivaju sekularni ili demokratski karakter države. Ovi argumenti služe održavanju percepcije da bi priznavanje takvih prava moglo destabilizovati krhku međuetničku ravnotežu u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Iz perspektive društvene sigurnosti (societal security), neuspjeh u ratifikaciji ugovora mnogi Bošnjaci doživljavaju kao ograničavanje njihove sposobnosti da izraze svoj vjerski identitet u javnoj sferi. Ovo je posebno značajno s obzirom na historijski kontekst u kojem su bošnjački vjerski i nacionalni identiteti bili meta i predmet sekuritizacije tokom rata. Za Bošnjake, čiji je vjerski identitet neodvojiv od njihovog etničkog i nacionalnog identiteta, nemogućnost finaliziranja ugovora pogoršava osjećaj marginalizacije i nesigurnosti. Politizacija ugovora stoga produbljuje društvene podjele i

potkopava napore usmjerene ka postizanju međusobnog povjerenja i kohezije među konstitutivnim narodima Bosne i Hercegovine.

Istraživanje pokazuje da stavovi članova Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine ne odražavaju samo njihove lične ili stranačke ideologije, već i šire društvene nesigurnosti. Bošnjački predstavnici u velikoj mjeri uokviruju ugovor kao neophodan korak ka jednakosti i društvenoj inkluziji, dok ga srpski i hrvatski predstavnici često prikazuju kao potez ka privilegovanju jedne zajednice na račun drugih. Ova dinamika otkriva kako su brige za društvenu sigurnost – usredsređene na očuvanje identiteta – duboko isprepletene s procesima politizacije i sekuritizacije u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Konačno, diskurs koji prati ugovor naglašava izazove njegovanja društvene sigurnosti u heterogenom društvu. Trajna politizacija vjerskih prava nosi rizik pretvaranja društvenih razlika u egzistencijalne prijetnje, održavajući podjele i narušavajući napore da se izgradi inkluzivnije i kohezivnije društvo. Da bi Bosna i Hercegovina krenula naprijed, od suštinske je važnosti pristupiti pitanjima vjerskih sloboda i identiteta s naglaskom na dijalog, jednakost i međusobno razumijevanje, priznajući da zaštita društvene sigurnosti jedne grupe ne mora ići na štetu drugih.

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II

PRIKAZI // REVIEWS

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**Safet Bandžović, RUSIJA I ISTOČNO PITANJE:
Izazovi deosmanizacije i balkanski odgovori, Institut za
historiju Univerzitet u Sarajevu, Tom I i II,
Sarajevo 2026, 1.350 str.**

Dvotomno izdanje studije *Rusija i Istočno pitanje: Izazovi deosmanizacije i balkanski odgovori*, autora dr. Safeta Bandžovića, objavljeno početkom 2026. godine u izdanju Instituta za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu, rezultat je dosad najobimnijeg istraživačkog poduhvata o ključnim procesima koji su oblikovali historiju Balkana i međunarodne odnose ovog dijela Evrope kroz stoljeća. Ova monumentalna studija obuhvata dvije knjige na ukupno 1.350 stranice teksta i 3.747 napomena.

Prvi dojam koji se nameće prilikom uvida u sadržaj oba toma knjige jeste da se radi o obimnoj i temeljito urađenom istraživanju koje se zasniva na heterogenoj historijskoj građi prvorazrednog karaktera. Studija nesumnjivo prevazilazi okvire klasične historiografije i vrlo brzo će potvrditi svoju relevantnost i nezaobilaznost u gotovo svim naučnim i stručnim diskursima izučavanja geopolitičkih i društvenih odnosa ovih prostora. Autor je, uz brojne izvore južnoslavenskih historiografija, svoju studiju bazirao i na mnoštvu ruskih izvora što je čine posebno vrijednom (donosi popis izvora i literature na preko 80 stranica). Dr. Bandžović demonstrira impresivno poznavanje domaće i strane literature, citirajući ključne autore relevantne za njegovu temu iz područja historije, teorije historije, sociologije i antropologije, poput Pitera Berka, Luciena Fevrea, François-a Fureta, Ibrahima Tepića, Milorada Ekmečića, Dubravke Stojanović, Jana Assmanna, Erika Hobsbawma, Agnes Heller, Michela Foucaulta i mnoge druge. Ova široka erudicija omogućava dr. Bandžoviću da problemu pristupi multidisciplinarno, sagledavajući ga iz različitih uglova i osnažujući argumentaciju.

Rezultate višegodišnjeg istraživanja autor je prezentirao u 2 toma, od kojih svaki ima po 6 opširnijih i izuzetno zanimljivih poglavlja. Nesumnjivo je

da će ova monografija predstavljati značajan naučni doprinos razumijevanju kompleksnih historijskih procesa na Balkanu, s posebnim fokusom na ulogu Rusije u „Istočnom pitanju“ i brojnim procesima koje je potrebno promatrati kroz prizmu deosmanizacije.



U prvom poglavlju vrlo opširno se govori o odnosu između prošlosti, kolektivnog pamćenja, historiografije i ideologije, te način na koji društva konstruiraju i tumače svoju historiju. Za Bandžovića historija nije potpuna prošlost nego selektivna rekonstrukcija, podložna interpretacijama, mitologizaciji i ideološkim utjecajima. On piše o njenoj ulozi u formiranju identiteta grupa, o izborima šta pamtiti a šta zaboravljati unutar jedne zajednice, o ulozi historičara i njihovom djelovanju unutar društvenog i političkog konteksta te važnosti kritičkog pristupa historičara, o mitovima i nacionalizmima kao kreatorima percepcije prošlosti i sadašnjosti, o stereotipima i predrasudama koji često proizilaze iz pojednostavljenih historijskih narativa a politika ih koristi za mobilizaciju, zatim o odnosima nacionalne i regionalne historije kao i o svjetskim trendovima u historiografiji. Autor zaključuje da je historija uvijek nedovršena i ideološki obojena, a kritičko promišljanje i pluralizam perspektiva ključni su za izbjegavanje mitologizacije i manipulacije prošlošću. U ovom poglavlju dr. Bandžović je vrlo uspješno obradio i ponudio širok teorijski okvir

o odnosu prošlosti, pamćenja, historiografije, mita i nacionalnog identiteta. Jasno je uočljiva nit od opće teorije historije prema specifičnostima u razumijevanju Balkana i nacionalizma.

U drugom poglavlju pod naslovom „Refleksije Istočnog pitanja i širenje kruga turske magije“ ponuđena je kritička analiza povijesnih pojmova i percepcija, posebno o „Istočnom pitanju“ i evropskom identitetu u odnosu na Osmansko carstvo i islam. Autor se osvrnuo na brojne stereotipe evropskog orijentalističkog pristupa u tumačenju islama i Osmanskog carstva. Kompleksno „Istočno pitanje“ on definira kao složen problem borbe velikih sila za utjecaj na Balkanu i podjelu Osmanskog carstva, s ključnom ulogom Rusije i Velike Britanije. Nesporno je da je Rusija na Balkanu imala geopolitičke interese. Panslavizam se razvijao kao protuteža pangermanizmu, ali i kao panruski pokret. Značaj prostor posvećen je i konstrukciji „evropskog identiteta“ koji se oblikuje u opoziji prema „Drugome“, pri čemu je islam, a kasnije i „Turčin“, poslužio kao „opasan i blizak Drugi“. Prezentirajući eurocentričnu perspektivu autor ističe da mnogi pojmovi poput „Orijenta“ i „Turskog Carstva“ zapravo konstruirani na Zapadu u svrhu stvaranja vlastitog identiteta i superiornosti, a religija i stereotipne predrasude, koje su i dalje prisutne u evropskoj percepciji "Drugog" kroz koncept „izmišljene tradicije“ korištene su za demoniziranje Osmanskog carstva kao krivca za sve nevolje. Posebno je potresan i važan dio o iseljavanju muslimanskog stanovništva s Krima i Kavkaza, što baca novo svjetlo na posljedice imperijalističkih politika. Na kraju naglašava da su ratovi, genocid i etničko čišćenje imali ključnu ulogu u promjenama demografske slike ovog dijela Evrope. Autor uspješno razotkriva licemjerje zapadne politike i ideologije, naglašavajući da su mnogi problemi s kojima se Balkan suočava, uključujući i koncept „genocidnih politika“, proizvod zapadnih ideja i imperijalizma. Ono što bi vrijedilo izdvojiti jeste da ova studija ne nudi jednostrana rješenja, već ističe složenost regije, susrete i sudare kultura i religija te ispreplitanje različitih utjecaja geopolitike.

U trećem poglavlju pod naslovom „Deosmanizacija i zov balkanizacije“ dr. Bandžović analitički prezentirai i obrazlaže zapadne diskurse iz 19. i 20. stoljeća koji su oblikovali iskrivljenu i pežorativnu sliku o Balkanu i njegovim narodima. U tim zapadnim naučnim i političkim diskursima Balkan je predstavljen kao „civilizacijsko raskršće“ i „metafora stalnog cijepanja i sudaranja“, regija koju Zapad promatra s visoka, često je nazivajući „zvjerinjakom Evrope“. Pozivajući se na druge relevantne autore ponuđena su i tumačenja pojma „balkanizam“ uz sve stereotipe koji ga prate i njegovu korelaciju s „orijentalizmom“. U ovom dijelu studije on čitaoca suočava sa idejama poput nacionalizma i rasizma koje su stigle sa Zapada i utjecale na razvoj društava na Balkanu. Prikazuje da je s pojavom modernog koncepta nacije u 19. stoljeću započeo proces „lančanog orijentalizovanja drugih“. Analizira ulogu historije, nacionalizma i crkava u stvaranju nacionalnih identiteta, a „princip nacionalnosti“ značajno mijenja političku kartu Evrope.

Naredno poglavlje (četvrto) autor je posvetio rusko osmanskim ratovima, s posebnim fokusom na onaj posljednji (1877-1878). U ovom poglavlju detaljno je analizirao složene geopolitičke, vjerske i nacionalističke motive koji su oblikovali događaje na Balkanu u 19. stoljeću, s posebnim naglaskom na ulogu Rusije i njenih interesa. On vrlo detaljno elaborira međusobne odnose velikih sila, utjecaj panslavizma, nastanak etnonacionalizma i aktivnosti etničkog čišćenja na Balkanu. Od 1676. do 1878. godine, bilo je deset ratova između Rusije i Osmanskog carstva. Rusija je u tim ratovima slabila Osmansko carstvo i pomagala uspostavu autonomija i nezavisnosti malih kršćanskih država na Balkanu. Vjerski motivi (pravoslavlje) i ideje panslavizma bili su iznimno važni u svim tim ratovima, na što ukazuje i dr. Bandžović.

U petom poglavlju donosi nam sistematičan pregled i analizu uloge Srbije i Crne Gore u ratovima protiv Osmanskog carstva u drugoj polovini 19. stoljeća. Autor nam objašnjava složenu političku i vojnu situaciju, naglašavajući ruski utjecaj i pritisak na Srbiju da se uključi u sukob radi teritorijalnog proširenja. On znalački koristi raznovrsne izvore, od diplomatskih izvještaja do sjećanja suvremenika, kako bi ponudio višestruke perspektive na ključne događaje. Posebno je vrijedan dio koji se bavi teškim posljedicama ratova na civilno stanovništvo i prisilnim migracijama, što omogućava bitnu i dubinsku dimenziju razumijevanja promjena etničke i religijske slike ovog dijela Evrope.

Šesto poglavlje posvećeno je analizi političkih, vojnih i diplomatskih posljedica Rusko-osmanskog rata iz 1877–1878. godine, s posebnim fokusom na Sanstefanski ugovor i Berlinski kongres. Dr. Bandžović pojašnjava kako su, unatoč ruskoj vojnoj pobjedi, interesi evropskih sila, posebno Velike Britanije i Austro-Ugarske, doveli do revizije Sanstefanskog ugovora. Radi se o vrlo detaljnom i analitičnom pristupu koji duboko zaranja u složenu diplomatsku igru velikih sila na Balkanu. Kako se radi o možda i ključnom razdoblju moderne balkanske historije posebno zanimljive su opservacije o ulozi mitova u formiranju nacionalnih identiteta i isključivanju drugih, što pruža širi kontekst za razumijevanje balkanskih sukoba.

Drugi tom počinje sa sedmim poglavljem koje je posvećeno ruskoj politici na Balkanu u drugoj polovini 19. stoljeća, s posebnim fokusom na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. U njemu je detaljno obrađena pozicija Rusije nakon poraza u Krimskom ratu i njeno redefiniranje vanjske politike, fokusirajući se na unutrašnje reforme, ali istovremeno zadržavajući snažan interes za Balkan kroz politiku panslavizma i pravoslavlja. Posebno su zanimljivi, a mogli bismo kazati i danas aktuelni, dijelovi koji govore o aktivnostima ruskih konzulata na Balkanu i njihovoj političkoj misiji, s posebnim opservacijama na rad Aleksandra Gilferdinga i njegove predrasude. Ruski pokušaji širenja utjecaja putem agitacije, propagande i financijske pomoći te njeno ponašanje za pregovaračkim stolom vjerno pokazuje kako su na Balkanu diplomatske igre velikih sila često bile u nesuglasju s romantičnom retorikom nacionalizma i panslavizma.

„Muhadžirska raskršća i pribježišta“ naslov je osmog poglavlja. U njemu autor obrađuje jednu od najvećih, a slabo istraženih demografskih katastrofa u

evropskoj historiji. Masovno iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva (muhadžira) s Balkana u Osmansko carstvo u drugoj polovini 19. stoljeća predstavlja tragediju koja je, prema autorovim zapažanjima, u velikoj mjeri prešućena u zapadnoj i regionalnoj historiografiji, a što nije slučaj kad se govori o sudbini kršćana na ovim prostorima. Posebno je zanimljiva analiza odnosa između novonastalih nacionalnih država i manjinskih skupina, te način na koji su međunarodni ugovori, poput onih s Berlinskog kongresa, često bili zanemarivani u praksi. Ovo poglavlje je izuzetno važno za razumijevanje slojevite historije Balkana jer baca svjetlo na „slijepe mrlje“ (blind spot) u historiografiji i donosi perspektivu muslimanskog stanovništva, čija je tragedija često bila prešućivana. U ovom dijelu svog istraživanja autor je pokazao da ne izbjegava otvaranje „teških tema“ i vrlo uspješno prikazuje složenost situacije, naglašavajući psihološke traume i izazove s kojima su se muhadžiri suočavali.

Slijedeći hronološki tok, u devetom poglavlju dr. Bandžović upustio se u analizu dosta slojevite i kompleksne uloge Rusije na Balkanu početkom 20. stoljeća, s posebnim naglaskom na Majski prevrat u Srbiji 1903. i aneksiju Bosne i Hercegovine 1908. godine. On objašnjava kako su događaji u Srbiji, a posebno ubojstvo kralja Aleksandra Obrenovića, učvrstili predrasude u Britaniji o Srbima kao „kraljeubicama“ i „orijentalnoj“ naciji. S druge strane, Rusija je, zanemarujući moralne obzire, bila spremna odobriti događaje u Srbiji ako su bili u skladu s njezinim interesima, što je dovelo do strateškog partnerstva. Autor vješto povezuje unutrašnje probleme Rusije (ekonomska ovisnost o stranom kapitalu, posljedice poraza u ratu s Japanom i revolucije) s njezinim vanjskopolitičkim potezima. Vrijednost ovog poglavlja ogleda se u činjenici da pruža detaljan uvid u kompleksnu političku dinamiku kako na Balkanu tako i u Rusiji uoči Prvog svjetskog rata.

Deseto poglavlje posvećeno je genezi, toku i posljedicama Balkanskih ratova te njihovom utjecaju na formiranje nacionalnih država i širenje nacionalističkih ideologija. Radi se o veoma značajnom dijelu studije koji nudi kvalitetan, temeljit i multiperspektivan historijski osvrt na Balkanske ratove. I ovdje se autor potrudio da nam ponudi perspektive o važnim pitanjima i temama koje su često zanemarene u tradicionalnoj historiografiji, kao što su tragedija i progoni muslimanskog stanovništva (muhadžira), te brutalnost rata i ratni zločini na prostorima novonastalih balkanskih država.

Istraživački fokus u jedanaestom poglavlju usmjeren je na stereotipne percepcije Balkana kao neciviliziranog dijela Evrope, odnose između Srbije, Rusije i Austro-Ugarske, srpski nacionalizam, Sarajevski atentat, dinamiku međunarodnih odnosa pred Prvi svjetski rat, uzroke rata i balkanska perspektiva Velikog rata. Analiza Sarajevskog atentata kao kombinacije „sistema i slučaja“ vrlo precizno razotkriva kako su naivnost, arogancija i podejnjavanje rizika doveli do globalnog sukoba. Posebno je vrijedno što autor kritički pristupa pozicijama svih učesnika prvog ratnog sukoba svjetskih razmjera i ne zanemaruje nijednu stranu, prikazujući i imperijalističke interese velikih sila i militantni nacionalizam malih balkanskih naroda.

U posljednjem, dvanaestom, poglavlju dr. Bandžović nudi čitaocima izuzetno sadržajnu analizu geopolitičkih i historijskih promjena koje su se dogodile nakon Prvog svjetskog rata, s posebnim naglaskom na stvaranje novog svjetskog poretka i njegov utjecaj na Evropu i Balkan. Detaljno opisuje promjene u međunarodnoj politici, ulogu Wilsonovih „14 tačaka“, kao program za svjetski mir, a koje su poslužile kao osnova za potpisivanje primirja s Njemačkom i početak Mirovne konferencije u Parizu 1919. godine. Proklamirano načelo samoodređenja naroda ubrzo se pokazalo problematičnim s aspekta provedbe na terenu, što će voditi generiranju novih tenzija i sukoba. Posebno je apostrofirao utjecaj Oktobarske revolucije i propasti Ruskog carstva na promjenu srpske vanjske politike, što je rezultiralo stvaranjem Kraljevine SHS. To je važna perspektiva koja pokazuje kako globalni događaji direktno utječu na regionalne odluke.

Opći dojam nakon pročitano izvanrednog dvotomog djela dr. Bandžovića neumitno upućuje na zaključak da je, u prvom planu, bosanskohercegovačka naučna i stručna javnost dobila priliku čitati jedinstvenu studiju koja predstavlja izuzetan doprinos savremenoj historiografiji i kulturi pamćenja na prostoru Balkana. Iako se formalno bavi Istočnim pitanjem i ruskom politikom prema Balkanu, autor izlazi izvan okvira puke analize događaja i nudi duboku teorijsko-ideološku interpretaciju historijskih narativa, struktura moći, pamćenja i zaborava. On dosljedno koristi interdisciplinarni pristup i savremene teorije historiografije, panslavizma, imperijalizma i kolektivnog pamćenja. Njegov stil je naučno rigorozan, ali narativno pitak i retorički precizan, čime omogućava širem krugu čitatelja pristup izuzetno kompleksnim temama.

Bandžovićev doprinos savremenoj historiografiji posebno dolazi do izražaja u njegovom kritičkom osvrtu na nacionalne mitove i funkciju historije u oblikovanju etno-političkih identiteta na Balkanu. On ne samo da dekonstruira postojeće narative, već i poziva na odgovornost historičara – da ne služe vladajućim ideologijama, već da budu, kako kaže Peter Burke, „čuvari nezgodnih činjenica“. Autor s pravom upozorava na geopolitičku dimenziju historiografije, naročito u kontekstu Istočnog pitanja, deosmanizacije i ruske uloge. Kroz ovu prizmu, Balkan postaje prostor trajne borbe narativa – između Istoka i Zapada, između mitova i činjenica, između univerzalizma i partikularizma.

Cijenimo da se radi o jednom od najzrelijih i najvažnijih historiografskih djela na postjugoslavenskom prostoru posljednjih decenija. To je izuzetno kompleksna i temeljita studija koja duboko zaranja u prepletene historijske, geopolitičke i ideološke procese koji su oblikovali Balkan u kontekstu Istočnog pitanja. Ona ne nudi gotove istine, već analitičke i multiperspektivne pristupe za razumijevanje višeslojnosti prošlosti. Bandžovićeva sposobnost da spoji teoriju i historiju, mikro i makro perspektive, individualna iskustva i strukturalne sile priskrbit će ovoj knjizi trajni akademski i društveni značaj. Preporučuje se ne samo historičarima, već i politolozima, sociolozima, edukatorima, novinarima i svima koji imaju potrebu odgovorno se suočavati s kompleksnim naslijeđem Balkana.

Dr. Safet Bandžović i svojom posljednjom studijom potvrdio je status jednog od najangažiranijih historičara u bosanskohercegovačkom i širem južnoslavenskom akademskom prostoru. Knjiga je ne samo vrijedan doprinos savremenoj historiografiji, već i važan društveni poziv na odgovorno promišljanje prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti. Ona pripada onoj vrsti historijskih sinteza koje prevazilaze puki narativ o prošlim događajima i ulaze duboko u analizu mentaliteta, ideologija, geopolitičkih narativa i kolektivnih memorijskih obrazaca koji su oblikovali i još uvijek oblikuju političku stvarnost balkanskog prostora.

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
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međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu , Tom I i II,
Sarajevo 2025, 1.400 str.**

Knjiga *Zvornik 1992-1995: Genocid na kapiji Bosne*, autora dr. sc. Muamera Džananovića i dr. sc. Elvedina Mulagića, objavljena je u izdanju Univerziteta u Sarajevu – Instituta za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava krajem 2025. godine. Djelo je napisano na 1.400 stranica i objavljeno u dva toma. Pored predgovora, uvoda, zaključka popisa skraćenica, izvora i literature, priloga, te registara imena i geografskih pojmova podijeljeno je u 15 tematskih i hronološki strukturiranih poglavlja.

Naslovi poglavlja su: 1. Društveno-političke i vojne prilike u Socijalističkoj Federativnoj Republici Jugoslaviji krajem XX stoljeća; 2. Od “saoizacije” Bosne i Hercegovine do uspostave vojske “Republike Srpske”: uloga SDS-a, državnih struktura SFRJ i “paravojnih” jedinica; 3. Zvornik u periodu pripreme i početka izvršenja agresije i genocida; 4. Okupacija i zločini u gradskom dijelu Zvornika; 5. Uloga birokratskog aparata “Srpske opštine Zvornik” u istrebljenju Bošnjaka Zvornika; 6. Sistem koncentracionih logora u Zvorniku; 7. Masovni zločini nad Bošnjacima Grbavaca, Glumine, Jusića, Križevića i okolnih sela; 8. Divoč bez Bošnjaka: realizacija Karadžićeve odluke; 9. Masovno strijeljanje zatočenika u Domu kulture 30. maja 1992. godine i drugi zločini u Drinjači; 10. Zločin “Bijeli potok” – realizacija genocidne namjere 1992. godine; 11. Deportacija i prisilno protjerivanje stanovništva Tršića, Kozluka, Skočića i Šepka; 12. Sapna i okolina 1992-1995. godine, s posebnim fokusom na počinjene zločine; 13. Genocid nad Bošnjacima južne zvorničke teritorije 1992-1993. godine; 14. Zvornik – najmasovnije stratište Bošnjaka tokom genocida u Srebrenici i oko nje jula 1995. godine; 15. Pregled žrtava zločina počinjenih na prostoru Zvornika u periodu 1992-1995. godine.

Knjiga dr. sc. Džananovića i dr. sc. Mulagića *Zvornik 1992-1995: Genocid na kapiji Bosne* do sada je najobuhvatnije naučno-istraživačko djelo na temu genocida nad Bošnjacima na području neke bosanskohercegovačke opštine. Značaj ove knjige utoliko je veći što je Zvornik mjesto s veoma visokim brojem ubijenih Bošnjaka. Knjiga je obimna, dvotomna, jer su i zlodjela počinjena na zvorničkoj opštini obimnih razmjera: gotovo 2.100 ubijenih Bošnjaka 1992-1993. godine. Značajan broj žrtava genocida u Srebrenici iz jula 1995. je, također, ubijen na području opštine Zvornik. Među njima i 392 Zvorničanina koji su protjerani iz svojih sela 1992. prema Konjević Polju i 1993. dalje u Srebrenicu. Tako se Zvornik može nazvati epicentrom genocida nad Bošnjacima za vrijeme velikosrpske agresije 1992-1995. godine.



Sublimirati naučnu vrijednost knjige je veoma teško jer je ona ogromna, da ne kažemo nesaglediva iako se i tako može reći. Kako zbog važnosti Zvornika, tako i radi prezentovanih visokih rezultata naučno-istraživačkog rada. Ova knjiga je stvarana deset godina. To se vidi i po njenoj naučnoj ozbiljnosti, ali i obimu.

Stil pisanja je odličan, ali je tema mučna i djelo se “teško čita”. Detaljno su opisane monstruoznosti i brutalnosti brojnih pojedinačnih i masovnih zločina, što nije ugodno za čitanje. Ali, zamislite koliko je bilo teško autorima čitati izjave, dokumente, slušati svjedoke i potom o tome pisati. Teško je to, naročito kada se opisuju mučenja i ubistva. Ratne teme su i emotivno teške, a ne samo naučno. Nije to istraživanje i pisanje o folkloru krajem prošlog

ili pretprošlog vijeka nego o ljudima, njihovim patnjama i smrti. Autor ne može, a da se ne stavi u poziciju žrtve i svjedoka i na neki način se poistovijeti s njima. Iako je to težak emotivni teret, zapravo, samo se tako može smoći snage da se istraživanje temeljito i valjano provode te na taj način odgovorno realizuje istraživačka misija. U ovoj knjizi su imena hiljade ubijenih ljudi, muškaraca, staraca, žena i djece. Ubijene su čitave porodice, očeви i majke sa svojom djecom. Zbrisana su mnoga bošnjačka sela i gradska naselja od njihovih stanovnika. Autori nisu izostavili ni jednu žrtvu, ni jedan pojedinačni i masovni zločin. Svaka je žrtva evidentirana i utvrđene su okolnosti njenog mučenja i ubistva. Koliko su pažljivo i detaljno radili, dijelovi ove knjige mogu poslužiti za udžbenike iz forenzike.

Potpuno su istražili na jednom – nazovimo – mikroplanu sve prijeratne političke i vojne pripreme agresora za izvršenje genocida nad zvorničkim Bošnjacima: formiranje SDS nelegalnih jedinica i jedinica VRS, njihovo ustrojavanje, naoružavanje, uvježbavanje i propagandno pripremanje za izvršenje zločina.

Jugoslavenska narodna armija je u saradnji sa srbijanskom Službom državne bezbjednosti i jedinicama pod njenom kontrolom, Srpskom demokratskom strankom i “paravojnim” jedinicama koje je ona formirala i brojnim drugim srpskim vojnim i policijskim grupama – kako lokalnim tako i onim koje su došle iz Srbije – blagovremeno zaposjela položaje u gradu i oko njega. Izvršila je i povoljan taktički raspored tih – dobro naoružanih sastava – za preuzimanje potpune kontrole nad zvorničkom opštinom. Sve je planski radila. To je bila vojska čije su starješine preko četiri decenije izučavale vojnu doktrinu i odlično poznavale teren. Imala je sve potrebne logističke i ljudske resurse, a nasuprot sebe malobrojne, nenaoružane i vojnički slabo organizovane bratioce. Ne može se napraviti odgovarajuća odbrambena struktura ako za nju nema kvalitetne logističke podrške. Zvornički je Bošnjaci – kao i mnogi drugi – nisu imali. Onoliko koliko jesu, toliko su i pružili otpora. Preko Drine Jugoslavenska narodna armija je imala na raspolaganju i sve srbijanske resurse. Zato Zvornik i jeste kapija Bosne kako je u naslovu knjige istaknuto i zbog toga je agresija i genocid nad Bošnjacima počeo upravo u Podrinju. Od Bijeljine na sjeveru do Foče na jugu.

Najbrutalniji i najmasovniji zločini nad zvorničkim Bošnjacima izvršeni su od aprila do prve polovine juna 1992. godine. Svrha ovog prikaza ne dozvoljava da predstavimo pojedinačne slučajeve zločina, ali ima primjera kakve nismo nikada gledali ni u najstrašnijim horor filmovima. Nisu to bila samo smaknuća nego divljačka izživljavanja nad nemoćnim muškarcima, starcima, ženama i djecom. Ne može se reći da su zvjerska jer se zvijeri prema svom plijenu ne ponašaju tako i ubijaju ga samo iz razloga da zadovolje svoju potrebu za hranom. U Zvorniku i okolini Bošnjaci su ubijani iz mržnje prema njima i plana da se kompletna opština etnički “očisti” od njih.

Bez obzira na neuporedivu nadmoć agresora naspram branilaca, Zvorničani su u nekim mjesnim zajednicama pokušali pružiti otpor. Bila je to

borba za preživljavanje. Pružili su herojski otpor u Kula Gradu. Naravno da on nije mogao duže potrajati zbog nadmoći i dobre prethodne pripreme agresora. On je uspio nakratko zauzeti i Sapnu. Taman toliko dugo da i u njoj počini zločine nad civilima. Pripadnici Teritorijalne odbrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine su u prvoj sedmica maja uspjeli osloboditi Sapnu i braniti je do kraja velikosrpske agresije. Herojski se branila i Kamenica sa okolnim selima, sve do kraja februara 1993. godine. Potpuno odsječeni od ostalih slobodnih teritorija u Podrinju.

Autori su detaljno opisali sve operacije Vojske Republike Srpske i Vojske Jugoslavije čiji je cilj bio okupacija preostalih slobodnih teritorija i enklava u srednjem Podrinju. U jednoj takvoj operaciji iz zime 1992/93, agresor je uspio zauzeti Kamenicu i okolna sela, a potom Cersku, Novu Kasabu i Konjević Polje. Dio Bošnjaka iz Kamenice i okolnih sela je uspio prebjeći na slobodnu teritoriju prema Kalesiji i Sapni, a dio se izvukao ka Srebrenici. Gotovo četiri stotine Zvorničana je ubijeno u julu 1995. u genocidu u Srebrenici i oko nje.

Autori se nisu zadržali na istraživanju genocida u Zvorniku 1992. kada je ubijeno najviše zvorničkih Bošnjaka. Sistematično su istražili cijeli ratni period uključujući i vrijeme izvršenja genocida u Srebrenici. Tako su došli do nepobitnih dokaza da je veliki broj podrinjskih Bošnjaka iz srebreničke enklave ubijen na području zvorničke opštine. Prema njihovim podacima, na teritoriji zvorničke opštine pod kontrolom VRS od aprila 1992. do sredine ljeta 1995. ubijeno je preko 7.000 podrinjskih Bošnjaka od čega 2.080 Zvorničanina u periodu od 1992. do 1994. i 392 zvornička Bošnjaka koji su bili izbjegli u Srebrenicu i potom ubijeni u julu 1995. godine. Ostale žrtve, ubijene na području zvorničke opštine u julu 1995, bile su iz drugih mjesta srednjeg Podrinja. Tako je opština Zvornik najkrvavija teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine s preko 7.000 ubijenih Bošnjaka.

Autori su utvrdili da je najveća masovna grobnica Bošnjaka u Bosni i Hercegovini – Crni vrh kod Zvornika – grobnica ubijenih Zvorničana 1992. godine. Također su istražili i opisali kako je izveden genocid, od planiranja preko izvršenja do skrivanja tijela ubijenih osoba. Sve je bilo dobro uvezano, besprijekorno isplanirano i savršeno organizacijski izvedeno. Uspostavljena je funkcionalna saradnja svih učesnika u genocidu, civilna vlast, vojska, policija, takozvane paravojne jedinice, uklanjanje i prikrivanje tijela žrtava. Uloge i zadaci u tom krvavom lancu zločina bile su jasno podjeljene. Ovo je važno naglasiti jer to dokazuje da zločini nad zvorničkim Bošnjacima nisu nekontrolisana haotična ratna dešavanja nego klasični slučaj genocida u kojem je sudjelovala i Savezna Republika Jugoslavija sa svojom vojskom i Republika Srbija sa svojom Službom državne bezbjednosti koja je opremala, upućivala i usmjeravala takozvane paravojne jedinice. Većina zločina i drugih oblika nasilja, organizacija nekoliko logora za hiljade ljudi i skrivanje posmrtnih ostataka preko 2000 ubijenih civila su obavljani u relativno kratkom vremenu – tri mjeseca. Za to je trebala dobra organizacija koja savršeno funkcioniše i

autori su na primjeru Zvornika dokazali da je postojala, a prezentovali su detaljno i pouzdano kako je ona funkcionisala.

Knjiga ima odličan kontekst za razumijevanje dešavanja u Zvorniku, ali i u ostatku donjeg, odnosno srednjeg Podrinja. Ona je bez sumnje odličan model kako se treba istraživati genocid. Ne samo na području jedne opštine nego u svojoj cjelini. Njena vrijednost je i u tome što je do njenog objavljivanja Zvornik – u odnosu na neka druga slična mjesta po broju ubijenih – bio prilično zanemaren u nauci i javnom diskursu iako je dobro poznato da je to područje s veoma velikim brojem žrtava. Kako je već spomenuto, na području zvorničke opštine ubijen je najveći broj Bošnjaka, preko 7.000. Sa ovom knjigom možemo slobodno reći da je sada genocid u Zvorniku odlično istražen i naučno najkvalitetnije. Ona je bez sumnje jedna od najboljih objavljenih knjiga na temu agresije na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu i genocida nad Bošnjacima.

Teško je izdvojiti neko poglavlje kao posebnu preporuku za čitanje. Ova knjiga se mora pročitati u cjelini bez obzira koliko je to mučno zbog težine njene teme. Potrebno je naglasiti da su autori napravili i mapu svih stratišta, logora i masovnih grobnica na području zvorničke opštine kao poseban prilog, što rezultate njihovog istraživanja čini još lakše razumljivim.

Autori su zadržali naučnu objektivnost bez obzira što su sigurno bili izloženi ličnim emocijama izazvanim patnjama svojih sunarodnjaka. Korektno su naveli nekoliko slučajeva u kojima su pojedini pripadnici Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine počinili ratne zločine nad srpskim civilima, ali i više primjera u kojima su pojedini Srbi zaštitili ili pokušali zaštititi Bošnjake. Pojedini od njih su radi toga ubijeni.

Ova knjiga predstavlja nezaobilazno referentno djelo za razumijevanje genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini i šire, kako u naučnom tako i u društvenom kontekstu. U konačnici, autori knjiga *Zvornik 1992-1995: Genocid na kapiji Bosne* dr. Muamer Džananović i dr. Elvedin Mulagić postavili su visoke standarde u istraživanju masovnih zločina i genocida, potvrđujući da je naučno utemeljeno, sistematsko i odgovorno dokumentovanje prošlosti ključni preduslov za očuvanje sjećanja, suprotstavljanje negiranju i izgradnju trajnog razumijevanja ovih događaja.

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Enis Omerović, GENOCID NAD BOŠNJACIMA – Međunarodnopravna analiza, Bošnjaci zajedno! – Nacionalna koordinacija Bošnjaka u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb 2025, 446 str.

Uprkos postojanju pravnih normi i mehanizama za prevenciju i kažnjavanje zločina genocida, savremeni sukobi dovode u pitanje efikasnost međunarodnih institucija zaduženih za očuvanje mira i sigurnosti u svijetu. Knjiga “Genocid nad Bošnjacima – međunarodnopravna analiza” autora prof. dr. Enisa Omerovića upravo nastoji odgovoriti na pitanje odnosa između teorijskih principa sadržanih u Konvenciji Ujedinjenih nacija iz 1948. godine o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida i njihove konkretne primjene u praksi, kroz niz historijskih i savremenih primjera činjenja ovog zločina, kao i pokušaja njegovog sankcionisanja u međunarodnom pravu.

Ova studija ne ostaje na nivou deskriptivne analize međunarodnog prava, nego implicitno problematizira njegovu normativnu učinkovitost u suočavanju s genocidom kao zločinom koji kontinuirano izmiče punoj pravnoj sankciji. Upravo u tom raskoraku između normativnog okvira i njegove primjene, knjiga otvara ključno pitanje savremenog međunarodnog prava: da li postojeći pravni instrumenti zaista mogu odgovoriti na kompleksnost genocidnih procesa, ili ostaju ograničeni vlastitim institucionalnim i političkim okvirom.

U 19 poglavlja knjige prof. dr. Enis Omerović temeljito analizira kompleksne pravne pojmove, sistematski obrađuje historijski kontekst, kršenje ljudskih prava kroz historiju, pravnu kvalifikaciju genocida, političke i međunarodne odnose, tumači pravne norme i kritikuje njihovu primjenu, ukazujući na nesklad između normi i prakse, odnosno nepodudarnost prava i pravde. Struktura knjige jasno prati unutrašnju logiku - međunarodnog krivičnog prava - od normativnih obaveza država i međunarodnih organizacija, preko razrade dva pravna režima odgovornosti (individualne i državne), do detaljne analize radnji izvršenja (*actus reus*) i specifične namjere (*mens rea*) genocida.


Pored navedenih 19 poglavlja, koja uključuju i uvod i zaključna promišljanja, knjiga sadrži i indeks skraćenica s punim nazivima, kao i obiman popis literature i izvora, čime dodatno dobija na istraživačkoj i metodološkoj vrijednosti. Djelo započinje predgovorom dr. Merise Karović-Babić, uposlenice Instituta za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, koja pruža jasan i analitički utemeljen historijski kontekst genocida nad Bošnjacima, čime čitatelja uvodi u tematski i interpretativni okvir same studije.

Autor dr. Omerović dublje sagledava teorijski okvir u međunarodnom pravu, uključujući i pet radnji izvršenja genocida prema Konvenciji - ubijanje pripadnika grupe, nanošenje teških tjelesnih ili psihičkih povreda, namjerno podvrgavanje uvjetima života koji vode uništenju, sprječavanje rađanja unutar grupe i prisilno premještanje djece. Autor ukazuje na ograničenost i suženost ove normativne konstrukcije, ali i na njen razvoj kroz sudsku

praksu, gdje se pojedine radnje dodatno preciziraju i proširuju, posebno u kontekstu seksualnog nasilja i sistematskog razaranja društvenih struktura grupe.

U tom kontekstu posebno razmatra pitanje specifične namjere (*dolus specialis*), kao ključnog elementa genocida, naglašavajući da upravo ovaj element predstavlja najviši dokazni prag u međunarodnom krivičnom pravu. Analiza obuhvata kako opće karakteristike genocidne namjere, tako i njeno dokazivanje kroz međunarodnu i nacionalnu sudsku praksu, uključujući pitanje posrednog dokazivanja i izvođenja zaključaka iz obrazaca djelovanja.

Dr. Omerović komparira zločin genocida s drugim zločinima u međunarodnom pravu, uključujući zločine protiv čovječnosti i ratne zločine, ukazujući na njihove sličnosti, ali i ključne razlike koje proizlaze iz postojanja posebne genocidne namjere. Upravo ta namjera predstavlja osnovnu distinkciju koja genocid izdvaja od drugih međunarodnih zločina. Posebno poglavlje posvećuje pojmu "etničkog čišćenja", analizirajući njegov odnos prema



genocidu, njegovu upotrebu u političkom diskursu, ali i njegovu funkciju kao potencijalne najave ili sredstva izvršenja genocida. Omerović zaključuje da kod upotrebe ovog pojma treba biti oprezan, jer “etničko čišćenje” nije pravni pojam niti samostalni međunarodni zločin prema pozitivnom pravu, već njegova pravna klasifikacija zavisi od dokaza o genocidnoj ili progoniteljskoj namjeri; stoga, ukoliko se provodi s genocidnom namjerom, opis činjeničnog stanja odgovara zločinu genocida.

Važnost ove knjige ogleda se ne samo u analizi sudski utvrđenih činjenica vezanih za zločine počinjene u Bosni i Hercegovini, nego i u kontinuiranoj komparaciji sa drugim međunarodnim sudskim standardima. Ukazujući na sličnosti i razlike sa sudskom praksom ICTY, autor posebnu pažnju posvećuje predmetima ICTR (Akayesu, Kayishema i Ruzindana, Musema, Semanza, Seromba i drugi), čime analizu genocida smješta u širi globalni kontekst.

Pored sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i Ruandi, u studiji se razmatra kršenje ljudskih prava kroz historiju, kao i savremeni oružani sukobi, čime autor pokazuje kontinuitet genocidnih obrazaca, ali i evoluciju međunarodnopravnih odgovora na njih.

Kroz pitanje lokaliziranja genocida, odnosno propitivanje da li je on moguć na geografski ograničenom području, autor razvija raspravu o kvantitativnim i kvalitativnim kriterijima uništenja grupe, uključujući i pitanje uništenja njenog “bitnog dijela”, što predstavlja jedno od ključnih pitanja savremene sudske prakse.

Autor istražuje i odgovornost pojedinca, države i međunarodnih organizacija, uz poseban naglasak na “propust zaštite” kao osnov odgovornosti. U tom okviru, posebno se razmatra pitanje postojanja plana ili politike genocida, kao i značaj znanja o genocidnom planu za utvrđivanje odgovornosti.

Uspoređujući presude Međunarodnog suda u Hagu (ICJ) Bosna i Hercegovina protiv Srbije i Crne Gore i ICTY-a, autor posebno analizira razliku između efektivne i opće kontrole, što smatra ključnim za razumijevanje uloge država u oružanim sukobima i pripisivosti djela.

Poglavlja koja se odnose na međunarodne sudove - uključujući ICJ i ICTY - nude detaljan pregled razvoja međunarodne sudske prakse, dok se posebno poglavlje posvećuje genocidu u Srebrenici, kao pravno i historijski najznačajnijem slučaju u savremenom međunarodnom pravu.

U kontekstu međunarodne odgovornosti, dr. Omerović posebno analizira koncept “vrlo nesigurnih sigurnih zona” Ujedinjenih nacija u Bosni i Hercegovini, ukazujući na strukturne slabosti međunarodnog sistema zaštite civila. Značajan dio studije posvećen je i reviziji presude ICJ, kao i pitanju odgovornosti država i međunarodnih organizacija za međunarodno protupravna djela, čime autor ulazi u jednu od najosjetljivijih oblasti savremenog međunarodnog prava.

Posebnu analitičku vrijednost ima poglavlje posvećeno negiranju genocida, koje autor ne tretira kao sekundarni ili postkonfiktalni fenomen, nego

kao sastavni dio genocidnog procesa. U tom smislu, negiranje se ne pojavljuje tek nakon izvršenja zločina, već predstavlja njegov produžetak u političkom, pravnom i društvenom prostoru. Oslanjajući se implicitno na šire teorijske okvire (poput konceptualizacije negiranja kao završne faze genocida), autor pokazuje da negiranje ima višestruku funkciju: ono služi zaštiti počinitelaca, normalizaciji zločina i dugoročnoj destabilizaciji društava pogođenih genocidom. Uvođenjem pojma memoricida, analiza se dodatno produbljuje, jer se fokus pomjera sa samog negiranja činjenica na aktivno preoblikovanje kolektivnog sjećanja. Ovaj pristup je posebno značajan u kontekstu Bosne i Hercegovine, gdje negiranje genocida nije marginalna pojava, nego strukturirani politički i institucionalni diskurs. Time autor implicitno ukazuje na ograničenja međunarodnog prava, koje je sposobno da normativno definiše i sankcioniše genocid, ali ne i da efikasno odgovori na njegove postgenocidne manifestacije. U tom smislu, poglavlje o negiranju nadilazi pravnu analizu i ulazi u širi interdisciplinarni okvir, povezujući pravo, politiku i kulturu sjećanja, čime predstavlja jedan od teorijski najrelevantnijih segmenata knjige.

Iako knjiga uvjerljivo demonstrira teorijsku i normativnu kompleksnost zločina genocida, njena najvažnija vrijednost leži u implicitnoj kritici međunarodnog pravnog poretka. Pokazujući trajni raskorak između pravnih normi i njihove primjene, autor otvara pitanje granica međunarodnog prava u suočavanju s najtežim oblicima masovnog nasilja. Upravo u tom prostoru između normativnog ideala i političke realnosti, studija dr. Omerovića nadilazi okvire klasične pravne analize i postaje relevantan doprinos savremenim raspravama o odgovornosti, pravdi i kulturi sjećanja.

Međutim, ostaje otvoreno pitanje u kojoj mjeri međunarodno pravo, u svom postojećem obliku, može prevazići vlastita ograničenja i odgovoriti na izazove koje autor precizno identifikuje - posebno u kontekstu negiranja genocida i izostanka efikasnih mehanizama njegove prevencije.

Zahvaljujući jasnom izražavanju, jednostavnosti, ali istovremeno i temeljitosti, knjiga prof. dr. Enisa Omerovića namijenjena je ne samo uskospecijaliziranom krugu eksperata iz međunarodnog humanitarnog i međunarodnog krivičnog prava, nego i studentima, istraživačima i široj društvenoj zajednici. Imajući u vidu širinu analize, metodološku dosljednost i relevantnost korištenih izvora, bilo bi izuzetno korisno razmotriti prevođenje ove knjige na strane jezike, kako bi njeni rezultati bili dostupni široj međunarodnoj akademskoj i stručnoj javnosti. Knjiga predstavlja značajan doprinos savremenim međunarodnopravnim studijama genocida i zaslužuje da bude uključena u akademske kurikule u Bosni i Hercegovini, regionu i šire. Istraživanje počinjenog genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini nužno je interdisciplinarno, jer podrazumijeva povezivanje pravnih, historijskih, socioloških, politoloških i drugih perspektiva. U tom smislu, znanja koja naučnici i istraživači mogu steći čitanjem ove knjige imaju izuzetnu analitičku i metodološku vrijednost.

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**Sait Š. Šabotić, BIHOR NA RAZMEĐU VJEKOVA
(1878-1914), Bošnjačka akademija nauka i umjetnosti, Institut
za historiju, demografiju i antropologiju Sandžaka,
Novi Pazar-Rožaje, 2025, 408 str.**

U izdanju Bošnjačke akademije nauka i umjetnosti, Instituta za historiju, demografiju i antropologiju Sandžaka izašla iz štampe knjiga dr Saita Šabotića pod nazivom *Bihor na razmeđu vjekova (1878-1914)*. Knjiga predstavlja rukopis njegove doktorske disertacije odbranjene na tuzlanskom univerzitetu jula 2024. godine.

Istraživati i pisati na temu iz lokalne istorije je veoma izazovan i težak posao, iako mnogi nipodištavaju pisanje ovakvog tipa istorijskih djela obrazlažući to stanovište da je navodno kroz obradu tema iz nacionalne, ili pak opšte istorije sve rečeno što je bitno. Naprotiv, istražiti neku temu, ili pak jedan širi geografski lokalitet u određenom vremenskom periodu samo je doprinos nacionalnoj istoriji, a posebno ako se temeljnim istraživanjem dođe do novih saznanja. Kada je riječ knjizi kolege Šabotića mora se imati u vidu kao što je već istaknuto, da je ona za štampu priređeni rukopis doktorske disertacije, što je samim tim podrazumijevalo iscrpno korišćenje arhivske građe sledećih Arhiva: Arhivsko-bibliotečkog odjeljenja Narodnog muzeja Crne Gore, Arhiva Srbije, Arhiva Mešihata Islamske zajednice u Crnoj Gori, Arhiva vlade Turske u Istanbulu, Državnog arhiva Crne Gore, Istorijskog arhiva „Ras“ u Novom Pazaru i Privatne archive Munira K. Šabotića iz Novog Pazara. Osim pomenute arhivske građe, korišćena je brojna objavljena arhivska građa, 250 bibliografskih jedinica i štampa različite provinijencije. Sve navedeno, navodi na zaključak da je u istraživanje uložen višegodišnji trud da bi se došlo do objavljivanja knjige *Bihor na razmeđu vjekova (1878- 1914)*.


Smatrajući da je knjiga namijenjena ne samo stručnoj već i široj javnosti objasnićemo da oblast Bihor zauzima sjeveroistočni dio Crne Gore i danas administrativno pripada opštinama Petnjica, Bijelo Polje i Berane. To je

prostor koji je bio naseljen još u praistoriji. Na ovom prostoru ostavile su trag mnoge kulture, što nam govori da je u kontinuitetu bio naseljen jer je imao veoma specifičan geografski položaj. Preko Bihora su se ukršatali mnogi putevi. Od ulaska u sastav Osmanskog carstva imao je važan geostrateški položaj kao provincija na periferiji carstva. Da bi se kvalitetno obradila prošlost Bihora u navedenom vremenskom periodu autor je dao i presjek najvažnijih

istorijskih dešavanja prije Berlinskog kongresa opisujući prošlost ovog kraja u kontekstu širih međunarodnih odnosa i na taj način nas uveo u suštinu njegovog istraživanja. Takođe, ova tema je obrađena i sa aspekta opšte istorije jer su se na prostoru Bihora ukršitali interesi Osmanskog carstva, Austro-Ugarske, Srbije i Crne Gore. To je bilo jedno burno istorijsko razdoblje, iako je hronološki obuhvatalo samo 36 godina. Upravo u periodu 1878-1914. Bihor je prošao kroz mnoge izazove, kako društveno-političke, tako i demografske i kulturne. Narod ovog kraja pokušavao je održati svoj

identitet na vjetrometini mnogih uticaja. Nije to bilo lako u jednoj multietničkoj i multinacionalnoj sredini kada su mnoge političke ideologije bile usmjerene na asimilaciju Bošnjaka. Upravo te retrogradne ideologije narušavale su odnose između pravoslavnog bošnjačkog stanovništva. Iako je period između Berlinskog kongresa i Prvog balakanskog rata bio period navodnog mira, za ovo područje se to ne može baš reći. Taj, nazovimo period „ni rata ni mira“ autor je detaljno istražio i opisao u ovoj knjizi. Mnoge bune koje su potresale ovaj kraj u navedenom periodu u našoj istorijskoj nauci do sada su samo evidentirane, a o nekima tek saznajemo sa stranica ove knjige.

Knjiga se sastoji od Uvoda i sedam poglavlja: 1. *Bihor u događajima od 1878. do 1898. godine-Politički događaji i utjecaji*; 2. *Obrazovne i kulturne prilike u Bihoru od 1878. do 1898. godine-Sudari različitih svjetova*; 3. *Bihor*



na razmeđu vjekova-Doba ravnoteže u utjecajima; 4. Prilike u Bihoru od 1902. do 1908. godine-Jaćanje utjecaja Srbije i Crne Gore; 5. Kultura kao vezivni faktor zajedničkog življenja u Bihoru; 6. Bihor od 1909. do 1914. godine-Utjecaji postaju stvarnost; 7. Zaključna razmatranja.

U prvom poglavlju pod nazivom: Bihor u događajima od 1878. do 1898. godine - Politički događaji i utjecaji, fokus je stavljen na probleme oko sprovođenja odluka Berlinskog kongresa. Naime, tzv. plavsko –gusinska afeta imala je velike refleksije na području Bihora. Znatan dio bihorskih glava uključio se na stranu Prizrenske lige u borbe protiv Crnogoraca koji su htjeli da se odluka Berlinskog kongresa o predaji Plava i Gusinja Crnoj Gori sprovede u djelo. Još veće strepnje u Bihoru izazvala je odluka Berlinskog kongresa o ulasku austrougarske vojske u Novopazarski sandžak. U Bihoru kao i u drugim krajevima koji su pripadali ovom sandžaku počele su mobilizacije za pružanje otpora zaposjedanju ovih teritorija od strane novog gospodara. Na ova turbulenta dešavanja nadovezuje se i kriza na osmanskome dvoru. Naime, sultan Abdul Hamid II ukinuo je 1879. godine. Ustav koji je bio usvojen 1876. godine. Znatan dio albanskog stanovništva u susjedstvu Bihora odbijalo je da daje sultanu porez i da šalje mladiće u osmansku vojsku. Došlo je do podjele na pristalice i protivnike centralne vlasti. To se neminovno odrazilo i na stanovništvo Bihora gdje je došlo do iste podjele. Te podjele samo su mogle koristiti Austro-Ugarskoj da lakše stacionira svoje vojne garnizone u Novopazarskom sandžaku. Stanovništvo Bihora tih godina bez prestanka je bilo na velikim iskušenjima u borbi da očuva golu egzistenciju. Već 1880. godine Austro-Ugarska u Novopazarskom sandžaku, kao i Bosni i Hercegovini koju je okupirala počinje da sprovodi nasilnu mobilizaciju u svoju vojsku a sa druge strane crnogorske čete napadaju i pljačkaju bošnjačko stanovništvo. Pored sve te političke i vojne nestabilnosti područje Bihora tih godina bilo je izloženo masovnom imigracijom bošnjačkog stanovništva iz Bosne koje se naseljava na ovu teritoriju.

Nakon detaljno obrađenih političkih prilika u Bihoru od Berlinskog kongresa do kraja dvedesetih godina 19. vijeka (preciznije do završetka grčko-osmanskog rata i novih reformi koje je morala prihvatiti, Porta od strane velikih sila) autor je obradio obrazovne –kulturne prilike u istom periodu). Ne dajući primat političkim zbivanjima već uporedo prateći obrazovanje i kulturu iako ona nije bila na nekom zavidnom nivou kako kod bošnjačkog tako i pravoslavnog stanovništva jer je ono bilo uglavnom pod okriljem vjerskih institucija, kolega Šabotić je ispoljio svojstvo profesionalnog historičara koji prati najsevernije trendove svjetske historijske nauke u kojoj da podsjetimo, više ne dominira politička historija. Ipak, nažalost mora se konstatovati da kod nas takav način pisanja kod mnogih historičara još nije u potpunosti zaživio.

Prilike u Bihoru od 1902. do 1908. godine obrađene su u trećem poglavlju. Ovaj period od šest godina obilježen je može se reći anarhijom kako kod bošnjačkog tako i kod pravoslavnog stanovništva. To je vrijeme kada haraju pljačkaše bande koje se međusobno sukobljavaju ne samo na relaciji

pravoslavci-bošnjaci već i među istovjernicima. Istovremeno to je i vrijeme velikih socijalnih i agrarnih nemira a sve je to bila posljedica slabljenja centralne osmanske vlasti koja je počela da gubi kontrolu posbno na perifernim dijelovima carstva kakav je između ostalog bio slučaj sa Bihorom. Dok su se pljačkaše bande harale uticaj propagandni uticaj zvanične Srbije i Crne Gore jače a u cilju pripajanja ove ali i šire teritorije ovoj ili onoj zemlji. Stanje nesigurnosti, a može se reći i beznađa kulminiraće aneksijom Bosne i Hercegovine 1908. godine.

Kultura kao vezivni faktor zajedničkog življenja u Bihoru, je peto poglavlje koje zaslužuje posebnu pažnju jer se u njemu susrećemo sa mnoštvom novih detalja o istaknutim kulturnim stvaraocima kako bošnjacima tako i pravoslavicima o kojim se do sada malo znalo, ili čak mnogi od njih nijesu ni pomenuti u našoj istoriji. Ratovi su bili i prošli. Svaki rat pa i manji sukob ostavi za sobom žrtve i pustoš a kulturno stvaralaštvo nadživi generacije i generacije. Kulturno se uzdizati i stvarati u takvim vremenima nije bilo lako, ali pojedinci su se uzdizali i ostavili iza sebe u nasleđe koje zaslužuje poštovanje a autor je to veoma vješto istražio i opisao i sačuvao takve ličnosti od zaborava.

Period od 1909. tj. od priznanja aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine od strane Srbije i Crne Gore do početka Prvog svjetska rata tema je šestog poglavlja. Politička zategnutost u neposrednom okruženju Bihora krajem 1908. može se reći dosegla je kulminaciju. Autor je sistematično i stručno razjasnio kako se podjela bošnjačkog stanovništva izbijanjem Mladoturke revolucije na tzv. „mladoturke“ i „staroturke“ odrazila na stanovništvo, kakve su posljedice te podjele. Još teže refleksije na ovo područje izazvala je aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine od strane Austro-Ugarske. Bihor i šira okolina bivaju ponovo izloženi masovnom doseljavanju bošnjačkog stanovništva iz Bosne, a s druge strane, bečki dvor širi propagandu među bošnjačkim stanovništvom da se Srbija i Crna Gora sprejaju da zauzmu cijeli Novopazarski sanžak. Narod ovog kraja bio je svjestan već 1909. godine nakon priznavanja aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine da je aneksija samo uvod u sukob većih razmjera što će se i dogoditi izbijanjem Prvog balkanskog rata. Šabotić opisujući prilike u Bihoru od 1908. do 1914. godine nije „upao“ u zamku tradicionalne istorigrafske škole da samo piše hronološki niz političkih dešavanja već uporedo analizira demografske promjene izazvane pomenutim dešavanjima, socijane i vjerske prilike.

Na kraju, sa ushićenjem možemo čestitati kolegi Šabotiću što je široj čitalačkoj publici podario jedno značajno historijsko djelo kojim je rasvijetlio prošlost rekli bi ne samo svoga zavičaja već i dao primjer budućim istraživačima da se upuste u istraživanje lokaliteta ili područja koja su ostala na marginama naše istorije jer će se takvim istraživanjima samo mogu obogatiti znanja iz naše prošlosti.

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1.04 Stručni rad/Professional article

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**Franko Dota, POLITIČKA POVIJEST MUŠKE
HOMOSEKSUALNOSTI U SOCIJALISTIČKOJ
JUGOSLAVIJI, Fraktura, Zagreb 2025, 536 str.**

Historičar, prevodilac, redovni dopisnik italijanske novinske agencije ANSA i aktivista za ljudska prava Franko Dota, u knjizi *Politička povijest muške homoseksualnosti u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji* po prvi put otvara pitanje koje je u pojedinim dijelovima prostora bivše Jugoslavije u određenim vremenskim periodima raspravljalo u naučnim krugovima. Autor donosi sveobuhvatnu analizu političkog, pravnog i društvenog položaja muške homoseksualnosti u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji, smještajući ovu temu u širi kontekst odnosa između države, ideologije i seksualnosti.

Knjiga ima višedimenzionalni karakter, budući da se ne bavi isključivo historiografijom pravnih normi koje su regulirale homoseksualnost, već i analizom načina na koje je homoseksualnost tumačena tokom nekoliko decenija – od kriminalizacije, preko njenog tumačenja kao devijacija i patologizacije (medikalizacije), zatim depatologizacije (demedikalizacije), dekriminalizacije u pojedinim federalnim jedinicama bivše Jugoslavije, pa sve do procesa liberalizacije. Ovakav pristup doprinosi dubljem razumijevanju ne samo krivičnihopravnih normi, nego i šireg društvenog i kulturnog konteksta u kojem su one nastajale i primjenjivane.

U *Prologu* knjige autor objašnjava razloge koji su ga potaknuli na arhivsko istraživanje, pozivajući se na feljton časopisa *Start* iz jeseni 1971. godine, posebno na prikaz Aljoševih homoseksualnih iskustava, ali i na tada aktuelne stavove ključnih društvenih aktera, koje autor označava kao “prave protagoniste i antagoniste“. U njih ubraja političare, ljekare, sudije, akademike, advokate, tužioce, policijske službenike, nastavnike, novinare i seksologe (str. 13-16), čime se već u uvodnom dijelu naznačava složenost i višeslojnost ove teme.

Knjiga je strukturirana u deset hronološki i tematski organiziranih poglavlja, koja ujedno predstavljaju i šire tematske cjeline, obuhvatajući pitanja od teorijsko-metodološkog okvira i normativne regulacije, preko institucionalne prakse i društvenih diskursa, do procesa liberalizacije i transformacije društvenog i pravnog statusa homoseksualnosti.

Prvo poglavlje, *Tematski, teorijski i metodološki okviri* (str. 17-58), predstavlja i analizira sociološke teze o seksualnosti, njihove interpretacije kroz decenije kao i radove jugoslavenskih psihijatara, seksologa i pravnika, podijeljenih između zapadnoevropskih i sovjetskih teorijskih utjecaja. Autor razmatra i početke dekriminalizacije homoseksualnosti u Evropi, kao i tekstove domaćih autora o iskustvima homoseksualaca, društvenim okolnostima vremena i različitim perspektivama koje su često bile ne samo politički, nego i izrazito vulgarno intonirane: pederastija je bila “turski porok”, oni su “izopačena grupa

kolaboracionista”, koja je svojom degeneracijom prijetila “integritetu srpske nacije”, što ukazuje na duboko ukorijenjene stereotipe i ideološko konstrukcije.

Drugo poglavlje, *Neporočna revolucija: koordinatide seksualne etike u ratu i neposrednom poraću* (str. 59-100), bavi se partizanskim periodom, s posebnim osvrtom na stavove i zahtjevima komunista za čistoćom njihovih članova, formulirajući to kao “komunistički karakter” koji je, između ostalog, uključivao i njihov privatni život, koji treba biti čist i besprijekoran. U stvari, privatni život komunista nije se smatrao isključivo ličnom sferom, već i sastavnim dijelom njihovog političkog identiteta i rada. Ovo poglavlje je također ilustrovano konkretnim primjerima intimnih veza ili ljubavnih afera, čak i kada nisu ni bili homoseksualni – bili su optuženi da su tokom rata i revolucije nalazili vremena za “nemoralna djela”, smatrajući to “kršenjem partizanskog seksualnog



kodeksa“. Najočitiiji primjer tiče se dvadesettrogodišnjeg partizanskog desetara, inače neoženjenog zemljoradnika, i dvije partizanke, od kojih je jedna bila njegova partnerka. Osuđeni su na smrt (nema podataka da li su pogubljeni) zbog seksualnog trokuta. Apstinencija, puritanizam, disciplina i kontrola seksualnosti unutar redova NOVJ bili su obavezni. Što se tiče homoseksualnih odnosa među partizanima, autor dokumentuje (prema Đilasovim *Ratnim memoarima*) i analizira slučaj homoseksualca, koji nije osuđen na smrt jer je “njega razvratio beg“. Uopšte za te poroke “kriv je bio Turčin, aga, hodža, sodomija je bila turski običaj“, ove ljude 'kvare' buržoaski dekadenti ili ih obuhvaća malograđanska stihija. S druge strane, postoji dokumentovan slučaj oficira Mardešića koji je 1944. godine osuđen na smrt i pogubljen zbog homoseksualnih odnosa, mada se ništa ne zna o njegovim homoseksualnim partnerima. Ovo poglavlje otkriva i poslijeratni period, kada je izgradnja zemlje krenula kroz volonterizam, uglavnom kroz omladinskih radne akcija (ORA). Mnogi roditelji su bili zabrinuti da će njihova djeca ostati bez “moralnog nadzora“, pa su seksualne i ljubavne veze bili strogo zabranjeni. Osim toga, provjeravani su na “seksualne abnormalnosti“, s obzirom da su većina njih bili mladići, koji su zajedno spavali u barakama.

Treće poglavlje, *Socijalistička modernost i tradicionalni moral: “protuprirodni blud” u jugoslavenskim zakonodavnim debatama (1945-1960)* (str. 101-159), analizira normativni okvir i praksu njihove primjene, uključujući sudsku praksu, represivne mehanizme i stav državnih institucija prema homoseksualnosti kao obliku “društvene opasnosti“, konceptu snažno oblikovanom pod uticajem sovjetske pravne doktrine. Nakon 1948. godine pojavljuje se i termin “mala društvena opasnost“, što ukazuje na postepeni otklon od staljinističkog modela i početak približavanja zapadnijim krivičnopravnim konceptima. Autor detaljno prikazuje tok zakonodavnih rasprava, stavove jugoslavenskih penalista, od kojih su se neki zalagali za dekriminalizaciju “protuprirodnog bluda“. Iako su pojedini pravници zagovarali ukidanje ove inkriminacije, pozivajući se na primjere zapadnoevropskih država, prevladali su konzervativni stavovi koji su zahtijevali čak i strožije kaznene mjere, uključujući prijedloge za kriminalizaciju bračne preljube. Homoseksualci su i dalje smatrani kriminogenim elementom, a policija je vodila detaljne kartoteke s imenima, njihovom broju, dobi i teritorijalnoj rasprostranjenosti.

Četvrto poglavlje, *Homoseksualnost u jugoslavenskom socijalističkom kaznenom pravu* (str. 161-183), pored vrste i težine kazni, usmjereno je i na analizu obelježja krivičnog djela, značenje zakonskih izraza “društvena opasnost“, “obljuba“, “bludna radnja” i “protivprirodni blud“, kao i povratak tradicionalnog naziva Glave XVI Krivičnog zakonika, čija je zaštitna vrijednost definisana kao “dostojanstvo ličnosti i moral“. Pored analize značenja ovih izraza, poglavlje analizira i nekoliko sudskih odluka koje pokazuju kako se medicinski diskurs o homoseksualnosti postepeno prelijevao najprije u kriminološki, a potom i u pravni diskurs.

Peto poglavlje, *Anni horribiles: progon homosexualaca u poratnoj Hrvatskoj* (str. 185-225), donosi detaljan prikaz najpoznatijih represivnih procesa, uključujući Dubrovački proces iz 1949. godine, u kojem je osuđeno šesnaest muškaraca i Zagrebački proces iz iste godine, kada je sedam osoba osuđeno na izuzetno stroge zatvorske kazne, neki i na prisilni rad. Paradoksalno, autor ukazuje da su u tim slučajevima kazne za homoseksualne osobe bile strožije od kazni izricanih za pokušaj bijega iz zemlje. Knjiga dodatno otkriva i tzv. Šibenski homoseksualni krug iz 1948. godine, kada je poglavar Šibenskog biskupskog sjemeništa osuđen na dvanaest godina zatvora s prisilnim radom. S druge strane, autor posebno analizira faktore koji su utjecali da sudije budu “razumniji” a to su mladići koji su pružali seksualne usluge, posebno kada se smatralo da neko “iskorištava tuđu nevolju“, skupina onih mladića koji su smatrani zavedenima, oženjeni muškarci ili starosna dob partnera, kojima su izrečene blaže kazne. U širem ideološkom okviru, homoseksualnost se tumačila kao klasni proizvod kapitalističkog društva i gradske dekadencije - grad je leglo “seksualnih perversija” - dok socijalizam i ekonomska jednakost stvaraju uslove za regulisanje ravnopravnih odnosa među spolovima, štite i oslobađaju proletersku neiskvarenost i čistotu, te na taj način suzbijaju homoseksualitet kao buržoasku karakteristiku.

Šesto poglavlje, *Pedesete i šezdesete: Napuštanje propagande i popuštanje sudske represije* (str. 227-254), predstavlja period kada je započela desovjetizacija i razvoj doktrine samoupravljanja. U ovom razdoblju sve su izraženije kritike političke servilnosti sudova, prekomjernih utjecaja tužilaca, proširenih ovlasti policije i UDB-e, kao i loše vođenih straga i prakse da se i “najobičnijem kriminalu daje izgled političkih delikata”. Ovo predstavlja samo uvertiru u napore da se odvoji sudska vlast, jer i dalje vrijedi princip da “sud treba da radi na osnovu zakona, ali i na opštoj liniji partijske politike”. Međutim, represija pravosudnog aparata primjetno je počela popuštati u pogledu izricanja kazni homoseksualnim muškaracima. Kao ilustraciju navodi se primjer Slovenije, gdje je policija zatekla devedeset muškaraca u homoseksualnim odnosima, ali je samo sedamnaest njih završilo pred sudom. Ipak, policijske evidencije i kartoteke su i dalje postojale. Poglavlje je dodatno ilustrovano konkretnim primjerima iz prakse sudova, kao i tabelarnim prikazima službenih podataka o broju osuđenih osoba za homoseksualnost u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1977. godine, raspodjelu kazni na teritoriji Jugoslavije, broj izrečenih presuda i broj muškaraca osuđenih za sporazumne homoseksualne odnose u Jugoslaviji sa odvojenim podacima za Hrvatsku, Srbiju i Sloveniju u određenim vremenskim periodima.

Sedmo poglavlje, *Patologizacija, liječenje i edukacija: homoseksualnost u tekstovima jugoslavenske psihijatrije i seksologije* (str. 255-282), usmjereno je na analizu literature i stavovima pojedinačnih autora o homoseksualitetu od 1945. godine kao i utjecajima stranih autora na njih. Autor prikazuje stavove pojedinih stručnjaka koji su smatrali da je homoseksualnost anomalija, patologija ili seksualna inverzija koja se mora liječiti psihoterapijom. Posebno su značajni

primjeri iz višegodišnje prakse zagrebačke klinike “Rebro“, gdje su provedeni brojni pokušaji “izlječenja“ homoseksualaca, koji su u konačnici ostali bez uspjeha. Međutim, sredinom pedesetih godina pojavljuje se nova generacija seksualnih reformatora i seksualnih pedagoga, koji postupno napuštaju patologizirajući pristup i zagovaraju stav da homoseksualnost “ne može biti bolest, niti pak porok i nemoral”. Time započinje proces demedikalizacije, koji će imati značajan utjecaj na kasnije pravne i društvene promjene.

Osmo poglavlje, *Glasovi dekriminalizacije: liberalni pravnici i napredni seksolozi* (str. 283-325), prati hronologiju stručnih nastojanja usmjerenih ka dekriminalizaciji homoseksualnosti u Jugoslaviji. Posebno mesto u ovom poglavlju zauzima skopski advokat Kiro Crnogorski, kojeg autor predstavlja kao prvi homofilni glas u Jugoslaviji. Crnogorski je 1959. godine pokušao osporiti Član 186 Krivičnog zakonika, odnosno krivično djelo “protivprirodni blud“, argumentirajući potrebu za njegovim ukidanjem na osnovu ličnog iskustva neuspješnog psihoterapijskog “liječenja” u Zagrebu i Beogradu. Njegov stav bio je da dekriminalizacija mora biti zasnovana na naučnim činjenicama, oslobođena predrasuda, dogmatizma i konzervativizma. U tom kontekstu pozivao se i na mrežu evropskih pokreta, kao i na svjetske poznate historijske ličnosti koje su bile homoseksualne orijentacije. Poglavlje dalje prikazuje kontinuitet pravnih i medicinskih argumenata za dekriminalizaciju, od ranijih rasprava iz dvadesetih godina XX stoljeća do sve intenzivnijeg naučnog zagovaranja dekriminalizacije tokom sedamdesetih godina, kada pitanje homoseksualnosti postaje predmet ozbiljnije stručne rasprave.

Deveto poglavlje, *Meandri nedovršene dekriminalizacije* (str. 327-370), bavi se periodom decentralizacije jugoslavenskog političkog i pravnog sistema, uključujući i krivičnopravnu decentralizaciju. U tom razdoblju svih šest republika e dvije autonomne pokrajine stekle su pravo donošenja vlastitih krivičnih zakona. Osim Slovenije i Hrvatske koje su bez oklijevanja pristupile dekriminalizaciji sporazumnih homoseksualnih odnosa, isti proces slijedile su i Crna Gora te Vojvodina. Nasuprot tome, u ostalim federalnim jedinicama homoseksualni odnosi ostali su i dalje inkriminirani. Poglavlje sistematično analizira zakonodavne procedure, pravna opravdanja i širi naučni, politički i društveni kontekst ovih promjena, ukazujući s jedne strane na argumente koji su podržavali dekriminalizaciju, a s druge strane na nastojanja da se očuva postojeći normativni *status quo*. Time autor pokazuje da dekriminalizacija nije bila jednostavan proces, već rezultat složenih političkih i ideoloških pregovora unitar jugoslavenske federacije.

Deseto poglavlje, *Seksološka evolucija: prema depatologizaciji homoseksualnosti* (str. 371-406), usmjereno je na historiografiju istraživanja i publikacija u SAD-u od 1948. godine, koje predstavljaju Kinsey i drugi. Ovo poglavlje je hvalospjev zagrebačkom ljekaru Marijanu Košičeku, zvanom “domaći Kinsey”. Prema autoru, Košiček, osim što je bio prvi i drugačiji, bio je i “prva truba u malom puhačkom orkestru jugo-seksologa”. Najvažnije mu je bilo da pomogne gej muškarcima i lezbejkama u procesu samoprihvatanja, odnosno

kako da se nose sa vlastitom homoseksualnošću. Razmatra se i Košičekov rad, počevši od objavljivanja njegove knjige *Spol, ljubav i brak* (1960) i njegov utjecaj na kasnije jugoslavenske autore kao i *Seksološki leksikon* (1962), uključujući njegov kontinuirani angažman u jugoslavenskim časopisima '70-ih i '80-ih, poput *Starta* i *Zum reportera*, odgovarajući na anonimna pitanja u seksološkim rubrikama, budući apsolutni protivnik bilo kakve ideje o liječenju. Ovo poglavlje također objašnjava prepreke na koje je naišao pri objavljivanju knjige *U okviru vlasti spola*, koje je ipak savladao i koja je objavljena 1986. godine. Pored Košičeka, autor razmatra i doprinos doktora Kecmanovića i Lokara, čiji su radovi značajno doprineli humanizaciji psihijatrije i procesu depatologizacije homoseksualnosti u Jugoslaviji.

Koristeći izuzetno širok korpus izvora (arhivske fondove, znanstvenu i stručnu literaturu, objavljene izvore, zakone, memoarsku građu, intervju i kazivanja kao i novinske priloge), autor je uspio otkriti ključne faktore koji su oblikovali historiju homoseksualnosti na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, o kojima je dosadašnje znanje bilo oskudno i fragmentarno. Knjigu odlikuju uvjerljiva argumentacija, metodološka dosljednost i izrazita originalnost istraživačkog pristupa. Upravo zbog toga ona predstavlja izuzetno vrijedan doprinos historiografiji, pravnoj historiji i studijama seksualnosti na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Knjiga se čita izuzetno angažirano i s velikim interesovanjem, gotovo "u jednom dahu".

Jedina poteškoća u čitalačkom iskustvu odnosi se na smještaj izvora i bilješki na kraju svakog poglavlja (*endnotes*), umjesto na dnu stranice (*footnotes*). S obzirom na obim izvora, fusnote bi nesumnjivo omogućile preglednije i lakše praćenje argumentacije. Međutim, riječ je isključivo o tehničkom aspektu koji ni na koji način ne umanjuje naučnu vrijednost ovog izuzetnog i rijetkog istraživačkog doprinosa.

III

IZVJEŠTAJI // CONFERENCE REPORTS

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Izveštaj sa Naučnog projekta “HISTORIJSKI POGLEDI 2025”, Centar za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla, Tuzla, 21. i 22. novembar 2025. godine

Conference Report from Scientific project “HISTORICAL VIEWS 2025”, Center for Research of Modern and Contemporary History Tuzla, Tuzla, November 21 and 22, 2025

Centar za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla je 21. i 22. novembra 2025. godine održao Naučni projekat “Historijski pogledi 2025” u okviru koje je realizirana Međunarodna naučna konferencija pod nazivom “**STOLJEĆE SVJETSKIH KATAKLIZMI: Ratni zločini i genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini u XX stoljeću**”.¹ Ista je održana u konferencijskoj sali Hotela „Grand Hotel Tuzla“ u Tuzli. Bila je ovo deveta po redu naučna konferencija u organizaciji Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla, na kojoj su otvorena važna pitanja iz naše prošlosti.

Međunarodna naučna konferencija bila je posvećena velikim ratnim kataklizmama i 20. stoljeću (Prvi svjetski rat, Drugi svjetski rat, te ratovi iz 90-ih godina 20. stoljeća vezani za disoluciju Jugoslavije i dr), i njihovim uticajima na prilike u Bosni i Hercegovini i zemlje okruženja. Godine 2025. se navršava 111 godina od početka Prvog svjetskog rata, 80 godina od okončanja Drugog

¹ Više o konferenciji vidi: Web stranica CIMOSHIS Tuzla: <https://www.cimoshis.org/2025/11/23/realiziran-naucni-projekat-historijski-pogledi-2025/>; RTV TK: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vUwjyTSJmJc&t=38s>; <https://historiografija.ba/historija-u-javnosti/naucne-manifestacije/stoljece-svjetskih-kataklizmi>; <https://www.bhstring.net/tuzlauslikama/tuzlarije/viewnewnews.php?id=125472>; <https://tztz.ba/ba/dogadaji/naucni-projekat-historijski-pogledi-2025/>.

svjetskog rata, te 30. godina od Genocida nad Bošnjacima Srebrenice i Dejtonskog sporazuma itd.

Svaka od ranijih konferencija, zbog aktuelnosti prezentovane tematike je pobudila interes naučne, prije svega historijske, ali i šire javnosti. Kao rezultat naših dosadašnjih rezultata, jesu brojni historijski radovi sa konferencija, objavljeni u časopisu *Historijski pogledi*.

Na početku otvaranja Naučnog projekta „Historijski pogledi 2025“ obratio nam se predsjednik Naučnog i Organizacionog odbora, prof. dr. Sead Selimović, koje je pozdravio skup i ukazao na značaj odabrane teme za ovogodišnju međunarodnu naučnu konferenciju. Potom se obratio i prof. dr. Sead Nazibegović, dekan Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Tuzli, te ministar obrazovanja i nauke u Vladi Tuzlanskog kantona, dr. Ahmed Omerović.

Pokrovitelji Naučnog projekta „Historijski pogledi 2025“ bili su: Federalno ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke, Ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke Tuzlanskog kantona i Grad Tuzla.

U okviru Naučnog projekta „Historijski pogledi 2025“ održano je Predstavlanje izdanja Centra

za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla, publikovanih u 2025. godini. Predstavljani su 13. i 14. broj časopisa *Historijski pogledi*. Mi iz Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla smo naročito ponosni na časopis *Historijski pogledi*, koji na najbolji način prezentuje rad Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla. O ovim brojevima časopisa govorili su prof. dr. Zećir Ramčilo, sa Instituta za nacionalnu istoriju, Univerzitet „Sv. Kiril i Metodij“ Skoplje (Sjeverna Makedonija), ujedno i član Redakcije časopisa, te prof. dr. Izet Šabotić, izvršni direktor Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla, i urednik časopisa *Historijski pogledi*.

Potom je uslijedilo predstavljanje monografije/knjige prof. dr. Izeta Šabotića, pod nazivom *VELIKA MEDRESA U SKOPLJU (1925-1941)*:



stasavanje jedne generacije. Monografijom Velika medresa u Skoplju (1925-1941), prof. dr. Izet Šabotić je na najbolji način, naučno-historijskim osvrtom otrgnuo od zaborava važno pamćenje o školi i ljudima koji su ispisali bitne dionice sandžačke i kosovske historije 20. stoljeća. O navedenoj knjizi govorili su recenzenti: prof. dr. Sead Selimović, sa Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Tuzli i prof. dr. Redžep Škrijelj, sa Državnog univerziteta u Novom Pazaru.

Na kraju je predstavljena publikacija mr. Esafa Levića, *Brčko u austrougarskom vremenu (1878-1918): Historijski izvori*. Navedena knjiga dijelom predstavlja nastavak 2022. godine objavljene knjige *Brčko u periodu austrougarske uprave (1878-1918) – Historijska građa i komentari*. O navedenoj publikaciji govorio je jedan od recenzenata: mr. sc. Omer Zulić, direktor Arhiva Tuzlanskog kantona.

U 2025. godini u okviru održavanja Naučnog projekta "Historijski pogledi 2025" uključili smo i Arhiv Tuzlanskog kantona (s kojim imamo dugogodišnju saradnju i potpisan sporazum o saradnji), isti nam je ponudio izložbu, koju su njegovi zaposlenici radili u 2025. godini u povodu obilježavanja *30. godina od Genocida u Srebrenici*. Izložba nosi naziv: *Presude za genocid u Srebrenici, zaštićenoj zoni Ujedinjenih nacija*. Izložba je urađena na 16 panoa, a njeni autori su: Jasmin Jajčević, Hatidža Fetahagić, Omer Zulić i Adnan Tinjić. O navednoj izložbi govorila je Hatidža Fetahagić, prof, arhivski savjetnik.

Nakon otvaranja izložbe uslijedila je realizacija Međunarodne naučne konferencije, koja se sastojala iz tri sesije i na kojoj je učestvovalo 28 izlagača. Neki od izlagača iz objektivnih razloga nisu mogli prisustvovati, ali je ipak značajan broj učesnika, predstavio svoje priloge. Učesnici su bili iz Bosne i Hercegovine, Srbije, Crne Gore, Hrvatske, Bugarske. Sjeverne Makedonije i sa Kosova.

Planirana problematika koja je prezentovana na Međunarodnoj naučnoj konferenciji bila je podijeljena u tri sesije:

Prva sesija

1. Prof. dr. Redžep ŠKRIJELJ, Državni univerzitet u Novom Pazaru (Srbija), *Bošnjačka „MAGISTRA VITAE“ – prizmom prošlosti do razumijevanja sadašnjosti*;
2. Dr. sc. Ramiza SMAJIĆ, Institut za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Bosna i Hercegovina i ponavljanja historije: Muhadžiri i traume u 20. stoljeću*;
3. Doc. dr. Mariyana STAMOVA, Institut balkanistike s Centru za trakologiju kod Bugarske akademije nauke Sofija (Republika Bugarska), *Učestvovanje Bugarske u Kosovskim događajima u Prvom svjetskom ratu*;

4. Prof. dr. Izet ŠABOTIĆ, Filozofski fakultet u Tuzli Univerziteta u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Pokušaji nacionaliziranja školstva u Prvoj Jugoslaviji – primjer Velike medrese u Skoplju (1925-1941)*;
5. Prof. dr. Ajdin HUSEINPAHIĆ, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Zenici (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Kako se nositi sa posljedicama genocidnih projekata nad Bošnjacima?*
6. Mr. Hamza MEMIŠEVIĆ, Magazin Stav, Sarajevo (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Odnosi između Muslimana i Pravoslavaca u Bosni i Hercegovini u 20. stoljeću: Povijesni i društveni aspekt.*

Druga sesija

1. Dr. sc. Safet BANDŽOVIĆ, Institut za historiju Univerzitet u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Spone i sporovi: Reperkusije partizansko-četničke saradnje u istočnoj Bosni krajem 1941. i početkom 1942*;
2. Doc. dr. Adnan PREKIĆ, Univerzitet Crne Gore, Filozofski fakultet Nikšić (Crna Gora), *Između istine i mitologije: Savremena reinterpretacija četničkih zločina u Crnoj Gori 1943. godine*;

The image shows a detailed program for the scientific project "Historical Views 2025". It is organized by the "CENTAR ZA ISTRAŽIVANJE MODERNE I SAVREMENE HISTORIJE TUZLA". The program is divided into two main sessions: Petak, 21. 11. 2025. and Subota, 22. 11. 2025. The Petak session starts at 18:30 and ends at 20:00, while the Subota session starts at 09:00 and ends at 11:30. The program includes various activities such as lectures, conferences, and a joint evening conference. The speakers are listed with their names, affiliations, and the titles of their presentations. The program is held at the "Grand Hotel Tuzla".

Organizator:
CENTAR ZA ISTRAŽIVANJE MODERNE I SAVREMENE HISTORIJE TUZLA

Pokrovitelji:
FMON
Ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke
Grad Tuzla

PROGRAM NAUČNOG PROJEKTA "HISTORIJSKI POGLEDI 2025"

Petak, 21. 11. 2025.

(Konferencijska sala "Grand Hotel Tuzla")

17:00 – 17:15 h
Svečano otvaranje Naučnog projekta "Historijski pogledi 2025"

Pozdravna riječ i uvodno izlaganje
Predsjednika Naučno-organizacionog odbora
Međunarodne naučne konferencije
STOLJEĆE SVJETSKIH KATAKLIZMI:
Ratni zločini u genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini u XX stoljeću

Pozdravi gostiju i učesnika
Međunarodne naučne konferencije

17:15 – 17:45 h
Predstavljanje izdanja
Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla publikovanih u 2025 godini

17:45 – 18:00 h
Otvaranje izložbe Arhiva TK Tuzla
Presude za genocid u Srebrenici, zločinu izvan
Ujedinjenih nacija

Kafe pauza 18:00 – 18:30 h

Petak, 21. 11. 2025.

Prva sesija 18:30 – 20:00 h
(Konferencijska sala "Grand Hotel Tuzla")

Prof. dr. Redžep ŠKRIBELJ
Državni univerzitet u Novom Pazaru (Srbija)
Bojotnjača "MAGISTRA VITAE" – priznanje prošlosti do razumijevanja sadašnjosti

Dr. sc. Ramiza SMAJIĆ
Institut za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Bosna i Hercegovina i ponavljanje historije: Muhadžiri i traume u 20. stoljeću

Doc. dr. Marijana STAMOWA
Institut balkanistike s Centrom za etnologiju kod Bugarske akademije nauke Sofija (Republika Bugarska)
Učestvovanje Bugarske u Kosovskim događajima u Prvom svjetskom ratu

Prof. dr. Izet ŠABOTIĆ
Filozofski fakultet u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Pokušaji nacionaliziranja školstva u Prvoj Jugoslaviji – primjer Velike medrese u Skoplju (1925-1941)

Prof. dr. Ajdin HUSEINPAHIĆ
Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Zenici (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Kako se nositi sa posljedicama genocidnih projekata nad Bošnjacima?

Mr. Hamza MEMIŠEVIĆ
Magazin Stav, Sarajevo (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Odnosi između muslimana i pravoslavaca u Bosni i Hercegovini u 20. stoljeću: Povijesni i društveni aspekt

Zajednička večera učesnika Konferencije (20:00 h)

Subota, 22. 11. 2025.

Druga sesija 09:00 – 11:30 h
(Konferencijska sala "Grand Hotel Tuzla")

Dr. sc. Safet BANDŽOVIĆ
Institut za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Spone i sporovi: Reperkusije partizansko-četničke saradnje u istočnoj Bosni krajem 1941. i početkom 1942. godine

Doc. dr. Adnan PREKIĆ
Univerzitet Crne Gore, Filozofski fakultet Nikšić (Crna Gora)
Između istine i mitologije: Savremena reinterpretacija četničkih zločina u Crnoj Gori 1943. godine

Dr. sc. Filip ŠKILJAN
Institut za istraživanje migracija Zagreb (Hrvatska)
Srpsko-Hrvatske paralele – od anekdote do federacije

Doc. dr. Ševko SULEJMANOVIĆ
Institut za društvena i religijska istraživanja u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Značaj liberalizacije jugoslavenske politike prema vjerskim zajednicama sredinom sedamdesetih godina 20. stoljeća na primjeru Tuzlanskog treća

Mesud HERO
Historijski muzej Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Bojotnjača Hercegovine u političkim projekcijama, planovima i praksi Hrvatske politike dvadesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća

Dr. sc. Mamer DŽANANOVIĆ
Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Trideset kadrovske centar vojske Jugoslavije: Organizacioni mehanizam Svrane Republike Jugoslavije za prikupljanje agencije na Republiku Bosni i Hercegovini

Prof. dr. Sead SELIMOVIC
Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina)
Genocid u najavi: Prve faze rata protiv Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na području Bosanskog Podrinja 1992. godine

Prilog 2. Dio programa Naučnog projekta "Historijski pogledi 2025".

3. Dr. sc. Filip ŠKILJAN, dr. sc. Marina PERIĆ KASELJ, Institut za istraživanje migracija Zagreb (Hrvatska), dr. sc. Blagoja ĐUKIĆ, Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Eparhija slavonska (Hrvatska), *Strmičko-Grahovske paralele – od aneksije do federacije*;
4. Doc. dr. Ševko SULEJMANOVIĆ, Institut za društvena i religijska istraživanja u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Značaj liberalizacije jugoslavenske politike prema vjerskim zajednicama sredinom šezdesetih godina 20. stoljeća na primjeru Tuzlanskog sreza*;
5. Mesud HERO, Historijski muzej Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Bošnjaci Hercegovine u političkim projekcijama, planovima i praksi Hrvatske politike devedesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća*;
6. Dr. sc. Muamer DŽANANOVIĆ, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Trideseti kadrovski centar vojske Jugoslavije: Organizacioni mehanizam Savezne Republike Jugoslavije za prikrivanje agresije na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu*;
7. Prof. dr. Sead SELIMOVIĆ, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Genocid u najavi: Prve žrtve rata protiv Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na području Bosanskog Podrinja 1992. godine*;
8. Mr. sc. Omer ZULIĆ, Arhiv Tuzlanskog kantona (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Svjedočanstva ratnih zločina, kao bitna osnova za validan historijski narativ*;
9. Doc. dr. Izudin ŠARIĆ, Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Tuzlanskog kantona (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Ratni zločin i genocid u međunarodnom krivičnom zakonodavstvu*;
10. Dr. sc. Meldijana ARNAUT HASELJIĆ, dr. sc. Sabina SUBAŠIĆ GALIJATOVIĆ, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Uloga oružanih formacija iz Republike Srbije u međunarodnom oružanom sukobu u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-1995*;
11. Dr. Berina BEŠIROVIĆ, doc. dr. Muhamed ŠEMOSKI, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Mirovni planovi za Bosnu i Hercegovinu u periodu 1992-1995. kao legalizacija etničkog čišćenja i ratnih zločina*.

Treća sesija

1. Mr. Alija MEVKIĆ, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Politički efekti genocida i ratnih zločina u Bosni i Hercegovini (1992–1995) – od agresije do ustavnog uređenja*;
2. Dr. sc. Omer HAMZIĆ, Izdavačka kuća „Monos“ Gračanica (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Neka iskustva i rezultati istraživanja ratnih zločina i civilnih žrtava rata (1992–1995) – slučaj Gračanice*;
3. Emir ŠEČIĆ, Institut za društvena i religijska istraživanja u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Stradanje vjerskih službenika u Srebrenici i njejoj okolini od 1992. do 1996. godine*;
4. Dr. sc. Jasmin MEDIĆ, Institut za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Ograničena pravda: Kriitička analiza učinaka Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju*;
5. Prof. dr. Arber HADRI, Institut za historiju “Ali Hadri”, Priština (Republika Kosovo), *Preoblikovanje stabilnosti u jugoistočnoj Europi: Politika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država pod predsjednikom Klintonom u okončanju rata i genocida u Bosni, 1993-1994*;
6. Prof. dr. Adib ĐOZIĆ, Srebrenica (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Nacionalna država i genocid: Prilog kritici predatorskog karaktera nacionalne države kao političke organizacije*;
7. Prof. dr. Suad KURTČEHAJIĆ, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Historijski značaj pravnog osporavanja entiteta Rs nakon presuda sudova u Hagu*;
8. Prof. dr. Enver HALILOVIĆ, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Tuzli (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Daytonski ustav Bosne i Hercegovine kao srpsko-hrvatsko rješenje*;
9. Prof. dr. Zećir RAMČILOVIĆ, Institut za nacionalnu istoriju, Univerzitet „Sv. Kiril i Metodij“ Skoplje (Sjeverna Makedonija), *Odnos Sjeverne Makedonije prema genocidu u Srebrenici: Između politike i javnog diskursa*;
10. Mr. Mustafa DEDOVIĆ, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Svijest Bošnjaka o genocidu*;
11. Mr. Nedžla KURTČEHAJIĆ, Sarajevo (Bosna i Hercegovina), *Kultura sjećanja i izgradnja mira: Srebrenica kao globalni simbol*.

Međunarodna naučna konferencija *STOLJEĆE SVJETSKIH KATAKLIZMI: Ratni zločini i genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini u XX stoljeću*, u organizaciji Centra za istraživanje moderne i savremene historije Tuzla, predstavlja nužan i pravovremen naučni odgovor na potrebu za dubljim

razumijevanjem historijskih procesa koji su oblikovali sudbinu Bosne i Hercegovine.

Analizom izlaganja autora na konferencije, mogu se izvesti zaključci:

Bosna i Hercegovina kao epicentar svjetskih previranja. Tokom 20. stoljeća, Bosna i Hercegovina nije bila tek periferni posmatrač, već centralna pozornica globalnih sukoba. Od Sarajevskog atentata 1914. godine, preko antifašističke borbe i stradanja u Drugom svjetskom ratu, pa sve do agresije i disolucije Jugoslavije 90-ih godina, Bosna i Hercegovina se nalazila u fokusu geopolitičkih interesa. Ciklično ponavljanje ratnih kataklizmi (1914–1918, 1941–1945, 1992–1995) ukazuje na tragičan kontinuitet u kojem su se globalni sukobi prelamali preko leđa bosanskohercegovačkog stanovništva.



Prilog 3. Učesnici Naučnog projekta "Historijski pogledi 2025".

Kontinuitet stradanja i prekid šutnje. Poseban fokus konferencije stavljen je na fenomenologiju zločina i genocida, gdje se jasno ukazuje na evoluciju nasilja – od vojnih i civilnih žrtava Velikog rata, preko ideološki motivisanih zločina NDH i četničkog pokreta u Drugom svjetskom ratu, do kulminacije u genocidu nad Bošnjacima Srebrenice 1995. godine. Važan aspekt ovih zaključnih razmatranja jeste prepoznavanje historiografske šutnje koja je desetljećima prekrivala zločine nad bošnjačkim stanovništvom u Drugom svjetskom ratu, a koja je prekinuta tek uoči nove agresije 90-ih godina.

Geopolitičke aspiracije i njihove posljedice. Kroz sva tri analizirana perioda provlači se konstanta velikodržavnih aspiracija susjednih zemalja prema teritoriji Bosne i Hercegovine. Od projekta „Homogena Srbija“ Stevana Moljevića do agresije 90-ih, cilj je bio isti, a metode su uključivale progone, etničko čišćenje i genocid. Zaključuje se da, iako je agresija okončana Dejtonskim sporazumom, politički pritisci i destrukcija Bosne i Hercegovine od strane susjeda i njihovih unutrašnjih satelita nisu prestali ni 30 godina kasnije, čime se koči prosperitet države.

Naučna revalorizacija kao imperativ. Obilježavanje značajnih godišnjica (111 godina od početka Prvog svjetskog rata, 80 godina od kraja Drugog

svjetskog rata i 30 godina od genocida u Srebrenici) nije samo čin komemoracije, već poziv na naučnu revalorizaciju. Sagledavanje ovih događaja iz više uglova – međunarodnog i unutrašnjeg – ključno je za utvrđivanje historijske istine.

Konačno, ova konferencija potvrđuje da se savremeni trenutak Bosne i Hercegovine ne može razumjeti bez temeljite analize trauma iz 20. stoljeća. Međunarodna naučna konferencija nije samo pogled u prošlost, već nužan alat za dekonstrukciju historijskih falsifikata i razumijevanje sadašnjosti u kojoj se posljedice stoljeća kataklizmi i dalje osjećaju.

CENTAR ZA ISTRAŽIVANJE MODERNE I SAVREMENE HISTORIJE TUZLA
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**U IZDANJU CENTRA ZA ISTRAŽIVANJE MODERNE I
 SAVREMENE HISTORIJE TUZLA ŠTAMPANE SU
 SLIJEDEĆE PUBLIKACIJE:**

1. *Drugi korpus Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 1992-1995*, (Sead Selimović, Izet Šabotić), Tuzla 2017, str. 574. (suizdavači).
2. *Primjeri suživljenja: Bilješke o tuzlanskom kraju u 19. stoljeću*, (Senaid Hadžić), Tuzla 2017, str. 467.
3. *Tojšići od srednjeg vijeka do 1958. godine, knjiga I*, (Damir Bošnjaković), Tuzla 2018, str. 189.
4. *Čifčijijski odnosi i promjena vlasništva nad zemljom u Bosni i Hercegovini (1878-1918)*, (Izet Šabotić), Tuzla 2019, str. 320.
5. *Život, ljudi i događaji: Tuzla na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća*, (Izet Šabotić), Tuzla 2019, str. 383.
6. *Migracije i Brčko*, Zbornik radova, Tuzla 2020, str. 400.
7. *Tvrda kora i krvave brazde: Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1945. do 1948. godine*, (Izet Šabotić), Tuzla 2021, str. 369.
8. *Veliki zaokret: Bosna i Hercegovina u vremenu tranzicije (od 1880-ih do 1950-ih)*, (Senaid Hadžić), Tuzla 2021, str. 493.
9. *Za jedinstvo domovine i slavu dinastije: Školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, (Sead Selimović), Tuzla 2021, str. 442.

10. *Ubijeni i protjerani: Promjene u etničkoj strukturi stanovništva Bosanskog podrinja od 1991. do 2013. godine pod utjecajem rata protiv Bosne i Hercegovine*, (Sead Selimović), Tuzla 2022, str. 446.
11. *Brčko u periodu austrougarske uprave (1878–1918): Historijska građa i komentari*, (Esaf Lević), Tuzla 2022, str. 363.
12. *Brčko u austrougarskom vremenu (1878–1918): Historijski izvori*, (Esaf Lević), Tuzla 2024, str. 304.
13. *Velika medresa u Skoplju (1925-1941): Stasavanje jedne generacije*, (Izet Šabotić), Tuzla 2025, str. 503.
14. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. I, br. 1, Tuzla 2018, str. 364.
15. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. II, br. 2, Tuzla 2019, str. 485.
16. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. III, br. 3, Tuzla 2020, str. 401.
17. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. III, br. 4, Tuzla 2020, str. 366.
18. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. IV, br. 5, Tuzla 2021, str. 347.
19. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. IV, br. 6, Tuzla 2021, str. 425.
20. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. V, br. 7, Tuzla 2022, str. 519.
21. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. V, br. 8, Tuzla 2022, str. 495.
22. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. VI, br. 9, Tuzla 2023, str. 447.
23. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. VI, br. 10, Tuzla 2023, str. 513.
24. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. VII, br. 11, Tuzla 2024, str. 513.
25. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. VII, br. 12, Tuzla 2024, str. 539.
26. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. VIII, br. 13, Tuzla 2025, str. 382.
27. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. VIII, br. 14, Tuzla 2025, str. 575.
28. Časopis *Historijski pogledi*, god. IX, br. 15, Tuzla 2026, str. 511.

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